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For Bernard, with infinite gratitude and unending friendship.

Introduction: Just This, Written Just Here and Just 
Now, By Just This Individual in Just This Mood
Every species of living being, and every specimen of each 
species, is affecting and modifying the biosphere by its 
efforts to keep itself alive during its brief lifetime. However, 
no pre-hominid species has ever had the power to dominate 
the biosphere or to wreck it. On the other hand, when a 
hominid chipped a stone with the intention of making it into 
a more serviceable tool, this historic act, performed perhaps 
two million years ago, made it certain that, one day, some 
species of some genus of the hominid family of primate 
mammals would not merely affect and modify the biosphere, 
but would hold the biosphere at its mercy.
Arnold Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth
The turn towards curtailment
Let me begin by expressing my sincere gratitude for your decision to 
crack open at least the first page of this volume. Given that mass lit-
eracy is an idea that has only been around a few centuries, given that 
thus far some 130 million titles have been published and more than 
two million new ones are added each year, given that a human being 
who dedicated his or her life to reading books would still only be able 
to get through a few thousand tomes cover-to-cover over the course 
of a lifetime, and given that the desire and the habit of regularly read-
ing whole books is on the decline, an author in the twenty-first cen-
tury should be thankful that anyone should happen to choose their 
work from among all the other possible options vying for their careful 
attention. Given the vastly greater number of possible choices com-
pared with the number any individual can read, the set of books read 
by any particular man or woman amounts, we could say, to one way 
in which the uniqueness or the singularity of the psychic individua-
tion process that characterizes his or her existence is expressed: the 
corpus of books read over a lifetime is an expression of that particular 
individual’s way of participating in the process of the transindividu-
ation of literary significance, their way of drawing nourishment for 
their noetic soul from what the philosopher Bernard Stiegler called 
the noetic necromass, that artificial treasure of wealth corresponding 
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psychically and culturally to the wealth of nutrition that the necro-
mass, composed of dead life, makes available to the biomass.
In the ecological sense (rather than the renewable energy sense), the 
biomass is the sum total of all the living biological organisms occupy-
ing an ecosystem, and the ecosystem that encompasses all the smaller 
ecosystems has been known since the work of Vladimir Vernadsky as 
the biosphere. Vernadsky reflected on the way in which biochemistry 
interacted with and also transformed geochemical processes, hypoth-
esizing that it was indeed possible, across geological timescales, for 
the combined biochemical processes of the biomass to reshape the 
whole ‘terrestrial envelope’.1 The book in which he made this case, 
The Biosphere, was published in 1926, the same year in which Martin 
Heidegger was still settling upon his conception of temporality while 
writing the final draft of Being and Time. The last of these books, 
Being and Time, was read by Stiegler early in his philosophical life, 
and his first book argues that, even though Heidegger does consider 
the place of artefacts in the constitution of Dasein’s historical tempo-
rality, he ultimately rejects the possibility that ‘determining the unde-
termined’ could grant access to the true character of time. For Stiegler 
himself, on the other hand, the possibility of such access can arise 
only from the world opened up by artefacts of all kinds, from the most 
basic tools to books to computer technology – the question of ‘tech-
nics and time’ lying in this possibility of a world opened up beyond 
the ‘milieu’ described by Jakob von Uexküll for the animal (or the 
sensible soul, in Aristotle’s terms).2
The first of these books, The Biosphere, was not read by Stiegler 
until many years later, I believe, when he had begun to ask not just 
about technics but about what he called ‘exosomatization’, a notion 
derived from reading the work of Alfred Lotka, a mathematical 
biologist, on ‘exosomatic evolution’.3 Exosomatic evolution refers to 
the unfolding of a form of life that is no longer just the endosomatic 
evolution of the biological life of the biosphere, but rather technical 
life, that produces organs extending outside the body of the organism, 
without which it cannot survive. Exosomatic evolution thus names 
the process that in Technics and Time, 1 Stiegler mostly referred to as 
hominization (a process that precedes the human).
What was crucial for Stiegler about the work of Lotka, however, 
was not just the distinction between exosomatic and endosomatic 
evolution, but the fact that these were considered to be distinct 
forms of the struggle against entropy: ‘as was pointed out years ago 
by Boltzmann, the life struggle is primarily a competition for avail-
able energy’.4 In other words, if, asking in Dublin in February 1943 
about the fundamental character of life, Erwin Schrödinger referred 
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to ‘negative entropy’, then Lotka shows in 1945 that we must ask this 
question in a specific way when life operates not just through natural 
selection, but artificial selection. Vernadsky himself would cite ear-
lier work of Lotka, but whereas Vernadsky still believed that tech-
nology is a ‘universal, peaceful and civilizing force’,5 Lotka, writing 
in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, was far more 
conscious of the fact that, for exosomatic life, technical power (the 
‘receptors and effectors’) requires processes of ‘adjustment’ through 
knowledge, wisdom and care, if the perpetual threat of disaster is 
to be avoided:
It is precisely this that has gone awry in the schemes of 
men: The receptors and effectors have been perfected to a 
nicety; but the development of the adjustors has lagged so 
far behind, that the resultant of our efforts has actually been 
reversed. From the preservation of life we have turned to the 
destruction of life; and from expansion of the human race we 
have, in some of the most advanced communities, turned to 
its curtailment.6
Stiegler, too, would characterize human existence in terms of this 
struggle between advance and delay, as a being constantly capable of 
leaps ahead but also of lagging behind, this corresponding as well to 
the ‘intermittency’ of the noetic soul according to Aristotle, that is, 
of the fact that this soul may be perpetually noetic in potential, but 
is noetic in actuality only at certain moments, and always at risk of 
falling back, both individually and collectively, a risk that is bound to 
occur, time and time again.
Arnold Toynbee and the enigmatic question
Another of the books that Stiegler chose to read seemingly towards 
the last few years of his life, since he referred to it only latterly in his 
work, is Mankind and Mother Earth, by the British historian Arnold 
Toynbee, written in 1973 but published posthumously in 1976. The 
life of Arnold Toynbee, from 14 April 1889 to 22 October 1975, occu-
pies an almost identical stretch of time as that of Martin Heidegger, 
from 26 September 1889 to 26 May 1976. This span stretches from: 
(1) a youth that coincided with the industrialization of production 
and faith in ‘progress’ characteristic of the world prior to the unprec-
edented destruction of the First World War; to (2) a major period of 
work, a period that also saw the industrialization of consumption 
and the withering of faith in progress that accompanied the cata-
strophic convulsions of the twentieth century; and eventually to (3) 
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late reflections, occurring at a moment when the ‘glorious’ post-War 
years were at an end, and the world was entering a new age of compu-
tational technology which by the 1970s had only begun to unfold into 
the vast process of transformation still underway in 2020.
In the third of these periods, Toynbee, like Lotka after the Second 
World War, had become highly conscious of the fact that humankind 
was now confronted with the reality of this curtailment, and the fact 
that the preservation of life had turned to destruction:
Man is the first species of living being in our biosphere 
that has acquired the power to wreck the biosphere and, in 
wrecking it, to liquidate himself.7
Toynbee does not discuss the second law of thermodynamics, and nor 
therefore does he discuss life in terms of the struggle against it, let 
alone exosomatic evolution. Nevertheless, the conception of the char-
acter of the ‘mankind’ of the title resonates with Stiegler’s Promethean 
and Epimethean description of neotenic man in Technics and Time, 1. 
Toynbee writes about the process of hominization as follows:
By the time that Man had become human, he had been 
stripped of all built-in physical weapons and armour, but 
he had acquired a conscious intellect which could think 
and plan, and two physical organs, his brain and his hands, 
which were the material instruments for his thinking, his 
planning, and his attempt to achieve his purposes by phys-
ical action.8
Furthermore, just as Friedrich Engels had said as early as 1883 that 
the hand ‘implies the tool’,9 just as Stiegler will argue in 1994 that the 
evolution of this brain and this hand are co-constitutive with the evo-
lution of the tool, so too Toynbee argues in 1973 that ‘tools are coeval 
with human consciousness’.10 Hence the situation with which we are 
confronted today, the power if not the likelihood that we will wreck 
the biosphere, is one whose roots lie so far back in time as to precede 
the appearance of Homo sapiens itself, in that coeval unfolding of 
hominization and technicization, of brain and hand, that gave rise to 
an exosomatic being who slowly but surely began to encroach further 
upon the biosphere, in the competition for available energy. Yet even 
if these roots lie far back, it is a transformation in the conditions of 
this competition that has produced a decisive turn from preservation 
to destruction:
Since the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic Age, perhaps 
70,000/40,000 years ago, Man has been taking the offensive 
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against the rest of the biosphere; but it is only since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution, no more than two 
hundred years ago, that Man has become decisively domi-
nant. Within the last two centuries, Man has increased his 
material power to a degree at which he has become a menace 
to the biosphere’s survival…
Like Lotka, Toynbee sees this in terms of a lag in the adjustors, that 
is, a failure of knowledge, wisdom and care to keep up with this 
acceleration:
…he has become a menace to the biosphere’s survival; but he 
has not increased his spiritual potentiality; the gap between 
this and his material power has consequently been widen-
ing; and this growing discrepancy is disconcerting; for an 
increase in Man’s spiritual potentiality is now the only con-
ceivable change in the constitution of the biosphere that can 
insure the biosphere – and, in the biosphere, Man himself 
– against being destroyed by a greed that is now armed with 
the ability to defeat its own intentions.11
Only an increase in spiritual potentiality can save us. If we do not 
wish to take this as a mystical invocation, then we must hear it as a 
diagnosis of current pathologies and a call to address them by chang-
ing the conditions of our psychic and collective formation. The exoso-
matic being may be in possession of a noetic soul, but there is no guar-
antee it will not be lost, in gaining the world (and it is for this reason 
that Stiegler will refer, in invoking and updating Weber’s account, to 
the lost spirit of capitalism).
What then is the pathology? It is a recklessness, a carelessness that 
Toynbee identifies as a kind of civilizational suicidal tendency:
Mankind’s material power has now increased to a degree at 
which it could make the biosphere uninhabitable and will, in 
fact, produce this suicidal result within a foreseeable period 
of time if the human population of the globe does not now 
take prompt and vigorous concerted action.12
Forty-five years later, this prompt and vigorous concerted action has 
utterly failed to materialize, and we cannot discount that the moment 
may already have passed, that we have already slipped the hangman’s 
noose we have fashioned for ourselves around our neck, climbed atop 
the chair and are now teetering on the edge of the precipice and star-
ing down into an abyss that can no longer be avoided. This is the point 
to which we have been brought by those two centuries that are now 
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called the Anthropocene; it seems to be the point to which the Covid-
19 pandemic is bringing us; it is the threshold that some noetic souls 
have already found themselves unable not to cross. As Toynbee says 
in the last lines of his book, in the case that we have just referred to as 
the Anthropocene, such a suicide cannot be divorced from a murder – 
on the scale of the biosphere:
Will mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? 
He could murder her by misusing his increasing technologi-
cal potency. Alternatively he could redeem her by overcom-
ing the suicidal, aggressive greed that, in all living crea-
tures, including Man himself, has been the price of the Great 
Mother’s gift of life. This is the enigmatic question which 
now confronts Man.13
Overshooting the mark, life itself
How should we characterize such a tendency towards civilizational 
suicide and biospheric murder? Is it not precisely the embodiment of 
the meaning of entropy, applied not just to thermodynamics or to biol-
ogy (but incorporating them all, and at the macrocosmic scale of the 
biosphere), but rather the entropy that is peculiarly characteristic of 
the kinds of beings that we ourselves are? In this tendency towards 
lagging behind, towards falling back from the noetic heights, towards 
destruction rather than preservation, towards disorganization rather 
than organization, towards the closing of what with so much diffi-
culty had been opened, towards laziness and cowardice, hubris and 
denial, towards failing to do what one knows without a doubt must 
be done, towards suicide and towards murder, do we not see all of 
the elements that define the real meaning of this strange word des-
ignating that turn within, as it applies not just universally, but cosmi-
cally, and for us?
Such a question may sound like an affront to physics, as if phi-
losophy has overshot the mark of its questions and landed in foreign 
territory over which it claims no rights. Nevertheless, in this book, 
all of these tendencies, taking the form of overreactions, underreac-
tions, denials, suicides, murders and so on, will be considered as a 
kind of entropy, one peculiar to the exosomatic beings that we are 
and that Stiegler calls exorganisms. We will follow Stiegler in argu-
ing that such tendencies are irreducible and ineliminable, that the 
struggle against them is a temporary and local effort, even if the 
biological struggle of endosomatic evolution has lasted a few bil-
lion years within that largest locality that is the biosphere, that this 
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struggle to decrease entropy here and now can never occur without 
also producing an increase of entropy ‘elsewhere’, and that for the 
kinds of beings that we ourselves are, this struggle is not just against 
the second law of thermodynamics that is named by the concept of 
entropy, but against the peculiar regressive tendency it possesses that 
Stiegler calls anthropy. For Stiegler, the struggle for the preservation 
of exosomatic life is conducted under the sign of neganthropy, and the 
potential for unexpected turns and bifurcations it contains, and must 
always contain as the différance we must make, relies on our anti-
anthropic capacity.
At the same time, this book will see such tendencies, such reac-
tions, such suicides and such murders – individual, collective, civi-
lizational and biospheric – from a slightly different perspective: if 
the struggle against entropy is always a question of ‘organization’ 
(leading to Stiegler’s distinction between the endosomatic organic 
and the exosomatic organological), and if this organization is always 
a question of strongly-interrelated local and temporary dynamic sys-
tems (such as a cell, an organism, an ecosystem, or an exorganism, 
a family, a tribe, a society, a civilization), then this organized local-
ity always involves a relationship between interior and exterior that 
we can consider in terms of what in biology are known as immune 
systems. More than that, we will follow Georges Canguilhem in con-
sidering that the difference between a ‘normal’ immune response and 
a supersensitive immune response – such as the kind that produces a 
shock reaction that can even prove fatal to the organism itself, so that 
a protective mechanism in fact functions as a destructive agent – can 
be understood in terms of the difference between tendencies that are 
propulsive for the locality (leading it towards a future metastability) 
and those that are repulsive (destabilizing the organism or exorgan-
ism).14 Canguilhem himself reflects on the distinction that character-
izes exosomatization when he refers to the ‘technical form of life’, but 
it is precisely this form of life that, he says, bears within it the ‘temp-
tation to fall sick’,15 and hence we argue for the possibility of seeing 
the shocks and reactions of contemporary existence as tendencies 
towards a form of anaphylaxis that is not biological but psychosocial.
This affront thus risks being one not just against physics, but 
against biology and medicine too. Nevertheless, we have already seen 
Lotka citing Ludwig Boltzmann that the life struggle is a question of 
available energy, and we are inclined to extend the question of energy 
past the thermodynamic and to the libidinal, if not beyond. In terms of 
physics, what led to the discovery of the second law of thermodynam-
ics was the inefficiency of the steam engine, and the effort to decrease 
that inefficiency through theoretical and practical means. From the 
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consideration of the engine as a closed system, it was recognized that 
inefficiency itself is irreducible, and that some energy must always be 
lost by the system: it was the generalization of this realization to the 
universe considered as itself a closed system that led to the formula-
tion of the concept of entropy.
At the time of Rudolf Clausius, however, atomic theory was not yet 
accepted, and so it was not possible to consider the entropic tendency 
of a gas, for example, in terms of the statistical consequences of vast 
numbers of atomic or molecular collisions. Only seven years later, in 
1872, the situation with regard to atomic theory had not changed, but 
it would nonetheless fall to Ludwig Boltzmann to formulate this law 
in statistical terms, which is to say, as the tendency for the probable to 
eliminate the improbable, which, over the vast numbers of such col-
lisions involved in any macroscopic phenomenon, becomes an over-
whelming and highly predictable progression. It is this characteristic 
of statistical dependability and this alone that makes this tendency 
susceptible to being described as a law.
How then did Boltzmann himself, who was a frequent lecturer 
willing to consider the relationship between scientific discovery and 
‘philosophical’ questions, conceive biological life in relationship 
to this tendency? In an address on the second law given in 1886, a 
year before the birth of Schrödinger and three years before the births 
of Toynbee and Heidegger, Boltzmann recognized that all of terres-
trial life depends on a constant source of energy from outside the 
biosphere, the Sun, allowing it to behave not as a closed system but 
as an open one. As a result, endosomatic life is, in sum, an effort to 
decrease and postpone the entropic tendency by taking advantage of 
this seemingly eternal source of ‘free’ energy:
The general struggle for existence of animate beings is 
therefore not a struggle for raw materials – these, for organ-
isms, are air, water and soil, all abundantly available – nor 
for energy which exists in plenty in any body in the form of 
heat […], but a struggle for entropy, which becomes avail-
able through the transition of energy from the hot sun to 
the cold earth. In order to exploit this transition as much as 
possible, plants spread their immense surface of leaves and 
force the sun’s energy, before it falls to the earth’s tempera-
ture, to perform in ways as yet unexplored certain chemical 
syntheses of which no one in our laboratories has so far the 
least idea. The products of this chemical kitchen constitute 
the object of struggle of the animal world.16
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The struggle for existence is a ‘struggle for entropy’, or, as 
Schrödinger will say, in a slightly less confusing way more than half 
a century later, the organism ‘feeds on negative entropy’ to ‘compen-
sate the entropy it produces by living’.17
In 1905, almost twenty years after this statement about life and 
entropy, the chemistry of photosynthesis was still not understood, but 
Boltzmann would turn to the question of value, which is to say, the 
criteria for behavioural selection for exosomatic beings. While endo-
somatic beings are bound by instinct, or may partially modify it as 
a means of adapting to lessons learned in the life of an animal, and 
where the criteria for these bound selections are themselves the result 
of endosomatic evolution, this is no longer the case for exosomatic 
life. In the latter case, behavioural selection becomes a problem of 
existence, unbounded by the dictates of instinct even if still tied to the 
material reality of biology, and imposing the necessity of asking the 
question: what to do?
We are in the habit, Boltzmann says, of ‘assessing everything as to 
its value’, and of doing so ‘according to whether it helps or hinders the 
conditions of life’. ‘Life’, whatever is named by this grand term, is the 
source of the judgment about values, and what has value is what pro-
motes life. From here, however, Boltzmann takes a perhaps surprising 
turn, if not to say a twist:
This becomes so habitual that we imagine we must ask our-
selves whether life itself has a value.18
What inner turn in the psychic individuation process of Ludwig 
Boltzmann produced this question?
Boltzmann intends to put before us evidence of a kind of perversion 
or distortion of thought. ‘Metaphysics’, having acquired the habit of 
pursuing questions and seeking out further territory to be conquered 
by those questions, applies that habit in ways that forget that the 
source of the possibility of such a habit is life itself qua archi-criterion 
of value. This problem does not arise for endosomatic life, which does 
not open up the gap into which the world enters and questions impose 
their necessity. Only for exosomatic beings, possessing a noetic soul 
that must select its behaviour, does it become possible to ask about 
‘value’, to make life into a question, a question of value.
Yet only for these beings, too, does the possibility of an inner turn 
arise, an en-trope, so to speak, allowing the question to rebound upon 
the source of its own unboundedness. It is the circuit through this out-
side that is the opening onto questions that introduces the possibility 
of this perversion or this distortion, which is inherent to questioning 
itself, and insofar as to question is always a question of responding 
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to the problem of the exigencies of exosomatic life or the shocks it 
encounters or brings upon itself. It is a matter of the pharmacology 
of the question (in the sense of the Greek pharmakon that is a remedy 
that can always become a poison). And this is what Boltzmann him-
self understands, and why he raises this example:
This becomes so habitual that we imagine we must ask our-
selves whether life itself has a value. That is one of those 
questions utterly devoid of sense. Life itself we must accept 
as that which has value, and whether something else does 
can only be judged relatively to life, namely whether it is apt 
to promote life or not [and] this means whether life is apt to 
promote life, a question that has no sense.19
It is the characteristic of human beings to ask questions in general and 
questions of value in particular, to rise up above phenomena in order 
to see what chances it affords, and it is for this reason that Whitehead 
will say that the ‘function of Reason is to promote the art of life’.20 
In asking the question of the value of life itself, however, in trying 
to measure that which provides the criteria for the measuring stick, it 
becomes a ‘mental habit that overshoots the mark’.21
In fact, this trope of ‘overshooting the mark’ occurs repeatedly in 
Boltzmann’s writing, like a habit of thought that occupies him con-
stantly: the tendency for behaviours that begin as beneficial adapta-
tions to be extended to an excessive point at which they become harm-
ful. For example, in 1904:
Many inappropriate features in the habits and behaviour of 
living beings are provoked by the fact that a mode of action 
that is appropriate in most cases becomes so habitual and 
second nature that it can no longer be relinquished if some-
where it ceases to be appropriate. I express this by saying 
that adaptation overshoots the mark. This happens especially 
often with mental habits and becomes a source of apparent 
contradictions between the laws of thought and the world, 
and between those laws themselves.22
What should regulate the relationship between thought and world is 
law, but the susceptibility of law to become a kind of automatism, 
repeated beyond all measure, leads to a kind of maladaptation, and 
this is precisely the case when, through a kind of repetition compul-
sion, we are drawn from asking about value within life to instead ask-
ing about the value of life, whether of the individual or of humankind:
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Similarly something is called useful or valuable if it furthers 
the living conditions of the individual or of mankind, but we 
overshoot the mark if we ask for the value of life itself, when 
for example it seems to us pointless because it has no pur-
pose outside itself. […] I regard it as a central task of philos-
ophy to give a clear account of the inappropriateness of this 
overshooting the mark on the part of our thinking habits.23
Yet it is ‘metaphysics’ itself that tends to fall into this trap, to over-
shoot the mark in a kind of excess that is also a kind of automatism 
– an excessive automatism. The task of philosophy must be precisely 
to aim at ‘appropriateness’ and eliminate ‘inappropriateness’ so as 
to approach a lawful expression without tangles and contradictions. 
Despite this seemingly straightforward, not to say naïve commitment 
to philosophical perfection and the removal of all dogma, Boltzmann 
seems at the same time to recognize that a problem arises in this 
adoption of life as value of values, of life as the seemingly ‘natural’ 
archi-criterion of values, and that it is a problem, precisely, of the vari-
ous scales of locality of this thing called life:
In this we try of course to talk the individual into believing 
that what has value for him is not what promotes his own life 
but that of his family, tribe or even mankind as a whole.24
What is the root of this need for persuasion? The implication, here, 
is that the values that promote the art of life and decrease the rate of 
entropy at least appear in different guises depending on the vantage 
point from which they are examined or sought, and more specifically 
depending on the scale of the locality with which one is preoccupied. 
Boltzmann seems to recognize that this unimpeachable value of val-
ues that is life ‘itself’ qua archi-criterion in fact involves a composi-
tion of standpoints that is hard to reconcile with any kind of ‘pure’ 
Reason, that this merging of perspectives always requires a kind of 
stereoscopic trick or illusion. Is it not to effect this illusion, to pull of 
this trick, that the force of rhetoric is required?
Only such a trick or illusion of a depth that crosses scales can guar-
antee the unsocial sociability necessary to overcome an anti-social 
tendency towards preferring ‘one’s own’ point of view, the wish to 
stay within the filter of one’s own bubble. Yet without this guarantee, 
which always involves instruments to generate this depth and achieve 
this illusion, the social organism itself consumes itself entropically 
and anaphylactically. This is what Boltzmann seems to acknowledge 
here with his admission of the need for persuasion, but it is difficult 
to reconcile this apparent recognition of the need to conduct such a 
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composition, to generate an always partly illusory or fictitious depth 
of field capable of crossing the scales of locality, with Boltzmann’s 
immediate conclusions concerning the task of philosophy in the after-
math of the second law of thermodynamics, which seem premised, 
instead, on the possibility of eliminating this aspectival or perspec-
tival implication:
The task of philosophy for the future is, in my view, to 
formulate the fundamental concepts in such a way that in 
all cases we obtain as precise instructions as possible for 
appropriate interventions in the world of phenomena. This 
requires first that if we follow different paths we never 
reach different rules for further thought and action, that 
is we never meet internal inconsistencies […]. That sort of 
event is always a sign that the laws of thought still lack the 
last finish.25
Surely what we know from the second law of thermodynamics is that 
no system ever receives that last finish, that there is only entropic 
becoming or unfinished individuation.
Boltzmann gave many such lectures and lecture series in the latter 
part of his life. Himself a ‘democratic radical and a resigned republi-
can’,26 Boltzmann lived within the contradictions of Robert Musil’s 
Kakanic Vienna,27 and faced with hostility towards atomic theory, 
especially from those around Ernst Mach, Boltzmann’s initial taste of 
success turned to pain, anxiety and restlessness, and a powerful urge 
to convey to anyone who would listen the importance of his theories, 
ideas and discoveries – which were, after all, destined to be proven 
correct. Cuts in finances, health problems, overwork, swings between 
mania and depression, thirty lectures in English at Berkeley in 1905 
that his listeners struggled to understand – in the latter part of that 
year, Boltzmann visited a mental hospital but decided against stay-
ing. Mach (who was the subject of Musil’s PhD) informs us that there 
had been earlier attempts at suicide, and it was understood he required 
constant supervision. Boltzmann was forced to postpone his lectures 
of summer 1906 due to ‘his nervous condition’, but then travelled to 
Duino with his wife and daughter: apparently it was her idea, but he 
seemed to improve.
As I am writing these lines, I realise with a sudden sense of shock 
that today is 5 September 2020, precisely one month after the death of 
Bernard Stiegler on 5 August 2020 at 68 years old, and precisely 114 
years to the day after 5 September 1906, when Ludwig Boltzmann, 
aged 62, due to return to Vienna the next day to commence his 
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lectures, and apparently having ‘showed himself particularly excited’ 
earlier on that day, made and carried out the decision to hang himself.
A final birth? The last escape?
Among those who would be affected by this event was Erwin 
Schrödinger, then nineteen years old:
The old Vienna Institute, from which shortly before Ludwig 
Boltzmann had been torn away in a tragic fashion […], 
engendered in me a direct empathy for the ideas of that pow-
erful spirit. For me his range of ideas played the role of a 
scientific young love, and no other has ever again held me 
so spellbound.
The budding physicist, registering the shock of the tragic, not to say 
violent loss of the voice that had spoken to him like no other, the one 
who, binding him with the spells that were his ideas, incantations that 
had opened the enchanted realm that would become Schrödinger’s 
discipline, would, by adopting this accident and striving to make it 
his necessity, participate in the transindividuation of the significance 
of the life and work of one who, for him, amounted, we could say, to 
a kind of saint – however improbably. Almost forty years later, in lec-
tures given in Dublin, Schrödinger would, as we know, postulate the 
thesis that life must be considered a form of ‘negative entropy’.
At some point in the last few years of his life, Boltzmann had begun 
a poem with the following lines:
With torment that I’d rather not recall
My soul at last escaped my mortal body.
Ascent through space! What happy floating
For one who suffered such distress and pain.
It is difficult not to hear in these lines the sense of mortality as a 
release from suffering yearned for by the distressed and unstable 
thinker of entropy as the statistically guaranteed triumph of the prob-
able. Yet later in the poem, we read the following:
The saint who suffers pain and grief
Redemption’s rays illuminate his way.
No man achieves a hero’s worldly fame
Who has not forced himself with all his power;
And as it caused his aching heart to tremble
His valiant deed will live in song immortal.
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Only a few years later, in his Duino Elegies, Rainer Maria Rilke 
would refer in similar terms to the klēos of the hero:
Begin again. Try out your impotent praise again;
think about the hero who lives on: even his fall
was only an excuse for another life, a final birth.
A ‘final birth’, seine letzte Geburt, that lives on ‘in song immortal’. 
Gilbert Simondon, in his own reflection upon the fate of the noetic 
soul of the mortal, will say a ‘second birth’, une seconde naissance.28 
What does it mean to say that there is a second birth that survives 
the first death? In fact, this involves the same question that animated 
Schrödinger’s consideration of the animate as negentropic, the same 
question that Lotka asks concerning the doubling of the struggle 
against entropy that occurs with exosomatic evolution, and which 
is to say, as well, the question just barely but already opened up by 
Boltzmann concerning the shifts of scale involved in the consider-
ation of ‘life’ as the source of neganthropic value.
For Simondon, the second birth becomes possible when ‘life’ is no 
longer just a matter of vital individuation but of psychic and collec-
tive individuation. The psychic individual belongs not just to a vital 
milieu, an ecosystem with which it negotiates its metastability until 
the moment of its eventual demise, but rather exists in relation to 
other psychic individuals, and, more than that, exists only in relation 
to other individuals. Already while still living, after the first birth, 
the individual is both drawing from the collective and secreting him-
self or herself into the collective, through which alone the individual 
has the chance of becoming the one who they are or will be. The indi-
vidual remains unfinished in life, and continues to be unfinished even 
after death, so long as there are psychic individuals who remain, and 
collective individuals that remain, affected by the life of the lost indi-
vidual, by the work of the individual, if not as well by the shock of los-
ing them, and who, so affected, carry something on – a survival. As 
the individual is withdrawn from life, that absence becomes the gap 
that opens the call to the work of ‘reactualizing this active absence’ as 
a ‘seed of consciousness and action’.29
Yet for all that to be possible, the remains are definitive, less the 
corpse than the corpus, the traces, through which what has been 
secreted may become the transindividuation of meaning, of signifi-
cance – significations that become, precisely, transindividual. As a 
result, what has closed remains open, ‘not contained, locked, in an 
individual enclosure that will degrade’.30 Instead, ‘converted into 
meaning, perpetuated in information’, or in other words, entered into 
a song immortal (and here we must not forget that a song, whether 
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mortal or immortal, is always something technical, as is the act of 
singing), the instability of the fragile individuation of a noetic soul 
can be overcome and can join the ‘only and definitive metastability’, 
that of the collective, ‘perpetuated without aging through successive 
generations’.31
Nevertheless, we would like to introduce two wrinkles into the 
tapestry we are here weaving between Toynbee, Boltzmann, Rilke, 
Schrödinger and Simondon (not to mention Lotka and Stiegler), two 
discordant notes into this cosmic melody concerning the posterity of 
the mortal individual sung by the chorus of the collective, amounting 
in the final assessment to an unending ‘ode to man’, and to his deinon.
The first is to suggest that, sometimes, the existence of a psychic 
individual is not only cut short, but cut short having left traces and 
memories of unfulfilled promise, of work yet to be carried out, of 
leaps yet to be taken, but indicated, prepared-for, initiated, promised. 
Secretions remain, unextruded, and no longer extrudable. Sometimes 
those promises, unfulfilled, are of a singular kind utterly dependent 
on the unique characteristics of the particular soul who conceived 
possibilities and bifurcations that were not yet brought to fruition – 
in the case of genius, for example. No doubt continuation, a second 
birth, is still possible, and even more so, yet in another direction, a 
turn off and probably a turn in, and where the collective, insofar as 
it is a genuine collective, cannot but be aware of how the direction in 
which that living on continues involves a deviation from the initial 
path, and, perhaps, in a weaker direction, as a shadow.
The second concerns Simondon’s thought that it is the collective 
alone, constituted through the immortal song of transindividual 
signification, that ever and always bears any lasting metastability. 
Maybe so, but if this song is technical, and this technics is a necessary 
medium and support through which alone the transindividual is pos-
sible, then we are confronted with what Stiegler calls a pharmakon, 
and with the fact that the collective individuation process opened up 
through this song need not just progress, but is always and irreducibly 
exposed to the risk of regress, just like the psychic individuation pro-
cesses of which it is necessarily composed. The collective soul, too, is 
only ever intermittently capable of its noetic potential, and its greater 
stability is by no means divinely guaranteed.
In short, while Simondon speaks as though, by being translated into 
transindividual meaning, the psychic individual is being absorbed or 
reabsorbed into something larger, something of a broader amplitude, 
not a universe but a cosmos, nevertheless it may be that scales become 
skewed and reversed, that what is larger suddenly becomes smaller, 
and that the smaller scale of the psychic soul suddenly proves to be 
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too vast for any such reabsorption. The whole world may shrink, and 
shrink before the task given to it by a loss that, precisely, exposes 
its shrunken character. In such a case, when the collective has suf-
fered a proletarianization and denoetization (to use Stiegler’s terms) 
that leaves it bereft and adrift, then the adoption of the shock of the 
event may not just be the improbable necessity of quasi-causally turn-
ing the accidental into the necessary: it may have become a strict and 
irreversible impossibility. Whether overshooting the mark in overre-
actions, or underreactively failing to fire a shot for want of ammuni-
tion or will, it may turn out that there is no longer anyone left to mea-
sure up to the task of thinking and caring in the Anthropocene. In the 
struggle between the upward trend and the downward, as Whitehead 
calls it, and so long as entropy remains an irreducible tendency of the 
universe, inevitably it eventuates that we one day reach the cosmic 
inflection point.
What is the Anthropocene? What is it, futurally, but the arrival of 
a moment when nihilism is fulfilled, when there is no longer any way 
to ‘talk the individual into believing that what has value for him is 
not what promotes his own life but that of his family, tribe or even 
mankind as a whole’ – or the biosphere as a whole? And when this is 
so because there is no longer any voice, speaking or singing, capable 
of resonating with a sense of the scale of the problem that exosomatic 
life in the biosphere has become, no signification immortal or mortal 
capable of weighing the gravity of the task.
It is possible, after all, for the last such voice to be silenced, in this 
Anthropocene whose probabilistic and entropic character Boltzmann 
was the first to open up mathematically, and who, perhaps, was also 
the first to perceive this epoch’s permanent and impending closing, 
foreshadowed by his own dramatic spiralling in upon himself. Other 
voices, too, have opened up our awareness of the general character of 
entropy, for instance philosophically, or organologically, calling us to 
the task of healing this sur-real cosmos, yet they too can close, per-
haps are closed, perhaps once and for all. Can we still dream that they 
might live on, a second birth? What else than a dream could they ever 
have been? It is this conjunction of closures, psychic, collective and 
biospheric, that, more than anything, confronts us with the appalling 
and dreadful likelihood of the Anthropocenic and anaphylactic fate 
that beckons us – the last escape.
How to read this book
This book is suffused with the work of Bernard Stiegler, in a way that 
is apparent on almost every page, but it is not the great synthesis of 
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Stiegler’s philosophy that the world still lacks. Would that it were so, 
but for that it is still necessary to wait, if it is not indeed still too soon, 
however urgent. More modestly than that, it is a compilation of texts 
written over the past five years or so, and then rewritten to various 
degrees, each chapter responding to certain aspects of Stiegler’s work, 
at times starting to open a dialogue that is now destined to remain 
closed. More specifically, several of the chapters take up themes 
from the Internation Collective project that occupied the last few 
years of Stiegler’s work, and resulted in the book entitled in English, 
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’. Nevertheless, this book does not 
respond to that one, and readers of some of the chapters in this book 
would benefit from reading some of the chapters of that collectively-
composed volume.
Because a number of the chapters were written as a kind of engage-
ment with an existing project, they tend to assume some familiarity 
with Stiegler’s work. One way around this potential problem for less 
familiar readers is to read the introduction, written by this author, 
to Stiegler’s collection entitled The Neganthropocene. At the same 
time, the first chapter of the present work was written subsequently 
to the others, and is intended to serve as a kind of introduction to the 
theme of Stiegler and the Anthropocene. Chapter 3 is also intended as 
another kind of introduction again, one written for students at Tongji 
University in Shanghai, and focused only on the first two volumes 
of Technics and Time. Additionally, Chapter 4 was in part written as 
yet another kind of introduction. Yet another choice, and probably 
the best one, would be to go straight to the Afterword, ‘On Positive 
Pharmacology’, written by Stiegler.
There are thus a number of different introductions available in 
this book and outside of it, and a number of chapters that engage in 
forms of discussion in need of an introduction. But then, it has always 
seemed that Stiegler’s work was in need of being introduced again 
and again, a mark, perhaps, of his departure from some of the conven-
tional expectations of philosophical writing over recent decades. It is 
also a sign, however, of the fact that his work has yet to achieve the 
reception it deserves, at least in the clear view of the present author.
In preparing this book, the decision was made to present the chap-
ters in the order they were written (with the exception of Chapter 1), 
because it seemed to the author that they formed a kind of progres-
sion, and that each chapter served to some extent as a way of lead-
ing in to the next. Nevertheless, the sequence of arguments in each 
individual chapter does not really add up to a coherent line of thought 
extending from beginning to end, and it is entirely reasonable and 
Daniel Ross 26
possible to read the chapters in any order whatsoever. In short, it is a 




1 Bereft and Adrift in an Entropic Universe:  
After Bernard Stiegler
Eons, eras, periods, epochs and ages – to the Anthropocene
The planet on whose surface dwells all the current or extinct living 
matter that has ever been discovered anywhere in the Universe was 
formed some 4.5 billion years ago, and the accidental terraforming 
of this surface began some 3.5 billion years ago, resulting in what, 
after Vladimir Vernadsky, has become known as the biosphere. Since 
that time, this planet and its biosphere have undergone many trans-
formations and seen many stages, which geologists divide into four 
eons, themselves neatly and progressively subdivided into various 
eras, periods, epochs and ages. The most recent of these four eons is 
the Phanerozoic (meaning ‘visible life’), commencing some 541 mil-
lion years ago with the Cambrian explosion and distinguished by the 
widespread proliferation of multicellular life – plants and animals.
The most recent of the three eras of the Phanerozoic Eon is the 
Cenozoic (‘new life’), corresponding to the rise of mammals and 
beginning around 66 million years ago. The most recent of the three 
periods of the Cenozoic era is the Quaternary that began approxi-
mately 2.5 million years ago and was characterized by a series of cli-
matic changes in which ice sheets and glaciers repeatedly formed and 
receded. The Quaternary itself is divided into two geological epochs, 
the second of which, the Holocene (‘wholly new’), begins some 11,650 
years ago, after the last glacial event.
The commencement of the Holocene epoch thus occurs at approxi-
mately the same time as, or just before, what is known in the divi-
sions of the stages of human evolution as the Neolithic age, when 
Homo sapiens became farmers, cultivating plants and domesticating 
livestock. This development also implied replacing the nomadic life-
style hitherto necessary for subsistence with an increasing tendency 
to build permanent settlements. In other words, it is at this very 
recent point that the 3.5 billion-year-old biosphere first begins to be 
anthropized – significantly marked by the effects of one particular 
species’ efforts to survive, efforts that consist in organizing (via arti-
ficial selection) the reproduction of various forms of biological life, 
and in covering the terrestrial surface with more or less long-lasting 
forms of organized inorganic matter (by making technical artefacts, 
a process that of course began much earlier). The Holocene epoch, or 
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the Neolithic age, thus occupies approximately 1/375,000 of the entire 
span of time in which the Earth has existed.
How should we marry this very long history of organic life with the 
much shorter history of what Bernard Stiegler will call organologi-
cal life, that is, a form of life composed of the inextricably entwined 
evolution of somato-psychic organs, social organizations and tech-
nological organs? How do these organic and organological strands 
of terrestrial history culminate in what has come to be called the 
Anthropocene? The notion that we have entered the Anthropocene 
corresponds to the idea that at a certain point the Holocene ended, and 
to the idea that some large-scale change befell that series of social and 
technological evolutions that can be traced back over ten or twelve 
millennia to the beginning of the Neolithic, in a way that trans-
forms and threatens to seal the fate of this biosphere. Does a chance 
remain that we can influence the fate of this Anthropocene epoch, 
which seems almost to be over and done with when it has but barely 
begun, less fading into its twilight than succumbing to a violent and 
irresistible suicidal impulse – however long may linger its agonizing 
death throes?
When did it begin? For geologists, the scientific question of whether, 
within this infinitesimal fragment of Earth’s history, a new epoch has 
begun after the Holocene requires asking whether changes are visible 
in stratigraphic rock layers, such changes needing to be observable 
all across the planet. In other fields, however, what matters are not 
so much the official standards by which stratigraphers institution-
alize the division of geological time, but rather the very noticeable 
acceleration in the processes of anthropizing the biosphere, which 
is to say, the accelerating encroachment of what has been called the 
technosphere upon the biosphere. This acceleration gets going a little 
more than two centuries ago, which is to say between 1/50 and 1/60 
of the span of time covered by the Holocene epoch or the Neolithic 
age, when human beings begin to employ new means in this process 
of anthropization: new forms of energy production and consumption 
with the development of heat engines and new forms of automation 
with the development of machinery and factories.
If we date the commencement of the Anthropocene from these 
developments, then it corresponds to the beginning of what, in terms 
of technological history, is usually called the industrial revolution, 
and what, in terms of economic history, corresponds to the rise of 
industrial capitalism or what Karl Polanyi called the great transfor-
mation. In the twentieth century, this acceleration intensifies with the 
development of vast electricity grids, mass production and consumer-
ist capitalism. It is transformed once again in the twenty-first century, 
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with the development of global digital networks and what has been 
called platform capitalism – but, thus far, the sources of energy pro-
duction have not greatly changed (though of course, the post-war 
sources of electricity were extended to include nuclear power, which 
has already given us Chernobyl and Fukushima), or, at least, not 
greatly enough.
From the tragedy of oi thanatoi to Gestell
Some hundred centuries after the dawn of the Holocene and the 
Neolithic, in the context of a crisis of that settled area known as the 
Greek polis of Athens, Socrates questioned whether the sophists really 
knew the things they thought they knew, whether they knew how to 
distinguish between what they knew and what they didn’t know, and 
whether they knew how to pursue a question to its origin, so that the 
unknown might become known. In so doing, and with the trial and 
punishment of Socrates by that polis, and then Plato’s retrospective 
written record of the spoken words of Socrates, there began a long 
chain of inquiry and recording concerned with knowledge and its cri-
ses that would be known as philosophy, which has continued until this 
day – or, at least, almost until this day.
At the time of philosophy’s commencement, and throughout most 
of the twenty-five centuries since then, none of the facts concerning 
the eons, eras, periods, epochs and ages of the history of Earth or its 
biosphere were known to philosophers or to anyone else, and nor were 
the ages of the history of hominization. Nor could the founders of phi-
losophy or most of their heirs ever have imagined how anthropization, 
which was already well underway in their lifetimes, would proceed to 
cover the biospheric surface of the Earth and transform the very con-
ditions of both biological (or endosomatic) life and technological (or 
exosomatic) life – to the point of threatening to destroy the conditions 
necessary for the very continuation of the human adventure. They 
could thus have imagined neither the Neolithic or Palaeolithic past 
of hominims nor the apocalyptic nightmare that currently threatens 
to engulf them, not just because they had yet to uncover the scientific 
facts of terrestrial history, but more importantly because the pace of 
the exosomatic process of anthropization (the pace of exosomatiza-
tion) was still too slow to be noticeable to those living through it.
For that reason, the cosmic conception that underlay philosophy 
and the concepts it produced was founded on the distinction between 
those things that change and those things that remain unchanged – a 
cosmos divided between the sublunary world and the astral universe. 
All of the concepts and categories of philosophy were characterized 
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by this opposition between being and becoming, the timeless and the 
temporal, the eternal and the transitory, and the interrelationships 
between living things dwelling within what we have come to think 
of as ‘nature’ were inevitably conceived in terms of notions of bal-
ance and harmony, rather than as a dynamic process and perpetual 
war unfolding through the struggle and proliferation of countless gen-
erations of organisms and species unfolding across an unimaginably 
long timescale.
In Greek mythology and thought, an element of disorder or dis-
harmony appears only with the disruption that we ourselves intro-
duce into the world of physis. In the famous ‘ode to man’ chorus of 
Sophocles’ Antigone, human beings are described in terms of deinon 
and deinotaton, ‘man’ being the uncanniest and most frightening of 
beings, constantly caught in one or another trap, but more adept than 
any other at finding their way beyond them – this is his mētis, his cun-
ning intelligence.32
We see this character again in the myth of human origins told via 
Prometheus and Epimetheus, where, because of Epimethean oversight, 
humans are alone among the creatures in having no pre-given quali-
ties defining their place among living things. Instead of being granted 
such skills, talents or abilities by Zeus or by ‘nature’, human beings 
have the foresight to fashion their own qualities by taking advantage 
of the gift of fire, stolen from Zeus and Hephaestus, allowing them to 
acquire the ability to escape from all those traps into which they fall 
due to their own disordered being. It is as a consequence of this theft 
and the unnatural power it brings, however, that human beings have 
the possibility of falling into disorder, in the form of war and strife. 
And it is only after this theft, as a late and compensatory afterthought, 
that the primordial feelings of dikē and aidōs are distributed to human 
beings, forming the basis of the potential for philia, that is, the pos-
sibility of acquiring the art of learning to live together – opening onto 
the always risky and fragile capacity for making wise collective deci-
sions that would come to be called politics.
Human beings, Anthropos, or better to say mortals, oi thanatoi, 
between the beasts and the immortals, are for the Greeks tragic beings 
caught in the dramaturgy of rise and fall, bearers of a noetic soul (as 
distinct from the sensible soul and the vegetative soul described by 
Aristotle for animals and plants) and so granted the perpetual possi-
bility of ascending to all the possibilities afforded by reason, yet only 
intermittently so, more often finding themselves falling back, regress-
ing to the level of the sensitive soul of the beasts. Despite this drama 
of the disorders of the noetic soul, however, this will not become 
a historical drama until the time of Hegel. And only with the work 
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of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in The German Ideology would 
it be suggested that Darwin’s theory of the evolution of sensible and 
vegetative souls should be doubled by an account of the evolution-
ary dynamic within which the existence of noetic souls would itself 
unfold: a theory of the evolution of what these two thinkers would call 
the ‘means of production’, or in other words, technics:
Men […] begin to distinguish themselves from animals as 
soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a 
step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. […] 
This mode of production must not be considered simply as 
being the production of the physical existence of the individ-
uals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individu-
als, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode 
of life on their part.33
To this thought of a technical mode of production defining the very 
conditions of life for those dwelling within it, Engels would later add 
an account of the complex interrelationship of the evolution of the 
hand, the tool and the brain, emphasizing not just that the hand sets 
human beings apart from animals by its ability to grasp tools, but that 
the hand ‘implies the tool’.34 What is implied by this implication is 
that hand and tool (and by extension, brain) evolve in a dynamic his-
torical relationship of co-constitution.
In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger would add to this the 
thought that the fate of this noetic soul in modern technology now 
consists in the prevailing of calculation over all earlier forms by 
which the world reveals itself, so that the future would henceforth be 
planned via a thoroughgoing use of calculation, rather than existen-
tially projected. This cybernetic tendency is progressing, he argues as 
early as the late 1940s, to the point that the co-evolutionary dynamic 
between the hand and the tool, between the human being and technol-
ogy, would not just be revealed by the unfolding of human history, 
but would increasingly displace the role of human beings themselves 
in this dynamic, where the latter increasingly find themselves to be 
just one more object of that provocation or challenging-forth that is 
its basis. It was for this reason that Heidegger would eventually posit 
that our uncanny destiny consists in the necessity of ‘thinking being 
without beings’, that is, without that guiding being who in Being and 
Time was named Dasein, that is, that being who may not be ‘man’ but 
is nothing other than man – or in other words, the kind of being that 
we ourselves are.35
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From phylogenesis, through epigenesis, to epiphylogenesis
Bernard Stiegler further complicates the account of this dynamic in 
the first volume of Technics and Time, through a close reading of the 
work of the palaeo-anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan. The com-
mencement of this new dynamic involving the co-implication of 
hand, tool and brain occurs long, long before the Neolithic evolu-
tion, long before the appearance of Homo sapiens, and even before 
the appearance of the genus Homo. Already with Lucy, that is, with 
Australopithecus afarensis, more than three million years ago, ham-
merstone tools were being produced; with Zinjanthropus, maybe two 
million years ago (more or less), Oldowan tools were in use. Only 
with Homo erectus would finer Acheulean flint tools be developed, 
and only with Homo sapiens sapiens would fires be systematically 
built and maintained for warmth and cooking. At the same time as the 
slow advancement of techniques in tool production, brain size would 
also progressively increase, from 365–417cc for Lucy, 450–550cc for 
Paranthropus boisei, 546–1251cc for Homo erectus and 1400cc for the 
beings that we ourselves are (and where this increase is not just uni-
form, but involves the development of the frontal lobes and so on, that 
is, those parts of the brain that extend beyond the limbic system).
In such a gradual, simultaneous evolution of hands, tools and brains, 
it is strictly impossible to assign one of these elements as the driver of 
the process. All three are inextricably entwined in a single co-evolu-
tionary process, and it is therefore as true to say ‘that the what invents 
the who […] as much as it is invented by it’.36 If by the who we imply 
a being (a Dasein, in Heidegger’s terms) in possession of an ‘interi-
ority’ (or what Husserlian phenomenology will call ‘intentional con-
sciousness’), a consciousness that apprehends the world as world, then 
it is as true to say that exteriorization, the process of putting oneself 
outside oneself in the prostheses of inorganic and exosomatic tech-
nics, invents the interiority of this who as much as it is invented by it. 
And all this, long before anything that we can call ‘the human’ even 
appears on the evolutionary stage, or in other words, long before the 
appearance of those creatures in whom we can conceivably recognize 
ourselves, long before ‘men like ourselves’,37 as Georges Bataille will 
say about those who painted the Lascaux caves, and who are already 
very much closer to the Neolithic age.38
In putting forward this way of conceiving the dynamic of homi-
nization, Stiegler is to an extent following Jacques Derrida’s attempt 
to undo (or deconstruct) the oppositions between the natural and 
unnatural, animal and human, that have, the latter says, perpetually 
structured the metaphysics of presence characteristic of the history 
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of Western thought. In Of Grammatology, Derrida, too, will refer to 
Leroi-Gourhan (albeit on a single page), and to his concept of exteri-
orization, in order to undertake this deconstruction. Derrida will refer 
to an exteriorization always already begun, in order to maintain that 
the history of life, whether biological or technological, is the history 
of différance, that is, the history of traces opening up new possibilities 
of life as the unfolding of a process of deferral and differentiation.39 
As Stiegler later summarizes:
In his most famous work, Of Grammatology, and after 
Speech and Phenomena, Derrida advanced his central the-
sis through a critique of Saussure – and by shifting from 
the question of structure (which was, for example, still the 
‘common understanding’ of the journal Tel Quel) to more 
general questions of the grammē and différance – that is, to 
the question of a process that, by deferring its own accom-
plishment, differentiates itself, this differentiation produc-
ing traces, which is also to say, grammēs, forms of writing 
and of what Of Grammatology called ‘supplements’.40
Yet despite their similarities on this score, Derrida, unlike Stiegler, 
never quite conceives différance as a process, let alone one through 
which there occurs the differentiation of Anthropos:
On the basis of reading Leroi-Gourhan, something became 
clear to me: it is necessary to think what Jacques Derrida 
calls différance – which constitutes the process of the pro-
duction of traces, which he also calls supplements – pre-
cisely as a process, while the possibility of considering this 
process, starting from what Georges Canguilhem calls the 
technical form of life, should be understood as a process of 
exteriorization, in the sense proposed by Leroi-Gourhan, 
with the formidable philosophical problem being that […] 
exteriorization is a paradoxical concept, since it is not pre-
ceded by an interiority, and therefore is not exactly an 
exteriorization.41
Far more than Derrida, Stiegler will emphasize this processual char-
acter of différance, not just through reading Leroi-Gourhan, but by 
marrying this account with Gilbert Simondon’s account of individu-
ation, and the latter’s description of the shift from the vital individu-
ation of biological or endosomatic evolution to the psychic and col-
lective individuation of technological or exosomatic evolution. What 
Stiegler will add is that the opening of this bifurcation, from out of 
which psychic and collective individuation unfurls a new process of 
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différance, cannot be conceived without recognizing that this new 
regime of individuation is composed of three intertwined strands: 
the psychic, the collective and the technical (thus coinciding with the 
three kinds of organs that define organology). In the passage from 
vital individuation to psychic and collective individuation, technical 
individuation introduces cleavage that opens this gap between the 
psychic and the collective, because it opens a new form of temporality 
(or temporality as such, in the Heideggerian sense), in the sense that 
every technical artefact functions, accidentally or deliberately, as a 
new support of memory.
Stiegler thus shows that the history of life qua différance should 
be grasped as a very long history of several great epochs of memory, 
where the latter is understood very broadly as the improbable pos-
sibility of the past persisting into the present. This possibility of con-
serving order in matter is in turn understood as constituting the fun-
damental means of all life in its struggle against the tendency towards 
the probable, that is, towards the disordering of its matter. The first 
of these great epochs is genetic memory, encoded and transmitted via 
the genome but incapable of learning lessons – phylogenetic memory, 
beginning with the commencement of terrestrial life.
The second great epoch is that of nervous memory, engraved not 
in the molecular structure of the DNA molecule but in ‘grey matter’ 
– epigenetic memory that arises with animal life and makes it pos-
sible for individual organisms to learn lessons, that is, to vary their 
behavioural selections according to the past experience of the organ-
ism, but where all of those experiences are lost with the perishing of 
the organism and its nervous system. Both of these forms of memory 
have existed for billions (in the case of phylogenetic) or hundreds of 
millions (epigenetic) of years, and they constitute the means by which 
endosomatization – vital individuation – postpones the march of the 
probable through a diversification of organs and species that runs 
counter to the overwhelming tendency of the so-called ‘arrow of time’.
With the advent of exteriorization, however, it is not just grey 
organic matter that is engraved but inorganic matter such as stone or 
clay, so that the lessons conserved in that engraving (for example, the 
gestures recorded in the form of a flint tool) are not lost with the loss 
of the individual who made them, but are instead preserved and trans-
missible – what Stiegler names epiphylogenetic memory. Again, this 
is something that begins long before the appearance of Homo sapiens, 
and thus the distinction that is marked by the advent of this third kind 
of memory simply cannot be ascribed to any kind of ‘anthropocen-
trism’, and nor can it ground any opposition between the human and 
the animal. What the recognition of this new and distinct process can 
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do, however, is open a pathway to understanding what difference this 
event in the history of différance makes, when the processes of natural 
selection operating through phylogenetic and epigenetic memory are 
supplemented, if not in fact suspended, by epiphylogenetic memory.
It is only after this history of epiphylogenetic exteriorization has 
progressed quite far that forms of exteriorization arise whose func-
tion it is to exteriorize memory. Every flint tool in fact functions as 
such a memory, because, for example, a careful examination can still 
divulge the lessons it contains about how that tool was crafted, but 
this is only an accidental feature of a hand axe. With phenomena such 
as cave painting, however, that is, forms of aesthetic decoration in 
which, Bataille says, we can at last recognize ‘ourselves’, there begins 
the deliberate recording of past experience, making it possible not 
only for lessons to be transmitted, but to be accumulated, and in a 
systematic way through those processes of intergenerational training 
we refer to as education. From cave painting to forms of writing in 
stone or clay, or on papyrus or paper, and then of printing and eventu-
ally within the circuitry of silicon chips, this exteriorized memory 
becomes hypomnesic, as Stiegler calls it, ultimately giving rise to for-
malized knowledge whose canon is geometry.
Hypomnesis, grammatization, proletarianization
What is the significance of this term, ‘hypomnesic’, and do we really 
need ‘philosophy’ to make sense of any of these multiple histo-
ries whose stories we have been telling? Aren’t these questions and 
stories scientific more than they are philosophical? Have we really 
located any grounds for considering that the Stieglerian perspective 
on the ‘Anthropocene’ distinguishes itself in any crucial way from 
any archaeological, anthropological, economic, sociological or polit-
ical account of the implications to be drawn from delineating such 
an epoch? To approach such questions, it is necessary to shift from 
the first stage of Stiegler’s work, on technics, to the second, when he 
begins to refer to ‘general organology’ and insists that it must also be 
a ‘pharmacology’.42
In Phaedrus, Socrates draws attention to the ambivalent character 
of writing, on which the sophists rely so heavily. On the one hand, 
writing functions as an aid to memorization, but it can also have the 
opposite effect, when it becomes a crutch on which one leans instead 
of internalizing what one knows. Because writing has this duplicitous 
characteristic of being both a remedy for faulty memory and poison-
ous for that same memory, Socrates refers to it as a pharmakon (a drug 
may cure us, but if not used well, it can poison us; a bandage may 
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help us heal, but if not used well, it can encourage infection). Stiegler 
argues that all forms of exteriorized memory, not just writing, and 
in fact all forms of technical exteriorization in general, possess this 
same duplicity, the consequence of which is that writing, epiphyloge-
netic memory and technics in general can never be described as good 
or bad in themselves: they always require care to be taken in the prac-
tice of these pharmaka, just as the gift of fire (that is, technics) stolen 
by Prometheus required the late gift of the possibility of philia, failing 
which the polis is bound to fall into strife.
In Socratic terms, the epistemological significance of this argument 
can be seen by drawing it into a relation with the conclusion reached 
in Meno. This early Platonic dialogue ponders how to know the mean-
ing of virtue: on the one hand, a list of examples of virtue drawn from 
experience cannot tell us what virtue is as such; on the other hand, 
where can we find the unity of these examples, if we cannot find it in 
our experience? What this aporia raises for Socrates is the question 
of the origin of knowledge, and of our access to it, and his answer 
is that all knowledge comes to us as a recollection, an anamnesis, of 
what we once knew, in a past life of our soul, but have since forgotten. 
The question of the location of knowledge can no longer lead us to the 
notion of past lives of an immortal soul. Yet the significance of the 
aporia of Meno remains, and the question it raises is still our question: 
from whence arises the possibility of ascribing unity to the concepts 
with which we think, and without which anamnesis is not possible, 
that is, thinking for oneself through that revealing that Heidegger too 
ascribed to an-amnesis?
Despite some vacillation in Being and Time about the place of 
monuments and other hypomnesic pharmaka in exposing the world-
historial character of Dasein, the possibility of such unconcealment 
ultimately depends for Heidegger on the opposition between the 
determined, which forms the basis of calculation, and the indeter-
minate, which opens the possibility of genuine thinking. This oppo-
sition between calculation and authentic thinking will be borne out 
and intensified in his later thought. For Stiegler, on the other hand, 
determination amounts to a necessary condition of any access to the 
indeterminate, and this means, firstly, that every prosthetic artefact 
can function as a hypomnesis, and that this alone gives rise to the pos-
sibility of any such anamnesis.
In Heidegger, determinate ‘clock time’ simply closes off the pos-
sibility of ‘authentic time’, which cannot be determined by the cal-
culability of mechanical timekeeping. Stiegler does not disagree that 
mechanical timekeeping, calculably determining duration, may close 
off the possibility of a remembrance of our existential thrownness 
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between past and future, as Heidegger thinks. Yet, he argues, it is 
equally true that if Dasein is the being who is capable of knowing such 
authentic time, it must be because Dasein is the being that is capable 
of seeing that it is thrown into time, because it is capable of gazing 
upon the artefacts of its own past, which open up, as the already-there, 
the fact of Dasein’s having to run ahead to its past, opening up its 
authentic and singular future, and opening Dasein to the existential 
fact of its mortality. What’s more, if this is so, it is because every arte-
fact, as a record of the past of Dasein and of every exosomatic being, 
is a kind of clock – not just because for Anaximander a stick was 
sufficient to create a gnomon, but because every artefact is a mirror 
in which one sees reflected one’s own past or the past of others, and 
which alone, and through that maieutic, opens up the possibility of a 
relationship to the indeterminate future.
It is because this artefactual mirror reflects not just the past one 
has lived oneself, but a past that one has not lived but that can thereby 
become one’s own past, that it answers to both Heidegger’s inability to 
constitute the grounds of the distinction of Dasein as the noetic being 
thrown into the possibility of authentic time, and the aporia of Meno: 
through the reflective waves made possible by the hypomnesic arte-
fact, the beings that we ourselves are can access, internalize and reca-
pitulate the lessons of lives other than our own. In this way, the les-
sons of past lives become a primordial and collective fund on which 
we can draw, from the mythological storytelling that occurs in ancient 
rituals to the geometry textbook that grants the student the possibility 
of acquiring a capacity for geometrical reasoning that required mil-
lennia before a Euclid would arise capable of setting down its funda-
mental axioms and theorems. Rather than the past lives of the immor-
tal soul, it is the continuous recommencement of knowledge through 
the circuit we form with the past via the hypomnesic memories of 
exteriorized artefacts that supplies the funds through which we can 
believe in the unity of the concepts with which we hope to reason and 
decide about our future. But these hypomneses can, as well, and as 
Socrates knew, always also become the very thing that stands in the 
way of the possibility of knowledge and reason – not just for oneself, 
but in general.
What follows from this analysis is that the stages, epochs and 
rhythms of the history of epiphylogenesis (the evolution of exoso-
matic memory) are just as crucial to the unfolding of the history of 
life qua différance as the stages, epochs and rhythms of the evolu-
tion of phylogenetic and epigenetic memory. Unlike the geological 
timescale of neatly divided subdivisions, however, these epochs of 
exosomatization involve a strange pattern of advance and delay, of 
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technical developments that run ahead of the ability to take care of 
them, provoking shocks and consequently requiring the invention of 
new practices and forms of care; or, alternatively, of moments when 
changes yet to come seem to be anticipated in advance of their arrival, 
which may take quite some time, such as the two hundred years that 
Nietzsche forecast would be necessary for the fulfilment of nihilism. 
In this way, these successions of advances and delay are the collective 
extension of the irreducible intermittency of the noetic soul that may 
leap forward or, more often, regress – of that noetic soul that belongs 
to the organological being that we ourselves are.
In order to elucidate the epochs of the organological life of the 
noetic soul, Stiegler draws on the work of the linguist Sylvain Auroux 
and his concept of ‘grammatization’. Grammatization is Auroux’s 
name for the process necessary for the temporal flow of speech to 
be turned into the spatial and material forms of alphabetical writing, 
necessarily involving the discrimination and analysis, not necessarily 
conscious, of the discrete phonetic elements that would become the 
letters.43 The processual reinterpretation of grammatology implies the 
necessity of such a process of grammatization, we could say.
Stiegler’s genius was to recognize that a process of spatialization, 
materialization, discretization and analysis lies at the root, not just 
of the alphabetical writing that made possible the Greek polis and its 
tragedy, philosophy and democracy, but also of the industrial revolu-
tion. In the latter case, however, this was a process of grammatization 
applied not to the temporal flow of speech but to the temporal flow of 
gesture, and more specifically, of the gestures of the tool-equipped 
hands (those hands that are the exosomatic consequence of the pre-
hominim foot that becomes implied with the tool) of workers possess-
ing the knowledge of how to craft material objects, from the weaver 
to the potter to the blacksmith and beyond. It was this gestural knowl-
edge of the worker that had to become subject to a process of gramma-
tization in order for the mechanization and automation of industrial 
manufacturing to be established in the nineteenth century.
This process is exactly what Marx describes in the Grundrisse, 
albeit without the concept of grammatization at his disposal. The 
‘Fragment on Machines’ is a precise account of how the knowledge 
possessed by the worker is inscribed into fixed capital, that is, into 
Arkwright’s spinning frame, Jacquard’s loom and a thousand other 
inventions based on the mechanization of processes that previously 
required manual skill. The formation of the great division of classes 
diagnosed by Marx as the division between capital and labour is made 
possible by this dispossession of workers of the means of production, 
but where these means must be identified above all as the knowledge 
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of how to use tools, which in the act of dispossession is transformed 
into a discrete and analytical form programmable into machines. In 
this act of dispossession, then, knowledge, which is incalculable, is 
turned into information, which is inherently and necessarily defined 
by its calculability.
What makes possible this dispossession of gestural knowledge is 
not its technologization (such knowledge was always already tool-
equipped, that is, technical, and this is precisely what opens it up as 
knowledge), but its industrialization (which is to say, its mechaniza-
tion, or in other words, its automation).44 The industrial machine, like 
writing, may open up the possibility of new knowledge, but, in the 
industrial revolution, which is to say at the dawn of the Anthropocene, 
its use mainly consisted in destroying the knowledge possessed by 
workers, who in this way literally disappear, becoming labourers 
deprived of the potential to pursue or transform their knowledge of 
how to work.
It is for this reason that Stiegler occasionally refers to Socrates 
as the first thinker of proletarianization, this term being understood 
firstly and in this way as the destruction of knowledge. In both 
ancient Athens and nineteenth-century Manchester, it is the process 
of grammatization that makes this destruction possible, by inscribing 
it into the fixed capital of writing and then into the machines of indus-
trial production. Conceived in this way, Marx and Socrates share the 
distinction of being the thinkers who conceived the pharmacological 
basis of the technical transformations that gave rise to their troubled 
epochs, but it is only in Marx’s time that such proletarianization 
becomes systematic and systemic.
Organology of tertiary retention in the twentieth  
and twenty-first centuries
There is an at least twofold problem, however, with the fate of Marx 
in becoming Marxism: first, this analysis does not appear in Capital, 
while the Grundrisse was not published until 1939; second, the pro-
cess of grammatization did not end in the nineteenth century, and new 
epochs of grammatization would in the twentieth century completely 
transform industrial society. These two problems, combined with a 
dialectical approach that would fallaciously ascribe negative power 
to this process of proletarianization, and with Engels’ rejection in the 
Dialectics of Nature of the concept of entropy, prevented Marxism 
from developing an adequate account of the fate of industrial society 
as it comes increasingly to be founded not on the industrialization of 
production but on the industrialization of consumption. Furthermore, 
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Stiegler effectively demonstrates that for any such account to be 
adequate, it will also require a consideration and critique of the 
Husserlian description of the time-consciousness.
The forms of grammatization that will develop in the twentieth 
century are first and foremost those of the temporal flows of sight 
and sound – the grammatization of the auditory and visual sensible 
realms that was necessary for the invention of the gramophone, radio, 
cinema and television. These forms of grammatization again gave rise 
to new forms of proletarianization, but the knowledge destroyed by 
the systematic use of these instruments would not just be concerned 
with the work made possible by the use of tools, but rather with all the 
forms of knowledge associated with ways of life, from politeness to 
education to courtship and ritual, and to all the other details of every-
day life. Although the so-called leisure or consumer society of the 
twentieth century was referred to by Alain Touraine and Daniel Bell 
as ‘post-industrial’, for Stiegler it is in fact hyper-industrial, marked 
by the rise of the culture industries and functionally premised on the 
capacity of these new grammatization technologies to influence and 
control desire (and from an increasingly young age), and through that, 
behaviour, making possible mass production, which required the abil-
ity to count on, that is, invest in, mass consumption.
Why is Husserl’s phenomenology of the temporality of intentional 
consciousness (that is, the noetic soul’s experience of the passage of 
time) necessary for this account? Because it is through the descrip-
tion of the consciousness of temporal flow offered by Husserl at the 
beginning of the twentieth century that we can understand how these 
new grammatizing technologies are able to systematically interfere 
with the very process of forming a relationship to the future. Husserl’s 
distinction between primary retention and secondary retention will, 
when supplemented with Stiegler’s concept of tertiary retention (as 
supplement), make apparent the way in which the deliberate and sys-
tematic introduction of audiovisual imagery offers a way of condi-
tioning the basis of perception – and does so pharmacologically, for 
better and for worse.
Husserl’s problem was to understand how it is possible to perceive 
the passage of time itself, and his assumption was that time cannot be 
composed of a series of ‘now points’ strung together, since this would 
not constitute the flow of time. His thesis was that the way to conduct 
a phenomenological investigation of this question is to reflect on the 
perception of an object whose existence cannot be divorced from the 
flow of time because its existence consists only in this flow: he called 
this a temporal object, the paradigmatic case of which is the melody. 
By examining the way we intend towards such a temporal object, it 
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would be possible to distinguish the perception of the object’s exist-
ing in time from the perception of the temporal flow within which 
the object itself flowed, and it would thereby become possible to pay 
attention to the experience of time-consciousness itself.
To perceive a melody, or even a single note, Husserl argued, it is 
necessary for the moment just past to be retained in the present, so that 
the ‘now-apprehension is, as it were, the head attached to the comet’s 
tail of retentions relating to the earlier now-points’,45 just as it must 
also be conjoined to the expectation of the immediate next moment, 
which he called protention. This keeping of the just-past as constitu-
tive of the present is what Husserl called primary retention, that reten-
tion involved in the very passing of the present, distinct from the sec-
ondary retention that would be illustrated, for example, when I run 
through a melody again in my mind that I heard yesterday – former 
primary retentions that have been added to my epigenetic memory and 
that, in becoming secondary, are able to be recalled. This distinction 
between primary retention and secondary retention is what Derrida 
will deconstruct in Speech and Phenomena, showing that Husserl 
falls into contradiction in the play of presence and absence at work in 
the opposition between past and present, and that both primary and 
secondary retention must be considered as ‘two modifications of non-
perception […], two ways of relating to the irreducible nonpresence 
of another now’.46 Stiegler will accept this critique without question, 
while nonetheless insisting that the distinction if not the opposition 
between primary retention and secondary remains crucial, but that to 
it must be added the concept of ‘tertiary retention’, exteriorized mem-
ory, as that which opens the very ground of the play of the primary 
and the secondary.
What difference does all this make? Stiegler points out that Husserl 
conducts his phenomenological investigation of the temporal object 
that is the melody at around the same moment as the invention of 
the gramophone. Furthermore, this invention makes it possible, for 
the first time in history, for a listener to repeat an identical auditory 
reception: the recorded sound that is emitted remains unchanged from 
the first time I listen to an album until the second. What this new pos-
sibility of identical auditory repetition exposes is that, for the listener, 
the experience is not identical.
The question is why, and the only possible conclusion is that if there 
has been change, it must be in the listener – they must have individu-
ated themselves in the interval between the first listening and the sec-
ond. What this implies is not that they have aged or undergone some 
other physiological alteration, but that the store of primary retentions 
that have become secondary has been added to and rearranged in the 
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interval between the two occasions, and firstly by the fact that, sec-
ond time round, the ‘content’ has become less unfamiliar. If this sec-
ond experience really is different from the first, however, then this 
further implies that the very act of perception, of primary retention, 
is not just a passive reception of the ‘given’ that is provided by the 
‘data’ on the gramophone record: the reception involved in primary 
retention must always already be a selection from among possible pri-
mary retentions, and the criteria for this selection must be provided 
by the arrangement of secondary retentions, that is, from the stock of 
past experience.
The upshot of this consideration is that tertiary retention, the artifi-
cial memory producing the process of epiphylogenesis, makes it pos-
sible to manipulate the arrangement of secondary retentions, which 
in turn makes it possible to influence the selection criteria involved 
in primary retention, or in other words, to condition the character of 
experience itself. And, along with it, to condition protention, that is, 
the whole gamut of the relationship to the future that is covered by 
the concepts of expectation, anticipation, hope, fear and desire, along 
with will, belief, faith, confidence and trust.
On the one hand, it is this possibility of control that is positively 
exploited in every process of education (conducted via what Stiegler 
calls the ‘programming institutions’,47 starting with parental care and 
including every level of schooling), where systematic access to the 
tertiary retentions containing the accumulated knowledge of past gen-
erations makes it possible to re-interiorize what has been exteriorized 
in books or other hypomnesic artefacts, so that it becomes possible, 
for example, to memorize a poem, and through that re-interiorization 
to produce a differentiation of experiences of that poem, which is to 
say, to open up the possibility of a new interpretation of that poem. In 
this sense, the automatisms of education are the condition on which 
it becomes possible to reach that state of autonomy that Kant called 
maturity and that amounts to the possibility of critique and thinking 
for oneself. At the same time, any such educational process is per-
petually threatened with becoming impotent with respect to changes 
occurring in the technical system that leave existing ways of life in 
want of new knowledge and practices of care, an impotence and ste-
rility reflected in knowledge becoming dogma, that is, negatively 
pharmacological.
On the other hand, it is this very same possibility of control that 
is exploited by marketing as the basis of twentieth-century consumer 
capitalism (conducted via what Stiegler calls the ‘programming 
industries’, that is, the culture industries), which, in the twentieth 
century, takes advantage of the mass broadcast capabilities afforded 
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by audiovisual grammatization technology to target, not the desires 
that form the basis of all long-term cultivation required by every kind 
of education, but rather the drives, in order to condition behaviour 
towards the pursuit of the most short-term satisfactions imaginable. In 
this way, consumer capitalism is founded on systematically short-cir-
cuiting the libidinal economy, undermining every form of long-term 
cultivation, and taking advantage of this proletarianization of every-
day life by offering readymade substitutes.
At the end of the twentieth century, a new form of grammatiza-
tion begins to dominate: digital grammatization (grammatizing liter-
ally everything in binary code), combined with the global networks 
of the internet based on the HTML protocol and so on. In the twenty-
first century, this is combined with the invention of the ubiquitous 
handheld computer known as the smartphone and the simultaneous 
rise of the gargantuan so-called ‘social’ networks, making possible 
a vast two-way traffic of data (which was not possible with the mass-
broadcast terrestrial networks of twentieth-century radio and televi-
sion) that could be combined with algorithmic processing to target 
individual brains in a highly segmented and particularized way.
This leads to a third stage of generalized proletarianization, target-
ing not just the knowledge of how to use tools in order to perform 
work, not just the knowledge of how to conduct everyday life, but 
every form of formalized, conceptual and theoretical knowledge as 
well. Beyond proletarianization, this amounts to what Stiegler calls 
denoetization, reflected not just in the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
that contributed to the rise of a president himself (dis)connected to/
from the world via Fox News, but also Lancetgate, which showed the 
reliance of researchers publishing in the oldest and most prestigious 
medical journals on datasets about which they themselves remained 
completely blind. In the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, the owners of 
the platforms involved in this algorithmic form of governmentality 
are doing their utmost to take advantage of this ‘shock’ to introduce a 
new doctrine, raising the prospect of what Naomi Klein refers to as a 
‘screen new deal’.48
From organology to neganthropology – there is no alternative
Bernard Stiegler himself did not begin to refer to the Anthropocene as 
such until the third phase of his work, in which he begins to elaborate, 
in a much more serious way, a question that can be found in his ear-
lier work, but without the same emphasis: the question of entropy and 
its corresponding counter-tendency most often referred to as negent-
ropy. Already in 2001, for example, Stiegler describes the ‘diversity 
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of possible interpretations’ involved in reading a text – and specifi-
cally for Kant himself in re-reading the Critique of Pure Reason and 
through that re-writing it – in terms of being the production of negent-
ropy ‘as the chance of thought itself’, whereas the ‘industrialized pro-
duction of tertiary retentions for masses of consciousnesses’ amounts 
to a mass standardization producing a ‘homogeneous entropic soup’ 
that risks ‘an entropic synchronization of consciousnesses that would 
add up to nothing less than the end of time’.49 ‘End of time’: because 
temporality is nothing but the maintenance and multiplication of the 
improbable against the arrow of probable becoming, consisting firstly 
in the struggle of endosomatic life, and secondly in that unfolding 
negentropic diversity of singular interpretations produced by singu-
lar noetic souls weaving a fabric of primary, secondary and tertiary 
retentions and opening the possibility of a future rather than sink-
ing and regressing into becoming. In later texts, this ‘end of time’, 
which is not an ‘end of history’ in the sense of Francis Fukuyama 
but rather an inability to obtain the conditions of a relationship to 
past and future necessary for the constitution of an epoch, will be 
referred to by Stiegler as our current state of subsisting within an 
‘absence of epoch’.
It is only with a series of lectures and papers, probably beginning 
with ‘The Anthropocene and Neganthropology’, given in November 
2014 at the University of Kent, and then the publication of La société 
automatique in March 2015, that the relationship will be established 
between the second law of thermodynamics and the planetary crisis 
conceived as an Entropocene.50 A new set of terms will then prolifer-
ate in Stiegler’s work, on the basis not just of Erwin Schrödinger’s 
1944 account of life as a kind of negentropic and asymmetrical pro-
cess of crystallization,51 but also the 1945 work of the mathematician 
Alfred J. Lotka,52 who emphasizes the fact that exosomatic evolution 
is a kind of second negentropy, in the sense that it may, indeed, belong 
to and emerge from endosomatic evolution, but it also suspends that 
evolution and, more importantly, the criteria by which it operates. 
Rather than involving the finite aims of genetic instinct, or some lati-
tudes of freedom in the expression of those aims granted by epigen-
etic memory, the behaviour of the noetic souls of exosomatic beings 
becomes detached from what Freud called the exigencies of life, and 
can instead be reattached to desires and expectations that are no lon-
ger finite, but singular and infinite, aiming at what does not exist but 
consists,53 including all the forms of knowledge.
This doubling of the counter-entropic tendency by the advent of 
exosomatization leads Stiegler to refer not just to negentropy but 
to neganthropy and anti-anthropy, which struggle against not just 
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thermodynamic entropy (for example, the warming of the atmosphere 
due to greenhouse gases), nor just biological entropy (for example, the 
loss of biodiversity resulting from habitat destruction), but anthropy 
(the psychic and collective devastation wrought by the reduction of 
knowledge to information, the incalculable to the calculable). The 
question of the origin of the human was, as we said at the beginning, 
of little interest to Stiegler: what mattered was not Anthropos but the 
appearance of epiphylogenesis, a third kind of memory associated 
with what, after Lotka, he will call exosomatization.
In the third phase of his work, noetic souls will be what are pos-
sessed by what Stiegler begins to call ‘simple exorganisms’ (a con-
traction of exosomatic organisms), which always belong to both 
‘lower complex exorganisms’ (a factory, a hospital, a school, a club) 
and ‘higher complex exorganisms’ (such as a nation), where it is the 
latter alone who can appeal to what does not exist but consists (jus-
tice, democracy, etc.), even if only at infinity, through that providing 
the overarching criteria for behavioural selection. Stiegler is not con-
cerned with the human, but with our undeniable potential to become 
inhuman. What matters is not Anthropos as such, but anthropy: 
anthropy as the risk of the noetic soul’s regression, as ‘anthropogenic 
forcing’, as all those tendencies towards stupidity and madness that 
are both the irreducible possibility of the noetic soul and the sys-
temic consequence of a technical and economic system that is based 
on an ideology of market absolutism and drives us ever-increasingly 
towards proletarianization and denoetization.
The infinity of knowledge, as that towards which simple and com-
plex exorganisms must aim, consists first of all in the fact that when-
ever we come to know something, and not just to acquire information, 
we add something to the world that it previously did not contain. In 
this way, knowledge does not just maintain the improbable against 
the tendency towards the probable: more than that, it always involves 
something of the incalculably improbable. Furthermore, like every 
kind of negentropy, knowledge and exosomatic life are always only 
ever local, the result of singularly local histories, even while they may 
be perpetually de-localizing (both positively and negatively), and 
only ever temporary (there is never any final victory against entropy): 
the production of negentropy within a locality (a cell, an organism, 
a tribe, a nation, a biosphere) always also produces entropy, and thus 
always involves risk.
This functional yet local, temporary and open characteristic of 
knowledge applies equally to whatever knowledge we may acquire of 
anthropy and neganthropy themselves, and for this reason it calls for 
a new relationship to the knowledge pursued in the physical, social 
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and human sciences, including philosophy: whereas in the final pages 
of Tristes Tropiques Claude Lévi-Strauss proposes re-spelling anthro-
pology as ‘entropology’ to reflect the overwhelmingly destructive 
agent that Anthropos has proven to be,54 Stiegler calls instead for a 
‘neganthropology’ of exorganic life. The neganthropic character of 
knowledge is a question of the incalculably improbable because it is a 
question of the new, of an addition that in this way opens up the pos-
sibility of a change – a bifurcation – making possible and necessary 
the pursuit of still further knowledge. It is to name the global scale of 
such a necessity, and against the anthropic tendencies that are lead-
ing to an increase of entropy of all kinds as the technosphere over-
whelms the biosphere, that Stiegler refers to the need for a planetary 
bifurcation taking us to what he calls the Neganthropocene – however 
improbable a dream that may be.
Such a bifurcation entails a reinvention of work as a knowledge-
able and knowledge-producing activity, less to prevent the new wave 
of automation that may well be coming than to take advantage of 
the chances it affords. Similarly, it cannot possibly be a question of 
rejecting or resisting ‘algorithms’, but of reinventing the operational 
characteristics and architecture of computation at a fundamental level 
so that it can serve the function of reason and the overarching value 
of neganthropy. And it requires the elaboration of new therapeutic 
approaches to the psychosocial disorders of contemporary life, which 
have their roots in the anthropic characteristics of the present-day use 
of hypomnesic tertiary retentional technologies. These were goals 
that Stiegler pursued collaboratively at his institute affiliated with 
the Centre Pompidou, experimentally as part of the Plaine Commune 
project that aimed to create a Contributory Learning Territory in the 
northern suburbs of Paris, and theoretically in his last book, the col-
lective work published in French under the title Bifurquer: ‘Il n’y a 
pas alternative’.
The evil reign of anthropy and the probably closed fate of the 
Entropocene
Nevertheless, we should not let these hopeful aims and positive proj-
ects cloud our awareness of the depths of the abyss before which 
we find ourselves, nor of the depths of the abyss to which Bernard 
Stiegler himself was led. In the preface of his first book (repeated on 
the back cover), he already wrote:
That a radical change in outlook and attitude is demanded 
induces all the more reactivity because it is unavoidable. 
Ressentiment and denegation are factors of ruin as well as 
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irreducible tendencies, which Nietzsche and Freud placed at 
the heart of their reflections a century ago.55
In Acting Out, writing about the twenty-five years that had passed 
since his release from prison, he says that, indeed, the world marked 
by ‘the organization of the loss of individuation’ has ‘revealed itself 
to be appallingly inhospitable’.56 In The Age of Disruption, a work on 
all the forms of madness produced by the ‘disruption’ pursued via 
computational capitalism, he describes how, in August 2014, he found 
himself ‘increasingly obsessed by death, that is, by what I projected as 
being my death, and by the latter as my deliverance, waking up every 
night haunted by this suicidal urge’.57 Later in the same chapter, in a 
section entitled ‘Suffering’, he relates this intimate and private haunt-
ing to a much more general spectre haunting our world or lack of it:
Today, however, melancholy and more generally all forms 
of ὕβρις are shaped by the retentional and protentional 
specificities of the pharmaka of the absence of epoch, and 
this absence of epoch produces disruption inasmuch as 
these automated retentions and protentions are treated by 
algorithms operating more quickly than any form of care. 
Because of all this, madness, which becomes ordinary 
and general, is today a question that is inextricably medi-
cal, economic, juridical, political and industrial, that is, 
technological.58
More recently still, in The Immense Regression, he returns to the 
statement he had made in the preface of Technics and Time, 1, observ-
ing that, twenty-five years later, the ‘explosion of resentment […] has 
exceeded all my fears’.59 Stiegler is thereby led to write a book that 
reflects on the fact that today, our problem is less a politics of repres-
sion than a vast tendency towards the regression of the noetic soul, in 
the course of which he undertakes to re-read Nietzsche through the 
prism of the relationship between entropy and nihilism, showing that 
the machine, the railway and the telegraph, which Nietzsche thinks in 
terms of a ‘combination’, lead Nietzsche to a profound dread steeped 
in his awareness of the second law but without the means to con-
ceive its negentropic and neganthropic counterpart. The Entropocene, 
Stiegler concludes, is what accomplishes nihilism in the form of so-
called disruption, no matter that its totalitarian character may so often 
remain unperceived. Agreeing with Nietzsche that today our philoso-
phy must begin not with wonder but with dread, he sees before us a 
becoming without future that brings to reality
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all the threats swept along by the current of nihilism, which 
is also a drowning of singularities in and by averages via 
technologies of scalability, which saturate the technosphere 
thanks to intensive computing – informational democracy, 
which has liquidated the democracy of opinion, moves like 
the sorcerer’s apprentice swept away by his broom.60
And it is in this world that, in his final book, he sees the arrival of 
Greta Thunberg as a sign, an Antigone, but a more-than-tragic fig-
ure. Greta Thunberg confronts us not just with the loss of the remem-
brance of divine law, but with the loss of everything: in the age of 
tragedy, death proves to be inevitable and every artifice to be ambigu-
ous and pharmacological, yet the cosmos remains inalterable; today, 
it is the cosmos itself that succumbs to the anthropic tendency as 
every improbable locality and singular place tends to be reduced to an 
undifferentiated entropic space.61
In one of his final texts, not yet published, Bernard Stiegler refers 
once again to the historian Arnold Toynbee, and to his 1976 book, 
Mankind and Mother Earth, where, in Stiegler’s words, Toynbee diag-
noses the imminent possibility of a catastrophe that ‘would result both 
from a suicidal tendency of civilizations and from excessive exploita-
tion of the biosphere’:62
Collective suicidal tendencies appear in a civilization when 
the credit it grants to itself, and which founds the power 
of its organic solidarity, is for any reason compromised – 
invasion, natural catastrophe, corruption, famine, disease. 
Aristotle called philia the solidarity that creates the sustain-
ability of societies – which he himself observed from the 
perspective of the city, the polis, and this standpoint consti-
tuted what since Plato has been called politics.63
What he had in the earlier quotation called ‘informational democ-
racy’, which seems to algorithmically and performatively close off 
every possible neganthropic future, amounts to this elimination of the 
possibility of granting the credit necessary for philia.
The credit necessary for any possible establishing of a sustainable 
future involves the entire field of belief, faith, trust, confidence and 
hope, but it is also a question of the existential dimension of philoso-
phy itself: without the ‘existential dimension of all philosophy’, the 
latter ‘would lose all credit and sink into scholastic chatter’.64 This 
existential dimension must be felt, as must its loss, which Stiegler, 
perhaps, felt more keenly than anyone, a loss that is also a loss of 
credit, leaving us in ‘absolute mécréance’:
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The latter is characteristic of the nihilism that will thus have 
been accomplished fifty years earlier than Nietzsche had 
foreseen, which presents itself in the form of an accursed 
age, corrupting the twenty-first century as if in advance, and 
which will become the general reality of the Anthropocene 
era as the latter turns out to be an accumulation of reasons 
for doubt in all domains, if not of counter-truths – modern 
certitude thereby literally collapsing.65
What now remains of Stiegler’s project, recalling that for him, mean-
ingful political action, if these remain terms with which to face what 
is coming, could never consist in designating scapegoats, nor in 
resenting what was, nor in resisting power, nor in opposing an enemy 
(who is only ever a bearer of a tendency)? Was it nothing more than a 
dream, like so many others?
A dream, what else?
His loss leaves us, leaves me, caught in a vast entropic current, seem-
ingly without any realisable dreams in which any longer to believe: 
bereft and adrift. Are we, am I, perpetually trapped in a more-than-
tragic situation of overwhelming anthropy, bound as a result to 
become or remain evil? A strange question, perhaps. On this, we will 
allow the final word to go to Bernard, neither quite a saint nor a hero 
nor a father nor a king, but a generous and warm and truthful friend, 
and undeniably a philosopher, a great one, and possibly – perhaps 
even probably – the last:
As for evil, it is above all, as the replacement of thought with 
the denunciation of evil, OUR renunciation, we who worry 
about the future of the we, our renunciation of critique and 
invention, that is, of combat.66
2 Protentional Finitude and Infinitude  
in the Anthropocene
Introduction
Casting a glance at the world today inevitably means peering into the 
ubiquitous screens now occupying the attention of consumers for the 
great bulk of their waking life.67 Doing so equally inevitably brings 
into focus a picture of a world that seems to be running off the rails 
and out of control, in which disorder and strife are intensifying in 
unforeseen ways, and where a torrent of populist events seems to have 
consigned truths hitherto assumed to a kind of twilight zone, if not a 
rapidly darkening twilight of truth itself. The future has never seemed 
so unpredictable, our disadjustment and misalignment never so unre-
adjustable and out-of-joint, and our protentional capacities never so 
correspondingly limited.
But when did this torrent begin its onrush? Everyone knows that 
today’s sense of chaos, privation and powerlessness was not born yes-
terday, as surely as they doubt that faith, or trust, or certainty will 
be reawakened tomorrow or the day after. Is this rising madness an 
industrially-manufactured populism peculiar to the twenty-first 
century, or do the worrying images propagating across our screens 
reveal the return of those secularized, disenchanted, technocratic, yet 
wildly irrational movements of the twentieth, such as the fascism and 
Nazism hurriedly evoked by so many of those trading in diagnoses 
of the present day? Ought we seek yet older roots in the industrial 
revolution itself, in the harnessing of fire’s motor force and in the 
philosophical ‘importation’ of thermodynamic ideas?68 Or has this 
irrationality been harboured and ushered forth via the very notions of 
progress and enlightenment themselves, bound, despite themselves, to 
lead to a new kind of barbarism?69
Is there a madman who, by dint of an uncommon willingness to 
peer more deeply into the shadowy parts of our collective souls, can 
illuminate these tenebrous sources, and so aid in re-orienting our 
disorientation? In July 2004, Peter Thiel, whose entrepreneurial per-
sona certainly consists in an unusual composition of contradictory 
personal, political and religious elements, proffered his own stab at 
a kind of barometer of the times, in a lecture entitled ‘The Straussian 
Moment’. Thiel begins with the rather arch assertion that the twenty-
first century began ‘with a bang’, and it is notable that, at this apogee 
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of ‘neocon’ influence, when, in the wake of 9/11, Paul Wolfowitz and 
his ilk had indeed seized hold with great force and even greater hubris 
of the American military apparatus,70 Thiel suspects these puta-
tive geopolitical world-shapers and will-revivers may have ‘missed 
something fundamental altogether’.71 And what Straussians miss 
is precisely the hubris of their own visions: they tend to downplay 
the violence, indeed the murder, lying at the foundation of all social 
formations, the scapegoating that is the perpetual temptation in the 
face of that violence, and the way all forms of secularization repeat, 
mimetically, the sacrificial inscription of that founding crime (sac-
rifice being itself an attempt to prevent repetition that paradoxically 
ensures it). In short, for Thiel, René Girard trumps Leo Strauss, and 
the neoconservative faith in the ability to conjure some new political 
will fails to reckon with the duplicity of the ritual tomb that simulta-
neously elevates the victim and conceals the crime that lies always 
at the origin.
Hence for Thiel the great pseudo-schism of American politics 
between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ requires temporal interpre-
tation: liberals wish to know nothing of this foundational violence, 
while conservatives wish to know nothing of the transformational 
character of the future.72 If it is clear that Thiel, the conservative lib-
ertarian, the pious disruptor, wants to stretch himself out along the 
contours of this schism between past and future, the practical implica-
tions are less clear: to counter the tendency towards ‘the limitless vio-
lence of runaway mimesis’ he offers only the elusive advice that ‘the 
Christian statesman or stateswoman would be wise, in every close 
case, to side with peace’.73
Nevertheless, one month after delineating the Girardian character 
of the Straussian moment, Thiel took the practical step of becoming 
the first outside investor in the largest mimetic experiment in human 
history, Facebook, and did so because Girard’s work gave him to 
understand that social media are doubly the embodiment of mimetic 
desire, both in the way they spread, and in what they are ‘about’.74 
Facebook: which is now relentlessly approaching two billion mem-
bers, and which algorithmically regulates the content to which each of 
those members is screenically exposed, with the effect of auto-prop-
agating microcosmological ‘bubbles’, a mimetic crisis that would, 
twelve years after Thiel’s investment, contribute to the election of a 
scapegoating candidate supported and assisted by Thiel himself.
Somewhat paradoxically, Thiel, who in 2004 was already a found-
ing member of the PayPal mafia, has not one word to say in ‘The 
Straussian Moment’ about network technology or its disruptions. 
There is only the hint of a suggestion that these transformations that 
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conservatives fail to envision may not just be social and political, but 
technological, perhaps even primarily so, yet how this goes in Thiel’s 
mind remains unstated. If this amounts to a suppression of the tech-
nological, however, it is a characteristic common also to Girard: in 
his own contribution to the 2004 Stanford University conference that 
would be published as Politics and Apocalypse, for instance, Girard 
argues that the duplicitous tomb (the ‘rotting corpse inside and the 
beautiful structure around it’) is homologous with culture itself, 
because, with ‘the exception of tools, the most ancient traces of 
human culture are tombs, and tombs may well be the original monu-
ments of humanity’.75 But what justifies this ‘exception’? Even if ritu-
alized burial sites date back 300,000 years,76 and thus vastly predate 
the Neolithic myths and rituals that Claude Lévi-Strauss understood 
to be those concerned with the origin of agriculture and the dispersal 
of groups, they would not predate the Palaeolithic myths concerned 
with the domestication not of plants and animals but of fire, the ‘seed’ 
of which must, in the hearth, itself be cared for and tended, and so 
cultivated, and so worshipped.77 On what basis is such a repression of 
the tool, that is, of technics, to be grounded, and what are its effects? 
Are not the duplicity of the tomb, and of the sacrificial structure that 
both forbids and ensures violent repetition, not in this light something 
more like instances of a more general duplicity, so that the Platonic 
pharmakon would not then function, as Girard contends, ‘like the 
human pharmakos’,78 but would instead, in its broadest generality, as 
technics in general, be rather more its source?
From Peter Thiel to Theodore Kaczynski, the struggle to the 
death between self-propagating supersystems and nuclear war 
as the lesser evil
One madman who cannot be accused of sweeping the technologi-
cal under the carpet, who all too clearly sees its ubiquitous figure 
adorning every terrestrial surface, who feels the night closing in, 
hears the noise of the gravediggers and smells the stench of decom-
position that these sometimes beautiful structures cannot conceal, 
currently resides in a federal prison in Colorado. While Theodore 
Kaczynski’s technological apocalypticism unambiguously opposes 
the rampant digital utopianism of Silicon Valley billionaires, not 
unrelated anxieties are clearly detectable among the latter, too, most 
openly thematized by Thiel but evidenced as well by their predilec-
tion for diverting wealth to potential escape routes, whether these 
be seasteading, the elixir of youthful blood, colonizing Mars (or, 
even more improbably, New Zealand), but also by rising fears of the 
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consequences of fully unleashed artificial intelligence. A brief exami-
nation of the Unabomber’s logic, as expressed most recently in Anti-
Tech Revolution: Why and How (2016), may expose, despite the locked 
prison of its delirium, how high are the theoretical walls and practical 
stakes raised by what is now termed the Anthropocene.
For Kaczysnki, as for innumerable others, it is self-evident that 
‘modern society is heading toward disaster’ and that what links 
together the dangers besetting it is modern technology.79 What sets 
him apart is his other founding premise, which we venture to describe 
as protentional finitude: the highly limited capacity of collective 
social formations to anticipate future events or predict the long-term 
consequences of collective action. His entire first chapter catalogues 
historical examples of failed attempts at ‘rational human control’. Of 
course, to assume from the outset the impossibility of control is to 
stack the deck: the technophilic hopes of the geoengineers and disrup-
tors and the sociophilic dreams of progressive planners like Naomi 
Klein are equally deluded, according to such a perspective, equally 
symptomatic of a denial that wants, regardless of the calculable prob-
ability of impending disaster, to do anything but acknowledge that 
only the total elimination of the destructive factors could significantly 
deflect the inexorable trajectory of what has become a global system.
Not content with drawing inductive conclusions from historical 
examples, Kaczynski presents a sequence of deductive propositions 
intended to elaborate a metaphysics of ‘self-propagating systems’, 
dynamic formations that tend to promote their own ‘survival and prop-
agation’.80 He thus aims to develop a quasi-Darwinian understanding 
of both vital and psychosocial individuation processes, where these 
localized metastable systems are nested within one another in such 
a way that microcosmological subsystems tend to accommodate to 
and become dependent upon macrocosmological supersystems. Such 
self-propagating systems are in perpetual competition, but their 
a-teleological character has the perverse consequence that those with 
advantageous short-term strategies tend to eliminate those with better 
long-term strategies: fitness for long-term survival does not translate 
into an increased likelihood of surviving, even if the long-term conse-
quence of the advantageous short-term strategy may be the destruc-
tion of all (say by the incomplete voidance of the destructive products 
of their own processes).
Throughout most of the history of life, and of the history of Homo 
sapiens, self-propagating systems have been limited by geographi-
cal conditions and their own restricted capacities for expansion, 
and when such systems have collapsed, the repercussions have only 
been local. But today, the globalization of human systems encounters 
Daniel Ross 54
other limits, encouraging the formation of a few massive supersys-
tems and tending to eliminate smaller, less successful systems, pro-
ducing intense competition between the remaining rivals – let’s say 
a mimetic crisis. In such circumstances, the slightest deviation from 
the most immediate short-termism (by unilaterally attempting serious 
climate mitigation strategies, for example) can result only in negative 
feedback for that system and corresponding gains for its rivals: a vast 
competitive potlatch in which, purely through the impact of selec-
tions effected through ‘trial and error’, the immediate destruction of 
resources will always triumph over the benefits of the whole, in this 
case the whole world. The strict irreversibility of this logic is so stark 
that Kaczynski advocates the immediate destruction of the entire 
global technological framework. Even the possibility that efforts to 
undo this destructive, supersystemic competition themselves risk pro-
voking geopolitical chaos, potentially triggering nuclear conflict, is 
no deterrent: the biosphere would likely survive the latter holocaust, 
he argues, and so, ‘if we had to choose between a major nuclear war 
and the continued existence of the system, we would have to take 
nuclear war as the lesser evil’.81
Light and heat, inertia and entropy
Kaczysnki expresses what everyone fears but tends to repress: that 
no process of collective decision-making may any longer be capable 
of curtailing destructive intensifications of systemic disruption. He 
ostensibly evinces a kind of social Darwinism, but one whose out-
come, when the imprisoned eco-terrorist obsessively runs simula-
tions of this model through his mind, is, instead of the survival of 
the fittest, always just ‘game over’. This ‘terroristic conception of 
human history’82 is absolutely antithetical to that of Immanuel Kant, 
for example, who, though ‘without the mind of a seer’, foresaw pro-
gressive improvement no longer subject to ‘total reversals’.83 Friedrich 
Nietzsche already saw this as a symptom of Kant’s becoming an 
idiot, action compelled by the ‘instinct of life’ having nothing to do 
with Kant’s ‘automaton of “duty”’.84 Yet if, with this sense of the life 
instinct as the only real arbiter in the struggle of existence, Nietzsche, 
too, embraced some more complex mutation of Darwinism, he him-
self arguably failed to reckon with what ultimately lies behind this 
theme and all its variations: the second law of thermodynamics.
For Georges Canguilhem, the discovery of this law corresponds to 
a shift in the locus of the question of progress, from light to heat.
Now, in the nineteenth century, the physical phenomenon 
that symbolizes progress is no longer light, but heat. Unlike 
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light, whose continuous emission is regarded as being guar-
anteed by the stability of the solar system, heat requires non-
renewable deposits of earthly combustibles if it is to be used 
as an industrial tool.85
Canguilhem does not fail to observe that the steam engine was a 
machine both invented and improved ‘before and without the elabo-
ration of the theory that made its workings intelligible’.86 Industrial 
mechanization arose, then, not from progressive improvements in the 
understanding of becoming, but in advance of that understanding, 
bringing with it a transformation of the social and working environ-
ment whose duplicitous face was immediately obvious in the darkened 
skies of industrial cities and pitiful conditions of proletarian labour. 
Only subsequently would the concept of entropy arise, precisely as 
the generalization of that theoretical elaboration enabling innovative 
gains in engine efficiency. It is these transformations of the produc-
tive economy, together with the philosophical importation of the con-
cept of entropy, that, according to Canguilhem, will then lead to the 
‘decline of the idea of progress’, a decline that reaches a kind of limit 
in Kaczynski’s terroristic conception of the fatal destructiveness of 
globally-extended self-propagating supersystems.
And yet, a glance at the dominant theoretical apparatuses elabo-
rated in the second half of the twentieth century doesn’t exactly con-
firm this hypothesis about entropy’s philosophico-political impact. 
In Jean-Paul Sartre’s attempted reconciliation of existentialism and 
Marxism, of freedom and its natural and historical limits (1960), scar-
city figures extremely prominently, yet the struggle it provokes is 
associated not with entropy but ‘controlled inertia’:
labour, as we have seen, is primarily the organism which 
reduces itself to a controlled inertia so as to act upon iner-
tia and satisfy itself as need. Clearly this does not in itself 
mean either that labour exists in the field of scarcity, or that 
it must be defined as a struggle against scarcity. But given 
a social field which is defined by scarcity, that is, given the 
historical human field, labour for man has to be defined as 
praxis aimed at satisfying need in the context of scarcity by a 
particular negation of it.87
The word entropy does not appear.
In Tristes Tropiques (1955), Claude Lévi-Strauss does indeed advo-
cate the re-spelling of anthropology as entropology, on the grounds 
that the former studies nothing more than the ‘highest manifesta-
tions of this process of disintegration’ that is civilization. Yet the 
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entropologist reveals his own confusion, when he describes this civi-
lization as an extraordinarily complex mechanism whose function is 
‘to produce what physicists call entropy, that is inertia’.88 It is by this 
seemingly minor substitution alone that the entropologist allows him-
self to believe that the ‘inertia’ of human (all too human) institutions 
can be opposed to the anti-entropic proliferations of biological evolu-
tion, as if the latter were not as bound as the former to produce an 
overall increase of entropy within their local ecosystems, and, at the 
largest scale, within the biosphere.
Prior to both these instances, Martin Heidegger begins to think the 
problem of what he, too, will call modern technology (1949). Like 
Canguilhem, he argues against the idea that science precedes technol-
ogy, which ‘then only later would have emerged as the application of 
this’. Yet he does maintain that modern technology ‘begins its reign 
with the commencement of modern natural science some three and a 
half centuries ago’, as the fate of modern physics that is destined to 
converge with the history of being, which then becomes the latter’s 
(cybernetic, informational) fate. And so, it does indeed make a differ-
ence how science apprehends nature:
But how does science take the material of nature? It con-
ceives it as matter. What is the fundamental characteristic 
of matter for physics? It is inertia. What does the physicist 
understand by inertia? Physically conceived, inertia is con-
tinuance in a state of motion. Rest is also such a state, which 
counts in a physically calculable manner as the limit case of 
motion. […] For physics, nature is the standing reserve of 
energy and matter.89
At the inceptions of existentialist Marxism, structural anthropology, 
and Bestand and Gestell, therefore, we don’t quite see Canguilhem’s 
replacement of light by heat, but, overlaying it, a confusion between 
inertia and entropy, or, in other words, between the (Newtonian and 
mechanical) first law of motion and the (probabilistic and irrevers-
ible) second law of thermodynamics. Beyond this confounding of 
mechanical and statistical notions, however, what this tends to show 
is that this ‘importation’ has brought little corresponding reflection 
on the persistence of order and ongoing complexification characteris-
tic of the negative entropy that Erwin Schrödinger would describe in 
1943.90 If the nineteenth century did indeed grasp something of this 
replacement of illumination with entropic heat – whose irreversibility 
and ‘calculus of probabilities’ would be, for Oswald Spengler’s ter-
roristic philosophical anthropology, the most ‘conspicuous symbol’ 
of decline and a new kind of mythology of Gotterdammerung91 – the 
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twentieth century, in its great philosophical currents, failed to take 
heed of Schrödinger’s thought that a vital counter-tendency exists, 
consisting in the struggle to organize the entropic.
From différance to neganthropology
These counter-tendencies, detours in the form of eddies provision-
ally and locally organized within the stream of entropic disorder, are 
another name for Kaczynski’s self-propagating systems. What the 
extremity of the latter’s eco-terroristic conception exposes is there-
fore that a sense of the negentropic does not, in and of itself, insure 
against an apocalyptic judgment unblinking even at the prospect of 
nuclear fire. What ultimately authorizes his rejection of ‘rational con-
trol’, however, is the failure to make distinctions (which are not oppo-
sitions) within the negentropic field: the negentropy of ‘nature’ and 
the negentropy of ‘culture’ remain undifferentiated, and the axiom 
that short-termism will always win out is, beyond historical exam-
ple, founded on this assumed unity: beyond improbable, it is simply 
impossible for the Unabomber that any more-than-biological will 
could constructively intervene in the conservation or transformation 
of these counter-entropic eddies, which are bound as a consequence 
to destructively drag the entire biosphere down into the torrent of 
becoming. Hence Kaczynski’s metaphysics is, in this, congruent with 
Sigmund Freud’s account of the infusorian that, ‘left to itself, dies a 
natural death owing to its incomplete voidance of the products of its 
own metabolism’,92 which Freud then extends to the mortal character 
of all higher animals, or, indeed, with Jacques Derrida’s différantial 
continuum extending ‘from the elementary programs of so-called 
“instinctive” behavior up to the constitution of electronic card-
indexes and reading machines’.93
Between Beyond the Pleasure Principle and What is Life?, however, 
Alfred North Whitehead did, in 1929, pronounce what amounts to a 
counter-entropic conception, according to which the tendency to ‘the 
slow decay of physical nature’ and the ‘degradation of energy’ are 
matched by another, ‘upward’ tendency.94 If this is the negentropic 
tendency of life itself, then, for the ‘higher forms of life’, it includes 
not just living but ‘living well’, that is, forms of life actively engaged 
in anti-entropically ‘modifying their environment’. And for we our-
selves, insofar as we remain noetic beings, beings amenable to reason, 
this ‘attack on the environment’ lives not just well but better, and does 
so precisely because ‘Reason’, whose primary function this is, is the 
‘art of life’ attaining ends ‘realized in imagination but not in fact’.95
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It is to this latter conception of contending tendencies (tenden-
cies within, emerging out of and falling back into other tendencies) 
that Bernard Stiegler turns when approaching the question of the 
Anthropocene, precisely in order to avoid the terroristic conceptions 
of contemporary apocalypticism and crepuscular madness, whether 
mimetic, technophilic, transhumanist, entropological or ecologi-
cal. As the differentiation from and deferral of the entropic tendency, 
the counter-entropic detour that is the vital process of individuation 
(‘life’, in Schrödinger’s terms) is, as Derrida thought, no more nor 
less than the process of différance. But for Stiegler, noetic beings are 
those whose milieu is not just ‘natural’ but always already ‘techni-
cal’, a pre-individuality enabling the intermittent and improbable 
capacity to strive for ends in imagination, for what does not exist yet 
consists – a potential for living better that amounts to a différance 
of différance. The conditions of noetic existence are therefore tech-
nological, or better, organological: the self-propagating systems that 
are the psychic and collective processes of individuation identified by 
Gilbert Simondon are possible only via their mutual dependence on 
processes of technical individuation, which in turn depend on psycho-
social adjustments and transformations, failing which technical pro-
cesses are indeed bound to sink into entropy, along with the psychic 
and collective individuations they support.
More than a question of nature and culture, this différance of dif-
férance involves the tendency for natural selection to be suspended 
when it makes way for processes of artificial selection.96 This is a new 
regime of individuation, not just because tools represent a new means 
of attack on the environment, but, more importantly, because the 
inscriptive character of every artefact also renders it an exteriorized 
form of memory, in addition to those forms of behavioural conserva-
tion and programming constituted by genetic and nervous memory. 
The transmissibility of exteriorized memory, combined with its abil-
ity to be lastingly conserved beyond the death of the individual who 
inscribes it into one or another form of matter, opens up new individu-
ation processes, enabling and requiring the intergenerational trans-
mission of accumulated knowledge so as to cultivate the capacities 
opened up by technical means, just as one must tend the seed of fire. 
With the advent of hypomnesis – technical compensations for reten-
tional finitude specifically dedicated to the exteriorization of knowl-
edge, turning it into exteriorized information but also opening up new 
processes of re-interiorization – it becomes possible not just to con-
serve knowledge but to accumulate it, build upon it, interpret it and 
criticize it. And to forget and destroy it.
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Hence the attack on the environment in which technical life con-
sists is, for Stiegler, unlike for Whitehead, explicitly pharmacological, 
simultaneously the remedy and the poison, containing the possibil-
ity of promoting the art of life or of undermining it, contributing to 
processes of interiorization or short-circuiting them, pursuing pro-
cesses of individuation or attenuating them. Because these pharma-
cological possibilities are dependent on the hypomnesic conditions of 
exteriorized memory, the commencement of the Anthropocene is, for 
Stiegler, as conditional upon Gütenberg, Jacquard and Vaucanson as 
it is on Watt or Newcomen. And this is also why, when it comes to 
anticipating the fate of the Anthropocene, Stiegler understands the 
shift to twenty-first century capitalism in terms of a kind of reversal 
of Canguilhem’s move from light to heat: for Stiegler, we are at the 
beginning of a long shift from the ‘carbon-time’ of industrial mecha-
nization, internal combustion engines and road networks to the new 
pharmacology of ‘light-time’, that of ubiquitous screens, digital net-
works and ‘big data’.97
As a question of hypomnesis, that is, of the conditions of reason, 
this is a matter not just of the new weapons of the productive econ-
omy, but of the fruitful or destructive weapons that transform or cap-
ture the libidinal economy as the engine of systems of anticipation 
and control in general, and consumerist systems in particular. The 
différance involved in contemporary exosomatization thus involves 
the question not just of an attack on the environment, but of the poli-
tics of that attack. Ultimately, the pharmacological character of exo-
somatization stems from the way it participates in processes leading 
both to probabilistic, cosmological, entropic indifferentiation or to the 
conservation and transformation of local differences that is the highly 
improbable and (finally) unwinnable, noetic struggle against entropy. 
Hence the theory and practice of this politics is what Stiegler calls 
‘neganthropology’:
If the hyperbolic negentropy in which the organological 
becoming of the organic consists installs a neganthropol-
ogy that accelerates (entropic and anthropic) becoming, it 
nevertheless also transforms this acceleration into a future 
that differs and defers this becoming, according to the two 
senses of the verb différer mobilized by Derrida in his term 
différance. Hence a (negentropic and neganthropic) future 
could be established from this infinitizing form of proten-
tion that is the object of desire as an agent of (psychic, social 
and technical) individuation and integration – failing which, 
différance will remain merely formal.98
Daniel Ross 60
The dramaturgy of modern technics and the question of desire 
beyond anthropocentrism
Long before he adopted this new terminology – neganthropy, 
neganthropology, Entropocene, Neganthropocene – Stiegler had 
already noted that the ‘dramaturgy of modern technics begins in the 
eighteenth century with a phase of optimism’, but that this enters 
into crisis with the doubly entropic, tool-equipped, thermodynamic 
machine, which both pollutes the milieu and destroys the worker’s 
knowledge.99 But where Simondon, whose ‘mechanology’ Stiegler is 
discussing in this passage, conceives the advent of cybernetics in the 
twentieth century as the rise of a new, negentropic machine, requir-
ing only the accompaniment of a new mechanological discourse to 
conduct the orchestra of machines, Stiegler worries that the increas-
ing automation of the functions and faculties of reason could lead ‘to 
an ever-greater dilution of the interior milieu into the exterior one’, as 
knowledge degrades into information.100 Stiegler’s notion of ‘reason’ 
has thus always been suspicious of any residue of the metaphysics of 
mastery,101 and has always been concerned with the conditions of rea-
son’s actualization.
Reason, for Stiegler, has always referred to a broad spectrum of 
projective illumination (always casting shadows) extending through 
expectation, motive, desire and conceptual thought, everything that 
amounts to a différance of desire from drive and drive from instinct 
(à la Whitehead’s tripartite schema: living, living well, living better) 
effected through an originary technicity undecidably emerging from 
and inaugurating a primordial and necessary default. Hence it has 
always also required the re-interiorization of exteriorized contents: 
data, the given, must circuit back into the brain qua organ for making 
decisions, aiming at, desiring, reasoning towards what does not exist 
but consists. But this ‘brain’ is not itself some pure interiority, but is 
better understood as the product of the very long maieutic between 
the organic and the inorganic that began at the dawn of human evolu-
tion and intensified with the birth of hypomnesic exteriorization in 
the Upper Palaeolithic: it is, then, an extended psychic apparatus that, 
as organological, cannot itself exist without being embedded in the 
social and technical networks of knowledge that form the system of 
intergenerational education in the broadest sense.
For Erich Hörl, writing prior to this terminological innovation, this 
foundation of Stieglerian thought in ‘(de)fault and lack’ (a highly prob-
lematic conjunction of what must in fact be distinguished) amounts 
to an ‘anthropocentric bias’, ‘a de-anthropologizing as well as a re-
anthropologizing operation’, exposing the ‘inherent limit’ of Stiegler’s 
libidinal ecology and resulting in a ‘neo-humanistic position’.102 Hörl 
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repeatedly suspects that the ‘negativity’ of ‘lack and default’103 has 
been superseded by cyberneticization that so redefines the difference 
of human and non-human actors as to require a new ‘general ecol-
ogy’ exposed to ‘the new sense that springs forth under the techno-
logical condition’.104 If the question of the fate of interiorization there-
fore seems to hang over this ‘new sense’, Hörl nevertheless situates 
such an ecology within the orbit of a ‘pharmacology of participation’ 
capable of distinguishing between alienating and counter-alienating 
tendencies,105 distributed between ‘hyperindustrially controlled’ and 
‘openly relational’ possibilities.106 How this critique of a purported re-
anthropologizing, neo-humanizing anthropocentric bias is to be com-
posed with such a pharmacology therefore awaits a fuller account of 
this proposed general ecology.107
Mark Hansen takes this line further, arguing that Stiegler sees tech-
nics ‘exclusively as a support of human becoming and […] as a support 
for an account of human becoming that does not put the human itself 
into question (or, at least, does not do so in radical enough terms)’.108 
This alleged deficiency is shown by Stiegler’s ‘investment in desire 
and libidinal economy’, which is merely a ‘throwback to a moment 
in cultural history that has been superseded’109 by more recent tech-
nology, leading Stiegler to a pharmacological prosthetics ‘restricting 
technics to a human-centered operationality’.110 The more radical tra-
jectory would consist in moving beyond ‘any imaginable organologic 
whatsoever’: it is necessary to ‘overcome the logic of human know-
how’,111 to ‘repudiate the operation of interiorization […] so cen-
tral to Stiegler’s account of libidinal economy’,112 and to elaborate a 
‘resolutely nonprosthetic account of technics […] as a component in a 
larger system of individuation’113 where psychic and collective indi-
viduations can be understood only from within ‘larger, thoroughly 
technical, environmental processes’.114
In a quasi-Girardian manoeuvre, Hansen mobilizes first Catherine 
Malabou then Gabriel Tarde to argue for a ‘cerebrality’ that ‘remains 
radically open’ to the ‘radically exterior’, because it is constituted on 
a purely imitative basis, ‘without requiring any form of interioriza-
tion’.115 Hansen wonders if such an account of imitative repetition 
might not ‘furnish the very motor mechanism for the entire indi-
viduation complex and might in this way make a crucial contribution 
toward situating individuation beyond organology’.116 This technolo-
gization of the Girardian account of mimesis and abandonment of 
organological pharmacology, however, seems ‘radically’ incapable 
of mounting a critique of the neo-technophilic Thielian acceptance 
of a resolutely post-democratic world of algorithmically-engineered 
crowds and audiences.
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Leaving aside the radically false assertion that Stiegler does not 
put the human into question, such criticisms fall for a philosophical 
red herring consisting in imagining that virtue today means adopting 
the most radically post-humanist or trans-humanist or anti-humanist 
pose. In short, the distinction between vital différance and noetic dif-
férance in no way implies an opposition between the animal and the 
human. For Stiegler it is clear that noetic ‘cerebrality’ has always been 
‘radically open’ to the exterior. What matters is not ‘the human’ but 
technical existence, insofar as, on the basis of biological and techno-
cultural automatisms, it is capable of autonomizing its existence only 
by aiming at what does not exist except in imagination.
Only through the operations of interiorization does technical life 
bear this capacity for protentional infinitude, for quasi-causally antic-
ipating and realising the highly improbable.117 Kaczynski’s desperate 
metaphysical prison of self-propagating structures may be naïve in its 
failure to question what difference exteriorization makes to the indi-
viduation processes it purports to describe, just as, conversely, Thiel’s 
entrepreneurial acceptance of algorithmic mimesis seems highly cyn-
ical. Yet in blithely accepting if not celebrating the breakdown of the 
operations of interiorization and the circuits of libidinal economy, is 
not Hansen at risk of locking himself outside, of discovering that his 
discourse is equally impotent, if not cynical, when confronted with 
today’s sinking of negentropic and neganthropic processes into entro-
pic twilight?
Between our protentional finitude and infinitude, the future con-
sists. Our Anthropocenic challenge consists in struggling to live psy-
chosocially and biospherically better by striving for ends existing in 
imagination but not in fact, or, in other words, that exist only at infin-
ity – that do not exist at all yet consist. Such as, for example, justice, 
but also love, for Stiegler also writes, ‘Today, in a time of loveless-
ness…’.118 Two conclusions. Firstly, the living better and the art of 
life that promote it are a question neither of ‘nature’ nor the ‘human’, 
but of inventing new forms of neganthropy via new processes of 
interiorization on the basis of new potentialities of exosomatization. 
Secondly, the question of the libidinal economy is the question of the 
possibility of reviving love in a loveless age, of opening up a new 
love of and care for the world bearing the chance of fostering the will 
to invent that new, as yet unapproachable cosmology currently barely 
existing in our imagination, if at all. ‘Duty’ cannot be discarded as 
nothing more than an automaton antithetical to ‘life’, but nor can it 
do without automatisms not just negentropic but neganthropic: with-
out processes of interiorization capable of fostering this new will, the 
apocalyptic fantasies fuelling the terroristic conceptions of telecratic 
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populism have every likelihood of ending in the ‘limitless violence of 
runaway mimesis’, and not just in imagination. ‘Siding with peace’, 
today, consists not in raising new anthropic tombs but in inventing 
the conditions for the emergence of the highly improbable with-
out denying the undoubtedly probable. If this neganthropological 
politics requires new ways of living, new forms of normativity in 
Canguilhem’s sense, what remains to be elucidated is how any new, 
imaginable or unimaginable metastability is to be effected: not just in 
the face of algorithmic mimesis that captures attention and attenuates 
interiorization; nor just in the face of media theorists all too willing 
to conclude that the wish to revive such interiorization is merely the 
conservatism and nostalgia produced by misplaced anxiety about the 
transformations taking us into the age of full cybernetic automation; 
but confronted, as well, with a psychosocial milieu where potential 
allies in this struggle remain caught within a cultural politics that 
defines ‘normativity’, whether in terms of love, sexuality, gender, 
kinship or society in general, as that which, in every case, is to be 
‘opposed’ and ‘resisted’.
3 Shanghai, 2018:  
An Introduction to Technics and Time, 1 and 2
1 What is Philosophy?
That a radical change of perspective and attitude is needed 
induces all the more reactivity in that it is unavoidable. 
Resentment and denial are putrefying agents as well as 
irreducible tendencies, which Nietzsche and Freud placed at 
the heart of their reflections a century ago.
Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1.
Opening remarks
I would like to begin by thanking Tongji University, and Professor Lu 
Xinghua in particular, for the invitation that made it possible for me to 
come here to speak with you in these lectures. I am extremely happy 
for the opportunity to do so, not just because it gives me pleasure to 
talk with you about a subject that I am ‘interested’ in, but because the 
philosophy of Bernard Stiegler is something I care about, and because 
I would like to show you why you too should care about it, and why 
you should care about it just as much as I do – which is to say, a lot.
In opening with such a statement, I am highly conscious that I am 
speaking in a way that does not necessarily have the ring of an ‘aca-
demic lecturer’: I sound, perhaps, more like a faithful disciple, and a 
disciple is someone whom the academy ordinarily does not want to 
hear from, because the discipline this seems to invoke would seem to 
involve a submission to authority that runs counter to the ‘academic 
freedom’ that has long been the academy’s founding principle. So I 
have to very quickly deny that I am a disciple, and assert instead that 
I am a translator of Stiegler’s work, where every translation is always 
also an interpretation, which is to say a reinterpretation, and where, 
nevertheless, this reinterpretation, despite its freedom, still involves 
discipline and fidelity. In wanting to interpret the work of Stiegler for 
you, I am hoping that you, in turn, will reinterpret my interpretation 
(and in fact, there is no other possibility, other than to not listen to my 
lectures, which is a perpetual possibility), as well as retranslate and 
reinscribe that interpretation into the singular context that is Chinese 
civilization and the world of contemporary China.
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This process of translation and retranslation, interpretation and 
reinterpretation, is extremely difficult and highly complex: this is 
why it still involves discipline. We may think this is becoming less so, 
because, for example, we have apps and programs that will automati-
cally translate from one language to another, one idiom to another. 
When we are exchanging ‘information’, such as instructions about 
how to do this or that, where this is or that is, this automation of trans-
lation can be extremely helpful, and perhaps one day not so far away 
this is how we will always translate between languages and idioms. 
And maybe we will do so by voice, and discover that we no longer 
have much use for reading, and even less for reading languages into 
which we have not been ‘raised’.
With developments of this kind, we may well think that the gulf 
between idioms, languages, philosophies or civilizations can indeed 
effectively be bridged by this and other similar processes, giving rise 
to the possibility of many and richer forms of cultural exchange and 
cross-pollination. And this is undoubtedly the case. But we should 
also not forget that these automatic translation programs do not know 
the languages they are translating, and that even the computer pro-
grammers who design them do not need to know the languages: they 
work by statistical and algorithmic procedures that treat vast amounts 
of calculable data derived from previous translations. This is a pro-
cess that reduces singular differences to calculable particularities, 
eliminating what is unique or infinite and therefore incalculable, and 
it does not just apply to languages or computer programs: it can be 
applied to the way movies are made, music is produced, art is created 
or the way we attempt to teach philosophy. Do such processes enable 
translation and thus lead to a genuine proliferation of diversity and 
pollination, or do they produce an illusion of diversity that in fact con-
ceals a much vaster process of standardized deterritorialization?
Without answering that question straightaway, but keeping it in 
mind, it is thus worth pausing for a moment to reflect on the strange-
ness of the fact that I am here in China speaking with you today. On 
2 November 2018, I find myself here in Shanghai, a city of some 
twenty-five million inhabitants, 70% of whom I am told were not born 
here, being therefore new to the city, in a country and a civilization 
dating back some forty centuries, here to talk with you about a phi-
losopher from France, French philosophy being part of Western phi-
losophy that amounts to a continuous chain of teachings and philoso-
phies given and devised by individual philosophers (the community 
of philosophy being in this way, and unlike science, essentially indi-
vidualized, that is, limited) dating back some twenty-five centuries, 
and where I myself originate from Australia, also with twenty-five 
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million inhabitants, which has existed as a ‘nation’ for barely one sin-
gle century, but on whose land so-called indigenous inhabitants have 
lived for more than four hundred centuries, making it possibly the old-
est continuous culture on Earth, or at the very least the oldest outside 
of Africa. So who is old and who is young?
What made it possible for this strange possibility to be realised? 
Most immediately, it depended on two things: firstly, the jet-pow-
ered airliner that flew me here, taking eleven hours to travel from 
Melbourne to Shanghai, and more generally the immensely complex 
and wildly successful global civil aviation industry that has arisen 
in the one hundred and fifteen years since the first flight at Kitty 
Hawk; secondly, the global networks of digital communication that 
mean that many many emails, messages and other forms of electronic 
exchange could occur between myself and Bernard Stiegler, myself 
and Lu Xinghua, Xinghua and Bernard, publishers, visa offices, land-
lords of AirBnB apartments, and so on.
In truth, such concrete realities of contemporary life are highly 
uncanny. If a question arises in the course of these lectures about 
Stiegler’s work that I am unable to answer, for example, I could, poten-
tially, simply remove my smartphone from my pocket and immedi-
ately tap out an email to Stiegler, and in only the time it takes for him 
to reply on his smartphone, or tablet, or laptop or desktop computer, I 
could read to you his response (while he is writing to me from France, 
or from anywhere in the world, you would have time to check your 
WeChat messages). This is a possibility that no lecturer in philosophy 
ever before had the opportunity to do. But this is not something I will 
do during these lectures, because I don’t want to take the risk that he 
could be busy – for example, he might be in an important meeting, 
or he might be going to the toilet, and this could mean that I will be 
forced to wait five minutes before receiving in Shanghai a reply from 
this person in Paris. Five minutes is so long – too long!
What makes this strange situation uncanny, then, is, at least in part, 
the incredible fact of speed, the speed with which I was able to physi-
cally travel across oceans and continents, the speed with which I am 
able to send information across oceans and continents. The fact that I 
could think that five minutes is too long to wait, that I cannot afford to 
waste this time, shows how easily we can absorb new situations, situ-
ations that are completely unprecedented in the four-billion-year his-
tory of life on Earth and unimaginable even only a few decades ago, 
and how difficult it can become to perceive what it is that we have so 
easily absorbed. After a very short interval, all this apparatus simply 
becomes our milieu and we simply expect it to function.
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For Heidegger, it is when our equipment fails to function, when it 
breaks down, that we first notice that particular piece of equipment, 
that tool, that smartphone, that internet, for what it is, in its being 
present-at-hand, it’s whatness. And in fact, there is another good rea-
son why I will not interrupt this lecture to send Bernard Stiegler an 
email: my account is with gmail, and I have yet to set up a VPN. For 
me to be in China is thus uncanny for another reason, because of how 
it makes me so conscious of what I ordinarily find so difficult to per-
ceive: the degree of my automatic entanglement with all these devices 
and networks, and of their entanglement with each other, in the vast 
global automated systems that pervade the contemporary world. How 
can it possibly be that Google is not here with me? As we shall see, 
it is through a sudden, unexpected revelation of this perceptual dif-
ficulty that Bernard Stiegler begins to think philosophically, and from 
which his philosophy has drawn nourishment ever since.
Beyond the end of history and the clash of civilizations
Dating back four thousand years, as we have said, traversing numer-
ous dynasties and provinces, persisting through several revolutions, 
and containing one fifth of the current world human population, it is 
obvious that China is not just a nation or a culture but a civilization 
(even if a civilization is always a kind of fiction that lasts only so 
long as there are those who believe in it). It belongs, in other words, 
to the highest order of magnitude of what, as we shall see, Bernard 
Stiegler has begun to call higher complex exorganisms – psycho-
socio-techno-organisms. The hyper-complex exorganisms that are 
civilizations, lasting centuries or millennia, are what secrete the most 
elemental criteria for selecting from among exosomatic possibilities, 
that is, for making decisions: in Western civilization, for example, 
this secretion has included the notions of truth, beauty and justice, 
along with theological criteria that seem no longer to be ‘in force’ – if 
any of them are.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of what 
the Gregorian calendar calls the twentieth century, there were 
some Americans who immediately saw this as the final ‘victory’ of 
Western civilization understood as ‘liberal democracy’, an event to 
be celebrated despite the inevitable ambivalence associated with the 
seeming rise to prominence of Nietzsche’s ‘last man’.119 The ‘last phi-
losopher’ may have prophesied that the European nihilism of the last 
man would give rise to ‘immense wars of the spirit’,120 but Fukuyama, 
unlike Nietzsche, was confident that ‘the liberal project of filling 
one’s life with material possessions […] appears to have worked’, and 
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hence that it is ‘hard to detect great, unfulfilled longings or irrational 
passions lurking just beneath the surface’.121
Other Americans very soon raised their voices to contest Francis 
Fukuyama’s ebullience in seeing this event as the beginning of the 
‘end of history’ and the pacification of these ‘immense wars of the 
spirit’. Samuel Huntington, for example, dismissed this ‘one world’ 
paradigm as merely an ‘illusion of harmony’.122 Contrary to such har-
monious fantasies, Huntington’s disillusioned realpolitik foresaw a 
coming ‘clash of civilizations’ in which ‘culture and cultural identi-
ties’ would shape ‘the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict 
in the post-Cold War world’.123 His was a kind of rudimentary attempt 
to outline the present and future of these hyper-complex localities in 
what he called a ‘multi-civilizational world’, but the terms in which 
he framed this clash essentially belong to a nineteenth-century social 
physics. These hyper-complex localities were treated by Huntington 
as great ships traversing a vast, cold and dark ocean, each more or 
less navigating their own, independent path, and, when these paths 
did cross, the geopolitical decisions to be made about the competitive 
relationships between civilizations were framed in terms of a balance 
of ‘international relations’, expressions of geopolitical power whose 
possibilities would range from soft diplomacy to thermonuclear 
devastation.124
In the twenty-first century, this way of conceiving the relationship 
between civilizations as a geopolitical battle between very large but 
more or less spatially discrete and socially cohesive entities (as car-
tographic entities) continues to propagate, especially at the level of 
the mediatized politics of spectacle and rhetoric, but it can do so only 
through a kind of denial that refuses to see that localities, even at the 
geopolitical scale, are today fundamentally embedded, technologi-
cally, economically and ecologically (but also screenically and infor-
mationally), within a planetary locality that is at once a biosphere, 
technosphere, exosphere, infosphere and cinesphere. And what we 
now know, and in truth already strongly suspected then (in the 1990s), 
is that the biospherical system on which all these other systems and 
entities depends has been severely compromised due to the effects 
generated by the rapid expansion of these anthropic spheres. In addi-
tion, all of these civilizational ships seem today to be at risk not just 
of colliding, but of running aground upon the shores of a seemingly 
boundless desert, or else of succumbing to a putrefying disease stem-
ming from deep within their bowels that threatens to send them into 
the abyss. Today, irrational passions do not seem to be lurking beneath 
the surface but can be found right out in the open, and immense civ-
ilizational wars of the spirit appear more likely than ever (but this 
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requires us to ask: do we know what is meant by this word, spirit, or 
what it could mean or should mean?).
The most important meaning of globalization is that no one locality 
can save its world at the expense of other localities: it is the inextrica-
bility of our common (but still differentiated) technical, economic and 
psychosocial fates that is the real ‘one world’ paradigm today, a fate 
that we now understand could be mortal. This undeniable but often 
denied ‘extinction risk’ raises completely new and urgent questions 
that are ‘existential’ in every sense, and that necessitate a return to the 
very origins of the problems from which they have arisen over the last 
two centuries, and especially the last few decades. These questions 
are those of limits: limits reached, limits needed. But which limits? 
The necessity of these new questions arises at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, whose conditions and tone might reasonably be 
said to have been fundamentally set by four events:
 ▪ the opening of the World Wide Web to global public 
access in 1993;
 ▪ the signing of the Kyoto Protocols in 1997, bound from the 
outset to fail.125
 ▪ the worldwide television broadcast of the Twin Towers 
attacks on 11 September 2001, a vast passive synthesis of 
collective consciousness and a kind of cinematic or televi-
sual (but of course not only televisual) performative con-
firmation, or illusion of confirmation, of the ideology of 
civilizational clash, itself the outcome of a series of disas-
trous decisions, key among which were those leading to 
America’s first war with Iraq in 1990;
 ▪ three months to the day after 9/11, China’s accession to the 
WTO, which paved the way for a transformation of manu-
facturing and a new phase of unrestrained global consum-
erist economic ‘growth’ (recollecting that deserts, too, are 
said to ‘grow’).
If we are inclined to observe that the questions raised by these four 
events are ‘philosophical’ in the sense given to this word in Western 
civilization, then such an observation must be immediately circum-
scribed by an acknowledgment that this would:
 ▪ necessarily entail a deterritorialization of ‘Western’ philos-
ophy that inevitably raises ethical questions, that is, ques-
tions of the ethos proper to any such globalized philosophi-
cal locality;
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 ▪ involve dilemmas of civilizational translation that vastly 
exceed those of any ‘archaeology of European transla-
tion’126 between related languages, recollecting again that 
translation is always an interpretation (within the limits we 
have already stated);
 ▪ raise the possibility that ‘philosophy’ itself, despite its 2500-
year history and its pretensions to ‘universality’, may itself 
be an idiomatic remnant that is too parochial or regional or 
metaphysical or ontological or obsolete to be suitable as a 
way of describing the field to be traversed by these ques-
tions and problems;
 ▪ necessitate consideration of the possibility that it is ques-
tioning itself that ultimately gives rise to that calculability 
of everything and the ever-accelerating speed of calculation 
that ultimately initiates and becomes the most threatening 
problem of all – that the horizon of all questioning may 
become enclosed within an algorithmic and performative 
exosphere operating according to rhythms and speeds that 
vastly escape and exceed those of human cognition, and 
hence that the rise of questioning could ultimately lead to 
its very elimination;
 ▪ force us to acknowledge that this is the true meaning of 
what Heidegger called Gestell, but also to acknowledge that 
this computational, algorithmic and performative govern-
mentality has, in the West, brought with it an intensifica-
tion from Reagan’s ‘government as the problem’ (1981) to 
Trump’s ‘government as the disaster’127 (2017), and that it is 
in this context of accomplished nihilism that Chinese gov-
ernmentality seems to have become an absolutely critical 
question, insofar as it remains capable of being asked, and 
as we await in Gestell what can no longer be just another 
questioning, but something wholly other: what Heidegger 
called Ereignis, but an alternative that we are suggesting 
here should be understood in terms of what Stiegler calls 
the Neganthropocene.128
But however difficult this set of problem-questions obviously is, and 
however opaque these opening elucidations may have been, it is as an 
initial step towards responding to this necessity of rational inter-civ-
ilizational engagement that these lectures are aimed (and where this 
must result in a trans-civilizational process that exceeds any possible 
outcome of Huntington’s multi-civilizational competitive negotiation, 
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which is, before anything else, a highly destructive economic war). 
With that in mind, however, what follows pursues that first step by 
way of an introduction to the thought of a particular Western phi-
losopher, which is undoubtedly to double up and double down129 on 
all the questions and problems that have been raised in these open-
ing paragraphs.
Philosopher and/or philosophy
When giving a series of lectures in a university philosophy depart-
ment devoted to a particular philosopher, it is customary to begin by 
situating his or her work within the context of the philosophy that 
was being done by preceding philosophers, in order to begin to pin-
point the gap or flaw or obstacle that would, so it would be claimed, 
provide the opportunity and the necessity for the particular step or 
transformation of thinking that would have been accomplished by the 
thinker in question: philosophy as a history of mistakes, of mistakes 
corrected, and of corrections that inevitably introduce new mistakes 
requiring new corrections. In giving a series of lectures on the work 
of Bernard Stiegler, such a way of beginning immediately avails itself 
to any such lecturer, given that on the first page of his first book, 
Stiegler explains in what way his work fits into just such a mould:
The object of this work is technics, apprehended as the 
horizon of all possibility to come and of all possibility of 
a future. […] This calls for a work whose urgency is still 
hardly grasped despite the high stakes of the issue and the 
disquiet it arouses […]. Here I would like to warn the reader 
of this difficulty and of its necessity: at its very origin and 
up until now, philosophy has repressed technics as an object 
of thought. Technics is the unthought.130
With this warning, the step that requires a transformation of think-
ing could thus not be more clearly stated: just as Martin Heidegger 
claims, on the first page of his first book, that the question of being 
has been forgotten since Plato and Aristotle, for whom this ques-
tion sustained the philosophical work with which they inaugurated 
Western philosophy, just as Jacques Derrida claimed on the first page 
of the first chapter of Of Grammatology that everything gathered 
under the name of language has by a ‘hardly perceptible’ movement 
been slowly transferred to ‘the name of writing’,131 so too Stiegler pos-
tulates that from the outset and ‘up until now’ (in 1994), philosophy 
has borne within it a fundamental question that it has never allowed 
truly to rise to the surface of visibility, even if, in more recent times, 
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this question has become blindingly obvious. From its very begin-
nings, he argues, Western philosophy got underway by separating 
epistēmē from tekhnē, the knowledge of beings that have their prin-
ciple of movement, their origin, within themselves, from the knowledge 
of beings that are produced by ‘art’, and whose origin, whose principle 
of movement, would thus lie outside themselves. On the basis of this 
separation, he asserts, technical beings and technics itself, were con-
signed by this philosophy to a subordinate status beneath the level of 
philosophical thinking.
But such a way of beginning a series of lectures already tends to 
presume that what truly counts in the attempt to understand the work 
of the particular philosopher in question is earlier work by other phi-
losophers that falls within the bounds of that academic field known 
as philosophy, just as it presumes what would count as the ‘level of 
philosophical thinking’. Such lectures are perhaps often leavened, 
admittedly, with some social or personal context from the world and 
life in which the work was written, just as Stiegler himself begins 
by stating that the initial subordination of tekhnē that more or less 
inaugurated philosophy occurred in a ‘political context’ in which the 
philosopher accused the Sophist of ‘instrumentalizing the logos’,132 
a context and a conflict that would then become our philosophical 
inheritance. Were we to adhere to this latter dictum, we would be 
obliged then to mention, for instance, that the philosopher in question 
in these lectures was born in Paris, the French son of a technician 
and electrical engineer with German heritage, that his youth unfolded 
during the ‘thirty glorious years’ of economic prosperity and his tran-
sition to adulthood during the disruptions and rebellions of the 1960s, 
that he did not complete his secondary schooling but became him-
self actively involved in these rebellions, joining the PCF after 1968 
and through that receiving a kind of Marxist philosophico-political 
education, that his becoming a philosopher occurred later and in the 
highly unusual circumstances of five years of incarceration for a 
non-political crime, that in this unusual if not desperate existential 
situation his work towards becoming a philosopher was made pos-
sible by a great deal of solitude, by a single friend who was himself a 
philosopher and by the books of which this inmate was able to avail 
himself in this solitude and from this friend, and that the possibility 
these circumstances furnished of doing this work in turn gave rise to 
a keen sense of indebtedness, but which combined in the thirty-five 
years following his release with an increasingly ominous feeling of 
unease if not alarm about the social, political and technological paths 
being followed by France and by the world, and that these feelings of 
obligation and anxiety then became the governing moods orienting 
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the philosophical work that he has undertaken across the more than 
thirty books that he has published since being released from prison, 
years that very few in the West would be inclined to characterize with 
adjectives akin to ‘glorious’.
But to so begin a series of lectures on the work of a philosopher, 
by leaping directly into such summaries of circumstances, lives and 
events, comes at the risk of avoiding the question of what this ‘thing’, 
‘philosophy’, actually is, if it is anything at all. This question is 
avoided for several reasons, but first among them is the fact that such 
a question always exposes an ‘academic’ holding a position within a 
department of philosophy to the risk of discovering that he or she may 
not be a philosopher, or may not even know what one is, or why this 
thing, philosophy, whatever it is, is worth the effort of actually doing. 
And the risk entailed by this question in turn produces a doubt that 
eats away at the courage required to ask this question – what is phi-
losophy? – whose initial answer was provided by the very separation 
of philosophy from the allegedly ‘instrumentalized’ and technical 
discourse of the Sophist, a separation first effected through Socrates’s 
courage to pursue and to teach the mysteries of what he termed the 
true, the good and the beautiful.
What I would like to propose, here, and from the outset, is that it 
would be better not to avoid asking this question, and that what we 
ought actually try to do is not just ask it but answer it, that is, to dis-
cover the answer, which is always in some sense to invent the answer, 
which implies that this answer may well contain an irreducible ele-
ment of fiction. And what should motivate us to pursue this answer is 
the further risk of discovering that we do not know why we are trying 
to do philosophy, or whether we should be doing it, or whether we 
should instead be doing something else: is philosophy in fact what we 
should be doing today?
Again, these elementary, almost childish-seeming questions, far 
from the heights of philosophical maturity or sophistication, are not 
ordinarily the terms in which philosophical lectures are framed. We 
might well be tempted to think that the very significance of contem-
porary French philosophy lies in the abandonment of such a search for 
origins, in much the same manner as Jean-François Lyotard defined 
postmodernity as suspicion about grand narratives: contrary to this 
temptation, we would argue that the very lesson that post-structural-
ism learns from structuralism is that the absence of a simple origin in 
no way legitimates the abandonment of the search. We argue instead 
that there is a sense in which the genuine pursuit of questions always 
involves a return to origins, even if such a return may prove to be 
impossible, where this absence of origin, this ab-originality, combined 
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with its repression, might prove to be the very movement of complica-
tion that gets going what, in its idiomatic singularity, will come to be 
known as the ‘history of Western philosophy’.
What is philosophy?
So, animated by this problem, this motive and this risk, we ask: 
what is philosophy? Of course, the first reaction upon hearing such 
an unseemly question uttered out loud may well be muffled uproar at 
what it seems so obviously to contain: less courage than hubris. What 
possible answer could one give to such a question that could ever 
hope to circumscribe the vast diversity of philosophical approaches, 
interests and standpoints? And would any such answer not inevita-
bly amount to an attempt to violently stamp the authority of one’s 
own perspective, or the perspective of the thinker one has chosen to 
explicate, over this vast diversity, in a way bound to prove ultimately 
indefensible? And is it not possible that all the critiques, suspensions, 
Destruktions and deconstructions of ‘Western metaphysics’ under-
taken in the last century have closed off any possible future hori-
zon for a discourse that would seek to keep itself lodged ‘within’ the 
boundaries marked out by the word ‘philosophy’, or in other words is 
it not possible that, as Derrida mused in 1964, philosophy may have 
‘died yesterday’?133 Such possibilities are in fact inevitabilities, and as 
such these are already ‘problems put to philosophy as problems phi-
losophy cannot resolve’.134
But might it be that hubris itself forms a part of that answer, not 
just in the sense that to presume to offer an answer to such a question 
would constitute an example of it, but in the sense that there can be no 
final separation of courage and hubris, which is to say crime, that they 
are therapeutic and pathological versions of one and the same motive, 
one and the same affect – to push past to the limit, or beyond the limit 
– and hence that these, and not just wonder, may turn out to be a nec-
essary aspect of what it is that has always gotten philosophy going? 
It was the aforementioned Socrates who, after all, through the text 
of Plato, and in the earliest dialogues such as Meno, taught us that, 
although a ‘what is…?’ question may have many exemplars to which 
one may point, this possibility does not discharge us of the responsi-
bility of asking how it is that all such examples cohere as signs point-
ing towards answers, a coherence that ought to precede the diversity 
of examples. Hence in teaching us not to avoid this responsibility, he 
teaches us also that this search for what unites the examples, what 
gives them their coherence, is always a search back to the origin of the 
question, and that at this origin, which is a question of the origin of 
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knowledge, there lies only an aporia: this search can only be for what 
we already know, even if what we know doesn’t exist, could never 
have existed and will never exist, because either we do not know 
what we are seeking, in which case we will not recognize it if and 
when we happen across it, or else we already knew it, and must have 
been only pretending not to know. Socrates’s answer, as any student 
of philosophy knows, is: we did know it, but we have forgotten it, and 
hence all knowledge is really the recollection of something forgotten 
– anamnesis.
For Stiegler, it was this question that formed the starting point, the 
opening question, of what became his philosophy, and what led him to 
the question of technics:
I did not first question technics but memory and, through 
Plato, anamnesis as the possibility of knowing and as the ori-
gin of knowledge itself […]. Besides, I continue to believe 
that there is no other possible way to arrive at philosophy 
than by questioning the origin of knowledge, which also 
constitutes the very possibility of knowledge.
It was on this path of memory that I found ‘technics’.135
It will be crucial for us to understand this path that goes from mem-
ory to technics, which will also be, strangely enough, a path that goes 
from technics to memory. But in any case, the hubris or the courage 
of philosophy is in part a matter of the insistence on this necessity of 
‘going back to the origins’ (of knowledge), despite the fact that this 
‘origin’ is always complicated, if not missing: in want of an origin, in 
default of an origin. In the case of the original separation of beings 
of phusis from beings of tekhnē, the fact that the latter do not have 
their principle of movement, their origin, within themselves becomes 
the very historico-philosophical basis for the argument that to under-
stand technical beings does not require a form of thinking that seeks 
those origins: they will have been deemed unoriginal beings. To think 
technics would, according to such a way of thinking, then not require 
philosophy, which would instead pursue something more original, 
something that would, unlike the products of artifice, be worthier 
of philosophical thinking: epistēmē and tekhnē are fundamentally 
distinct, opposed to one another. Against such a separation, such an 
oppositional manner of thinking, it would then be necessary to look 
back before this opposition, to seek a coherence of ‘technics’ older 
than its opposition from ‘physics’: even if such an originary technics 
does not exist, might it be that it consists?
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To go back beyond this understanding of the distinction of philo-
sophical discourse can only mean, then, understanding why this sepa-
ration of technical knowledge from epistemic knowledge, on the basis 
of which the repression of technics by philosophy first got going, why 
this separation may be necessary (in the sense of unavoidable, or in 
the sense of an accident that then becomes our necessity136) but not 
sufficient for truly delineating what it is that distinguishes philoso-
phy. Or does it simply mean that a discourse that would no longer live 
by this opposition of two kinds of beings would therefore no longer 
count as philosophical? For Socrates, this subordination of the tech-
nical is allied to the doggedness of his pursuit of the question, ‘what 
is…?’, beyond what for the Sophists would be all reasonable limits, 
beyond all instrumentalizable purpose: in the eyes of the Sophists, 
what Socrates teaches has no function. But here, this notion of an 
instrumentalizable purpose is itself a function of the Sophist’s place 
within the ‘political context’ that determines the boundaries within 
which sophistic thinking is free to move. In insisting on his own ques-
tioning, on pursuing the questions that arise from out of his own sin-
gular individuality, because this is what philosophy always does, he 
implicitly accuses the Sophists of allowing their own individuality to 
be diluted, and hence he in turn finds himself accused of a surfeit of 
individuality, that is, of excess, of hubris. As Stiegler says:
In fact, this inscription of the philosophical at the heart of 
the very intimacy of the individual is what is testified to by 
the life and by the death of that proto-philosopher Socrates 
– with that sacrificial dimension which is undoubtedly 
part of an existence completely devoted to thought. The 
singularity of Socrates’s existence, his individuality, was 
precisely Anytus’s accusation, before the trial that would 
condemn him.137
But when Socrates exceeds those boundaries that determine what it 
is legitimate to think or say, when he cannot remain content within 
those boundaries, when he pursues a question all the way to the apo-
ria of its origin, he does so because he is himself moved to do so 
by a political context that amounts to a problem that gives rise to 
his question: Socrates is not only his individuality; his individual-
ity is fundamentally an individual co-existence with others, which 
means that he cares about these others and the collective they form 
together with him.
To answer a question such as ‘what is philosophy?’ requires, before 
anything else, seeking to understand the provenance of that question, 
which in turn means, firstly, going back to the origin of the question, 
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and, secondly, to understanding how that origin consists of a problem. 
Philosophy, then, would be the teaching of this necessity: to under-
stand the genesis of the question from out of a problem. It will be 
this relationship of (philosophical) questioning to its provenance in 
a problem that makes of philosophy, not an instruction or even a pre-
scription (for life), but always a matter of participation in and contri-
bution to a critique.
So now we have another question: what is a problem, or, better, why 
is there a problem? What gives rise to a problem? What makes a prob-
lem? In promising answers, questions are piling up, and how could we 
fail to be exposed to the accusation of making false promises, prom-
ises that cannot hope to be kept?
But is this not ultimately the accusation of ‘corruption’ that Socrates 
himself faced, and for which he was condemned to drink the hemlock: 
the accusation that, by insisting on leading the youth of Athens so far 
along his own path of questioning, he could not deliver on the prom-
ises of a knowledge that could ever be beneficial for the city? And if 
so, what difference does it make that Socrates accepted this judgment, 
this punishment meted out by the city, that he preferred it to exile, 
and preferred it on the grounds that, despite the political context, it 
is better for his children to be orphans of Socrates than to become 
orphans of the city? And what difference does it make to us, who are 
also orphans of Socrates, and to our understanding of the question of 
philosophy inasmuch as this question arises from out of this problem 
of Socrates (hearing here the double genitive)?
This, of course, is the question that Socrates addresses in Crito, 
where he rejects Crito’s plan for him to make an escape from Athens. 
Such an escape, Socrates argues through the voice of the laws, would 
only give rise to the suspicion that he was, after all, a ‘destroyer of 
laws’ (53c), and so would, with such an escape, only confirm the 
judgment that his questioning, his engagement of maieutic dialogue, 
far from constituting a genuine teaching, really amounts to a wholly 
negative destruction, a dismantling of the instrumentalization of jus-
tice embodied in the technical apparatus of the law.
But it would also be to break the injunction that ‘one ought not to 
return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation 
is’ (49c–d), which in this case means that, if the city injures us, we 
ought not want to exact revenge by injuring those who have injured 
us, city-dwellers, citizens. In short, Socrates does not resent the sen-
tence that has been imposed: that he suffers, that he is caused to suffer, 
does not mean that he wants to assuage his suffering by causing oth-
ers to suffer in turn – neither those who are his direct accusers nor the 
city of whom they are the representatives. And nor does he want any 
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such resentment to be transmitted to those who are his heirs, that is, to 
his children, that is, to us. In other words, even at that moment when 
his own being-towards-death becomes inescapable and undeniable, 
Socrates maintains an affirmative relationship to the city and to the 
future, to a being-towards-life together in the polis, an affinity with 
life itself and life-to-come in its onward struggle, in all its productive 
ab-originality and all the mistakes that follow, until it reaches us.
Nietzsche against Socrates
To describe this mood of Socrates as ‘affirmative’ is unavoidably to 
draw attention to the way in which such an interpretation of the char-
acter of the philosopher Socrates, as portrayed in the fiction that is 
the dialogue of Crito as composed by Plato, is utterly at odds with the 
interpretation of the ‘problem of Socrates’ that Nietzsche describes 
in Twilight of the Idols. For Nietzsche, such a characterization of 
Socrates could only be completely false. ‘The Problem of Socrates’ 
opens by declaring that Socrates and those of his kind, the ‘wise’, far 
from affirming life, have always resisted it:
The wisest men in every age have reached the same conclu-
sion about life: it’s no good… Always and everywhere, you 
hear the same sound from their mouths, – a sound full of 
doubt, full of melancholy, full of exhaustion with life, full of 
resistance to life.138
For Nietzsche, such judgments, attitudes and moods can only ever 
be symptoms of a pathological relationship to life, and as such stu-
pidities, for ‘the value of life cannot be estimated’.139 Socrates is for 
Nietzsche nothing but a decadent who wanted to die, who took it upon 
himself to drink down the poison, whose in-sistence on the dialecti-
cal method was nothing more than re-sistance, a last resort of the 
defeated, his ‘irony’ no more than an expression of ressentiment and 
as such a booby trap of revenge.140
Nietzsche does acknowledge that with this dialectics Socrates 
touched on the ‘agonistic drive of the Greeks’, and that he was, in this, 
also ‘a great erotic’.141 Furthermore, he argues that this was possible 
because it was Socrates who perceived that, among the Athenians 
generally, the drives were in disarray, excessive, leading to the clash 
of Greek civilization with itself. In other words, Nietzsche acknowl-
edges that Socrates perceived the political context as a problem, and 
as a problem of desire disordered. If dialectics is seen as a last resort, 
it is because for Nietzsche the tyranny of reason arises as a possi-
ble expedient only in the midst of a crisis, a state of emergency [eine 
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Notlage], producing a ‘rational’ ‘moralism’ that is thus ‘pathologically 
conditioned’.142 And in this pathology, the error consists in the misbe-
gotten hope that to wage war on decadence by such means could ever 
succeed in overcoming it:
Socrates was a misunderstanding; the whole morality of 
improvement, including that of Christianity, was a misun-
derstanding… The most glaring daylight, rationality at any 
cost, a cold, bright, cautious, conscious life without instinct, 
opposed to instinct, was itself just a sickness, another sick-
ness – and in no way a return to ‘virtue’, to ‘health’, to hap-
piness… To have to fight the instincts – that is the formula 
for decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness is equal 
to instinct.143
Again, our pursuit of a coherent answer to the question, ‘what is 
philosophy?’, appears to have stumbled, in this case on this opposi-
tion between Socrates (conjoined by Nietzsche to Christianity) and 
Nietzsche with respect to life and the city, or life in the city, or in 
other words on this vast antipathy that Nietzsche seems to have for 
‘the cleverest of all self-deceivers’.144 Is it conceivable that we could 
muster a sympathetic co-understanding of Socrates and Nietzsche 
capable of overcoming this antipathy, and if so, on what basis?
At present, Western civilization is undoubtedly suffering from a 
crisis of resentment, that is, the proliferation of a widespread feeling 
that the fact of my suffering deserves compensation in the form of the 
expiatory suffering of others. Contrary to any end of history, this has 
led to the unprecendented election of an American president on the 
basis of a campaign that appealed to and exploited this widespread 
feeling by giving it what it wants, that is, by supplying a set of scape-
goats onto which these feelings can be fixed and discharged, some-
times violently, sometimes explosively. This is just the most visible 
symptom of what, in his most recent work, Stiegler refers to as an 
‘immense regression’. China has not succumbed to this process, not 
yet, but it must surely have an interest in prophylactically tracing its 
causes back to their origins, because at the very least it risks catch-
ing this disease, and a strain that has had time to mutate to a high 
level of virulence, and against which the immune system of Chinese 
civilization may find itself unprepared and sorely tested, in particu-
lar if that system is itself on the way to becoming computationally 
algorithmic.145
This potential for ressentiment that inevitably leads to the ‘spirit of 
revenge’ that Nietzsche describes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is that 
of which he was the master pathologist, and for which, as a thinker 
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of reactive forces and tendencies, he today remains more indispens-
able than ever. Just as Socrates in the eyes of Nietzsche was the one 
capable of seeing what ‘was quietly gaining ground everywhere’146 
(the problem), but was unable to fight this diagnosis other than with 
weapons that themselves stemmed from the disease – that is, a dialec-
tics according to which ‘any concession to the instincts, to the uncon-
scious [and hence a dialectics opposed, so Nietzsche argues, to the 
affirmation of life], leads downwards’147 – so too Nietzsche sees with 
dread that what is quietly gathering itself in the nineteenth-century 
industrializing West (its problem) is that ‘average man’ afflicted with 
nihilism and resentment, and dwelling within a growing desert proph-
esied to last two centuries. The average man: that is, the Anthropos 
who is the product of averages, of the law of large numbers, of popula-
tion statistics, later to become marketing statistics and user profiling 
– calculable man.
But with this notion that ‘to have to fight the instincts’ is the ‘for-
mula for decadence’, and hence with his conclusion that, on the con-
trary, ‘happiness is equal to instinct’, or, we might say, to the drives 
unbound (by ‘rational’ ‘morality’), we are forced to ask ourselves 
whether Nietzsche’s diagnosis of Socrates (of philosophers and mor-
alists generally), that ‘what they choose as a remedy, as an escape, 
is itself only another expression of decadence’, applies also to his 
own prescriptions.148 If so, could Socrates amount to Nietzsche’s 
scapegoat, his pharmakos, thanks to which he, too, could be accused 
of being one of those ‘philosophers and moralists [who] are lying to 
themselves when they think that they are going to extricate them-
selves from decadence’?149 Yet obviously we must not be too hasty: we 
must also remember that Nietzsche is the thinker from whom Georges 
Canguilhem learned that we are the animal with the ability to make 
ourselves sick, that we are perpetually tempted to do so, and that there 
is no cure and no health other than through and with that which makes 
us sick? With this thought, we have already arrived at the problem not 
just of the pharmakos but of the pharmakon – and of the relationship 
between them.
On what basis could we attempt such a sympathetic co-reading of 
Socrates with Nietzsche? In common between them is this question 
of collective life, of collective life beyond familial life, larger than 
familial life, as a problem (of disarray, of decadence) whose causes 
must be traced back to their origins, in the absence of which it is a 
problem that is bound to be exacerbated, and so to descend into inci-
vility, if not into civil war, and as a problem and a question whose 
teaching always opens onto the problem and the question of the future 
of collective life.150 What distinguishes Socrates and Nietzsche, at 
An Introduction to Technics and Time, 1 and 2 81
least in the eyes of the latter, is some relationship between a series of 
terms: life, instinct, reason.
More specifically, we find an opposition between the Socratic 
notion that only the rationality of life in the city counts as ‘ascend-
ing’ and the Nietzschean notion that sees the rationality of Socrates 
as indelibly ‘opposed to instinct’, Nietzsche affirming on the contrary 
that only instinctual life is ascending, life as such. For Nietzsche, the 
‘most profound instinct of life’ is ‘directed towards the future of life’ 
and contrary to ‘ressentiment against life’, but is it not this very exclu-
sion – of anything ‘descending’ from the peak that would be life lived 
according to the ‘instincts’ – that legitimates the all too common, all 
too human interpretation of the ‘eternal joy of becoming’ as simply a 
matter of going with the flow of existence, with ‘tragic feeling’, per-
haps, but without the tragic necessity of decision?151 Beyond decon-
struction and its undecidability, such a sympathetic reading would 
thus need also to be a critique of what Nietzsche lacked that enabled 
his instincts to fall back, to the extent that he does (or in other words, 
perhaps, what makes possible misinterpretations of Nietzsche that go 
in this direction), into this last metaphysical (and biological, if not 
‘Darwinian’) opposition between instinct and reason (even if revers-
ing the metaphysical sign in order to privilege the former over the lat-
ter), and what can lead us beyond that opposition. This philosophical 
question, which necessarily entails asking how this ‘future of life’ is 
distinct from merely its becoming, forms the horizon of, and will be 
indirectly pursued in, the lectures that follow.
Philosophy today
Let us recap. From the assertion that we should not avoid asking and 
answering the question of what it is that philosophy actually is, we 
passed to a consideration of the figure of Socrates, and to his pref-
erence that his children (and we are all his children) be orphans of 
Socrates rather than orphans of the city, which we interpreted as a 
desire not to transmit resentment to these heirs on the grounds it is a 
perpetual threat to the modicum of sociability without which collec-
tive existence is impossible. From there, we were forced to acknowl-
edge that this affirmative interpretation of Socrates is completely at 
odds with the ‘problem of Socrates’ as delineated by Nietzsche in 
1888, where Socrates is portrayed as the prototypical resentful phi-
losopher for whom life is ultimately worthless (as opposed to being 
that which is priceless), which, fifteen years earlier, had been the way 
that Nietzsche characterized the contemporary philosopher, for whom 
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the ‘drive toward truth’ leads only to the question, ‘And what is life 
worth, after all?’152
We are, then, led to the thought of philosophy as always involved 
with the actual problem of collective existence, with the action 
required in the here and now of a city in this or that epoch, or mired 
in this or that crisis, and where this involves tracing the genealogy 
of this or that problem, so to speak, to its origins. But if the inten-
tion here is to overcome the Nietzschean antipathy towards Socrates 
through the location of some kind of common ground between the 
‘gadfly’ and ‘first philosopher’ and the ‘last disciple of Dionysos’ 
and ‘last philosopher’ with respect to the questions of life and the 
city, how, once again, could we hope to extend this to a definition 
of philosophy that could ever hope to include the notoriously divided 
kaleidoscope of approaches from the strictest ‘logician’ to the vagu-
est ‘postmodernist’? The only possible answer, which is something 
other than the location of common ground, is if by ‘life’, here, we 
understand the problem of existence for those beings for whom this 
problem, becoming a question, is amenable to resolution through 
‘reason’, understood in the broadest possible sense, where such rea-
son is therefore understood as itself a function of life, and ultimately 
as that ‘special embodiment in us of the disciplined counter-agency 
which saves the world’.153 In other words, where it is understood in the 
Whiteheadian sense according to which the art of life has a tripartite 
division between ‘living’, ‘living well’ and ‘living better’,154 in life’s 
perpetual tension between what Whitehead calls history’s
two main tendencies. One tendency is exemplified in the 
slow decay of physical nature. With stealthy inevitable-
ness, there is degradation of energy. The sources of activity 
sink downward and downward. Their very matter wastes. 
The other tendency is exemplified by the yearly renewal of 
nature in the spring, and by the upward course of biological 
evolution. In these pages I consider Reason in its relation to 
these contrasted aspects of history. Reason is the self-disci-
pline of the originative element in history. Apart from the 
operations of Reason, this element is anarchic.155
How do we relate this twofold tension between a descending ten-
dency and an ascending counter-tendency to the tripartite division 
between being alive, being satisfactorily alive and transforming life 
and its satisfactions, where the function of reason, as the promo-
tion of this ‘art of life’, according to Whitehead, consists primarily 
in directing ‘the attack on the environment’, and where he concludes 
that this function amounts to a factor that ‘directs and criticizes the 
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urge towards the attainment of an end realized in imagination but not 
in fact’?156
With this strange question, between two and three, we are equipped 
to find a way of entering into the thought of the philosopher whose 
work forms the subject of these lectures, and for whom the question 
is not just of what life is worth, but, very specifically, of what makes 
life worth (the effort and the toil of) living – and where we must inter-
pret this, not just as a question for the individual, or even for the col-
lective, but as a question of technical life, or as the problem and the 
question of the work involved in a (collective and technical) education 
in technical existence. Or in other words, if we take this as an exis-
tential question involving our fundamentally technical ethos, then it 
is a question of how to live in a way that is worthy of the technical 
power we have so manifestly acquired. And this is, furthermore, a 
civilizational question, and it is now, that is, in the Anthropocene, a 
question that is not just multi-civilizational but trans-civilizational. 
If this question of how to collectively and worthily live the technical 
life inevitably entails ‘affirming our trans-civilizational future’, then 
for philosophy this can only be, today, and insofar as this remains the 
name of a discourse capable of approaching this problem, a matter of 
coming to know on what basis to conduct a revaluation of all values, 
where these revaluated values must form the criteria for deciding in 
what possible, improbable future to invest (which is also a question of 
knowing what investment means or could mean).
If we must ask this question ‘today’, that can only mean in a world, 
and on a planet, that is today deeply threatened by ecological disas-
ter (for instance, irreversible climate change), economic disaster (for 
instance, the collapse of the consumerist ‘perpetual growth’ model) 
and political disaster (for instance, the dangerous rise of what is often 
referred to as populism), at a moment when the ability to think and 
care about all these possible futures is itself deeply threatened by 
the automated, algorithmic production of industrial temporal objects 
operating at extremely high speed. There is thus a vast gulf between 
Fukuyama’s idea of an ‘end of history’, in which a ‘final’ geopolitical 
equilibrium would supposedly bring an end to ‘events’, and the punk 
notion of ‘no future’, where plenty can still happen even as we enter a 
fatal downward spiral.
Philosophy, according to this delineation, this delimitation, is a 
functional application of understanding and reason directed towards 
learning and teaching what it could mean to take care of collective 
existence, which can only mean to take care not just of its present 
but its future, and where today this ‘collectivity’ is that of the entire 
biosphere – fundamentally at risk, and in all the biological and noetic 
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diversity that it contains, and on which it depends. This cannot be a 
matter of awaiting the god who could save us from economic or eco-
logical catastrophe – from ‘extinction risk’. Nor can it be a matter of 
blindly accelerating the disruption – the ideology of ‘crash or crash 
through’ – as if gathering enough speed will make it possible to burst 
through and beyond the systemic limits with which we are currently 
threatened. It can only be a matter of struggling against denial and 
resentment, and through that of investing ourselves (politically, eco-
nomically, libidinally, existentially) in the urgent, careful invention of 
a new existence worthy of the accident that has befallen us as a result 
of the awesome and manifold technical powers we have ourselves ter-
rifyingly unleashed.
For the question with which we are left is: why are we the beings 
for whom this question of taking care arises? Why are we the beings 
who find ourselves confronted with instabilities that bring questions 
to the fore? Why are we the beings who find ourselves in situations in 
which thresholds have been crossed, limits of tolerability that produce 
crises, requiring critique and reinvention? Why are we the beings who 
find ourselves thrown into questions, and through that into question? 
Why, thrown into questions and into question, are we the beings who 
must seek new ways of living, and living worthily? Without oppos-
ing ourselves to other beings, must we not ask ourselves, what dis-
tinguishes us?
With all of these questions in mind, what follows is by no means a 
summary of Stiegler’s work across his thirty or so books, let alone a 
summation. Instead, these lectures will navigate an at times wayward 
path into and through his corpus, focusing on certain eddies in the 
general flow of his philosophy, the tensions and counter-flows giv-
ing rise to these eddies, and the unusual currents by which they are 
conjoined, sometimes across great conceptual distances. In so doing, 
it will constantly be a matter of giving thought to the philosophical 
import of Stiegler’s work, but where this adjective must be heard 
together with all of these preceding questions, and in a context where 
the putrefying agents that are resentment and denial, along with 
numerous agents of ecological degradation, are visibly contributing to 
the potential closure of all future horizons.
2 Exteriorization and Différance
The unfurling of French theory
As we have already seen, the movement of Stiegler’s philosophy takes 
as its point of departure the thought that what remains unthought 
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throughout the history of philosophy is technics. That technics is 
repressed does not mean that it never appears in the history of phi-
losophy, but that when it appears, it does so symptomatically, deriva-
tively, and not as a cause or as the ultimate destination to which any 
legitimately philosophical question is thought to trace back. If the two 
great regions of beings as they have been conceived in the metaphys-
ics of modern philosophy and modern science are (1) inorganic beings 
whose dynamic is merely physical and in that historically ‘anarchic’, 
and (2) organic beings whose dynamic is biological and evolution-
ary, then, within this schema, technical beings are metaphysically 
conceived merely as ‘hybrids’, unoriginal mechanical beings whose 
origin and movement lie in the beings that we are ourselves, whether 
we are conceived as merely beings of phusis or as beings who exceed 
the ‘natural realm’.
It is Karl Marx who begins to conceive the possibility of thinking a 
technical dynamic that would be something other than merely deriva-
tive of physical processes and biological dynamics. In The German 
Ideology, Marx and Engels argue that men may be distinguished from 
animals by many criteria, but they begin to distinguish themselves 
‘as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence’, through 
which ‘men are indirectly producing their actual material life’.157 
Contrary to idealist metaphysics, ‘production’ and ‘mode of produc-
tion’ become the originative element in history that conditions the 
forms of the attack on the environment, which, more than ‘the pro-
duction of the physical existence of the individuals’, amounts to ‘a 
definite mode of life’, where this mode is then affected by ‘[e]ach new 
productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension 
of productive forces already known’.158 Heidegger will then see the 
possibility that such a dynamic could evolve to the point of absorbing 
phusis ‘itself’, ultimately outstripping and overtaking the very possi-
bility of control and even of the very possibility of thinking.
What remains doubtful, however, is whether either Marx, thinker 
of the industrial revolution, machines and the ‘general intellect’, or 
Heidegger, thinker of ‘modern technology’, Gestell and cybernetics, 
ever pursued the technical question all the way back to the beginning, 
or saw in that complicated commencement the inauguration not just 
of a solution but of a problem, a problem that later becomes the pos-
sibility of the question as such, and hence, subsequently, the possibil-
ity of what Heidegger will call the question of the meaning of being, 
and where the meaning of Gestell would then be that this overtak-
ing of thinking by the problem of Gestell amounts to the possibility 
that this questioning could come to an end, dissolved into a techni-
cal problematics that would then become our problem, the problem of 
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whether we are any longer up to the task of thinking, and specifically 
of the problem of needing to think what (and that) we have not yet 
even begun to think.
One thinker and scholar who may aid this pursuit of the techni-
cal question back to the beginning is André Leroi-Gourhan. Who is 
André Leroi-Gourhan? He was a French prehistorian, archaeologist 
and palaeontologist who, among many other activities, studied under 
Marcel Mauss, was a member of the French Resistance, and became 
a professor at the Sorbonne before being appointed to a chair in pre-
history at the Collège de France. It is necessary to ask this question, 
‘Who is Leroi-Gourhan?’, because there was a long period of time 
in which he seemed almost to have been erased from the history of 
French thought, and especially from its Anglophone reception, and in 
the first place by another scientist profoundly influenced by Mauss, 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose Saussurean structural anthropology will 
set the scene for the great structuralist movement as well as for the 
post-structuralism that will follow it soon thereafter.
Now, Jacques Derrida’s work gets going with the question of gen-
esis, not in Lévi-Strauss but in Husserl, and the first published lecture 
he ever gave continues this theme by deconstructing (before ‘decon-
struction’ had been coined, and long before it became something 
like a brand name) the distinction between genesis and structure in 
Husserlian phenomenology, which he pursues by noting that there is, 
in Husserl, an ‘initial distinction between different irreducible types 
of genesis and structure’, but that these inevitably lead back to a ques-
tion of ‘genesis in general’ and ‘structure in general’. It is on this basis 
that ‘Husserl operates’, but without himself asking about ‘the mean-
ing of his operative instruments in general’ because, as that which 
forms the very possibility of posing the question of the transcendental 
reduction, to do so would imply asking ‘the question of the possibil-
ity of the question’ that strictly exceeds the Husserlian project.159 And 
when in 1966 Derrida presents what we can consider the foundational 
text of this so-called post-structuralism, ‘Structure, Sign and Play in 
the Discourse of the Human Sciences’, he plainly states that Lévi-
Strauss’s ‘respect for structurality’ comes at the cost of a ‘neutraliza-
tion of time and history’ that works by ‘omitting to posit the problem 
of the transition from one structure to another’,160 Derrida giving the 
example of language that according to Lévi-Strauss ‘could only have 
been born in one fell swoop’.161
Yet even though Derrida begins his work by indicating the defi-
ciency of structuralism with respect to genesis, history, diachrony, 
genealogy, the destructuring process of shifting from one structure to 
another and so on, nevertheless post-structuralism remains marked by 
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its own genesis in a form of thought that is perhaps not entirely free 
of this neutralization of time and history. And hence even though it is 
Derrida himself who draws attention to this deficiency, who rejects 
this refusal of history, and who therefore calls for a positive displace-
ment towards a new concept of history, nevertheless Derrida does not 
himself produce this new concept, as Anne Alombert has recently 
pointed out.162 And when he comes to consider Althusser’s ‘scientism’, 
Derrida again understands the Althusserian gesture that consists in 
a critique of the ‘Hegelian’ metaphysics of history, but nevertheless 
calls for ‘a new logic of repetition and the trace’ aimed not at ‘one sin-
gle history’ but ‘rather histories different in their type, rhythm, mode 
of inscription’,163 but without himself producing this new logic.
How might the history of French thought have unfurled otherwise, 
and how might it have produced a different concept of history, had 
Leroi-Gourhan not been kept behind the scenes of these questions, so 
to speak, had not become someone about whom it is still necessary 
to ask and answer the question, ‘Who is André Leroi-Gourhan?’? Of 
course, such counterfactual questions are impossible to answer, and 
can lead only to pointless speculation. Nevertheless, posing them can 
at least serve as a worthwhile reminder of the contingency and poten-
tial deficiency of the intellectual inheritance that continues to set the 
conditions of intellectual production in the academy.
Such counterfactual speculation would surely be tempted to con-
clude that, had Leroi-Gourhan occupied a place somewhere closer to 
centre stage in the theatre of French thinking, we might have found 
ourselves much further along the way to this new approach to his-
tory in its types, rhythms and modes of inscription. Already in 1943, 
Leroi-Gourhan was proposing a distinction between ‘technical ten-
dencies’ and ‘technical facts’, where the former are not determined or 
localized within what he called ‘ethnic groupings’, that is, within par-
ticular localities, even though it is only in ethnic groupings that these 
tendencies are concretized – in the form of such technical facts, such 
actually realised instances of technical artefacts, facts that are always 
contingent or accidental. Already in this case, it is clear that the idi-
omatic technical expression of these localized tendencies indicates a 
kind of behavioural programming operating at a level (the ‘ethnic’ 
level) other than the species level.
Furthermore, when in 1945 he comes back to the question of the 
relationship between the ethnic grouping, he formulates a distinc-
tion between the exterior milieu, meaning the geography, climate and 
ecosystemic locality within which the ethnic grouping is located, 
and the interior milieu, meaning the shared past and shared ways 
of living of those within the ethnic grouping. The means by which 
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the interior milieu and the exterior milieu are articulated is the ‘cur-
tain of objects’, the ‘interposed membrane’, the ‘artificial envelope’ 
formed by the ethnic grouping as the basis for its attack on the envi-
ronment (as Whitehead would say). And so, with this distinction, we 
can understand his concept of technical tendency as, in the words of 
Leroi-Gourhan, ‘a movement, within the interior milieu, that gains 
progressive foothold in the exterior milieu’,164 a foothold that, nev-
ertheless, is only ever expressed in the localized differentiation of 
technical facts. What forms of articulation are at play in this articula-
tion of the interior and the exterior, what complexities of advance and 
delay, negotiation and renegotiation, between artefacts and the prac-
tice (or behavioural regulation) of those artefacts? With such ques-
tions, it becomes possible to think another approach to the temporality 
of the technical beings that we are (which extends before and beyond 
the question of the history of humanity), one that can begin to think in 
terms of tendencies, rhythms, epochs and modes of inscription.
For Leroi-Gourhan, the technical tendency on the one hand pos-
sesses its own dynamic: it involves a dynamic relationship between 
exterior and interior that exceeds localization and individual will. But 
on the other hand, it cannot do so without the intentionality involved 
in the negotiation of that dynamic: how could innovation or inven-
tion ever occur without intentional foresight? (This is similar, in other 
words, to the way in which the evolution of a particular language 
occurs without any conscious decision to do so by any of the speakers 
of that language, exceeding the level of the individual, yet is the prod-
uct of nothing other than the totality of decisions of individual speak-
ers about what to say.) In that way, Leroi-Gourhan was perhaps ripe 
for deconstruction, so to speak: a key question that Stiegler formulates 
in Technics and Time, 1, via Gilbert Simondon (and Bertrand Gille, 
who thinks the relationship between ‘technical systems’ and other 
systems, these ‘others’ being all those social systems that regulate 
or cope with or take care of the functioning of the technical system 
and its consequences), is whether this progression of technical tenden-
cies can really any longer be said to arise from the interior milieu, or 
whether it is not rather the case that this interiority is progressively 
dissolved into a planetary exterior that itself finds itself progressively 
anthropized (that is, technicized) as technics becomes thoroughly 
industrial.165 This, once again, ultimately leads to the question raised 
by Heidegger with the concept of Gestell – but in other terms.
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Leroi-Gourhan, Derrida, Stiegler
It is not just a question of finishing a project whose necessity Derrida 
makes clear without himself carrying it to completion. More than that, 
it is a question of understanding the impediments, whether ‘internal’ 
or ‘external’, that prevented him from doing so. Because absent such 
a critique, those undiagnosed impediments will likely remain in force 
for any future attempts to so ‘displace’ the notion of history.
When Derrida refers to ‘modes of inscription’ or to the trace, these 
inscriptions and traces cannot simply be ascribed to ‘materiality’, 
because this would be to assign precedence to one side of a metaphysi-
cal opposition whose very possibility would for Derrida be opened up 
by this trace, as for example the opposition of matter and form, or the 
material and the ideal, the material and the spiritual, or, ultimately, 
presence and non-presence. But given that metaphysics is accord-
ing to Derrida that from which it is strictly speaking impossible to 
escape, the refusal of any such materiality, the attempt to conceive 
traces and inscriptions as purely immaterial, would be exposed to the 
very same risk.
For Derrida, of course, this question of the trace therefore implies 
the notion of archi-writing, the originarily inscriptive character of 
even vocal language prior to the existence of the ‘narrow and histori-
cally determined concept of writing’, which is how Derrida compli-
cates that ‘one fell swoop’ by which Lévi-Strauss conceives the advent 
of language. Before there can be inscription that opens technics, there 
must be the inscriptive possibility, and hence Derrida states his belief 
about the priority of writing:
I believe […] that a certain sort of question about the mean-
ing and origin of writing precedes, or at least merges with, 
a certain type of question about the meaning and origin of 
technics.166
It may be that everything hangs on the significance of the little 
phrase, ‘or at least merges with’, or, perhaps, that the whole issue is 
left hanging on that phrase. We can at least wonder whether Derrida 
ever truly analyses this possible merger, and, in the absence of such an 
analysis, we are forced to wonder what is at stake in placing it under 
the very specific sign of ‘writing’, no matter how qualified this word 
may be. Are we not at least entitled to question this preference for 
this particular word, given that the history of inscription in matter 
begins some three million years prior to the narrow and historically 
determined concept of writing? What exactly is the relation between 
this ‘concept’ and the choice of this word to describe the condition of 
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possibility of something lying not only outside this concept but prior 
to its historical determination by such a vast distance? If everything is 
already there with the first inscriptive gestures, then is not the choice 
of this one word, writing, historically and philosophically loaded?
If archi-writing is the condition of possibility of something like 
carved stone, then can the fundamental possibility of something so 
old (flint tools dating from at least 3.3 million years ago, that is, pre-
dating not only Homo sapiens but the entire Homo genus) be unprob-
lematically approached by way of something much, much newer (per-
haps around 8000 years old)? And even if we refer not to inscription 
in stone, but to the first engraved markings whose function is to con-
serve or communicate meaning, as for instance with prehistoric cave 
painting, do not these, too, predate ‘writing’ by a significant margin? 
Is there not a risk that the use of the term ‘writing’ to name what pre-
dates all these epochs of inscription implies some kind of reasoning 
by analogy? Finally, if archi-writing refers to the opening, beyond 
the metaphysics of presence, of the inscriptive possibility from out of 
which the event of meaning can occur, does this non-concept contain 
sufficient resources for conveying not just the retentional character of 
such ‘inscriptivity’ but also its protentional character, which is to say, 
its projective character as the engine of dreams and images, some of 
which will then become realised dreams, that is, materialized ones, 
materialized specifically in artefacts?
It is with Leroi-Gourhan’s two-volume major work, Gesture and 
Speech, published over 1964 and 1965, that we can begin to approach 
these questions, and specifically with his concept of ‘exteriorization’, 
a technical concept that, unfortunately, did not manage itself to gain 
a progressive foothold for at least thirty years, up until the publica-
tion of Technics and Time, 1 in 1994. The leap effected by the concept 
of exteriorization consists in retying the question of the technical to 
the question of inscription, because Leroi-Gourhan’s insight was that 
every technical artefact, whether by design or accidentally, functions 
as a kind of memory, and does so precisely because it is inscriptive, an 
inscription of living gestures into dead matter, that is, an inscription 
of time into space. With the concept of exteriorization, Leroi-Gourhan 
understands the specificity of the process of hominization as lying in 
the advent of what amounts to a third kind of memory.
Why do we say, a ‘third’ kind of memory? What is memory? Could 
we say that memory refers to the means by which localized systems 
keep the past in the present, so as to preserve a record of the past and 
the lessons it contains, and thereby to increase the chances of success 
in the attack on the environment in which living consists? Or, to put 
it another way, memory can be described as the capacity of localized 
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systems to retain improbabilities against the overwhelming tendency 
towards the probable characteristic of the universe and described by 
the second law of thermodynamics. This counter-tendency to retain 
past improbabilities is, as far as we know, only a characteristic of 
those localized systems that are associated with life in the terrestrial 
biosphere. Describing the relationship between memory and behav-
ioural anticipation, Leroi-Gourhan says that memory is to be under-
stood ‘in a very broad sense’ as ‘the medium for action sequences’.167 
With this in mind, we may indeed feel justified in referring to three 
great epochs of memory that have developed on this planet.168
Let us briefly outline this vast genealogy. The first kind of memory 
is that of molecular genetics, beginning some four billion years ago 
with the first articulation of organic evolutionary processes from out 
of inorganic matter: a first complicated moment, no doubt, but, in any 
case, involving a ‘before’ and an ‘after’.169 Of course, the DNA mol-
ecule does not ‘remember’ the past in the strict sense in which we 
ordinarily use this word: the molecule itself is precisely incapable of 
learning lessons. Nevertheless, this macromolecule reproduces itself 
almost but not quite perfectly (so that we should really say that DNA 
is not ‘one’ molecule but a perpetually unfolding chain of variations 
upon a molecular theme), thereby allowing for a stability of repro-
duction necessary for the survival of species, while also enabling 
the proliferation of differentiation across the expanse of evolutionary 
time (while about 1.5 million species have been formally described, 
estimates of the number of currently-existing species range into the 
billions170). In so doing, this dynamic of synchronic and diachronic 
reproduction effectively and efficiently, but accidentally, preserves the 
lessons of experience at the genetic level, as a kind of ‘species-related 
memory’171 honed by the very long-term effects of selection pressure, 
even if the individual has no awareness of those lessons as it follows 
genetically-based behavioural patterns within the conditions set by 
the exterior milieu in which the individual finds itself.
The second kind of memory is that which begins with the develop-
ment of nervous tissue, some 550 million years ago. With the evolu-
tion of life forms possessing such tissue, it became possible for the 
individual to respond in a primitive way to changes in environmental 
conditions.172 With the subsequent evolution of the central nervous 
system, it became possible for the individual to co-ordinate sensory 
reception with behaviour, involving the kind of sensorimotor loops 
that von Uexküll studied in relation to the tick. And with the fur-
ther development of the executive functions of that central nervous 
system, parts of the brain evolved to become dedicated to preserv-
ing a record of the outcomes of these sensorimotor loops, that is, a 
Daniel Ross 92
‘potential memory’ through which it becomes possible to learn and 
remember the lessons of individual experience, and so to evolution-
arily benefit from the introduction of greater latitudes of behavioural 
variability with respect to the genetic program, even if the content of 
those lessons cannot be transmitted from the nervous system of one 
individual to the nervous system of an individual from the succeeding 
generation: again, the species benefit operates simply through the law 
of large numbers applied to selection pressures.
So we have one kind of ‘memory’, genetic memory, which is pre-
served and gradually transformed from generation to generation, but 
which cannot itself learn directly from the experience of the indi-
vidual other than through the effects of the pressures of selection. 
And we have another kind of memory that allows the individual to 
modify behaviour on the basis of experience, but where those lessons 
are lost with the death of the individual and the destruction of its cen-
tral nervous system. Furthermore, the capacity and accuracy of ner-
vous memory is itself limited – finite – for the individual organism 
endowed with such a nervous system.
With the advent of what Leroi-Gourhan calls exteriorization, how-
ever, it becomes possible for those lessons learned by the individual 
to be put outside the central nervous system of the organism, because 
they can be inscribed into dead matter. This begins to make possible:
1 the sharing of a lesson learned by an individual (for exam-
ple, the sequence of gestures required to make a tool), open-
ing up the possibility of a community of knowledge and 
cooperative systems between groups of individuals;
2 the lasting of that lesson beyond the life of the individual 
(for example, we can still learn from prehistoric tools 
how they were made, and learn to make them ourselves, 
which is a branch of archaeology and one practised by 
Leroi-Gourhan173);
3 the eventual formation of methods of exteriorization that 
are designed specifically in order to record these lessons, 
such as cave painting, writing and so on (forms of exterior-
ization that Stiegler refers to as hypomnesic or mnemotech-
nical retention, where this hypomnesis would then become 
the condition of possibility of Platonic anamnesis, the recol-
lection that, in Meno, is for Socrates always the movement 
that opens the path to knowledge);
4 the development of a cumulative set of lessons that build 
from generation to generation, so that any individual may 
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enter a process of compressed learning of lessons that 
they have not themselves lived through, lessons that may 
have taken many generations to be collectively discovered 
and understood;
5 the proliferation and metastabilization of these conserved 
lessons as all the forms of knowledge, but also their trans-
formation, so that this building of a cumulative set of les-
sons becomes the Bildung embedded in a localized culture 
or civilization and transmitted via systems of education, 
including the transmission of the knowledge of how to 
use such hypomnesic retentional systems (how to read and 
write, for example), and where these educational and reten-
tional systems are themselves periodically transformed, 
and where all of this introduces a retentional dynamic that 
absolutely cannot be reduced to biological evolution (and to 
a great extent suspends biological selection).
When it comes to the question of the advent of this third kind of 
memory that is exteriorization, however, Leroi-Gourhan cannot avoid 
the problem that Derrida points out with respect to Lévi-Strauss: how 
to explain the genesis of a structure, or a system? Did the process of 
encephalization (the evolutionary increase in brain size) just happen 
to ‘naturally’ reach a point where the possibility of conceiving tools 
and then producing them simply became ‘spontaneously’ possible 
and therefore inevitable? Or was a gesture somehow ‘accidentally’ 
inscribed in rock, prompting reflection on this accidental action? But 
could such an accident happen without in some way being both antici-
pated and recognized, in which case how could it be considered just an 
accident? Does the process of exteriorization derive from the interior, 
from the being who ‘thought’ to exteriorize, who imagined doing so, 
or is it the process of exteriorization that reflectively makes possible 
the constitution of something like an interior in the first place, and, 
even more so, something like imagining, or dreaming, or eventu-
ally, thinking?
This is the question of invention, and, as Stiegler says, of the 
who and the what of invention, where it is not at all clear which is 
the inventor and which the invented. It is not difficult to show that 
answering such a question one way or the other is strictly impossible:
To enter these questions, we shall focus on the passage 
into the human leading from the Zinjanthropian to the 
Neanthropian. This ground breaking [frayage], which is that 
of corticalization [or encephalization as it becomes focused 
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on the expansion of the neocortex], is also effected in stone, 
in the course of the slow evolution of techniques of stonecut-
ting. An evolution so slow – it still occurs at the rhythm of 
‘genetic drift’ – that one can hardly imagine the human as its 
operator, that is, as its inventor; rather, one much more read-
ily imagines the human as what is invented.174
In other words, speed matters: if the rhythm of the evolution of tool 
production occurs at a pace measurable in hundreds of thousands of 
years, and if the expansion of the neocortex occurs at a similar rate 
and over the same period of time, then it becomes strictly impossible 
to ascribe causality to one or other of these, the prosthetic tool or the 
hominid brain. For instance, the Oldowan stone tool is associated with 
the Australopithecus garhi hominim species living some 2.5 million 
years ago and with a brain volume of 450cc, whereas the development 
of the Acheulean hand-axe is associated with the significantly larger-
brained Homo erectus and dated from around 1.76 million years ago 
(and where neither of these species are what we would call ‘human’).
What happens in the vast space of time over the course of which 
this evolution of the complexity of tools and the size of brains occurs? 
There is no scientific way of deciding that one or other of them is the 
originator or the driver of the process by which both are invented and 
transformed. We can only refer to a dynamic co-origination between 
the tool-equipped hand (the hand that is defunctionalized and refunc-
tionalized by the advent of bipedalism) and the corticalizing brain. 
The process of exteriorization is also and simultaneously a process 
of interiorization, that is, the process of the elaboration of a psychic 
interiority (which will also become the social interiority that is the 
ethnic grouping, and where bipedalism, freeing the hands from walk-
ing, also frees the mouth from needing to grip, opening the possibility 
of that subsequent exteriorization that is speech).
Yet despite the revolutionary perspicacity of the notion of exterior-
ization as a third kind of memory, Leroi-Gourhan is himself not free 
of a tendency to conceive the inception of this process as needing to 
happen suddenly, just as Lévi-Strauss saw the inception of language 
as bound to have occurred ‘all at once’. If Lévi-Strauss in this way 
cannot avoid seeing the exterior as being constituted from the inte-
rior, in Leroi-Gourhan the movement tends to go the other way: the 
exterior invents the interior. This is, at least, the basis of Stiegler’s 
claim that the concept of exteriorization needs to be radicalized still 
further: the movement of exteriorization is a paradoxical opening of 
both exteriority and interiority:
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Hominization is for Leroi-Gourhan a rupture in the move-
ment of freeing (or mobilization) characteristic of life. This 
rupture happens suddenly, in the form of a process of exteri-
orization which […] means that the appearance of the human 
is the appearance of the technical. […] The movement inher-
ent in this process of exteriorization is paradoxical: Leroi-
Gourhan in fact says that it is the tool, that is, tekhnē, that 
invents the human, not the human who invents the technical. 
[…] But here the human is the interior: there is no exterior-
ization that does not point to a movement from interior to 
exterior. […] Interior and exterior are consequently consti-
tuted in a movement that invents both one and the other: a 
moment in which they invent each other respectively, as if 
there were a technological maieutic of what is called human-
ity. The interior and the exterior are the same thing, the 
inside is the outside, since man (the interior) is essentially 
defined by the tool (the exterior).175
This complication at the origin, and this co-implication of interior and 
exterior qua processes opening the possibility of the human, are what 
lead Stiegler to refer to a ‘default of origin’, an origin that, as an acci-
dent in becoming, becomes the necessity of adopting this accidentality 
without essence that is an originary de-fault. But to pursue this fur-
ther, we need to inquire as to what this Stieglerian analysis means for 
the Derrida of 1967 (Speech and Phenomena and Of Grammatology), 
and then for the Heidegger of 1927 (Being and Time).
Deconstruction and différance
Derridian thought has a plurality of sources but the most cru-
cial undoubtedly lie in the thought of Husserl and Heidegger. 
‘Deconstruction’ begins firstly as a way of approaching the legacy 
of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ (the opposition of presence and non-
presence and the privileging of the former, as the presence of the 
present, over the latter) that residually remains within these phenom-
enologies and ontologies deriving from the first half of the twentieth 
century, as well as within the whole history of what Heidegger called 
the history of metaphysics. ‘Deconstruction’, however, also main-
tains an inextricable relationship, via the reference contained in the 
word, to that structuralism which is also undoubtedly a key source of 
Derrida’s approach. That deconstruction is so defined by its relation to 
structuralism is much more than a choice: it is a necessity.
Yet that necessary choice nevertheless has consequences for 
Derridian thought. Derrida will never cease drawing attention to 
Daniel Ross 96
the remnants of the metaphysics of presence in the human sciences 
in general, and structuralism in particular, but despite its own opera-
tion, deconstruction itself tends to lead to the reproduction of the very 
same privileging of the structural and the synchronic, the very same 
neutralization of time and history, to which Derrida himself points in 
structuralism. When it comes to thinking ‘invention’ or the future, 
for example, Derridian thought tends to be able to do so only in terms 
of an absolute break or rupture, rather than, as Simondon will con-
ceive it, as a systemic characteristic of a dynamic process itself. In 
other words, where Simondon will see invention starting from the 
process, as the emergence of a possibility involving the reorganiza-
tion of the dynamic field arranging organism and milieu, Derrida will 
tend to see invention as the origin of the dynamism of the process, 
which we might well take as evidence of deconstruction’s difficulty, 
despite itself, with respect to the attempt to think the temporality of 
processes.176
We say ‘despite itself’ because, as a deconstruction of so-called 
‘binary oppositions’, it can in fact only be a compositional style of 
thinking, which seeks the originary complication that unfolds as the 
process by which distinctions rigidify into the oppositions of so-called 
‘metaphysics’. A compositional style of thinking is one that seeks the 
emergence of such distinctions-cum-oppositions from out of an origin 
and across a dynamic, that is, as a struggle of tendencies and counter-
tendencies. In this sense, deconstruction would, despite how the term 
sounds to the ear, be an essentially processual form of thinking, and 
for Stiegler it will be crucial to interpret Derridian thought in a way 
that takes this processual character as fundamental. Deconstruction’s 
goal is to cause the foundations of an opposition to tremble, so as to 
expose what metaphysics forgets – the composition that is ‘older’ than 
the opposition – making possible a transformational reading, defunc-
tionalizing an opposition so that it might be refunctionalized as a pro-
ductive distinction, often through the introduction of an invented term 
that cannot be placed within the oppositional logic of metaphysics.
(But one question that this will leave is whether Derrida can think, 
not just processes of composition but processes of de-composition, 
factual, objective or material deconstructions that entail the need to 
think not just what is older than a distinction, but its future in the 
necessity and the virtue of re-composition, which is something other 
than a quasi-transcendental ‘to-come’: it is here most of all that we 
can understand that it may not be completely false to say that Derrida 
neutralizes history and time. Compositional thinking should be a 
form of thinking that sees the complexity at the origin as an acci-
dentality, and that this means that the end is not determined by the 
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origin: composition is an accidental process, and, in this way, to think 
in terms of composition would be a tragic style of thinking. One cru-
cial question for the future of deconstruction is the degree to which 
Derrida himself let go of this tragic insight when he dropped the ques-
tions of the monstrosity of the present and the pharmacology of the 
trace in favour of the aporias of quasi-transcendentality, and, in so 
doing, lost sight of the de-compositional possibility and danger.)
One key instance of an invented term introduced by Derrida in 
order to exceed the limits of oppositional logic is ‘différance’, and it 
is perhaps the most important, at least for Stiegler’s transformational 
reading (or refunctionalization) of Derrida’s thought as processual, 
compositional and tragic. And what makes the introduction of this 
term in Of Grammatology immediately relevant is the fact that he does 
so at the one moment in the entire course of ‘post-structuralism’ when 
Leroi-Gourhan’s argument concerning the very long epochal history 
of exteriorization is put on stage, even if this appearance of Leroi-
Gourhan in Of Grammatology is rather accidental,177 and even if this 
reference by Derrida to Leroi-Gourhan seems scrupulously avoided 
by almost the entire subsequent history of deconstruction, whether in 
Derrida’s own work or that of his epigones – with the very notable 
exception of Christopher Johnson.178
And yet, for Derrida himself, epochality is the very reason for 
putting this term, ‘neither a word nor a concept’, on the scene 
of philosophy:
I would say, first off, that différance, which is neither a word 
nor a concept, strategically seemed to me the most proper 
in order to think, if not to master […] what is most irreduc-
ible about our ‘epoch’. Therefore I am starting, strategically, 
from the place and the time in which ‘we’ are, even though 
in the last analysis my opening is not justifiable, since it is 
only on the basis of différance and its ‘history’ that we can 
claim to know who and where ‘we’ are, and what the limits 
of an ‘epoch’ might be.179
With this statement, Derrida indicates as clearly as could be that dif-
férance and its history ought to be the basis upon which it becomes 
possible to think who we are, our epochality, the irreducibility of 
today’s epochality, and the limits of our epochality, the question of its 
reaching its limits. But at the same time, he immediately suspends this 
‘most proper’ starting point, on the grounds that it is différance that 
opens up the very possibility of such a start – of a thinking of epochal-
ity and its limits. Derrida thus operates a kind of ‘give and take’ with 
respect to the relationship between différance and epochality, where 
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each becomes something like the originator of the other’s possibility, 
in a way that may ultimately prove too ‘suspensive’ in order to allow 
any further step to be taken in relation to this ‘most proper’ beginning.
That said, as for these limits, they must undoubtedly be circum-
scribed in relation to Derrida’s statement at the end of the ‘Exergue’ 
of Of Grammatology:
The future can be anticipated only in the form of an abso-
lute danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with consti-
tuted normality and can only announce itself, present itself, 
as a kind of monstrosity. For that world to come and for that 
within it which will make tremble the values of sign, speech 
and writing, for that which guides our future anterior, there 
is still no exergue.180
If Derrida will, despite the introduction of this neologism, leave this 
exergue unwritten, despite the proliferation of Derridian works, then 
it becomes imperative to ask whether Derrida’s way of conceiving dif-
férance has in some manner historically functioned as an impediment 
to this futural necessity for which he seems implicitly to call.
Auto-affection and inscription
Over the past half-century (for it has been that long), students of 
‘French theory’ have perhaps become too familiar with the idea of 
thinking of différance as the origin of the play of difference, maybe 
even taking for granted somewhat that this non-concept can be placed 
safely under their conceptual toolbelt. For there is undeniable pleasure 
in the feeling of having mastered the notions of a master thinker, in 
feeling confident that one knows what is meant by the sign’s or the 
trace’s perpetual openness to retrospective reinterpretation as differ-
ences proliferate, a proliferation made possible by the fact that there 
is no sign whose meaning does not refer to others signs, no signified 
that is not itself a kind of signifier, différance thus amounting to the 
inscriptive detour that is necessary for anything like language or 
speech to arise.181 To this can be added the certainty that Derrida’s 
critique of the structuralist tendency to neutralize time and history 
is also a critique of the structuralist gesture that consists in wanting 
to ‘totalize’ structure, that is, to close the system that is to be eluci-
dated, to repress the element of excess or default that gets that sys-
tem or structure going, and that leaves it perpetually exposed, that 
is, open. ‘Différance’ would be the deconstructive term with which 
Derrida tries to undo this repression, and to find a path by which to 
think systems and structures without totalizing them and to think 
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them precisely as processes. But perhaps there remains significantly 
more to say about this ‘term’ whose difference from difference cannot 
(in French) be heard but only read.
Before getting to Of Grammatology, we must consider how ‘dif-
férance’ is deployed in Speech and Phenomena, where it is intro-
duced in the course of Derrida’s deconstruction of the remnants of 
the metaphysics of presence to be found in Husserl’s notion of the 
‘pure auto-affection’ of ‘hearing oneself speak’. The argument for the 
purity of this form of auto-affection lies in the ‘immediacy’ involved 
in speaking and then, without delay, seemingly without exteriority, 
hearing what one has oneself said. Derrida notes the oddness of this 
argument premised on the ‘absolute proximity of the signifier and 
the signified’,182 given that Husserl also attributed the possibility of 
the ideal objects of scientific truth to writing, that is, to inscription. 
But if for Husserl this necessity of inscription lies in reactivation and 
repetition – being able to ‘repeat the original sense, that is, the act 
of pure thought which created the ideality of sense’, inscription also 
brings with it (as Socrates already argued in Phaedrus with respect 
to the pharmakon of writing, which Derrida will not mention until 
later texts) ‘the ever growing risk of “forgetting” and loss of sense’ 
as it becomes
more and more difficult to reconstitute the presence of the 
act buried under historical sedimentations. The moment of 
crisis is always the moment of signs.183
It is in the context of what we could call (getting ahead of ourselves) 
this ‘pharmacological’ argument concerning the duplicity of writing 
that Derrida introduces the notion of ‘différance’. Despite all of his 
efforts to absolutely distinguish presence and non-presence – that the 
‘body’ that is spatialized writing means something only if it is ‘ani-
mated’ by an intentional act of meaning enacted by the temporalizing 
voice of a speaker – Husserl, through this phonocentric repression of 
difference ‘by assigning it to the exteriority of signifiers’, ‘could not 
fail to recognize its work at the origin of sense and presence’, because 
this supposedly pure auto-affection that is hearing oneself speak still 
‘supposed that a pure difference comes to divide self-presence’.184 
Derrida concludes:
In this pure difference is rooted the possibility of everything 
we think we can exclude from auto-affection: space, the 
outside, the world, the body, etc. As soon as it is admitted 
that auto-affection is the condition for self-presence, no pure 
transcendental reduction is possible. But it was necessary to 
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pass through the transcendental reduction in order to grasp 
this difference in what is closest to it […]. We come closest 
to it in the movement of differance.
This movement of differance is not something that happens 
to a transcendental subject; it produces a subject.185
The introduction of the notion of differentiating-and-deferring dif-
férance in Speech and Phenomena thus functions as the repressed 
complication lying at the origin of difference, beyond the metaphys-
ics of presence and non-presence, and opening the very possibility 
of space, exteriority (and interiority), world and ‘self’, or ‘subject’. 
And, in relation to these last, ‘self’, ‘subject’, Derrida’s 1968 lecture 
on différance will reiterate in other terms that it is by this temporal-
izing deferral opening a divided self-presence that this ‘self’ can be 
constituted as a localized economy: ‘to temporize, to take recourse, 
consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal or temporizing media-
tion of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of 
“desire” or “will”’.186 With this thought that différance lies at the root 
of an economy not just of an auto-affective ‘subject’ but of a desir-
ing subject, that is, at the root of a libidinal economy, we can see the 
opening of a thought that Derrida does not in fact pursue very far, but 
that Stiegler will pursue, even if for the latter it is crucial to under-
stand this not as a suspension or deferral of desire, but rather of what 
is not yet desire but no longer an instinct: the drives, where such a dif-
férantial detour proves to be the very condition of possibility of desire.
But the question we will have to ask via Of Grammatology is: is it 
just, is it right, to understand the inscriptivity of différance as neces-
sarily and primordially a question of writing? For Derrida, the pho-
nocentric opposition is always a matter of opposing the human and 
the animal, and, with the argument that speech was always already a 
kind of writing, he means to contest the opposition of nature and cul-
ture. But that still leaves the question of the passage from one mode of 
inscription to another. As Derrida himself asks, and does not hesitate 
to ask, despite différance being ‘neither a word nor a concept’: ‘What 
differs? Who differs? What is différance?’187 And what is its history?
The history of life and its epochs
The ‘grammatology’ for which Derrida calls can be neither ‘one of 
the sciences of man’ nor ‘just one regional science among others’, 
because this grammatology would ask ‘the question of the name of 
man’,188 or in other words because the object of grammatology is ante-
rior to the question of what ‘defines’ humanity. With such anteriority, 
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grammatology can be neither a scientific anthropology nor a philo-
sophical anthropology. In Of Grammatology, Derrida introduces the 
notion of ‘différance’ to describe that process of differentiation and 
deferral through which actual, material traces of all kinds are pro-
duced. Such traces are for Derrida firstly those of writing, but they 
are not only so, and, importantly, in introducing this term he evokes 
the work of Leroi-Gourhan (even if, as mentioned, he does so some-
what accidentally). So as to clarify this anteriority of grammatology, 
Derrida aims to inscribe ‘man’ into a much larger adventure, whose 
terms fall on both sides of the metaphysical opposition of ‘animal’ 
and ‘human’. Hence Derrida answers the question that he will ask in 
the ‘Différance’ lecture, and answers it loud and clear, in a manner 
matched only by the degree to which this page of Of Grammatology 
has remained unheard by most Derridian readers of Derrida, who have 
for the most part remained deaf to this reference to Leroi-Gourhan:
Leroi-Gourhan no longer describes the unity of man and 
the human adventure thus by the simple possibility of the 
graphie in general; rather as a stage or an articulation in the 
history of life – of what I have called differance – as the his-
tory of the grammè.189
The vast chasm between what Derrida says explicitly and what 
Derrida has been understood to have said or not said about différance 
means that it is worthwhile reiterating:
the history of life – of what I have called différance.
And we must go slowly enough to understand what it means to iden-
tify this conjoint and originary difference and deferral that Derrida 
names différance with the history of life, and what it means to do so 
from within the heart of the grammatological project.
This already clearly implies another necessary question, and to the 
one that was raised twenty-three years earlier, but which, raised in 
this way, was, too, and despite everything, ignored by Derrida as by 
French philosophy of the 1960s in general: what is life? Consideration 
of Schrödinger’s bio-thermodynamic question means that we cannot 
avoid asking: is the notion of life that Derrida raises here one that is 
opposed to non-life, or rather something with which it composes? But 
then we will also have to ask: what is non-life? And finally, what is 
the relation between this ‘history of life’ and the history of what we 
call the ‘human adventure’, where the latter might indeed turn out to 
amount to a new composition of life and non-life, whatever it is that 
these words name before being the name of man? All these necessities 
arise because scholars and students of Derrida have, at least in the 
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Anglophone world, spent the past five decades skipping straight over 
this reference to Leroi-Gourhan at the heart of the grammatological 
project: that is, the thirty years prior to the English-language publica-
tion of Technics and Time, 1, and the twenty years since.
If this is a question of the ‘history of life’, then what is being 
deferred, in what kind of economy, in order to produce the play and 
proliferation of what kinds of differences? And this question will 
raise another question: in relation to this economy of deferral and dif-
ference that characterizes the history of life, does the history of defer-
ral and difference that will characterize the history of our (noetic) life 
constitute a rupture or a continuum – what exactly is meant by ‘a stage 
or an articulation’ in this history of life, and why does Derrida feel the 
need to introduce this ‘or’ in the first place? What is at stake between 
a stage and an articulation and what possible uncertainty is reflected 
in the suggestive hesitation between them?
Whatever may be the case in that regard, for Derrida it is a ques-
tion of a shift to a new basis into which all such concepts must be 
reinscribed:
Instead of having recourse to the concepts that habitually 
serve to distinguish man from other living beings (instinct 
and intelligence, absence or presence of speech, of society, 
of economy, etc. etc.), the notion of program is invoked.190
For Derrida, the import of this ‘notion of program’ lies in its causing 
the opposition of animal and human to tremble: as Stiegler puts it, for 
Derrida, here, the human is nothing more than ‘the appearance of a 
new type of grammē and/or program’.191
But what is this notion of program? Naturally one thinks of cyber-
netics and computation, which are clearly in Derrida’s mind, but the 
reference to ‘instinct and intelligence’ shows that he may well be 
thinking of the subchapter of Gesture and Speech that bears this title, 
and which is indeed a point at which Leroi-Gourhan complicates the 
question of the human distinction. There, Leroi-Gourhan argues that 
what we refer to as either instinct or intelligence, imagining that these 
are the names of what causes particular animal or human behaviour, 
are not in fact causes but effects: action programs whose sources lie 
in the three kinds of memory we have already outlined. Such action 
programs may be short or long, simple or complex, depending on 
whether the species under consideration is an earthworm, an ant, a 
reptile, a bird or a mammal (the latter, according to Leroi-Gourhan in 
1964, for the first time possessing the ability to choose between action 
sequences and of ‘checking’ the adequacy of the outcome of a par-
ticular sequence, meaning that ultimately the ‘individual’s memory 
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[…] takes precedence over the species memory’).192 The ‘program’ 
invoked by Leroi-Gourhan thus refers to action sequences determin-
ing the attack on the environment, a ‘double movement’ from past to 
future whose anticipatory potentials are drawn from the ‘information’ 
contained in the ‘medium’ that is memory, understood in a very broad 
sense that encompasses genetics, brain and exteriorization.
If we say ‘information’, here, it is to draw a link to what Derrida 
will state in his next sentence when he does indeed refer explicitly to 
cybernetics, but in a way that, as it were, immediately demands that 
we place this under erasure: ‘information’ is invoked here only with 
great precaution, as we are far from having determined whether it can 
really be deployed in relation to what is ‘stored’ or ‘communicated’ 
genetically by the earthworm, nervously and pheromonally by the ant, 
or in paintings or textbooks by ‘we’ ourselves.193 But Derrida himself 
understands perfectly well the difficulty and the necessity of avoiding 
‘mechanist, technicist, and teleological language’, as well as the scope 
of the questions all this raises, as he immediately indicates:
It [the notion of program] must of course be understood in 
the cybernetic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible 
only in terms of a history of the possibilities of the trace 
as the unity of a double movement of protention and reten-
tion. This movement goes far beyond the possibilities of the 
‘intentional consciousness’.194
The question, then, is how Derrida’s extension of retention and proten-
tion far beyond ‘intentional consciousness’ and to the whole history 
of life relates and does not relate to the creation of this new science of 
communication and control that is cybernetics.
The inscriptive character of the trace whose possibility is opened 
up by différance here extends from the pre-intentional, pre-conscious 
memory/programs of genetics, through the retentionality and proten-
tionality of Husserlian intentional consciousness (where this extends, 
as we have seen, to questions of will and desire that are those not 
just of consciousness but of the unconscious, as well as that movement 
of retention and protention that is the mortality of Dasein stretched 
out between unremembered birth and the indeterminate determinacy 
of death), and far beyond, that is, through the artificial memory that 
is ‘writing’ and towards cybernetics ‘as such’, the cybernetics of 
electronic card indexes and computational programs. It is here that 
Derrida stakes his claim for différance as an inscriptive emergence 
amounting to the entire ‘history of life’:
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Since ‘genetic inscription’ and the ‘short programmatic 
chains’ regulating the behavior of the amoeba or the annelid 
up to the passage beyond alphabetic writing to the orders of 
the logos and of a certain homo sapiens, the possibility of the 
grammè structures the movements of its history according to 
rigorously original levels, types, and rhythms.195
This history is thus an epochal history, where the epochs are those 
of the varying modes of inscription and anticipation unfolding over 
the course of this history of life. But for Derrida, this lesson con-
cerning the necessity of treating epochs in their specificity and their 
rhythms, a lesson learned from Leroi-Gourhan, ultimately and irre-
ducibly depends on ‘the most general concept of the grammè’.196 And 
this is so because for Derrida it is always, and always already, a ques-
tion of exteriorization:
If the expression ventured by Leroi-Gourhan is accepted, 
one could speak of a ‘liberation of memory’, of an exteri-
orization always already begun but always larger than the 
trace which, beginning from the elementary programs of so-
called ‘instinctive’ behavior up to the constitution of elec-
tronic card-indexes and reading machines, enlarges differ-
ance and the possibility of putting in reserve.197
With this ‘exorbitant’198 thought, beyond the oppositions of the sys-
tem, Derrida outlines his grammatological answer to the question of 
what différance is. As Francesco Vitale puts it:
Derrida does not simply say that, thanks to Leroi-Gourhan, 
it is possible to retrace the emergence of writing, in its 
restricted sense, back to a much greater history, which would 
find its roots in the emergence of Homo sapiens in prehis-
tory. […] Above all […], the grammè would allow us to point 
out that différance is a genetico-structural condition of the 
life of the living and of its evolution.199
That is, différance would, according to Derrida, be the genetico-struc-
tural condition of the history of life qua history and economy of defer-
ral and differentiation opened up by the originary possibility of the 
movement of inscription, from the genetic, through the alphabetical, 
and to the analog and the digital.
Indecision
What are we to make of this phrase, ‘an exteriorization always already 
begun’? Why does the ‘liberation of memory’ that unfolds across the 
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whole evolutionary process necessarily amount to an exteriorization 
always already begun, given that for Leroi-Gourhan, exteriorization 
is the name of that bifurcation within the liberation of memory (and 
mobility) that consists in the advent of an organism or species that 
puts (itself) outside itself (so to speak) by inscribing its gestures in 
dead matter – or, as Derrida puts it, by ‘articulating the living upon 
the nonliving in general’?200 Is a process that continually enlarges dif-
férance always and necessarily a process of exteriorization, which is 
also to say a process of the production of a distinction between exte-
rior and interior? Perhaps we must indeed respond affirmatively here, 
but only if we then understand ‘exteriorization’ as this production of 
a progressively larger delimitation of locality between interior and 
exterior, and where such delimitations are those membranes, exoskel-
etons, epidermises, skins, frontiers and borders of localized systems 
at different orders of magnitude (of the unicellular organism, of the 
single cell within a multicellular organism, of the multicellular organ-
ism itself, of the ecosystem, of the tool-equipped multicellular organ-
ism that is exteriorized as such, of the infra-specific groups that such 
organisms form at various scales, from the tribe to the civilization, 
and of the biosphere as a whole).
But in that case, is it not that we are no longer talking about Leroi-
Gourhan’s exteriorization, but about some more general relationship 
between the interior milieu and the exterior milieu characteristic 
of the whole movement of life? Is Derrida justified in so enlarging 
Leroi-Gourhan’s concept? Is he right to keep the same name, and to 
do so in the name of a grammatological project that in this way seems 
to erase the distinction and difference that Leroi-Gourhan intends 
to make with this concept? In other words, is what unfolds from the 
advent of what Leroi-Gourhan calls exteriorization still a question of 
this ‘history of life’, or are we forced to ask what difference it makes 
when this history becomes the ‘pursuit of life by means other than 
life’, when it becomes not just a matter of the articulation of the liv-
ing upon the disorganized inorganic (of inanimate matter), but of its 
articulation upon the organized inorganic (the tool, technics)? This is 
the question with which, in Technics and Time, 1, Stiegler introduces 
a critique of Derrida whose implications for Derridian thought and 
beyond are, we claim, far-reaching:
To articulate the living onto the nonliving, is that not already 
a gesture from after the rupture when you are already no lon-
ger in pure phusis?201
And this is the question raised by Derrida when he describes this artic-
ulation of the living onto the non-living as the ‘origin of all repetition, 
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origin of ideality’, the originary trace of which is ‘not more ideal than 
real, not more intelligible than sensible, […] and no concept of meta-
physics can describe it’.202 The question is: on what condition can this 
still be ascribed to the ‘history of life’ and its economy? It is a ques-
tion by which Stiegler is able to make Derridian différance tremble:
There is something of an indecision around différance: it is 
the history of life in general, but this history is (only) given 
(as) (dating from) after the rupture […]. The whole problem 
is that of the economy of life once the rupture has taken 
place: life is, after the rupture, the economy of death. The 
question of différance is death.203
In other words, once the articulation of the living onto the non-living 
has commenced, it is no longer a question only of a history and an 
economy of life: it is then a question of another economy, or of an 
economy properly speaking (because it starts not from the organism 
or the ecosystem but from the house), a pursuit of life by means of 
an economy that is no longer just biological but inclusive of the non-
living, that is, of what is dead. And also of death: Stiegler relates this 
default of origin of mortality in technics to the reflective character of 
the tool, functioning as a mirror in which we can first see our own 
gestures, retained, but also, in being retained, can see for the first 
time that there was an existence before mine and will be an existence 
after it – ‘technical life – that is, dying’.204 So it becomes a question 
of reconciling or deconstructing the relationship of this ‘history of 
life – of what I have called différance’ with what Derrida will say the 
following year:
culture as nature different and deferred, differing-deferring; 
all the others of physis – tekhnē, nomos, thesis, society, free-
dom, history, mind, etc. – as physis different and deferred, 
or as physis differing and deferring. Physis in différance.205
Hence, with ‘all these others of physis’, it becomes a question not only 
of what differs or who differs in différance. We must also ask: when is 
différance, for Derrida? Stiegler notes:
Now phusis as life was already différance. There is an inde-
cision, a passage remaining to be thought.206
The Stieglerian rethinking and reinvention of différance operates on 
this indecision in the surgical pursuit of this passage. Stiegler stakes 
his claim with respect to his Derridian inheritance on the possibility 
of this operation and this pursuit.
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From Heidegger to Stiegler
Stiegler will not invoke ‘neganthropology’ or ‘exosomatization’ until 
twenty years after the publication of Technics and Time, 1, when the 
question of entropy will be brought to centre stage via the works of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Alfred Lotka, 
and in confrontation with rising problems associated in particu-
lar with ecological destruction, self-defeating consumerism and the 
potential consequences of a new wave of automation. But with this 
association – non-living, the dead, death – the question he raises with 
respect to Derrida is already inscribed in a field that will be delim-
ited by an ‘economy of death’ that connects our mortality to our 
inextricable relationship to inorganic (but organized) matter. And it 
is through this that the argument with respect to différance – which, 
as an economy of life and death that both conserves and transforms, 
is already a matter of the perpetual and exosomatic struggle against 
entropy – becomes the foundation of the argument with respect to the 
existential analytic of Dasein:
To think the articulation [of the living onto the non-living] is 
also to think the birth of the relation we name with the verb 
‘to exist’; this is to think anticipation.207
What is at stake here is existence in the Heideggerian sense: there 
is no tool production without anticipation and delay, and as soon as 
there is the opening of anticipation and delay, have we not already 
opened the way to the ecstatic horizon of the mortality of existence? 
So Stiegler will argue.
In Being and Time, Heidegger sets out in pursuit of the meaning of 
being, repressed in the history of thought just as Derrida will argue 
concerning writing and Stiegler concerning technics, but the prob-
lem Heidegger identifies at the beginning of this pursuit is that being 
is not just forgotten but elusive: we perpetually find ourselves only 
amidst beings, stuck at the ontic rather than the ontological level. How 
to retrieve the question of being is a problem. Hence he argues that 
we must first go in pursuit of the exemplary being for whom being is 
a question, which can function as a guide and through which it will 
become possible to undertake the destruction of metaphysics neces-
sary to think the meaning of being as such. The being for whom being 
is a question is, of course, the one he names Dasein: not humanity as 
such, yet nothing other than we ourselves, the who in its distinctness 
from all those beings that are inevitably whats. Dasein would thus be 
that being who possesses the possibility of seeing past or through or 
into the what – to the meaning of being itself.
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Characterizing Heidegger’s opening moves in this way already 
begins to indicate how he makes an opposition between the economy 
of death (existential mortality) and the economy of the non-living (the 
what). For Heidegger, Dasein is the being who knows it is mortal, and 
knows this not because of its relationship to the what, but, mostly, in 
spite of it. Unlike other beings, Dasein’s existence is fundamentally 
circumscribed by the knowledge of its mortality, that is, a knowledge 
that exceeds the determinacy of beings and of itself as a determinate 
being. Nevertheless, its way of being mortal consists in knowing 
something in the mode of not knowing it. Its way of comporting itself 
to beings exceeds those ways that take beings as ready to hand (exor-
ganically available for use, let’s say) or as present to hand (‘objects’ in 
their whatness as such, initially revealed when objects such as tools 
fail to be at hand): knowing that it is mortal, and that this mortality 
is irreducibly its own mortality, that its world is irreducibly its own 
world, Dasein’s relationship to beings involves the way they matter to 
it in an ‘existential’ way, as objects of an always future-oriented (that 
is, anticipatory) care, Sorge.
As circumscribed by care, however, Dasein both knows and forgets 
that it is mortal, which is to say, not yet finished, perpetually unfin-
ished: Dasein knows it is mortal in the sense of being primordially 
certain of it and of being unable to escape it, but it does not know it in 
the sense that what it knows about its mortality is indeterminate (in 
its circumstances, for example), and in the sense that it can flee from 
what it can nevertheless not escape – it can ‘forget’ what it knows, as 
it does in its average, everyday way of living and its way of living as 
‘one’ does, in the mode of the ‘they’. That Dasein knows it is mortal 
means that all of its projects exist in a relationship to this certain but 
indeterminate future – it is a futural being – but the fact that it can 
also not know means that it inevitably finds itself tempted to live as 
if this knowledge does not matter to it, getting caught up in or slid-
ing back down towards all the whats of everydayness and busyness, 
Besorgen. Dasein exists as perpetually caught between knowledge 
and non-knowledge.
Dasein is thus that being who is capable of existing in an ‘authen-
tic’ way towards the futural knowledge it possesses, projecting itself 
towards and anticipating its end, but also the being who can fall back 
into ways of existing that tend to eliminate this tension between 
knowing and not-knowing by forgetting what it knows, denying the 
singularity of its existence, assimilating the mineness of its existence 
to that of the de-singularized group, and determining the indetermi-
nate. With respect to the latter, to determine temporality is to see it in 
terms of what is measured by the clock, to make time into something 
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‘objective’, into a calculable object. Dasein’s authentic existential pos-
sibility consists in the capacity for recollecting its indeterminate mor-
tality and on that basis making a decision, in the ‘resoluteness’ with 
which it has the possibility of tearing itself away from all the whats of 
concern, away from ‘clock time’, even if this tearing away only ever 
seems to amount to a ‘modified grasp’ through which Dasein adopts 
its ownmost possibility, that is, the singularity of its existence. But 
it is through this possibility of tearing itself away (which is in this 
regard still conditional upon a relationship to whatness, which is why 
we said that the relationship to mortality is for Heidegger ‘mostly’ in 
spite of its relationship to the what) that Dasein can expose the origi-
nary character of the meaning of being as temporality as such.
Resoluteness is thus a kind of différance with respect to ordinary 
everydayness, the possibility of an anticipatory decision that extends 
past everyday concern with all the whats that preoccupy das Man, a 
differing and deferral of those concerns through an economy of care. 
But then, like Derrida, we have to ask: What differs? Who differs? 
From whence arises the possibility of Dasein, and the possibility of 
resolutely adopting its existence, and what is it that is thereby adopted?
What actually is this who that is Dasein? Heidegger says that Dasein 
‘is its past’.208 The italicization is his. Dasein ‘finds its meaning in 
temporality’, and this temporality is ‘the condition of the possibility 
of historicity’, where ‘historicity is prior to what is called history’209 
(just as for Derrida archi-writing will be prior to what is called writ-
ing). What Heidegger wants to say, by stating that temporality is the 
condition of historicity and historicity is prior to history, is that origi-
nary temporality belongs to this being who is Dasein, and that this is 
anterior to the busyness of history that unfolds and is recorded and 
thematized in the minutiae of its everydayness. Yet as he has already 
just said, this search for the temporality of Dasein, like all research, 
consists in ‘an ontic possibility of Dasein’,210 that is, it moves within 
the realm of beings, within the ‘factical’ realm of whats that always 
constitutes Dasein’s field of existence. What exactly does it mean to 
say that Dasein is its past, that it ‘always is how and “what” it already 
was’?211 Heidegger continues:
It is its own past not only in such a way that its past, as it 
were, pushes itself along ‘behind’ it, and that it possesses 
what is past as a property that is still objectively pres-
ent and at times has an effect on it. Dasein ‘is’ its past in 
the manner of its being which, roughly expressed, on each 
occasion ‘occurs’ out of its future. In its manner of exist-
ing at any given time, and thus also with the understanding 
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of being that belongs to it, Dasein grows into a customary 
interpretation of itself and grows up on that interpretation. 
It understands itself initially in terms of this interpretation 
and, within a certain range, constantly does so. This under-
standing discloses the possibilities of its being and regu-
lates them. Its own past – and that always means that of its 
‘generation’ – does not follow after Dasein but rather always 
already goes ahead of it.212
By the past of Dasein, then, Heidegger means that ‘already there’ 
(before it) that it must adopt ‘out of its future’. Dasein’s concern with 
its past derives from the fact that it is always (getting) ahead of itself, 
not that it is but that it has to be, that it has to care from out of its 
futurity. Because this past is already there, it is that into which Dasein 
must grow, in the sense of finding for itself the singular interpreta-
tion of its singular past that will both disclose its (futural) possibilities 
and regulate them (through which it can economize its possibilities, 
so to speak). It is not just the facts of its demise that Dasein knows 
in the mode of not knowing: it is also Dasein’s own past that has not 
yet been discovered by Dasein, not yet discovered its significance, but 
that awaits Dasein’s resolute taking upon itself of that past.
Hence it is because Dasein must discover this past that precedes 
it that, for that Dasein, the past is what ‘always already goes ahead 
of it’, awaiting Dasein’s discovery, interpretation, transformation and 
adoption. That about which Dasein cares in resolutely projecting itself 
is an interpretation of its past that is singular, in contrast to the ‘domi-
nant interpretation’ to which Dasein adapts in the mode of everyday-
ness and das Man. This is so because Dasein’s past is its past, because 
that which counts as its past is different from the past of any other 
Dasein, and therefore, that future from out of which this past can 
become its past is also singular. Yet this past, even if it is its own past, 
is never just its past, the past of a solitary Dasein, but also and indis-
solubly ‘that of its “generation”’, which is to say, that of a collective of 
singular Daseins who together, and with the world that surrounds them 
and that they make together, form a generation, that is, an epoch.
Now, as we said, Heidegger wants to say that originary tempo-
rality is the condition of historicity and precedes history. That is, 
Heidegger’s existential analytic arguably remains metaphysical inas-
much as he argues that, ultimately, the who precedes the what, insofar 
as originary temporality is always the temporality of a Dasein itself. 
And he remains metaphysical in that he wants to say that this grow-
ing of Dasein into its past by interpreting its past, and by interpreting 
it in terms of a future that it also projects, is, in the end, something 
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fundamentally disconnected from all those whats with which Dasein 
is concerned in that busyness that flees such possibilities. Among the 
questions that Stiegler puts to this account are therefore the following:
1 on what basis is this ‘already there’ accessed by Dasein?
2 on what basis is Dasein’s growing into (and transforming) 
its past, its heritage, a deferral that works by producing and 
adopting a different interpretation into which it grows?
With respect to these two questions:
1 Dasein’s past differs from the past of other beings because 
it is a past that is inscribed, not just in DNA, or in the nerve 
cells recording the memories of the experiences it has lived 
through, but in the records that remain of experiences it has 
not lived through:
What Heidegger calls the already there, constitutive of the tem-
porality of Dasein, is this past that I never lived but that is never-
theless my past, without which I never would have had any past 
of my own. Such a structure of inheritance and transmission […] 
presupposes that the phenomenon of life qua Dasein becomes sin-
gular in the history of the living to the extent that, for Dasein, the 
epigenetic layer of life, far from being lost with the living when it 
dies, conserves and sediments itself, passes itself down.213
It is the différance of différance that is technical exterior-
ization qua artificial memory, and it is only this, that makes 
it possible for Dasein to have a past that always already 
goes ahead of it and that it must grow into and out beyond. 
Stiegler does not at all disagree with Heidegger that exis-
tence exceeds what can be measured by the clock, and, fur-
thermore, there is a sense in which every artefact is a kind 
of clock, determining time, which is to say, making it into 
something spatial and material, and therefore calculable. 
But he argues that only through the whats into which this 
past has been inscribed, which are determinate and inani-
mate, an articulation of the living onto the non-living, only 
through this spatialization and materialization of time, 
only through this ‘epiphylogenetic’ process, is it possible 
for Dasein to access this past that awaits it and that it must 
make its own by exceeding its determination and sedimen-
tation, and through which it exists as such.
This is not a ‘program’ in the quasi-determinist biological sense, 
but a cipher in which the whole of Dasein’s existence is caught; 
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this epigenetic sedimentation, a memorization of what has come 
to pass, is what is called the past, what we shall name the epi-
phylogenesis of man […]. We come now to Heidegger after hav-
ing opened up the questions of the temporality of différance qua 
the movement of life in general because there is in Heidegger an 
opposition between the time of technical measurement and con-
cern, which is the loss of time, and authentic time, which is proper 
to Dasein – wrenched from the technical horizon of concern. Now 
if it is true that only epigenetic sedimentation can be the already-
there, this is only possible when the transmission allowing for the 
sediments is of an absolutely technical, nonliving essence: made 
possible by the organized albeit inorganic matter that the trace 
always is – be it a matter of tool or writing – let us say of the 
organon in general.214
2 Lacking the notion of différance as inscription in general, 
that is, the spatialization of the temporal, Heidegger wants 
to keep a privilege for one side of the distinction between 
the who and the what: the who that is Dasein precedes the 
what, and the whats involved in the technical determination 
of time are only what reduce temporality to technics and not 
that on the basis of which Dasein opens itself to a tempo-
rality beyond clock time. Sedimentation in artefacts is only 
that deathly loss of existence and forgetting of its ownmost 
possibility to which Dasein can fall prey; not the fertile soil 
(the humus and, as Stiegler will say much later, the ‘noetic 
necromass’215) from out of which it projects its possibilities.
This is the price Heidegger pays for not being able to 
dwell within the ambiguity and tension of the genitive 
involved in the ‘invention of the human’. Yet for Heidegger, 
the tradition that is Dasein’s past, and that of its ‘genera-
tion’, is nothing but the consequence of that rupture in the 
history of life that brings a new kind of organization, that 
of the tribe, the ethnicity, the ‘people’ (das Volk, he will 
say), and so on, which is the result of a new kind of shared 
memory, on the basis of which it becomes possible to imag-
ine and to realise (to project) a new kind of shared future. 
Dasein can anticipate, can project itself futurally, run ahead 
of itself, only on the basis of the already there of its inher-
ited past, which can be inherited only on the basis of its 
artefactual sedimentation.
But if Dasein can do more than remain caught in the 
dominant interpretation of das Man, if it bears within it 
the possibility of projecting another interpretation, one 
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founded on the singularity of its past, this is ultimately 
because it can return to this past in repetition. Repetition is 
the foundation of the possibility of interpretation, because 
by repeatedly coming back to the same, to what remains 
unceasingly the same, it is possible to create, from out of 
this recursivity, a dynamic and an economy of différance 
that finds the resources for the new precisely in the old. 
And this possibility depends on the recording of the past, 
and on the exactitude of that recording: to read the text of 
Plato today is to read precisely the same marks and signs 
that were read by the Greeks, and it is for this reason that 
it remains possible today to discover new interpretations of 
that old text. The openness of that text comes because of its 
spatialization in the form of a durable what, not despite it. 
But to interpret or reinterpret a text (whether it is a philo-
sophical text, a literary text or a legislative text), to come 
back to a text, is to re-temporalize what has been spatial-
ized, to re-interiorize what has been exteriorized, because 
it must pass through the temporal processes of a noetic 
Dasein. Ultimately, this is what makes every text uncanny, 
but this uncanniness consists precisely in the fact that what 
is dead, non-living, and which opens an originary economy 
of death within the text, nevertheless remains, and always 
bears within it the potential for revival, that is, for reinter-
pretation, re-temporalization.
Heidegger justifies his disengagement of the who from 
the what by the critique of horological instrumentality, 
of the measurability and calculability of clock time. But 
this instrumentality is thought exclusively in terms of its 
end – precision, that is, exactitude. For Heidegger, this is 
what means that clock time amounts to a technical attempt 
to determine the indeterminate. But if Stiegler is right that 
every artefact is a kind of clock, through which we ‘see’ 
time materialized, then, while it may be true that Dasein 
is a temporal being before it possesses sundials, clocks and 
watches, it is not true that it is a temporal being prior to 
being an instrumental being: it is all of these instruments, 
from the outset, and irrespective of their intended function, 
that in fact open up the temporality of the being who will 
become Dasein. Dasein is temporal because it is born and 
invented from out of the articulation of the who and the 
what, an articulation that must then also be socialized as 
‘our’ articulation of the who and the what. Exactitude – for 
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example, the exactitude of written public laws, requiring 
knowledge, interpretation and decision, that is, judgment – 
becomes the very basis of the openness of that socializa-
tion process, and of its open idiomaticity, that is, the open-
ness of what unfolds as the processuality of open local 
systems emerging from a default of origin, that is, from a 
complication.
Far from it being the case that technical beings are sub-
ordinate to ‘human’ beings, because the former are merely 
‘hybrids’, lacking their own dynamic, lacking the existen-
tial infinitude of the latter, they are what open the very 
possibility of such a dynamic beyond biological evolution. 
Heidegger was indeed among the first to perceive that 
‘modern technology’ bore the potential to form a dynamic 
of such magnitude as to potentially eclipse the very hori-
zon of the world of Dasein: this is what he would later call 
Gestell. But in failing to see the limits of his disengagement 
of the who and the what, in failing to see the way in which 
the what was the very basis by which Dasein could access 
its past and project itself towards indeterminacies and 
infinities beyond calculability, in failing to give the what 
any genuinely constitutive role, he failed to grasp the full 
depth of the mystery of tekhnē as that which lies both before 
and beyond the anthropological horizon of Dasein. Hence 
Stiegler’s concluding questions in Technics and Time, 1:
Is not the consideration of tekhnē, as the originary horizon of any 
access of the being that we ourselves are to itself, the very pos-
sibility of disanthropologizing the temporal, existential analytic? 
When ‘Time and Being’ gives itself the task of thinking being 
without beings (without Dasein), is it not a question, ultimately, 
of radically shifting the above understanding of time in terms of 
this finitude?216
It is to these questions that Stiegler will return twenty 
years later.
3 Tertiary Retention
Husserl, Heidegger, Stein, Celan
Thus far we have focused on Derrida’s notion of différance, and on 
broadening and critiquing what already for him was something 
beneath and beyond the level of a concept. For Derrida, this being 
more and less than a concept means that it was already something that 
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exceeded the distinction between philosophy and science, and this is 
also the case for Stiegler: it is neither a matter of reducing différance 
to a ‘materialist’ scientific account, nor of raising science to the ‘spiri-
tual’ level of philosophical ideas, but rather of exposing each of them 
to the processual, compositional conditions of their emergence from 
out of that originary complication that Stiegler calls the default of 
origin. We were thereby led to reflect upon two kinds of temporality 
relating the who and the what: (1) at the palaeo-archaeological level, 
the co-invention of the anthropic and the technical through the emer-
gence of a third kind of memory, exteriorized or exosomatic memory; 
and (2) at the level of the existential analytic, the emergence of pro-
jective, mortal Dasein, stretched between birth and death, from the 
conditions of access provided by exteriorization, making possible the 
formation, adoption and transformation of ‘tradition’ and ‘heritage’, 
that is, of a past that Dasein has not itself lived.
We have seen that for Derrida, the significance of Leroi-
Gourhan’s account of exteriorization lies in the possibility of extend-
ing the Husserlian concepts of retention and protention beyond 
their Husserlian provenance in ‘intentional consciousness’. As 
Stiegler puts it:
In Husserl, retentions and protentions are phenomena exist-
ing in the temporal flow of a consciousness itself proper to 
a noetic soul – in Aristotle’s sense – which is also the soul 
of a ‘transcendental subject’. In Derrida, the trace as reten-
tion and protention concerns every living organism – if only 
because DNA, as it was understood at the time he developed 
this grammatology, as genetic pro-gram, is a kind of reten-
tional as well as protentional system.217
And we should add that for Derrida, it was the relationship between 
this genetic program and the cybernetic program that meant he could 
conceive that this extension, operating ‘far beyond’ intentional con-
sciousness, did so on both sides of ‘the human’. In this way, Derrida 
would seem to be led towards the questions concerning both technol-
ogy and humanism that would occupy the later Heidegger. The latter, 
as we have seen, did not succeed in formulating the question of how 
it was possible that an epoch could commence in which there arose a 
being concerned not with survival but existence, that is, with a form 
of temporality not just calculable but existential: what Heidegger 
could not quite manage to think was how such a possibility depends 
on conditions of access to knowledge of the flow of time, and where 
these conditions are inevitably technical.
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Even if Stiegler will agree with the thrust of this challenge to 
‘humanism’, that is, this deconstruction of the opposition of the ani-
mal and the human, he will nevertheless insist that, in the history of 
life, a new regime of individuation is introduced when, to genetic 
(DNA) and epigenetic (cerebral) memory, there is added a third kind 
of memory, which is epiphylogenetic (that is, artificial): it is necessary, 
not to oppose the animal and the human, but to distinguish the epoch 
that begins with the advent of technical life. Nevertheless, it would be 
a mistake to conceive Stiegler as a philosopher of technology: if he is 
a philosopher ‘of’ anything, he is a philosopher of memory, or more 
specifically, of retention. Technics, or what he will later follow Lotka 
in calling exosomatization, always has retentional properties, and, for 
the exosomatic beings that we are, technics conditions all the forms of 
retention of which we are capable. If indeed Stiegler becomes a phi-
losopher of technics, it is through the question of memory, and where 
technics becomes not a ‘region’ of philosophical knowledge but the 
question of philosophy as such, or the question that exceeds philoso-
phy, if it is true that philosophy has always unfolded as the repression 
of this question. It is for this reason that Stiegler has said that his proj-
ect amounts to a ‘hyperphilosophy’.218
Tertiary retention is a uniquely Stieglerian term, but it is built upon, 
extends and transforms Husserl’s account of the phenomenology of 
time-consciousness, for the elucidation of which Husserl created the 
concepts of primary retention and secondary retention (and primary 
and secondary protention). But Heidegger already long ago argued 
that by making ‘lived experience’ the sole reference point for phenom-
enological analysis, Husserl inevitably found himself stuck within a 
metaphysical form of phenomenology unable to think the constitu-
tive role of tradition and heritage, of the historicity and singularity of 
language and ideas, in the very possibility of philosophical thinking 
(though he himself did not finally confront the question of the condi-
tions of access to that tradition and heritage, as we have seen219). Why, 
then, would it be necessary to go back now from Heidegger to Husserl, 
and to formulate this post-Husserlian concept of tertiary retention?
Before elaborating upon Stiegler’s reading and critique of Husserl, 
then, it is worth complicating what it means to ‘go back’, because it 
is perhaps not so clear as all that what comes before what, and what 
comes back after what, what is remembered and what is forgotten, 
what is retained and what is portended. That there is indubitably a 
before and an after is no guarantee of the validity of any strictly linear 
narrative. This will certainly prove to be the case for anyone who con-
siders the ‘place’ of the 1905 lectures on internal time consciousness, 
and what it means for the relative positions of Husserl and Heidegger 
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in a set of widening spirals that do not come to a halt at the boundaries 
of phenomenology or of philosophy.
It is through Rudolf Boehm, editor of Husserliana X, translated into 
English as On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time, that we know many of the immediately relevant chronologi-
cal details of the documentation and publication of these lectures, as 
the English translator John Barnett Brough recounts.220 They were 
first published in 1928, with Heidegger credited as their editor, but 
what this conceals is that it was Husserl’s assistant Edith Stein who 
in 1917 received from Husserl all the written notes on which these 
lectures were originally based, but to which Husserl had periodically 
added and deleted pages at will over the dozen years transpiring since. 
Despite working ‘zealously’ by herself and with Husserl to arrange 
and re-edit the texts, however, Stein did not in 1917 succeed in having 
them published.
So how did Husserl’s later assistant, Martin Heidegger, come to be 
credited as their editor when they were eventually published in 1928?
According to Heidegger’s recollection, as reported to 
Boehm, while Husserl and Heidegger were spending their 
spring holidays in the Black Forest in 1926, Heidegger 
showed Husserl the manuscript of Sein und Zeit, which 
was almost complete at the time. It was this that prompted 
Husserl to propose to Heidegger that the latter undertake the 
publication of Husserl’s investigations of time-conscious-
ness, which meant the draft Edith Stein had prepared in 
1917 […]. Heidegger agreed, stipulating, however, that he 
could not get underway with the task until Sein und Zeit had 
appeared, and even then could do no more than give Stein’s 
manuscript a careful reading.221
For the Heidegger who was completing Being and Time, then, these 
edited pages of Husserl’s 1905 lectures on time may have been his 
past, but they were, in an explicit way, a past that ‘does not follow 
after Dasein but rather always already goes ahead of it’, awaiting him. 
We cannot simply say that these lectures preceded Being and Time, 
because, for the Dasein that was the author of that work, and who 
knew of these lectures while still finishing his own manuscript, they 
still lay in his future. We can ask whether he ever really himself came 
to these lectures that lay in wait for him. And for we who read these 
lectures now, we must ask ourselves whether it makes a difference for 
us that it was Stein who had edited them together, twelve years after 
they were delivered and eleven years before they were published by a 
Heidegger who had already just published Being and Time, that is, his 
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work dedicated (with the infamous exception of certain editions) to 
Husserl and to a complete reformulation of phenomenology focused 
on the question of temporality and the impossibility of divorcing lived 
experience from the non-lived past.
How Stein edited Husserl’s pages is clearly significant: in the 1905 
notes, for example, there is in fact no mention of ‘retention’ what-
soever. This fact would not have been apparent to a reader in 1928 
because Stein’s attempt to render a coherent whole caused her to intro-
duce later texts into the earlier lectures, or simply to substitute ‘reten-
tion’ for other terms such as ‘primary memory’ or ‘fresh memory’.222 
Such a substitution may be an act both of philosophical justice and 
historiographical distortion.
What else would it be worth our while to know about this Edith 
Stein, assistant to Edmund Husserl? Like Husserl, she was born into 
a Jewish family, and like Husserl, she would convert from Judaism 
to a form of Christianity (Husserl to Lutheranism in 1886, Stein to 
Catholicism in 1921/22). In other words, she underwent a transforma-
tional experience, a leap of individuation, consisting in the adoption of 
a past that was not hers and that she had not lived: the Christian past.
Stein, Heidegger and Husserl were all together in one room on 8 
April 1929, for the occasion of the celebration in Freiburg of Husserl’s 
seventieth birthday, when Heidegger, Husserl’s ‘closest friend’,223 
gave a speech in honour of his mentor, presenting Husserl with a bust 
of himself by Arnold Rickert, along with a volume dedicated to his 
work. In this speech, Heidegger stated that Husserl’s
breakthrough consists in nothing less than the radicalization 
of how we do philosophy, bending it back onto the hidden 
path of its authentic historical happening as this is mani-
fested in the inner communion of the great thinkers. […] But 
those who want to transform must bear within themselves 
the power of a fidelity that knows how to preserve. The only 
way to feel that power grow within oneself is to be caught up 
in wonder. And the only way to be caught up in wonder is to 
travel to the outermost limits of the possible.
Yet the only way to become the friend of the possible 
is to remain open to dialog with the powers at work in the 
whole of human existence. And in fact that is the philoso-
pher’s way of being: heeding what has already been sung 
forth and can still be perceived in each essential occurrence 
of the world.224
These are the words to which Stein and Husserl listened in 1929, 
framed in terms of inheritance and transformation. How did they hear 
An Introduction to Technics and Time, 1 and 2 119
these words? Did Stein hear them differently than did Husserl? Did 
either of them hear them in any way similarly to the way they would 
have resonated auto-affectively for Heidegger himself? One might 
well imagine that this audience asked itself, as it listened, whether 
Heidegger was genuinely attempting to describe the way he conceived 
Husserl’s ‘breakthrough’, or whether he was actually offering a sly 
– if not passive aggressive – account focused on what he considers 
to be his own breakthrough, that is, his transformation or rejection 
of the Husserlian inheritance, itself following his own conversion to 
philosophy, where this conversion amounted to a ‘transformation of 
[his] fundamental standpoint’ that ‘made the system of Catholicism 
problematic and unacceptable’?225
Only four years later, Husserl’s view of Heidegger had undergone 
a complete reversal, having taken note of the latter’s anti-Semitism, 
‘which [Heidegger] came to express with increasing vigor […] around 
the department’, as well as the fact that Heidegger had ‘discounted 
[Husserlian phenomenology] as something entirely surpassed and 
superfluous, not worth studying any more’.226 At the same time, the 
rise of Hitler had forced Stein to resign her recently gained teach-
ing position, and so, instead of continuing her academic career, 
she entered a Carmelite monastery in Cologne, where she wrote on 
Heidegger’s work. Being cloistered as a Catholic nun did not mean 
that she was no longer threatened by the effects of Nazism, however, 
and in 1938 she was forced to move once again, this time to a monas-
tery in the Netherlands.
For the Nazis, Stein’s adoption of a past that was not hers made no 
difference to the Jewish ‘racial’ heritage that for them was the funda-
mental, ‘biological’ criterion of discrimination: she was arrested by 
the SS on 2 August 1942 and sent to a camp at Westerbork. While 
there, we are told, and just like Socrates, Stein was offered a chance 
to escape before facing the unimaginable horror of being sent to 
Auschwitz, but now it was neither her birth nor her adopted past that 
decided her response, but simply her relation to all those to whom she 
was conjoined through a common fate:
If somebody intervened at this point and took away her 
chance to share in the fate of her brothers and sisters, that 
would be utter annihilation. But not what was going to 
happen now.227
For Stein, both a nun and a phenomenologist of empathy, my death 
is not so exclusively mine as it is in the orthodox interpretation of 
the existential analytic. She interprets the Heideggerian account of 
being-towards-death in terms of the possibility of being transformed 
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through experiencing the death of those close to us, but also in terms 
of ‘the question of the destiny of the soul’.228 For Stein, this latter ques-
tion is obviously interpreted in relationship to her adopted faith, which 
Heidegger would no doubt have concluded ultimately falls back into 
the metaphysical opposition between the temporal and the timeless 
that structures the Catholic system, as when she writes of ‘the way in 
which the temporal touches something which is not itself temporal, 
but which reaches into its temporality’.229 But even if this may well be 
judged as a regression from Heideggerian philosophy back to meta-
physics-as-ontotheology, it still raises the question of whether ‘a bond 
between Dasein and a being which is not its own’ can in fact lead to 
a ‘breaking open of temporality’, not in the sense of being a passage-
way to ‘eternal life’, but in the sense of participating in a futurity of 
life beyond Dasein’s ‘own’ mortality. Does being-towards-death, or 
being-for-death, contain a counter-tendency that could be described 
as being-for-life, for life after ‘mine’ has ended?
Stein died at Auschwitz on 9 August 1942, less than a week after 
refusing the offer of escape. Fifty-six years later, she was canon-
ized by Pope John Paul II as Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, and 
was thus herself fully adopted at the highest level of veneration as a 
member of the Catholic community. Her bust can also be found in 
Walhalla in Regensburg, and thus she numbers among those vener-
ated and distinguished individuals of German history represented 
in that ‘classical’ temple, too, eventually adopted by the Germans as 
truly, and after all, one of their own.230 The official posthumous trans-
formation of the Jewish philosopher into Catholic saint and German 
heroine was thereby completed.
Is this, then, the last chapter of a narrative that is already anything 
but linear? We would perhaps need to add at least the following: in 
1959, Paul Celan purchased a biography of Edith Stein, marking a 
quotation from her that reads, ‘I spoke to the Savior and said to him, I 
knew it was his cross that was now laid on the Jewish people.’231 Can 
this decision to mark this quotation then be used to retrospectively 
interpret a poem such as ‘Tenebrae’, written in 1957, as John Felstiner 
suggests? ‘Tenebrae’ is a poem whose darkness precisely seems to 
stage a confrontation between Christianity and those who met their 
fate at Auschwitz: is that confrontation a reconciliation or an accusa-
tion (no doubt these terms are far too simple for any convincing read-
ing of Celan)?
While ‘Tenebrae’ draws a phrase, ineinander verkrallt (‘clawed into 
each other’), from an early account of the unimaginable suffering 
that must have been felt in the gas chamber, it has been interpreted 
by some German readers as nevertheless invoking a kind of Christian 
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existentialism, combining the Holocaust theme with that ‘inner com-
munion’ with the other that lies at the heart of Christian ritual, ‘as if 
/ each of our bodies were / your body, Lord’.232 Hans-Georg Gadamer 
gives a kind of semi-Heideggerian, semi-Steinian account of the figu-
ration of mortality in the poem, arguing that, in dying, ‘each of us is 
as alone and forsaken as the dying Jesus on the cross’, before con-
cluding that with the poem’s repetition of the word ‘Lord’, ‘the person 
speaking for us recognizes finally that the Jesus who died on the cross 
remains our Lord’.233
But if the ‘Near are we’ with which the poem opens (which might 
also be thought to hearken towards Hölderlin’s ‘Patmos’, the poem 
through which Heidegger thinks the Ereignis in terms of the saving 
power that grows only where the danger also lies) is mirrored by the 
‘We are near’ with which it closes, should this be taken as a commu-
nion of solitude that confirms Gadamer’s interpretation, or does this 
‘nearness’ imply, with the darkest irony, the entrance into death and 
extermination (with implications of Catholic complicity, and with-
out failing to recollect that, in addition to the famous (non)meeting 
between them that would take place in Todtnauberg in 1967, Celan 
and Heidegger had long read each other’s work, and that Celan would 
himself commit suicide in 1970)? These words – ‘death’, ‘extermina-
tion’, ‘Auschwitz’ – cannot be found in the poem, of course, await-
ing an irreversible witness to irreversibility, perhaps, and for reasons 
that are both congruent with and extend far beyond the Heideggerian 
observation that death is both what we know most fundamentally and 
what can never be known. Or, as Günter Grass expressed it, what he, 
Grass, owes to Celan is ‘the knowledge that Auschwitz has no end’.234
How, then, should we interpret Celan’s marking of this pre-Aus-
chwitz quotation from Stein? How do we read Celan differently before 
and after knowing about his marking of a quotation? How do we 
read Stein differently, which is to say, how do we hear it differently? 
Should Celan be interpreted through Stein or Stein through Celan, 
Stein’s ‘breaking open of temporality’ with Celan’s ‘deep in time’s 
crevasse’, for instance, and what would this mean for the interpreta-
tion of temporality in Husserl and Heidegger? These questions, which 
build upon each other as dense layers of textual and historical sedi-
mentation and transformation (crystallizations and turns of breath), 
and which rebound upon each other through loops and spirals of read-
ing and hearing, imply those that will need to be addressed to Husserl 
concerning the thickness of the temporality of, for instance, reading 
poetry – or of reading philosophy, viewing paintings, listening to 
melodies or indeed gazing at busts – both before and after Auschwitz.
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And all this is also just (‘also just’: that is, ‘not just, but also’) to 
serve as a reminder that the questions opened by Husserlian phe-
nomenology ‘remain open to dialog with the powers at work in the 
whole of human existence’ – as long as there remain readers capable 
of (re)interpreting them.
The things themselves and the non-lived past
Husserl’s ‘breakthrough’ starts with the phenomenological motto, ‘to 
the things themselves’, which essentially states the dictum that there 
should be no basis for philosophy other than lived experience, and that 
the phenomena apprehended in that experience arise from intentional 
acts, from the fact that perception or consciousness is always percep-
tion or consciousness of such ‘things’. If this is a breakthrough, it is 
because it is an attempt to leave the opposition of subject and object 
behind: what is apprehended in intentionality is not an ‘objective’ 
content passively received by the senses, nor is it a merely ‘subjec-
tive’ illusion produced by consciousness. Husserlian phenomenology 
argues that to understand what happens in intentional acts in terms of 
subject and object would be to commit a philosophical error of a kind 
that arises from the unreflective familiarity with which we ordinarily 
grasp the relationship we have to our own existence. For this reason, 
the method of phenomenology consists in a suspension of that rela-
tionship, an epokhē or a ‘reduction’ of the so-called ‘natural attitude’.
These ‘things themselves’, these intentional objects, are eidetic, 
Husserl says, but such eidē are neither outside (lying there in advance 
of consciousness, ‘in the world’) nor inside (‘in our minds’): despite 
the fact that ‘things’ are not ‘there’ in advance, awareness of the eidē 
still requires an intentional act that moves towards them. Stiegler 
summarizes the aim, notion and problem of Husserl’s philosophy in 
the following terms:
Husserl’s Logical Investigations asserts that all conscious-
ness is consciousness-of-something, constituted out of its 
object of consciousness. The phenomenological, which for 
Husserl cannot be constituted in advance, must neutralize 
all hypotheses of existence and its objects: the phenom-
enon is constituted in lived experience whose intentional 
goal is always that of an eidos. […] The object could not be 
already given in advance, but through the object an eidos – 
in advance – is being sought. The eidos is not in the world: it 
is, rather, an ideal object. But it is also not in consciousness: 
if it could be discovered there already, it could not be the 
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objective of a process of completion that could always fail 
[…]. The issue, then, is: where are the eidē […]?235
The question, then, is: where are the idealities, where are ideal objects, 
if they are not just in consciousness or just in the world? What ‘third 
place’ could there be, or is this just a matter of ‘the space in between’, 
in which case, on what basis is such a space constituted – where is 
the between?
In fact, this is largely a contemporary repetition of the famous ques-
tion that Socrates raised when he asked how it is that all the examples 
of (for instance) virtue can hope to be unified as a coherent idea of 
virtue. Again, Meno’s paradox argued that either we already know 
what we are looking for, in which case we cannot ‘find’ it, or we never 
knew and so will never find it. Socrates’s conclusion was that someone 
who is seeking knowledge can only find what he has already known 
but somehow forgotten, and in Husserl this becomes the intentionality 
of the object: it is only in the process of enunciating knowledge that 
it can be constituted; it is never received; there is only (intentional) 
conceptualization. The question is: from out of what dynamic does 
this possibility of constituting ideal objectivities arise, that is, objects 
occurring in the perpetual flow of consciousness whose ‘coherence’ 
seems stable? And secondly, who is the one seeking: can it be reduced 
to the I, or will it be that the cumulative character of (for example, 
geometrical) knowledge means that the dynamic of knowledge neces-
sarily exceeds (or transcends) the I?
For Husserl, even though we tend to think of such idealities as time-
less, or as in some way lying ‘outside time’, it is nevertheless the case 
that they can be explored only through lived experienced. Given that 
consciousness and what is apprehended by consciousness both occur 
only as a flow, however, means that Husserl comes to realise that the 
way to seek these objectivities inevitably passes through the question 
of the experience of temporal flow. Stiegler again:
It is necessary to replace the subject/object relationship with 
that of flow / (real content → ideal content).236
In other words, it is not a relationship between a subject and an object 
that is at stake here, but rather between two kinds of flow: on the one 
‘side’, the flow of consciousness, and on the other side, the movement 
of intentional apprehension that seeks the eidos in the movement from 
‘real’ to ‘ideal’. Rather than a movement from ‘subjective’ to ‘objec-
tive’, or vice versa, it is a question of a shift from inadequate to ade-
quate perception, and it is to this that Stiegler was referring when he 
said that this process of ‘completion’ can always fail:
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All adequate perception is internal perception, but not all 
internal perception is adequate perception. Between inter-
nal inadequate perception and internal adequate perception, 
there is a tendency towards completion – which can always 
fail. […] What must be studied [according to the phenomenol-
ogist] is not the inadequation of subject to object, but rather 
the inadequation of the always-internal perception that is 
lived experience, which constitutes the external object and 
therefore external perception, to the ideality aimed at within 
lived experience. The inadequation of the subject as sphere of 
internal perceptions to the object as source of external per-
ceptions thus becomes the inadequation of the real content of 
lived experience that is essentially internal perception to the 
ideal content of lived experience – which is neither internal 
nor external: where is it?237
What this makes clear is that, despite appearances, Husserl is in fact 
in many ways a compositional thinker of processes – phenomenology 
is always a question of temporality. Instead of the metaphysical oppo-
sition of subject and object, it is a matter of the complicated unfolding 
of the flow of consciousness and the movement from a raw apprehen-
sion of contents, of the data of the ‘given’, to a unified apprehension 
in an ideal object. This movement may not always succeed, but it is 
that towards which consciousness or perception aims, towards which 
it intends. But, once again, the question is: if the idealities are neither 
internal nor external, where are they? Or in other words: how should 
we conceive the internality of what has hitherto been called the sub-
ject and the externality of what has hitherto been called the object, 
where the oppositional way of understanding this relationship would 
now be seen as the outcome of a ‘natural attitude’ towards phenomena 
that in fact arises from a prior compositional movement?
It is at this point that Stiegler introduces an article of reasoning that 
he will also deploy on future occasions, but the context in which he 
will do so is not usually a reading of Husserl. Rather, he will in subse-
quent texts mostly do so in order to describe the compositional, ‘trans-
ductive’ relationship between what Simondon calls psychic individu-
ation and what he calls collective individuation, and to describe how 
this process opens up a space between the psychic and the collective, 
a space in which different processes of individuation are bound never 
to share an absolute coincidence of meaning, but where they neverthe-
less aim towards such, and a space whose conditions of possibility 
(where this is what is missing in Simondon) are technical (including 
the techniques of language). What we can see here, therefore, is that 
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this explanatory trope with respect to Simondon has its roots, not in 
Simondon, but in Stiegler’s understanding of the specificity of the 
Husserlian ‘breakthrough’ with respect to the approach to conscious-
ness in terms of ‘flow’, and of the questions that ultimately lie behind 
and haunt that breakthrough (as that which seems bound to return in 
Husserl’s thinking). Stiegler writes:
What you read of what I write is not what I write; it is what 
you read of what I write: the reality of your ‘external percep-
tions’, of what you perceive of my writing, these are not my 
writings, they are the productions of your flow of conscious-
ness, the purely internal sense of your flow of consciousness 
that you generate on the basis of my writings. If our internal 
perceptions could coincide, thus eliminating my exteriority 
(which makes up the ideal scientific community that Husserl 
would later call a transcendental We), it is because my writ-
ten expressions aim at an ideal sense that you too intend/
read [visez-lisez] and that we attempt to complete together in 
‘reading/visualizing/intending’ [livisibilisant] it.238
In the breakthrough that consists in the shift from an opposition of 
internal and external to a compositional movement from inadequate 
to adequate, Stiegler concludes, Husserl thus ‘inscribes, at the heart 
of consciousness, an inadequation that is nothing other than temporal-
ity’,239 and which Stiegler then relates to the Heideggerian question of 
being-towards-death:
What is the nature of this tension between real and ideal and 
of its possibility of completion? Heidegger will say: death 
is the achievement of this completion, the end of inten-
tional consciousness in the living qua difference-comple-
tion, completion in différance, and as different: as other. 
But this gesture will depend on abandoning the privileg-
ing of lived experience and the introduction of a historial 
non-lived-experience.240
With this thought, we may well conclude that the Heideggerian break-
through, the ‘radicalization of how we do philosophy, bending it back 
onto the hidden path of its authentic historical happening as this is 
manifested in the inner communion of the great thinkers’, does in fact 
spring from the Husserlian breakthrough that first sees that the ques-
tion is that of a flow, and a movement that depends on an originary 
inadequation. What Heidegger adds would then be that this inadequa-
tion is the mark of Dasein’s mortality, not just in terms of the inde-
terminacy of its end but in terms of the complexity of its origin in 
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the relationship between lived experience and the non-lived past. And 
what Stiegler will then add (in Technics and Time, 1) is that the ques-
tion of this non-lived past cannot be divorced from the question of the 
conditions by which it can be accessed, where these conditions are 
technical, and where the history of these conditions is itself a move-
ment, that is, a technical dynamic composed of epochs.
In fact, this critique of Husserl is already foreshadowed in Technics 
and Time, 1, precisely in order to elucidate the critique of Heidegger 
that he develops in that first volume:
It is easy to see in what Heidegger’s critique of Husserl ought 
to consist: the historial conception of temporality such as 
it constitutes the who would demand that the already-there 
that is not lived but inherited, constituted outside any percep-
tion, is nevertheless constitutive of presence as such – and 
this is why temporality cannot be conceived in terms of the 
‘now’. The response would be an argument in favor of a radi-
cal revision of the oppositions between the primary, the sec-
ondary, and the tertiary.241
It is this radical revision that Stiegler will undertake in Technics and 
Time, 2, as we shall now see.
The temporal object
If phenomenology exceeds the metaphysics of subject and object by 
reinscribing these within the flow of consciousness and the movement 
between inadequacy and adequacy, what does this mean for the I, the 
ego for whom these flows flow? On what basis can this I form an iden-
tity that persists in its unity across the time of this flowing? Is it not 
that the I can then be nothing but the time of lived experience itself, 
as this flowing? And if so, how is it that we are able to have a lived 
experience of the flowing of time at all?
The first phenomenological step towards responding to these ques-
tions consists in recognizing that if we are able to have a lived expe-
rience of temporality, then this means that we are capable of taking 
temporality as an intentional object itself: we can be conscious of the 
passage of time, we can make ourselves aware of it, pay attention to 
it, and hence it seems that the passing of time can in some way itself 
become an intentional object. If we then wish to conduct a phenom-
enological investigation of temporality, perhaps the way to do so is 
therefore through an object that itself exists in time and as the flow 
of time, that is, through what Husserl calls a ‘temporal object’. It is 
this thought that Husserl pursues in the 1905 lectures, taking as his 
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exemplary case of a temporal object the melody, or even just a single 
extended tone (but the question of what is at stake between the melody 
and the tone will prove to be anything but incidental, as we will see).
A temporal object is one whose quality as passing in time is funda-
mental to our apprehension of it: when we listen to a melody, we have 
no choice but to listen to it in the time of its passing into the past – we 
cannot stop its passing in its tracks in order to contemplate a moment 
(unless we have a ‘pause button’, but in that case we are no longer con-
sidering the temporal object as a temporal object but as, for example, 
a ‘freeze frame’ that continues to pass from the present to the past 
even while the image remains unchanging). The reason to focus on 
a temporal object of this kind is that ‘the perception of a temporal 
object itself has temporality, […] the perception of duration itself pre-
supposes the duration of perception’.242 In other words, the perception 
of a temporal object is the perception of a flow in time perceived by a 
consciousness that is itself a flow in time within which this object’s 
flow flows. To the objection that there is such a thing as ‘objective 
time’, that is, the time indicated, measured and recorded by the clock 
(such as a pendulum clock, invented in 1656 and using a harmonic 
oscillator and escapement mechanism; a quartz watch utilizing an 
electronic resonator vibrating at 8192 Hz, first unveiled in 1969, or 
an atomic clock based on the caesium standard, that is, 9162631770 
Hz), Husserl responds that the very possibility of such objectivity is 
only ever phenomenologically constituted, and hence that the question 
of phenomenological temporality precedes the question of objective 
time. The perception of duration is in this way something quite differ-
ent from, for example, the passage of time on which the functioning 
of a computer depends.243
For this reason, the analysis of temporality must suspend all refer-
ence to objective time and instead focus on clarifying how time is 
phenomenologically constituted in those intentional objects that exist 
as temporal: not just objects that persist in time as presenting a unity 
(as in any ordinary object, from a stone to a bust cast in stone) but 
rather objects whose fundamental character consists in their own flow 
through the passage of time (like a tone or melody). In so doing, what 
first becomes apparent is the difference between apprehending those 
phenomena that are presented in a temporal object and apprehend-
ing the durational quality itself as it is presented through the tem-
poral object:
By temporal objects in the specific sense we understand 
objects that are not only unities in time but that also contain 
temporal extension in themselves. When a tone sounds, my 
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objectivating apprehension can make the tone itself, which 
endures and fades away, into an object and yet not make the 
duration of the tone or the tone in its duration into an object. 
The latter – the tone in its duration – is a temporal object. The 
same is true of a melody, of any change whatsoever, but also 
of any persistence without change, considered as such.244
The function of the analysis of the temporal object (the tone, the 
melody, the recited poem) is to elucidate the phenomenon of time that 
is something other than the ‘objectivity’ of an instantaneous ‘now’: 
if time were but an endless series of now-points, there would be no 
perception of duration, and, by extension, no enduring perception 
whatsoever. Stiegler describes what it is that Husserl revealed through 
this analysis:
Husserl discovered that the now is what passes, and that it is 
always already and immediately passing and past: still pres-
ent, it is already past (i.e., retention). And at the same time 
already future (i.e., protention). This is the evidence, the 
phenomenological datum produced by the analysis of time in 
the temporal object’s phenomenality.245
With this we arrive at Husserl’s concepts of retention and proten-
tion, which as we have seen did not in fact appear in the lectures of 
1905 but were fed back into them retrospectively, so to speak, by Edith 
Stein in 1917. The now itself, which is nothing but the flow of tempo-
ral passage, itself possesses retentional and protentional aspects, that 
is, it is already the retention of what has just passed by into the past 
and the protention of what is about to come: it must retain the just past 
and portend the immediate future, if there is to be any possibility of 
apprehending a melody as a melody, or even any tone as a tone.
The question, then, is the status of this retention of the just-past in 
the now, in comparison to that ‘ordinary’ retention that consists in the 
everyday fact that we can recollect not just the preceding moment of a 
note of a melody to which we are presently listening, but also the mel-
ody to which we listened yesterday, or a year ago. Husserl differenti-
ates between them with the terms ‘primary retention’ and ‘second-
ary retention’. He characterizes primary retention as something like 
‘a comet’s tail that attaches itself to the perception of the moment’,246 
while Gérard Granel will describe this retentional and protentional 
extension of the present moment as a ‘large now’.247 Secondary reten-
tion, memory as such, is on the contrary, for Husserl, detached from 
the moment: it is a re-presentation or re-production of a present that 
has now gone past, operating through the imagination with which, for 
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example, we can ‘run through’ in our minds a symphony that we lis-
tened to at a concert the previous evening, privileging an imaginary 
now-point as our recollection moves along,248 just as if it was back 
listening to the earlier evening’s concert.249
Hence for Husserl, primary retention and secondary retention are 
fundamentally distinct phenomena, just as they are distinct from 
‘image-consciousness’, that is, materialized re-presentations of the 
past (‘paintings, busts, and the like’250): image-consciousness does 
not involve the actual re-presentation of the thing but, precisely, only 
its exteriorized image. Secondary retention, on the other hand, does 
in fact re-present the object, but it does so via the living imagina-
tion, whereas primary retention, for Husserl, involves no use of the 
imagination at all but only the apprehension of the durational char-
acter of the passing of the present into the past. Were we somehow to 
complicate this distinction between primary retention and secondary 
retention, this would inevitably entail what would for Husserl be the 
wholly undesirable consequence that an element of imagination would 
be introduced into perception. For Husserl, this would amount to an 
untenable denial of the ‘real content’ of perception as perception, even 
though primary retention is already a kind of inclusion of the past in 
the present that Husserl himself can describe only in terms of a pro-
cess of modification of present perception as it passes into the past, a 
modification that alone makes the perception of duration possible. But 
if the past is already past, no matter how just past it may be, then what 
is this modification that occurs in the passing from present to past, if 
not a movement from perception to imagination, even if it is one that 
occurs within the comet’s tail of a large now of primary retention?
This question may seem obvious, but it is not, in fact, the most 
fundamental question that must be addressed to this account of the 
relationship between primary retention and secondary retention. We 
must, according to Stiegler, ‘revisit the entire question of the temporal 
object from a dynamic point of view’,251 where what is dynamic will 
prove to be the complex, looping play between primary retention and 
secondary retention, but also, and fundamentally, image-conscious-
ness, or what Stiegler calls tertiary retention. In the very dynamism 
of this play, the terms by which Husserl intends to keep the primary, 
the secondary and the tertiary apart from one another will find them-
selves ruined, even while the distinctions themselves will continue to 
persist, and to persist as profoundly necessary.
Daniel Ross 130
The tone, the note and the selection involved in perception
We will now attempt to outline three steps that are necessary in order 
to ‘revisit the question of temporal objects from a dynamic point of 
view’. The first of these steps concerns the reciprocal relationship 
between primary and secondary retention, and how this reciprocity 
relates to tertiary retention. More specifically, it is a question of rec-
ognizing that primary retention is always a selection, and that the cri-
teria for such a selection can come only from one’s accumulated stock 
of secondary retentions.
When discussing the paradigmatic temporal object, Husserl refers 
to a tone or a melody, but, in the details of his analysis of the con-
sciousness of time, he really only takes the former into account: the 
phenomenological temporality of a melody tends to be regarded as 
only an unimportant extension of the temporality of the single tone. 
But what is lost in this assimilation of the melody to the tone? What, 
for example, is at stake in the fact that, as an intentional object, a tone 
can function as a tone or, on the contrary, as a note? What difference 
is in play between the (sonic) tone and the (musical) note? Might it 
even be that the noetic ear is musical before it learns to perceive a 
tone (just as we might also ask whether the voice was already singing 
before it learned what it is to speak, or the foot was already dancing 
before knowing what it means to walk)?
Hearing a tone as a note means apprehending it as irreducibly 
belonging to a piece of music, which is to say, functionally and aes-
thetically attached to other tones: ‘melody can be composed as a unity 
only in this extension that always already transcends the elementary 
unity of a tone’.252 Hence one could say that whereas one hears a tone, 
one listens to a melody, which is possible because we already know 
other melodies, we know in what it is that a melody consists, which is 
to say, we know how to listen to it as a melody. And so, when we listen 
to a melody, it is not at all unusual to call up secondary retentions of 
other melodies, given that such recollections and recurrences are the 
very condition of possibility of such listening in the first place:
This recurrence, this dynamic, is inscribed into a flow to 
which it is linked, and through which it connects to other tem-
poral objects that are already-there in the secondary mode 
of no-longer-being-there, and which enable it to itself con-
tinue on. We refer here to a melody and not, as Husserl ulti-
mately suggests, to a tone. A melody is composed of notes, 
and a tone can become a note only in tying itself to other 
tone-notes with relations similar to those by which verses 
constitute a poem.253
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By focusing analysis only on the tone, Husserl avoids asking about 
the implication this contains: that secondary retention makes a differ-
ence, or a différance, to primary retention itself. One might think that 
he allows for this possibility via the concept of protention, assuming 
that the anticipatory aspect of the way in which a tone is expected 
affects the very constitution of what is perceived, but Husserl sticks 
narrowly to the idea that protention is just the minimal expectation 
that when listening to a melody that has not yet reached an end, for 
example, one expects the arrival of notes left to come. This narrow 
concept of protention thus mirrors the limited notion of modification 
that Husserl applies to retention, as merely the immediate effect of 
passing itself, by which what is primarily retained ceases to be pres-
ent even as it is retained in the comet’s tail of the ‘large now’. Husserl 
may thus be accused of ‘a failure to think modification as recurrence: 
as the return of the modification of retentions onto the constitution of 
presentation itself’.254
How should we characterize this step, this modification that 
operates within primary retention itself? The phonograph was first 
invented by Thomas Edison in 1877, the commercialization of the 
graphophone started a decade later, the first commercially produced 
disc records, for Emile Berliner’s gramophone, appeared in 1892, and 
better quality ten-inch records were produced for the Victor Talking 
Machine Company starting in 1901. Does this historical sequence of 
early sound-recording have any bearing upon the lectures that Husserl 
gave four years after this sequence, in 1905? Firstly, we can by no 
means exclude the possibility that it was exposure to this new tech-
nology, and the possibility it afforded of easy access to recorded melo-
dies in domestic space, that prompted Husserl to reflect on the phe-
nomenological constitution of the temporal object, with the melody as 
his exemplary case. But secondly, it may be that he was aware of these 
sound-recording inventions, and possibly provoked to think about 
the temporality of hearing and listening as a result, but had himself 
only limited experience of their use (the Victrola, for example, was 
not released until 1906, and it would still be a few more years before 
such devices became a widely diffused consumer item present in most 
middle-class homes).
This last possibility is significant, given that the capacity to 
record sound meant that, for the first time in history, it was possible 
for a listener to know that a sequence of sounds to which they were 
aurally exposed could be repeated identically on a second occasion 
(by replaying a recording), something that would be true neither of 
a melody whistled or hummed nor of a symphony performed by an 
orchestra. Today this is even truer: if I sit at home, put on an album 
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(or select a playlist), close my eyes, and listen to the music that is 
electronically communicated from my device to my noise-cancelling 
headphones, and if I then do so once again, I can fairly know that the 
datum produced on the second occasion is an exact repetition of the 
first. But from such a process of exact repetition, only one phenom-
enological conclusion is possible: the flow of this industrial temporal 
object may be identical on both occasions, but the flow of my con-
sciousness is not. What I hear, and what I listen to, in that recording, 
is not the same, and in fact what I hear is not the same, even though it 
is a recording: primary retention is always and fundamentally a selec-
tion (I can pay attention to the woodwind instruments or the brass, the 
melody or the bass line, different memories or associations may be 
voluntarily recalled or involuntarily evoked, and so on):
Yet the role of secondary retentions as selection criteria in 
primary retention, and therefore as a horizon of expectation 
overdetermining the construction of a musical phenomenon 
while listening to a musical temporal object, only becomes 
obvious with the arrival of the phonograph. […] The pho-
nograph allowed one for the first time to repeat a temporal 
object – and obliged one to consider that when the same 
object is produced many times, different phenomena are pro-
duced every time.255
What the invention of sound recording shows is that between the 
first and the second occasion on which I listen to a recording, some-
thing must have happened to have altered the conditions on the 
basis of which that selection occurs – and in the first place what has 
happened is that the listener has retained the memory (the second-
ary retention) of having already listened to the recording: what has 
changed is the listener as a temporal consciousness whose primary 
retentions are constantly adding to a store of secondary retentions, of 
accumulated experience.256 Between the first and the second time lis-
tening to a temporal object, the listener has accumulated a slightly 
different store of accumulated experience, and these accumulated sec-
ondary retentions function as slightly different filters meaning that 
slightly different selections are made, producing slightly different 
primary retentions.
If perception itself involves a selection, and if in fact no two encoun-
ters with temporal objects are ever precisely the same, even where 
these objects provide identical ‘givens’, identical ‘data’, identical ‘real 
content’, then it is strictly speaking impossible to distinguish primary 
retention and secondary retention on the basis of presence and non-
presence. Derrida had already reached a similar conclusion in Speech 
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and Phenomena with respect to the very possibility of distinguish-
ing the presence or otherwise of primary retention in perception. In 
other words, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for Husserl to clarify 
the status of primary retention with respect to perception, because in 
spite of everything, he cannot ultimately let go of the metaphysics 
of presence:
Thus, in retention, the presentation that enables us to see 
gives a nonpresent, a past and unreal present. […] As soon 
as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, 
perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality 
common to primordial impression and primordial retention, 
we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; 
nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink 
of the instant. […] This alterity is in fact the condition for 
presence, presentation, and thus for Vorstellung in general 
[…]. The difference between retention and reproduction, 
between primary and secondary memory, is not the radical 
difference Husserl wanted between perception and nonper-
ception. Whatever the phenomenological difference between 
these two modifications may be, […] it only serves to sepa-
rate two ways of relating to the irreducible nonpresence of 
another now.257
Hence Derrida is not saying only that Husserl, in trying to introduce 
the non-presence of primary retention into the presence of perception, 
gets lost in confusion. He is not just saying that with respect to primary 
retention, Husserl is having it both ways: present and non-present at 
the same time, or present in one passage of the text and non-present 
in another. While such accusations may be justifiable, Derrida is not 
ultimately attempting to refute the necessity of the concept: rather, he 
is arguing that alterity, non-presence, is the condition of presence, that 
the possibility of presence arises from out of absence, for otherwise 
the now would have no ‘room’, so to speak, for the inclusion of the 
other presence/nonpresence that is primary retention.
We find the echo of this argument in Stiegler, as for instance here:
When does perception cease, since retention lasts 
beyond sensation?
In the case of primary memory, it is no longer possible to 
speak about simple perception, in the strictest sense, since 
retention always already inhabits the large now: perceptual 
presence extends to the black hole of retentional absence, a 
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kind of im-perceptibility already being at work in the being-
perceived of the temporal object, as its modification.258
There is no perception that is not always already retentional: there 
is, in this sense, only retention. Is Stiegler, here, merely repeating the 
Derridian argument? Is he listening to Derrida, and, hearing what he, 
Stiegler, hears in what Derrida says, and not what Derrida himself 
hears in what he himself says, nevertheless finds himself moving 
towards a position that is ultimately asymptotically highly similar to 
Derrida’s? Here we should resist the temptation to fast forward too 
quickly through the respective flows of thinking of the two (or three, 
or more) thinkers, because, in this repetition of the question of dif-
férance, we may well think that it is in some sense the whole direction 
of the future flow of philosophy that is at stake.
Derrida takes note of Husserl’s broadening of the present (Granel’s 
‘large now’), and then draws attention to the strict impossibility of the 
inclusion of non-presence in presence. He then pushes that argument 
further, towards the conclusion that both purely immediate perception 
and primary retention must somehow include non-presence:
The frontier must pass not between the pure present and the 
nonpresent, i.e., between the actuality and inactuality of a 
living now, but rather between two forms of the re-turn or 
re-stitution of the present: re-tention and re-presentation.259
As Stiegler observes, the two steps of Derrida’s deconstruction, here, 
consist in ‘first reflection upon, then the inversion (le renversement) 
of, the Husserlian expansion of the present to the “large now” of the 
temporal object’.260 It is this manoeuvre that ultimately leads Derrida 
to conceive the trace and différance, and even the movement of dif-
férance qua history of life – including the bifurcation in or the conti-
nuity of that history that would consist in life’s becoming conscious:
Without reducing the abyss which may indeed separate 
retention from re-presentation, without hiding the fact that 
the problem of their relationship is none other than that of 
the history of ‘life’ and of life’s becoming conscious, we 
should be able to say a priori that their common root – the 
possibility of re-petition [of the now that is first repeated 
in primary retention and then in secondary retention] in its 
most general form, that is, the constitution of a trace in the 
most universal sense – is a possibility which not only must 
inhabit the pure actuality of the now but must constitute it 
through the very movement of differance it introduces. Such 
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a trace is […] more ‘primordial’ than what is phenomeno-
logically primordial.261
Derrida here inscribes the very problem of retention, and of the rep-
etition as re-presentation it contains, into the history of life that in Of 
Grammatology extends from the amoeba to electronic card indexes 
– as the question of retention and protention extended far beyond 
intentional consciousness. And he does so in terms of an originary 
différance, or what Stiegler will call a default of origin, a trace that 
precedes the phenomenological opening itself. Stiegler, however, 
wishes to clearly emphasize that something remains missing from 
Derrida’s deconstruction of the Husserlian metaphysics of presence 
with respect to the distinction between primary retention and second-
ary retention: like Derrida, Stiegler thinks that
the difference between primary and secondary retention 
is not a radical difference insofar as primary retention is 
unceasingly composed with secondary retention, that is to 
say, insofar as perception is always projected by, upon, and 
in imagination.262
What, then, is the point of difference? For Derrida, it is the trace that 
is constitutive, but he does not tend to see the distinction between 
primary and secondary retention as itself productive: the deconstruc-
tion of the difference between them is the neutralization of any con-
stitutive potential as the distinction falls into the familiar Derridian 
aporia. For Stiegler, however, it is the distinction between primary 
retention and secondary retention itself that is Husserl’s real ‘break-
through’ with respect to temporality, because in fact, and contra 
Derrida’s reading of Husserl, and despite Husserl himself, what they 
form together is something other than an opposition:
But it is no less the case that the difference remains and con-
stitutes a distinction that is not an op-position, but precisely 
what I have called a com-position. Now this constitutive 
character of composition – that is, the woof of time – con-
structed by the difference between primary and secondary 
is a distinctive philosophical discovery on Husserl’s part. 
At the end of his career, he supplements it with the discov-
ery of retentional finitude and its primordial technicity in 
geometry. Neither of these advances were, in the end, fully 
acknowledged or explored in Derrida’s thought.263
Stiegler here refers to two things: (1) the compositional character of 
the relationship between primary retention and secondary retention 
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that weaves the fabric of temporality; (2) primordial technicity, that 
is, the technological genesis (image-consciousness in Husserl’s terms, 
tertiary retention in Stiegler’s) that ultimately lies behind the very 
opening of the distinction between primary and secondary, and also 
the possibility of its closing. These will be the second and third steps 
that are necessary in revisiting the question of the temporal object 
from a dynamic point of view. We will need to consider them in turn.
The stereotypical and the traumatypical
We can know for sure that primary retention composes with second-
ary retention because listening to an identical recording twice pro-
duces two different perceptual experiences. This difference between 
the first time and the second time can be due only to the difference 
that has occurred in the listener, which is to say the difference that 
has occurred in the accumulation of secondary retentions between the 
first time and the second time. What this shows is that primary reten-
tion is a selection, and this selection must operate according to crite-
ria. Let us now pursue the second step of this dynamic reconsideration 
of the temporal object, which will consider the characteristics of this 
selective process.
Let us say that I listen to a poem read aloud that I have never before 
heard: I experience in this temporal object, as we have said, primary 
retentions that are themselves selections, where these selections are 
made on the basis of prior primary retentions that have now become 
secondary. What I hear in the poem, I hear on the basis of selections 
made from that ‘real content’, and these selections occur on the basis 
of secondary retentions, which are always my secondary retentions. 
This is why what I hear in the poem is not what you hear, because 
your secondary retentions are different from mine, because you have 
experienced primary retentions of your own that have now become 
secondary. (It is through recognizing this that it becomes possible 
to articulate Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness with 
Simondon’s account of psychic and collective individuation.)
But this is not all that happens when I listen to a poem (or have 
any temporal experience whatsoever). This new poem that I have 
never before heard, in being added to the store of secondary retentions 
I have of poems I have previously listened to, also recontextualizes 
all those previous experiences of listening to poems. All of my sec-
ondary retentions, all of my memories, have the possibility of being 
recontextualized on the basis of new primary retentions. New pri-
mary retentions that I experience (and all primary retentions are new 
primary retentions) will sometimes conform to the understandings I 
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have already acquired on the basis of previous experience, in which 
case these easily comprehended retentions will tend to reinforce the 
arrangement of these secondary retentions within my consciousness 
or unconscious. Other primary retentions – for example, a poem that 
is utterly unlike any poem that I have ever previously heard – will 
confound my anticipations (my protentions) of what can be expected in 
poetry, or by one or another poet, and, surprising me, will thus recon-
textualize my set of secondary retentions in a transformational way, 
upsetting their arrangement.
When, in the second volume of Symbolic Misery, Stiegler brings 
psychoanalytic considerations more directly to bear upon phenom-
enological questions, he will describe the difference between these 
two possibilities in terms of a distinction between stereotypical pri-
mary retentions and traumatypical primary retentions.264 Whether 
they are stereotypical or traumatypical, however, is not a matter of 
the ‘real content’ of these retentions as such: they are stereotypical 
or traumatypical only in relation to the protentions and expectations 
that have formed within my psychic apparatus on the basis of the set 
of secondary retentions that I have accumulated. Where a primary 
retention tends to conform to the arrangement of the set of secondary 
retentions I have accumulated, that is, to be able to fit itself into that 
arrangement without disruption, which is also to say, where this pri-
mary retention functions protentionally in a way that fits in with the 
secondary protentions (accumulated desires and expectations) that are 
arranged within my psyche on the basis of these secondary retentions, 
then we can say that the primary retention is stereotypical; where it 
tends not to fit, and where it tends to therefore lead to the disruption 
and rearrangement of my secondary retentions and protentions, then 
we can say that it is traumatypical.
This will in turn affect the protentional selection process involved 
in my apprehension of primary retention itself, forming a recursive 
spiral that greatly exceeds in complexity the linear relationship that 
Husserl wishes to sketch out between primary and secondary. Hence 
irrespective of whether a new primary retention, in becoming second-
ary, reinforces or upsets the arrangement of my secondary retentions, 
what unfolds can be described only as a play between the primary and 
secondary that works in both directions, secondary retentions forming 
the selection criteria for primary retentions, and primary retentions, 
becoming secondary, recontextualizing existing secondary retentions 
and rearranging them, in a process of continuous modification.
The absolute separation between perception and imagination that 
Husserl wants to maintain cannot survive the recognition of this com-
plex, compositional play. If the selection involved in primary retention 
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amounts to a kind of in-camera editing (not limited to visual percep-
tion), so to speak, in fact every aspect of montage and post-production 
comes into play:
But since there is a difference in each hearing of the iden-
tical, as is clear in phono-grammatic experience, this mon-
tage is what (re)constitutes the Living Present itself, always 
already dying, as if it were only a plane linked to another 
plane (a secondary retention), which in turn precedes a plane 
to come (a secondary protention).265
Stiegler notes Paul Ricoeur’s observation that there is a large degree 
of freedom with respect to the way in which the past can be repro-
duced and reiterated when secondary retentions are reactivated, and 
himself concludes:
Only an originary, ‘cinematographic’ possibility enables this 
pausing over the images of life, of epochs, frees these spe-
cial effects such as slow motion, fast motion, condensation – 
idealizations by which something new occurs in a transcen-
dental history.266
The ‘exactness’ of the repetition of the ‘real content’ in cinematic 
recording is not quite the same as in sound recording, but this is due 
less to the difference in technological apparatus than to the differ-
ence in the receptor organs it involves: my eyeball can always swivel 
its attention from one part of a screen to another, for example, in a 
way that is not possible for the listening ear. The fabric of cinemato-
graphic experience is in this way closer to the complexity of noetic 
consciousness than is the case for purely aural recording. Hence it 
remains the case that, in order to demonstrate that the repetition of the 
same datum does not produce the same experience, a sound recording 
is still a clearer exemplary temporal object than a film. Nevertheless, 
despite this greater level of complexity involved in the play between 
primary and secondary with respect to visual media, the conclusions 
drawn from the recorded melody about the singularity of all primary 
retentional experience remain entirely valid for the experience of cin-
ematographic recording, and vice versa.
It is to this constitutively cinematographic possibility that Stiegler 
will turn in Technics and Time, 3, and to the possibilities this pos-
sibility opens up. What is the source of this ‘freedom’? From where 
do these cinematographic possibilities arise? With this question of 
‘where’, it is once again a matter of turning back to the question asked 
at the beginning of this lecture, ‘Where are the idealities?’, and to 
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the question of primordial technicity that forms the third step in the 
dynamic revisitation of the question of the temporal object.
Ubiquitous image-consciousness and the question of protention
As we have seen, phenomenology pursues the constitution of these 
idealities by seeking their genesis: how is it that we ever manage to 
pass from intentional relations between flows of consciousness and 
flows of temporal objects to, for example, the purportedly non-tempo-
ral or omni-temporal foundations that are the transcendental objects 
of logical, mathematical and scientific knowledge? In pursuit of this 
question, Husserlian phenomenology wends its way through its own 
epochs and modifications, like a default of origin that constantly leads 
to the metastabilization of new philosophical systems but also to their 
eventual critical destabilization. It is in the unfolding of this history 
of transcendental genetics that Husserl is ultimately brought to the 
question of transcendental history, via the question of the ‘origin of 
geometry’, which will be less the culmination of these epochs than 
the suspension of their unfolding.
In the texts on the consciousness of internal time, as we have seen, 
image-consciousness (along with all the artefacts of objective time) 
is rendered phenomenologically incidental, derivative or trivial. And 
why? Because the imperative dictating the method always privileges 
lived experience over the non-lived, the already there:
What is not in question is a re-presentation by means of a 
resembling object, as in the case of conscious depiction 
(paintings, busts, and the like). In contrast to such image-
consciousness, reproductions have the character of the re-
presentation of something itself. […] The present memory 
is a phenomenon wholly analogous to perception. It has the 
appearance of the object in common with the correspond-
ing perception, except that the appearance has a modified 
character.267
As with Weltgeschichtlichkeit in Heidegger, Husserl would prefer to 
discount or minimize the specific significance of ‘image-conscious-
ness’, that is, tertiary retention, the already-there. But in Husserl’s 
case, when it comes to the question of ‘transcendental history’, he in 
the end has the courage to acknowledge the necessity of suspending 
the privilege he has always accorded to lived experience in the consti-
tution of idealities:
When Husserl addresses the question of transcendental 
history, he locates the possibility of originary geometric 
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intuition within the possibility of cumulative science as 
intuition of re-actualization of invention’s present. He can 
no longer relegate tertiary retention to a place outside it: the 
large now then becomes a very large now, an archi-now, and 
its composition a (re)composition.268
In other words, the constitution of the ideal objects of geometry 
may operate through a transcendental dynamic, but that dynamic is 
less and less focused on the ego, transcendental or otherwise, and 
increasingly on a collectivity that is irreducible to the individual, and 
on technological conditions that make possible the cumulative char-
acter of ‘intersubjective’ knowledge due to ‘reactivation’ and the sta-
bilization of its ‘objectivities’, and where these technological condi-
tions possess their own dynamic.269
Husserl’s profound shift with respect to the fundamental assump-
tions of phenomenology will eventually lead Derrida to the notions 
of the trace and archi-writing, but this will happen only after a long 
delay. At the time of his dissertation in 1953, Derrida found this radi-
cal Husserlian reversal, this ‘technicist explanation’ of the origin of 
geometry, to be a ‘rather laughable’ hypothesis founded in ‘prephilo-
sophical empiricism’.270 Derrida will himself, therefore, engage in a 
radical reversal with respect to Husserl, first revealed as such when in 
1962 he comes to write the introduction to Husserl’s text on geometry 
– and it will be by doing so that he becomes ‘Derrida’. By that time, he 
will have come to understand that the finitude of retentional power is 
the very thing that necessitates the preservation of significations, val-
ues and the past as such in habitualities and sedimentations,271 that the 
implications of the transcendental We are that ‘it is the we that makes 
possible the reduction of the empirical ego’,272 that ‘there is not first 
a subjective geometrical evidence which would then become objec-
tive’,273 that Husserl is not falling into historical empiricism because 
such possibilities of a geometric origin have ‘always conditioned the 
existence of the ideal objects of a pure science’, and hence these ‘are 
nothing but the possibilities of the appearance of history as such’,274 
that such possibilities depend on (as Husserl says) ‘the broadest con-
cept of literature’, and that it is thus (the technics of) writing, ‘as the 
place of absolutely permanent ideal objectivities’, that opens the pos-
sibility of what Jean Hyppolite will call a ‘subjectless transcenden-
tal field’.275
As Stiegler points out, however,
the technological question posed by The Origin of Geometry 
is not limited to writing in the current sense [for example, 
it also consists in ‘polishing’, which Derrida had in 1953 
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described as a ‘purely technical’ origin], which leads to the 
question of what that signifies for the concept of archi-writ-
ing, and for the thoughts of the trace and of différance.276
And as was the case with regard to the relationship of différance to 
technical life, here Stiegler diagnoses ‘a hesitation […] as to the “tech-
nicity” of writing and arche-writing’.277 Whether it is by polishing, 
or by inscribing a point, a line or a shape in the sand, producing geo-
metrical figures that illustrate what does not exist but on the basis of 
which we can think geometry, these modes of inscription may be ges-
tural or graphic without firstly or immediately being ‘writing’. The 
origin of geometry would thus lie in the necessity of both figuration 
and the conceptual recording of the significance of this figuration: it 
requires both writing and drawing.
The price of this Derridian hesitation is an inability to think about 
the epochality not just of writing, but of tertiary retention in general, 
technics insofar as, beyond writing in its current sense, it is (always) 
a kind of memory. And this leads to a deficiency of actually exist-
ing Derridian deconstruction considered as a tool or a weapon with 
which to analyse and critique the most recent of those epochs – that 
is, beyond the popularity of the Victrola or the rise of electronic card 
indexes, the becoming-temporal-object of everything.
In fact, despite this late-blooming account of the technical genesis 
of ideal objectivity, this deficiency is also Husserl’s, even though the 
distinction between primary and secondary retention and protention 
is absolutely necessary to any such analysis or critique. On the one 
hand, when he comes to write ‘The Origin of Geometry’, he grasps the 
constitutive role of tertiary retention as a technical retentional supple-
ment for retentional finitude, opening the possibility of a dynamic of 
knowledge accumulation, condensation and reactivation that funda-
mentally displaces the I or the who as origin. On the other hand, how-
ever, not only does the focus on the tone come at the expense of the 
note, but the insistence in the earlier lectures that image-conscious-
ness is incidental, and the subsequent failure to weigh the signifi-
cance of the mass retentional supports that were then just emerging 
(radio and cinema), means that he never manages to apply the question 
of the historical dynamic by which the ideal objectivities of science 
are constituted to the ideal objectivities of perception and conscious-
ness that had been his phenomenological focus in the lectures on time. 
Nor, then, can he deal with the fact that the play of the primary, the 
secondary and the tertiary bears the possibility not just of being con-
stitutive with respect to knowledge, perception and consciousness, but 
also destitutive.
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When looking at a photograph depicting an event to which I have 
borne witness, for Husserl it is only that ‘I remember the latter in the 
former’,278 never that this exteriorized memory, supplementing reten-
tional finitude, is what opens the very possibility of ‘running through’ 
the event again, with all the cinematographic special effects through 
which this secondary retention may be post-produced (which is the 
case, irrespective of whether this ‘image’ is visual). Furthermore, the 
becoming-temporal-object of everything, which had yet to occur in 
Husserl’s time, depended on the industrialization of temporal objects, 
from the gramophone to the radio, cinema, television, YouTube, 
Skype, Zoom and beyond. Not only does this lead to a tertiary reten-
tional system that enables mass broadcast, but it also does so at the 
speed of electromagnetic communication, that is, effectively without 
delay, ‘live’ across the globe, on screens that are ubiquitous and that 
take up an ever-increasing proportion of conscious time. The third 
step of this dynamic reconsideration of the temporal object thus con-
sists in asking what difference it makes when there is no longer any 
way of separating the primary from the tertiary because the former is 
always and immediately apprehended via the latter:
How is it then possible to distinguish, in the temporal objects 
that are news and current events, between primary memory 
– the ‘just-having-been’ – and image-consciousness, since 
what happens happens im-mediately through image-con-
sciousness? The lived experience of these events is a tempo-
ral object that is irreducibly an image-consciousness, while 
the present tends only to be the present as temporal object 
(listening to radio, watching television).279
My lived experience thus becomes absolutely inseparable from 
image-consciousness. Such a technical system of mass broadcast 
without delay of ubiquitous industrial temporal objects enables the 
exploitation of the play of primary, secondary and tertiary retention 
in order to condition and standardize protention. The analysis and cri-
tique of such a mnemotechnical retentional system absolutely requires 
the Husserlian distinction between primary and secondary retention, 
because the very foundation of that system lies in the technological 
possibility of conditioning the play between them. But in addition to 
tertiary retention being that which opens this possibility of techno-
logical control, it will also be necessary to clarify other elements: (1) 
the relationship between protention and desire; (2) the relationship 
between this ‘intersubjective’ dynamic constitutive of knowledge and 
the Simondonian notion of ‘transindividuation’; (3) the basis of the 
epochal character of mnemotechnical systems; and (4) the ways in 
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which all of this demands a political economy of the production and 
destruction of knowledge. It is to these questions that Stiegler will 
turn in the second phase of his work, after September 2001, in which 
he elaborates a ‘general organology’ that will also be a ‘pharmacol-
ogy’, and where the crucial analytical concept will prove to be ‘gram-
matization’ and the correspondingly crucial political concept will 
prove to be that of ‘proletarianization’.280
4 The Question of Elon Musk  
and the Aporia of Sustainability
We Are Allowing the Mainspring of Humanity to Run Down
History discloses two main tendencies in the course of 
events. One tendency is exemplified in the slow decay 
of physical nature. With stealthy inevitableness, there 
is degradation of energy. The sources of activity sink 
downward and downward. Their very matter wastes. The 
other tendency is exemplified by the yearly renewal of 
nature in the spring, and by the upward course of biological 
evolution. In these pages I consider Reason in its relation 
to these contrasted aspects of history. Reason is the self-
discipline of the originative element in history. Apart from 
the operations of Reason, this element is anarchic.
Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason.
The question and the problem
What’s Elon Musk got to do with us?281 If we’re going to use Musk 
as a prism through which to understand not just our contemporary 
existence but a possible fruitful future world, however improbable, 
how should we go about it? Should we take Musk as someone with the 
perspicacity not just to see problems but to initiate projects capable 
of opening new pathways to solutions, or should we see him as a fig-
ure whose extreme inventive cleverness with respect to some aspects 
of present or future systemic crises (climate change, AI, congestion) 
comes at the expense of a truly systemic approach based on a truly 
critical analysis? Musk’s strategy, whether we look at Tesla, SpaceX, 
the Boring Company or Neuralink, is to use innovative product design 
to induce technological acceleration with the goal of producing a kind 
of widespread industrial-economic stimulus amounting to a positive 
disruption, with the intended outcome being to bifurcate away from a 
dangerous pathway for humanity and towards a more hopeful future.
The question for ‘us’, then, is whether we can believe that the 
Muskian model of acceleration, disruption and bifurcation sufficiently 
grasps the depths of the largely negative disruption that is currently 
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unfolding at high speed due to the very same process of accelerated 
innovation. Should we accept at face value Musk’s claim that he is 
a ‘pro-human’, pro-Earth proponent of biospheric transformation and 
positive anthropogenic forcing, or does such a claim obfuscate the 
reality that he is just a less unsympathetic libertarian ideologue of 
Silicon Valley computational, engineering and transhumanist ‘soluti-
onism’? Is he the wizard we are looking for or just one more salesman 
selling us the dream of a magic wizard hat and leading us down his 
own particular Yellow Brick Road?
A variation on the theme of this question would consist in asking: 
is Elon Musk an artist? Are his electric cars, rocket ships and wiz-
ard hats the artefacts of a new kind of rational magic, the incantatory 
objects of the positive bifurcation we are seeking today? But what is 
an artist, if we conceive this in ‘social’ or ‘anthropological’ terms? 
What is the function of art, and what is the function of art today? If we 
say that our species has from the outset co-existed with the material 
and technological artefacts and prostheses it produces, and that this 
production, which is constitutive for this species, and which for mil-
lennia occurred imperceptibly slowly but today operates extremely 
rapidly, requires forms of social organization in order to be used well, 
and then, through the changing of these technical systems, destitutes 
and disrupts social organization and so requires the invention of new 
forms of social organization, in turn requiring new instruments, and 
new ways of using these instruments – if all this is true, then is the 
function of art, which is itself a production of and by instruments and 
artefacts, to provide ways of negotiating and facilitating these disrup-
tions, these problems, these questions, by providing ways of navigat-
ing the relationship between the known and the unknown, and so of 
overcoming these problems (until the next problems arrive with the 
next technical disruptions)? And if so, what is the function of art in 
a world where the perpetual and rapid acceleration of technological 
innovation has produced an immense set of problems that synergisti-
cally and antagonistically combine in a manner that seems to have set 
the course of the world system on an apocalyptic path?282
Is it conceivable that Elon Musk is (to put it in the terms of Joseph 
Beuys) socially sculpting Silicon Valley billionaires and, more gener-
ally, capital, through a corporate artistry conducted so as to affirma-
tively respond, and as quickly as possible, to the large set of grave 
problems and disruptions with which we are presently afflicted? 
And if we say no, this is not conceivable, if we wish to reject such 
a conclusion, as we are surely inclined to do, then is it enough just 
to smugly bemoan the hubris of this modern-day Icarus: would not 
the responsibility to think better and care better, and so to respond 
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better, with greater artistry, greater inventiveness and greater genius, 
then fall upon us?
In raising this question – the question of Elon Musk – we are open-
ing a path that will prove, in what follows, to be both elliptical and 
circuitous. But with regard to the conclusion to which it leads, we 
are obliged to be absolutely clear. Macroeconomic critique has long 
been concerned with the contradictions of capitalism, and rightly so: 
the antagonistic battle of tendency and counter-tendency within the 
hyper-globalized capitalist technosphere is undoubtedly thrusting the 
latter headlong to a limit point that ultimately threatens to ‘clog the 
economic arteries and increase the dangers of a political stroke’ that 
may well prove to be fatal.283
But in addition to these contradictions, there are also contradictions 
within critical macroeconomic discourse itself. On the one hand, the 
most clear-sighted discourses on environmental sustainability in the 
age of climate change understand full well that desperately needed 
‘dramatic reductions in emissions at current high levels of consump-
tion are very challenging’, to say the least: hyper-consumption pro-
foundly threatens environmental sustainability and solvency in the 
age of the Anthropocene.284 On the other hand, the most clear-sighted 
discourses on macroeconomic sustainability understand full well that 
this hyper-globalization, fuelled by financial deregulation and subse-
quent debt-driven bubbles, has led to ‘more inequality, underconsump-
tion, debt and, consequently, macroeconomic vulnerability’. Take 
note: what profoundly threatens macroeconomic sustainability and 
solvency in the age of hyper-globalization is also under-consumption.
This problem amounts to a dual contradiction, both of capitalism 
itself and of its critique: global ecological sustainability absolutely 
requires addressing the risks brought by hyper-consumption, while 
global economic sustainability cannot avoid addressing the risks 
brought by under-consumption. The depths of this dual contradiction 
justify referring to it as an aporia of sustainability, and the failure to 
resolve this macroeconomic aporia gives rise to the significant threat 
of a global economic insolvency and a global political stroke of a 
magnitude sufficient to expose human civilization to a level of danger 
that is best described in terms of ‘extinction risk’.
Opening digression on the function of art, via Whitehead
Today, we think of art as a thing, as an object offered for sale at a 
gallery or maintained as a relic in a museum, or perhaps as an 
‘installation’ or even an ‘event’, but in the prehistoric past, art was 
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fundamentally a part of ritual. Hence Whitehead argues, for instance, 
that for the emotional beings that we are, ritual was the
primitive outcome of superfluous energy and leisure. […] 
Mankind became artists in ritual.285
If ritual is a function, then it is so as a divergence and diversification 
from biology, a differentiation from the aesthetic function in endoso-
matic life. For Whitehead, what matters with the advent of ritual is 
that what begins by having ‘no direct relevance to the preservation of 
the physical organisms of the actors’ comes to establish a new non-
organic function precisely by this divorce from the organic, or as the 
aesthetic composition of the organic and the organological:
It was a tremendous discovery how to excite emotions for 
their own sake, apart from some imperious biological neces-
sity. But emotions sensitize the organism. Thus the unin-
tended effect was produced of sensitizing the human organ-
ism in a variety of ways diverse from what would have been 
produced by the necessary work of life.286
Whitehead’s use of this term, ‘work’, as that which is made neces-
sary by our biological conditions of subsistence, must be understood 
in relation to his tripartite division in The Function of Reason between 
living, living well and living better. As a question of living well, we 
might say that the function of ritual is the artistic use of repetition 
to achieve the transformation of a situation: in the tribal dance, the 
diffuse collection of individuals who make up the tribe, with their 
disagreements and their disputes, are brought together into a higher 
unity, the unity of the tribe itself, against the ‘downwards tendency’ to 
fall into disunity; in the war dance, they do the same thing, but in order 
to galvanize that unity into the strength and the will to fight against 
another collective group; in the courtship ritual, two separate individ-
uals are brought together and conjoined so that they will be raised into 
a unity that would be a subunit within the tribe, with the possibility of 
having children according to the law of the tribe and so on.
In every case, ritual is a ‘way of artificially stimulating emotion’,287 
the function of which is to generate artificial affective automatisms 
in order to transform a situation, and to transform it in terms of the 
relationship between different scales or orders of magnitude: the indi-
vidual, the couple, the family, the tribe, the ethnic group, and so on. 
But how is this transformation possible? It is possible, and it is only 
possible, if the practitioners know how to do it, if they know how to 
carry out the ritual, if they know how to use the artistic objects that 
are sacred objects in a way that achieves and performs this ritual. It 
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is through the practice of these art objects that access is gained to 
some higher value, beyond values, which supplies the criterion for the 
determination of value by which the arrangement of higher and lower 
levels can be organized. The transformation this involves is therefore 
performative in John Austin’s sense: by doing something ‘correctly’, 
that is, in the right context and in the right way, that is, with knowl-
edge, an operation occurs through which a transformation is effected. 
This transformation is the work art does in the ritual.
When we think about this ‘right way’, about the ‘institutional con-
text’ that means a priest can perform the act of marrying a couple, it 
sounds as if the rule precedes the ritual: does this not imply that ritual 
is always ‘conservative’? No doubt this is very often the case, because 
the function of art in such rituals is to transform a situation but to 
transform it in order to maintain the continuity of the relationship 
between these different orders of magnitude. But at the same time, 
at some point in time, a particular ritual begins. Rituals are invented. 
And rituals are constantly changing, even if this happens slowly and 
it may be that nobody is consciously deciding what to change. The 
fact is that the knowledge of what it means to perform a ritual ‘prop-
erly’ itself changes, as the world changes, as the individuals who 
compose that world change, and, most importantly, as the products of 
our technics change, giving rise to crises of performance and thus to 
challenges to old ways of doing things, that is, old ways of transform-
ing situations, old ways of negotiating the relationship between the 
different orders of magnitude within a particular locality, and so on.
What is this ‘knowledge’ that makes it possible for art and ritual to 
transform a situation? It is the knowledge of how to make the objects 
of artistic production, and the knowledge of how to use them, how 
to practise them. But it is also a matter of a kind of ‘cosmological’ 
knowledge, of something higher, something that, in Stiegler’s terms, 
does not exist but consists, something to be aimed at or something 
that orients how to negotiate this transformation of the relationship 
between orders of magnitude, and that does so by bestowing mean-
ing and value.
This last kind of knowledge is of a very strange kind, because we, 
latecomers, we very often tend to think: but all these tribes, all these 
ethnicities, all these little localities, all these ‘minor differences’ (and 
their narcissism, as Freud said), each one of them ‘knows’ something 
different than all the others, and all these differing knowledges of 
higher beings and deities and so on are all incompatible with each 
other, if not simply (therefore) false. So surely this is not knowledge 
at all, we tend to think, but its very antithesis. Yet in fact, knowledge 
always has this very structure: it always aims at things that do not 
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exist, like the point and the line that are the foundation of Euclidean 
geometry, but that consist – we need them, and we aim at them 
through our knowledgeable desire. Even in science, the aim is not to 
discover facts, but laws: which do not exist but consist.
Given all this, the function of art would then be to cultivate, to 
uncover and to utilize knowledge in the broadest possible sense in 
order to negotiate and renegotiate the transformation of situations 
existing between varying orders of magnitude, that is, varying scales 
of locality. And this is the case in a situation where, however appar-
ently stable, new problems always eventually arise in this negotiation 
between orders of magnitude, in turn requiring the transformation 
of art itself, and of its knowledge. As Whitehead also understood (in 
relation to the rise of ‘religion’ as progenitor of living better), this 
then becomes a question not just of generating artificial automatisms, 
but, on the basis of those automatisms, of generating new knowledge 
enabling the autonomy of thinking:
For just as ritual encouraged emotion beyond the mere 
response to practical necessities, so religion in this further 
stage begets thoughts divorced from the mere battling with 
the pressure of circumstances. Imagination secured in it a 
machinery for its development; thought has been thereby led 
beyond the immediate objects of sight. Its concepts may in 
these early stages be crude and horrible; but they have the 
supreme virtue of being concepts of objects beyond immedi-
ate sense and perception.288
Over the course of its history, this function of art (via ritual and 
religion), a function that is explicitly non-organic in the way it fos-
ters first emotion and then thought, has undergone at least two fun-
damental divorces. First, the divorce of art from ritual itself: this is 
what produces the notion of the artist as producer of the art object. 
It appeals, like the ritual object, to something higher, but this ‘some-
thing higher’ that does not exist but consists is no longer necessarily 
theological, transformed gradually into the notion of beauty. The art 
object thereby becomes an aesthetic object in the classical sense, that 
is, in the sense that emerges from out of the ritual culture that ancient 
Greece still was, as tragic culture.
The second divorce occurs when artistic production is confronted 
with another kind of production: industrial production. Through this 
encounter, the art object becomes or resists becoming itself indus-
trial, and, even more so, art becomes or resists becoming a market. 
In becoming industrial, in becoming a market, and even in its way of 
resisting becoming industrial or a market, art gets caught up in that 
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commensurability of all things that is the calculation of the market, 
of the art market. And so it is forced to abandon that notion of ‘some-
thing higher’ that would be beyond value and hence able to bestow 
value, or in other words, it is forced to accept the market as value of 
values: the problem of modern art thereby becomes the constant prob-
lem of knowing what art is, why it is, why it matters – whether it has a 
function. Instead of beauty, it becomes the question and the necessity 
of the new – of some new surprise, or of at least being ‘interesting’.
In this way, the ‘knowledge’ with which art becomes preoccupied 
is, a little like philosophy, more and more insular, internalized, a mat-
ter of rejecting past notions of art’s function and of proclaiming new 
ones, through constant reiterations of this function that prove to very 
often be more or less calculated strategies on that very market, even 
at the moment when something is celebrated for ‘raising questions’ or 
‘changing perceptions’ or just being abstractly ‘radical’.
In this way, art comes to think of itself increasingly in terms of 
a war with itself, within the greater economic war that defines the 
global market. But in fact, art in this industrial age that continues 
today has, especially since the twentieth century, been involved in 
another war, with another kind of production – art versus what Adorno 
and Horkheimer called the ‘culture industry’. And in this war, ‘art’ 
has found itself constantly losing ground, retreating further and fur-
ther into a walled garden while the culture industry expands to a plan-
etary scale, absorbing the ‘art industry’ that succumbs to marketing.
What fundamentally is the difference between this modern art and 
the culture industry? If there is a difference, it is surely not fundamen-
tal. If this is a war, it is not a war between two enemies, but between 
two tendencies. The first is the tendency that sees that the question 
of art ultimately cannot be divorced from the question of function, 
but that the question of function is always open, and for that reason 
involves a question of knowledge, where knowledge is always a mat-
ter of a desire for the knowledge of what does not exist, yet consists, 
and where this must therefore be constantly cultivated and practised 
and transformed. The second is the tendency that dissolves all of that 
into calculability, into the market, and into speculation on that mar-
ket. This second tendency aims as far as possible at the destruction of 
localized knowledge, even as it more and more comes to value ‘infor-
mation’ – because information, unlike knowledge, can be calculated.
Record of a living being who lives in fear
Is art in this open functional sense possible today, and if so, in what 
would it consist?
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In 1954, the Japanese composer Fumio Hayasaka told Akira 
Kurosawa that he felt that someone who is in danger of dying 
is not capable of working well,289 by which he was referring, in 
Whiteheadian terms, not to the necessary work of life, nor just to liv-
ing well, but working in the transformational sense of responding 
to increasing entropy by struggling for ways of living better. Since 
Hayasaka was himself suffering from tuberculosis at the time (he 
would die from this disease the following year), Kurosawa thought 
that the composer was describing his own plight. In fact, however, 
Hayasaka was referring to something much more general, less than a 
decade after Hiroshima and in the wake of the hydrogen bomb testing 
that commenced on the Bikini Atoll on 1 March 1954 with the detona-
tion of Castle Bravo, which was a thousand times more powerful than 
Hiroshima’s Little Boy.
In addition to the general threat to Japan of radiation fallout brought 
by the series of hydrogen bomb tests, the first of this series, Castle 
Bravo, was also well known in Japan because of the radioactive con-
tamination to which the crew of the fishing vessel Daigo Fukuryū 
Maru (Lucky Dragon 5) were exposed, leading to the death of one 
crewman, Aikichi Kuboyama, on 23 September 1954. Edward Teller, 
the nuclear physicist and ‘father of the hydrogen bomb’ (who would 
later become the inspiration for the character of Dr. Strangelove in 
Stanley Kubrick’s eponymous film), reportedly said of this death, ‘It’s 
unreasonable to make such a big deal over the death of a fisherman’.290
Kurosawa decided to make a film on the subject raised by Hayasaka, 
which was released the following year, in November 1955, a month 
after Hayasaka’s death (it would be his last movie soundtrack): its 
Japanese title means Record of a Living Being, but it is better known in 
English as I Live in Fear. The movie tells the story of a character who 
has started worrying and hates this remarkable innovation known as 
‘the bomb’. It is structured as an intergenerational dispute between an 
elderly man and his adult children: the latter ask the courts to declare 
their father incompetent because of his wish to sell the foundry he 
owns in order to finance the family’s relocation to Brazil, where, he 
thinks, they will be safer, at least from this threat. (Apart from any-
thing else, this is personally interesting to me, because in 1961 my 
father – who had himself unwittingly contributed to the Manhattan 
Project during the Second World War291 – permanently moved from 
the United States to Australia, partly for this very reason.)
Despite the title of the film, the protagonist played by Toshiro 
Mifune claims that, in fact, he does not live in fear: on the contrary, all 
those who continue to live their lives as if this threat did not exist…
they are the ones who are afraid. To be afraid is to run away from the 
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knowledge one has of a problem, to deny that one is in possession 
of problematic knowledge, rather than to face it and respond. And to 
deny that of which one is in possession is to be possessed – that is, 
to be haunted by what one refuses to see. In short, this character is 
presented as a kind of parrhesiast, as someone with the courage of 
truth, but he is taken by those around him for mad: he is taken by his 
peers as the one who is possessed, which is always the fate of the par-
rhesiast, because the parrhesiast is mad – he is mad because, as is said 
to him in the film, this technological problem that so concerns him is 
‘too big for the individual’.
When he loses the court case, and can no longer pursue his plan, 
this presumptive madman does become afraid, very afraid, and, out 
of desperation, he sets fire to his own foundry in order to destroy his 
family’s incentive to remain in Japan. When his workers ask him, 
‘does this mean that you do not care about us?’, he recognizes his 
error: he needs a solution to this problem, not just for himself, not just 
for his family, but for everyone – which means, at another scale. And 
then he really does sink into madness. Arrested for the arson, a cell-
mate in jail says to him, mockingly (as if to Musk), ‘If you’re so wor-
ried, why don’t you just leave earth?’, and when he finds himself sent 
to a mental hospital, under the delusion that he is indeed on another 
planet, his psychiatrist states:
Whenever I see this patient, I become melancholic. […] 
All lunatics are melancholic, however this patient makes 
me melancholic. Maybe I’m not sane, although I believe I 
am. I’m often obliged to wonder, ‘Is he a lunatic, or am I 
the lunatic?’
This is a film, in other words, about the relationship between 
fear and melancholy, but more fundamentally about the relationship 
between truth and denial. It is not just that the protagonist is a par-
rhesiast: the film itself is a kind of parrhesia, which is why Kurosawa 
and his co-writers felt that they were ‘making the kind of picture with 
which, after it was all over and the last judgment was upon us, [they] 
could stand up and account for [their] past lives by saying’ that at least 
they had made this film.292 I Live in Fear is an attempt to dis-cover, to 
uncover, the knowledge of a dangerous situation, knowledge that is in 
everyone’s possession, but of which they cannot manage to take pos-
session in order to transform their situation, the local situation of the 
localized beings that are the citizens of Japan, collectively forming 
the people of Japan: Japanese society.
The film was a work of art in the genuine sense to the extent that it 
was an attempt to renegotiate the relationship between the orders of 
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magnitude comprising this situation, and to do so from out of the need 
that arose from a new and unprecedented challenge, a new danger. 
In this sense, it is a work of art precisely because it is a question of 
responsibility, and of the responsibility of the artist. In fact, it turned 
out to be the celebrated director’s greatest commercial failure: origi-
nally intended as a satire, it was anything but, and Kurosawa con-
cluded that he had made it ‘too soon’.293 Or at least that is what he 
said nine years later, in 1964, the year of Dr. Strangelove or: How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. (And it would also be 
worth comparing this to Sion Sono’s post-Fukushima cinema, in par-
ticular Land of Hope, but also Himizu).
There is, of course, a long and entirely justified tradition of reject-
ing apocalyptic thinking, in the name of Enlightenment reason and 
progress, and there is good reason to remain wary of any trace of mil-
lenarianism. It is, however, now almost three quarters of a century 
since the ‘dialectical’ character of Enlightenment reason was first 
pointed out, in 1944, by Adorno and Horkheimer, for whom the ‘ratio-
nalization’ of this reason brought forth not just light but shade – dark-
ness – as witnessed in the industrial revolution, at Auschwitz, and 
through the culture industry. Today we have reached another thresh-
old, beyond this ‘dialectic’, where to overcome denial would seem to 
require the invention of a kind of ‘rational apocalypticism’, and one 
whose many facets have continued to proliferate. Yet the only reason 
to adopt such a rational apocalypticism is if, by doing so, a bifurcatory 
path can be opened up that, if it is not capable of leading us away from 
the apocalypse, at least has the potential to illuminate a possible way 
through it, however improbably.
Fear and denial today: on the biggest,  
dumbest experiment in history
Let us then state it for the record: I live in fear. And in melancholy. 
And also, most of the time, in denial. And so, probably, do you. All 
these, for all of us, are more or less unavoidable, at least intermit-
tently, because we all know, in one way or another, that the scale of 
the problems we face is ‘too big for the individual’. Today, it is not just 
one country and its citizens that live with this sense of danger. Today, 
the whole world exists with the sense that there is a danger to that 
whole world itself. And today, everyone in the whole world succumbs 
to the tendency to deny that sense, and to live as if they do not possess 
this knowledge, by which they are, accordingly, possessed. For art, as 
for everyone, this presents a threat, but art is already threatened, and 
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firstly by its own dysfunctional counter-tendency, and so this threat is 
also a chance: a chance to rediscover and reinvent its function.
But art today – and everyone is an artist, as Joseph Beuys said, just 
as everyone is a philosopher, even if the vocation is not ‘equally’ actu-
alized294 – art must go beyond Kurosawa: we must not only uncover 
this knowledge and present it in order to transform the situation of 
this locality or that. Today, the problem is not just from one device, 
the hydrogen bomb, nor is it even from several devices, or many, but 
from an entire exospheric system that preys upon and destroys the 
entire biosphere, and does so in a situation where the culture indus-
try has itself transformed, becoming global, networked and algorith-
mic, threatening every localization and hence every localized form of 
knowledge. The function of art today is not just to resist this destruc-
tion of localized knowledge: it is to invent new forms of localiza-
tion and to cultivate forms of knowledge capable of making possible 
a genuinely solvent and sustainable global economic system – that 
is, a transformation giving rise to a new anti-entropic cosmological 
arrangement of those orders of magnitude comprising our planetary 
situation, situated as it is within an entropic universe. Making this 
highly improbable transformation possible is the true and only func-
tion of art today, however grandiose a claim this may seem to be on 
face value. A dream, what else?
Elon Musk, too, seems to feel these feelings of fear and melan-
choly. As far as it is possible to tell, his motivation for building Tesla 
does seem to really be the fear generated by what he calls the ‘big-
gest and dumbest experiment in human history’, the ‘crazy game’295 
we are playing by pouring billions of tons of carbon into the atmo-
sphere. To this we must add the possibility that this crazy experiment 
is approaching its endgame, the threshold at which even the reduc-
tion of carbon emissions to zero may no longer be enough to prevent 
catastrophe:
Our analysis suggests that the Earth System may be 
approaching a planetary threshold that could lock in a con-
tinuing rapid pathway toward much hotter conditions – 
Hothouse Earth. This pathway would be propelled by strong, 
intrinsic, biogeophysical feedbacks difficult to influence 
by human actions, a pathway that could not be reversed, 
steered, or substantially slowed. […] The impacts of a 
Hothouse Earth pathway on human societies would likely be 
massive, sometimes abrupt, and undoubtedly disruptive.296
Given that the leading scientists in the field feel compelled to pres-
ent a hypothesis of such immense foreboding, contemplating the 
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possibility of soon reaching a point where not only does disaster 
becomes unavoidable but it can barely be ameliorated, we can equally 
comprehend the mindset behind SpaceX: for Musk, the prime motiva-
tion behind his attempt to accelerate rocket engineering is the wish to 
construct an escape mechanism lest this big dumb experiment lead 
the planet to uninhabitability with no way out.297
But what we fear today, and what we deny today, is not just climate 
change or the anthropogenic (or ‘anthropic’) destruction of ecosys-
tems: what we equally fear is the destruction of the only means we 
have of addressing these problems – our collective intelligence, col-
lectively cultivated and applied to making collective decisions. What 
we are still most in denial about, what we are still not thinking, or that 
we have barely begun to think (barely has it ever become a political 
issue anywhere, for example), is how we have created computational, 
cybernetic and algorithmic systems that, in the name of commercial 
imperatives, produce individual and collective stupidity, madness, 
desperation, fear and, therefore, denial. Ex-President Obama was 
undoubtedly right when he said recently that Donald Trump must be 
treated not as a cause, not as a disease, but as a symptom: it is indeed 
a great mistake and stupidity of the ‘resistance’ to Trump to fail to 
grasp this fundamental fact, which, by denying it, is bound to produce 
even greater stupidity and madness, and on all sides. And Obama is 
right to say that Trump, with whom the world has become possessed, 
was elected by capitalizing on resentments whose flames have been 
fanned by politicians for years.298 But if we agree with his thesis that 
Trump is a symptom, then it becomes all the more important to ask 
by what means those flames were and continue to be fanned – fanned 
with what fans? – and what to do about them.
Neuralink in the age of ‘our id writ large’
From this angle, more significant than Tesla or SpaceX, more inter-
esting than the Boring Company, is Neuralink, Musk’s most fantasti-
cal if not science fictional entrepreneurial venture, devoted to devel-
oping so-called ‘direct’ means of interaction between the brain and 
the computer. No doubt we have every reason to be sceptical about his 
proclamations of imminent progress in this field, and he does seem to 
buy rather too readily into the cognitivist fable according to which the 
brain can survive its somatic death by ‘uploading’ its informational 
contents to some or other device, apparatus or cloud. Nevertheless, 
it is also obvious that Musk is no fool: he understands very well, for 
example, that we have always been co-existent beings. An individual 
is an individual with his or her tools, today his or her smartphone, 
Daniel Ross 156
and a collective is the same: a company, for example, is for Musk just 
a ‘cybernetic collective of people and machines’.299 We are techni-
cal beings through and through, both individually and collectively, 
and Musk’s integrated perspective is not so far removed from what 
Stiegler calls simple exorganisms (‘I and my tools’, ‘I and my house’, 
‘I and my phone’) in their relationship to complex exorganisms (which 
he divides into lower complex exorganisms, such as companies, cit-
ies, galleries, geographical societies, and higher complex exorgan-
isms such as states and nations). The question would then be to know 
exactly what Musk means by cybernetic, and of knowing whether he 
thinks these individual and collective organisms, and their relation-
ship to their machines, are reducible to cybernetics understood as the 
science of systems of control and communication via the calculation 
of information.
Another way of saying that humanity has always been co-originary 
and co-existent with technics is to say that what matters is not the 
demarcation of ‘the human’ but rather the advent of an organism in 
possession of what Musk calls a ‘tertiary layer’. In relation to what 
primary and secondary layers would this layer be tertiary? For Musk, 
it is a question of the structure of the brain and nervous system. The 
primary and secondary layers are endosomatic: they are, respectively 
the limbic system, which, moving too quickly (as we shall see), is 
something like the animalian brain, and the cerebral cortex (or the 
neocortex), which is the cogitating brain, more or less. The latter 
is still, as Musk puts it, ‘mostly in service to the limbic system’:300 
behind the abstract uses we may make of our cortex, there almost 
always lies, in some way, an attempt to satisfy the finite and affective 
dictates of the limbic system – which we might well relate to what 
Freud called the drives.
Nevertheless, this secondary layer can achieve relative indepen-
dence from the primary layer that is the limbic system, and this rela-
tive autonomy of the cortical is achievable in a situation where, fur-
thermore, these two layers have, for the kinds of beings that we are, 
always existed alongside what Musk refers to as the tertiary layer. The 
latter is akin to a prosthetic envelope through which the individual 
brain relates to other brains, to tools, and to itself. It is the tertiary 
layer that opens up the relative independence of the secondary layer 
with respect to the primary layer, which is to say that it opens up what 
Simondon calls a transductive relationship between them. This is the 
very thing that Whitehead was describing when he claimed that ritual, 
which is a technique and as such a tertiary layer, a technical form of 
life, is the source of the sensitization that will lead to emotional life, 
and which in turn ‘begets thoughts divorced from the mere battling 
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with the pressure of circumstances’. Or in other words, it is a question 
of a divorce from circumstances inaugurating a regime of individua-
tion divergent from what Simondon called vital individuation, charac-
teristic of the history of life up until the advent of this tertiary layer.
Musk doesn’t quite say this himself, but, from a Stieglerian per-
spective, it is only through the transductive relationship between the 
secondary and tertiary layers that this relative independence from 
the primary layer is achievable (either in human evolution or in the 
life of the infant equipped with Winnicott’s transitional object). And, 
paradoxically, it is only because of the tertiary layer that the primary 
layer is not just and not quite an ‘animal brain’, precisely because 
it is divorced from biological exigencies – composed of detachable 
psychic organs – and through that available for the sensitization and 
noetization processes that constitute the very possibility of the sec-
ondary and tertiary layers themselves. It is a question of co-origina-
tion from out of an originary default, as Stiegler says.
With smartphones, computers and the internet, we find ourselves 
living today with what Musk calls a ‘digital tertiary layer’, but, 
throughout the history of civilization (which for Musk is the history 
that begins with writing), what is crucial is that this interface between 
the brain and the tertiary layer has always been indirect, requiring a 
circuit of exchange operating through a medium (a support) that can 
be, in this history of civilization, language, painting, writing, sculp-
ture, cinema, radio, television and so on: the Neuralink project301 is to 
facilitate the emergence of a direct interface between these three lay-
ers that would amount to a neurotechnological bifurcation from what 
Simondon calls psychic and collective individuation and towards, 
again, yet another new regime of individuation, that is, a fundamen-
tally new relationship between what Stiegler calls endosomatization 
and exosomatization.302
Musk is also no fool when confronted with the anti-social misery 
and unhappiness produced by social networks. When asked about it, 
he can perfectly clearly and from his own experience see that today’s 
AI is, ‘in large part, our id writ large’303 – that is, in his terms, the 
limbic system writ large, at the expense of the cerebral cortex, and 
in that sense a regression from the relative independence necessary 
for the begetting of thought (and care). Or to put this once again in 
Stiegler’s language, these anti-social networks systematically, algo-
rithmically and performatively target the drives, inscribing them-
selves into the limbic layer and at the expense of desire (in the broad-
est possible sense as referring to the anticipatory and protentional 
aspects of the conjunction of the primary and secondary layers via 
the tertiary layer), ultimately destroying our capacity for reason (itself 
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fundamentally tied to desire in the form of reasons). Musk, then, has a 
sense of the pharmacological character of the digital tertiary layer and 
of the dangers it already brings for psychic and collective life.
In terms of the future dangers he sees associated with advances in 
the digital tertiary layer, his great fear is that the slow speed of indi-
rect data flow and data transfer between brain and machine suggests 
that when superintelligent AI appears, it will acquire an unbeatable 
advantage over these brains, hindered by their slow connections to 
the tertiary layer. For Musk, it is therefore this problem of ‘band-
width’ between brain and digital tertiary layer that urgently needs to 
be resolved.
What seems odd, if not contradictory, is that Musk can see perfectly 
clearly that the AI we have right now is inscribing itself into the lim-
bic system, targeting it, and that this gives rise to the crowd psychol-
ogy and herd-like politics of scapegoats and post-truth characteristic 
of the ‘id writ large’ – he can see this, and yet he has not one real word 
to say about how and why some more direct interface with our desires 
and drives would get around the problem of these connected brains 
being targeted and hijacked in an even more intense and accelerated 
way. He does not seem to see that this id writ large is the direct result 
of the attempt by Facebook, Twitter et al. (not to mention Pornhub et 
al.) to use their indirect but still powerful connections to these brains 
not just to control individual psychic apparatuses but to undermine 
the local and singular relationships between these apparatuses. The 
paradoxical and dangerous result is a kind of hyper-synchronization 
that no longer resonates at an individual level yet produces seismic 
disruptions at the collective level.
Limbic resonance, regulation and revision
Given Musk’s fondness for conceiving his Neuralink project on the 
basis of the tripartite division between the primary (limbic), second-
ary (neocortical) and tertiary (technical) layers, one might be inclined 
to suggest he reflect on the work of Thomas Lewis, Fari Amini and 
Richard Lannon, as set out in A General Theory of Love, and the trio 
of concepts they name limbic resonance, limbic regulation and limbic 
revision.304 When Musk describes the limbic system, and refers to the 
id writ large, he seems to invoke a sense of the ‘primitive’ drives of 
the animal brain. For Lewis, Amini and Lannon, however, it is cru-
cial to understand the limbic brain in its specificity as the mamma-
lian brain, built upon the prior structures of the reptilian brain, and on 
which will be built the subsequent structures of the neocortical brain. 
In this conceptualization of the evolution of the brain and nervous 
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system, therefore, Musk’s ‘primary layer’ (the limbic brain) envelops 
a pre-primary layer, so to speak, and is already, in this way, quite far 
indeed from anything ‘primitive’ or ‘reptilian’.
What differentiates the limbic brain from its precursors is the dif-
ferent relationship to offspring that is generally characteristic of 
mammals as compared to reptiles, a relationship we could character-
ize as the evolution of endosomatic forms of care, in terms of both 
parental concern and the response of young to the absence of a parent, 
and where these forms of care are also associated with increasingly 
complex forms of ‘social’ care. (But here it is necessary to recall that 
these forms of ‘care’ – and of sociality – are the result of selection 
pressures resulting from biological evolution, and therefore are not 
the same thing as the noetic and idiomatic forms of care made pos-
sible by artificial selection when life becomes exosomatic, where the 
latter forms arise from the composition of the secondary and tertiary 
layers, even if they are undoubtedly built on limbic foundations, and 
where, for Homo sapiens, even our limbic and reptilian layers have 
likely been reshaped by millennia of exosomatic evolution.)
Whereas the reptile’s brain would consist of limited action 
sequences relating the interior milieu to the exterior milieu more or 
less directly, in the sense of being largely ‘pre-programmed’ for the 
individual organism, the limbic brain is composed of ‘open loops’ that 
can be formed only in relation to others, and this openness consists 
firstly in the possibility of being attuned to other interior milieus:
With the effulgence of their new brain, mammals devel-
oped a capacity we call limbic resonance – a symphony of 
mutual exchange and internal adaptation whereby two mam-
mals become attuned to each other’s inner states. […] To the 
animals capable of bridging the gap between minds, limbic 
resonance is the door to communal connection.305
Noting Konrad Lorenz’s notion of imprinting to describe ‘the ten-
dency of birds and mammals to lock on to an early object’,306 and 
John Bowlby’s attachment theory that ‘theorized that human infants 
are born with a brain system that promotes safety by establishing an 
instinctive behavioral bond with their mothers’,307 the authors of A 
General Theory of Love formulate the idea of open loop systems that 
cannot survive without stabilizing themselves via processes of ‘syn-
chronization with nearby attachment figures’, through which mam-
mals ‘adjust and fortify one another’s neural rhythms in the collabora-
tive dance of love’.308 In short, the capacity for limbic resonance makes 
possible ‘this mutually synchronizing exchange’, effected through 
open loops between organisms, which they call limbic regulation, 
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and where, as mentioned, these processes are not just definitional, but 
indispensable: ‘A baby’s physiology is maximally open-loop: without 
limbic regulation, his vital rhythms collapse, and he will die.’309
The therapeutic aspect of the ‘general theory’ argues that the thera-
pist takes advantage of the mutual capacity for limbic resonance, that 
is, for reading and responding to the ‘radiant aura of limbic tones’310 
expressed and written in a manifold of forms, so as to reset limbic 
dysregulation. This is not just a matter of filling in for deficiencies 
of limbic regulation, such as compensating for failures of attachment 
stemming from early life. To this necessity of synchronization must 
be added diachronic processes that rewrite, so to speak, the open 
loops of psychic and collective life, and do so both in the grey matter 
of the limbic brain itself and in the circuits of social existence. Such 
diachronizations are a matter of limbic revision:
Overhauling emotional knowledge is no spectator sport; it 
demands the messy experience of yanking and tinkering that 
comes from a limbic bond. If someone’s relationships today 
bear a troubled imprint, they do so because an influential 
relationship left its mark on a child’s mind. When a limbic 
connection has established a neural pattern, it takes a limbic 
connection to revise it.311
When Lewis, Amini and Lannon refer to this ‘messy experience’ 
necessary for a therapeutics of limbic revision based on ‘overhaul-
ing emotional knowledge’, they mean that the knowledge required to 
undertake it can never be the merely abstract or cognitive information 
that might have been acquired in psychotherapeutic ‘training’, and 
that therapy can never simply be a one-way street:
In the duet between minds, each has its own harmonies 
and the tendency to draw others into a compatible key. 
[…] Coming close to a patient’s limbic world evokes genu-
ine emotional responses in the therapist – he finds parts of 
himself stirring in response to the particular magnetism of 
the emotional mind across from him. His mission is nei-
ther to deny those responses in himself, nor to let them run 
their course.312
A therapist without this knowledge, without the ability to sense with 
their limbic brain, open to its necessity but curbing their own ten-
dency towards excessiveness, is bound to go astray, which means: 
to ‘substitute inference for resonance’, to ‘offer cookie-cutter solu-
tions’.313 In other words, the capacities made possible by the primary 
layer that is the limbic brain can be externalized and understood via 
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the knowledge opened up by the arrangement coordinated between 
the secondary and tertiary layers that are the neocortical brain and 
exosomatic memory, but where these are subject to regressive or 
entropic tendencies. For this reason, a pharmacology is required, and 
specifically a pharmacology conceived in a tragic key and concerned 
with the ways in which this ‘tertiary layer’ promotes or impedes the 
anti-entropic and anti-anthropic possibilities of limbic resonance, reg-
ulation and revision:
The evolution of the limbic brain a hundred million years 
ago created animals with luminescent powers of emotional-
ity and relatedness, their nervous systems designed to inter-
twine and support each other like supple strands of a vine 
[and which later become the supple strands of the vine of 
psychic, collective and technical individuation]. But in life, 
as on the Greek stage, every attribute confers a matching 
vulnerability; each heroic strength finds its mirror image 
in a tragic flaw. […] The limbic brain bestows experiential 
riches denied simpler creatures, but it also opens mammals 
up to torment and destruction. […] The giant reptiles van-
ished when the skies darkened and temperatures fell. Our 
downfall is equally assured if we push our living conditions 
beyond the limits our emotional heritage decrees.314
For the authors of A General Theory of Love, the pharmacology of 
these limits consists firstly in noting that instead of ‘protecting 
us from the frailties of the limbic brain, American culture magni-
fies them by obscuring the nature and need for love’.315 More point-
edly, they argue that ‘we cherish individual freedoms more than any 
society, but we do not respect the process whereby autonomy devel-
ops’.316 The condition of possibility of independence is the dependence 
that forms through limbic resonance; the condition of possibility of 
autonomy lies in the forms of regulation (all the synchronic autom-
atisms of education) and revision (all the diachronic accumulations 
of education) that can thereby be cultivated and, in being cultivated, 
transformed.
Such conditions of possibility themselves have technical and tech-
nological conditions, but such technologies are always also them-
selves pharmacological. This is particularly so for the young: those 
for whom transitional objects are essential to the formation of bonds 
and attachments (which form not just attachments to others, but to 
every object of desire, including all the objects of knowledge). The 
authors of A General Theory of Love write as follows in 2000, that is, 
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at least half a decade before the rise of smartphones and algorithmic 
social networks:
A spectrum of surrogates occupy modern babies and tod-
dlers: relatives, live-in au pairs, regular or revolving nan-
nies, neighbors, institutional day care workers, television 
shows, Disney videos, interactive computer games. […] 
These questions revolve around an inconvenient center of 
gravity: the specificity of a child’s limbic needs. […] But 
decades of attachment research endorse the conclusion that 
children form elaborate, individualized relationships with 
special, irreplaceable others. […] A child’s electronic stew-
ards – television, videos, computer games – are the emo-
tional equivalent of bran; they occupy attention and mental 
space without nourishing. […] Today’s machines deliver not 
a limbic connection but imprecise simulations. Small won-
der that Internet use in adults actually causes depression and 
loneliness. ‘We were surprised to find that what is a social 
technology actually has anti-social consequences’, said that 
study’s author.317
If such psychic disruptions were evidently recognizable in 2000, pro-
duced through the indirect means of targeting the limbic layer, how 
much further has this tendency progressed in the two decades since, 
with the introduction of those mobile computers that are smartphones 
and ‘social networks’ operating through supercomputing and mak-
ing use of vast amounts of user data to run highly powerful algo-
rithms dedicated to systemically interfering with every relationship 
to ‘special, irreplaceable others’? The consequence, as Musk knows 
full well, has been the id writ large – writ from the computer onto 
our limbic matter, even if still not quite directly, and debilitating the 
secondary layer. Why, then, would Musk not be concerned about the 
attention-destroying and hyper-synchronizing processes that could 
eventuate if ever direct communication between the tertiary layer and 
the primary and secondary layers should be achieved?
The cinesphere as electronic monster
The possibility of such an eventuality was to some extent anticipated 
in a little-known novel written in 1956, the year after I Live in Fear 
was released: the book, written by David McIlwain under the pseud-
onym Charles Eric Maine, is called Escapement (a horological term 
referring to a device that transfers energy to the timekeeping element 
in order to render time countable), published in the United States as 
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The Man Who Couldn’t Sleep (the mediocre film version from 1958 
is called The Electronic Monster).318 It postulates precisely the kind 
of brain-machine-interface that Musk envisions for Neuralink: in the 
novel, the builders of this fantastical device conjoin millions of users 
to just the kind of headsets (or ‘magic wizard hats’, as Tim Urban calls 
them) that Musk envisions, and provide them an endless procession of 
artificial dreams, or automated tertiary protentions, distributed across 
a vast global network, which they consume in an artificially-induced 
somnolescent state.
In the novel, this corporation, Cinesphere, bears little resem-
blance to what Musk intends for Neuralink, but it is motivated by a 
kind of maniacal ‘philosophy’ built around the concept of ‘unlife’.319 
According to the four-page treatise that forms the centrepiece of the 
book, written by the philosopher-queen who is the corporation’s head, 
there are such things as ‘absolute concepts’, meaning elements of 
thought that are fundamental and indivisible. Among these absolute 
concepts, we are told, would be ‘life’, but the opposite of this concept 
is not ‘death’ but ‘unlife’, which is itself absolute: if life is ‘the instinc-
tive drive to survival’, the author of the treatise contends, then unlife 
must be ‘the instinctive drive to non-survival’, a kind of amalgam of 
the death drive and escapism: consumption of and by unreality, and 
in that a form of entropy peculiar to the kinds of beings we ourselves 
are. ‘Escapement’ techniques operate via an ‘entertainment medium’, 
but ‘complete absorption’ would require the ‘escape medium’ to be 
‘injected directly into the brain’, through which its ‘reality-tone’ 
might not just be indistinguishable from ‘real life’ but potentially 
exceed it (in an industrial process of the absolute becoming-temporal-
object of everything).
In any case, reality is nothing but this co-production between brain 
and medium, and it is for this reason that the opposite of life is not 
death, but unlife. Given the choice, audiences may prefer to dwell 
within this unconscious unlife escape mechanism for years or genera-
tions or lifetimes:
Might it not be the destiny of man, in the twilight of evo-
lution, to apply his immense technical knowledge to the 
creation of synthetic life? To determine once and for all the 
pattern of his experience in the strange illusory world of 
the mind.320
It is to the conquest of the mastery of this ‘direct’ medium, and to 
making it available to all, that the Cinesphere corporation is devoted, 
just as is the case in ‘real life’ for Neuralink. And here, we should not 
forget that Musk, too, subscribes to the ‘information is everything’ 
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notion that opens up the possibility of Nick Bostrom’s argument321 
according to which it may be not just possible, but inevitable, that our 
whole reality will prove to in fact have always been just a simulation 
run by beings operating with some vast superintelligent AI, cyber-
netic organisms who wish to create a cosmos less ‘boring’ than ‘real-
ity’, whatever and wherever that may be – precisely what is foretold 
in terms of synthetic life in the treatise on unlife, but at the scale of 
the universe as a whole. For its success in this pursuit, Cinesphere is 
accused of producing an ‘escapement mechanism that is allowing the 
mainspring of humanity to run down’,322 to the point that it threatens 
to ‘undermine every […] governmental structure’.323
The limbic de-regulation (the drives unbound) that we are presently 
pursuing is itself a ‘crazy game’ that we are playing right now, not just 
with the gaseous composition of our geophysical atmosphere but with 
the noetic composition of our civilizational atmosphere. This experi-
ment in human history is equally big and equally dumb, because it 
systemically produces dumbness, and it does so both bigly and big 
league. And, in so doing, it systemically prevents us from finding the 
thought, the care and the will to invent solutions to large-scale sys-
temic problems. We are becoming dumb and numb, or else wild and 
desperate. This systematic production of stupidity and madness ought 
to matter to everyone, but in particular to ecological political parties 
constantly faced with ‘democratic’ parliaments and constituencies 
lacking the will to pursue effective environmental policies, and an 
increasingly deficient understanding of or trust in science.324 But it 
is this ‘ecological issue’, concerning the ecology of the production of 
stupidity and madness, that they mostly continue to deny, even as they 
descry the ‘denialists’. As do we all.
Energy return on investment and the competition  
of self-propagating supersystems
An invited background paper entitled ‘Governance of Economic 
Transition’, published prior to the 2019 United Nations Global 
Sustainable Development Report, points to changes in energy return 
on investment (EROI) – that is, the increasing amount of energy that 
must be invested in order for a unit of exploitable energy to be pro-
duced or liberated – as a key factor shaping the geopolitical future. 
‘For the first time in human history’, they argue, economies are 
‘shifting to energy sources that are less energy efficient’,325 that is, 
for the first time in human history, instead of it tending to become 
easier and cheaper to obtain energy, it is becoming more difficult and 
more costly.326 Or in other words, and as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen 
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pointed out long ago with respect to our efforts to undo our vast pro-
duction of waste and toxicity, we will eventually be forced to con-
front, in a manner akin to Freud’s protists, the ‘numberless genera-
tions of Maxwell’s demons needed for the completion of the project’.327 
According to the Finnish authors, this will in all likelihood give rise 
to geopolitical conflicts, and necessitate a shift away from a macro-
economic model based on endless growth and towards a model where 
‘economic activity will gain meaning […] by rebuilding infrastructure 
and practices toward a post-fossil fuel world with a radically smaller 
burden on natural ecosystems’.328
These biophysical economists are undoubtedly right to draw atten-
tion, like Georgescu-Roegen, to the fact that in an earlier world of 
cheap and abundant energy, economists could get away with ignoring 
the significance of the second law of thermodynamics for economic 
science in general, and macroeconomics in particular. They ought no 
longer be able to so deceive themselves. Yet after drawing this conclu-
sion about the need to redefine ‘meaningful’ economic activity, they 
then immediately add, ‘in rich countries, citizens would have less 
purchasing power than now’:329 while this may be undeniable, we can 
only wonder to what degree the authors have considered all the rele-
vant and interrelated systemic questions and implications of this need 
to reduce consumption, and whether a touch of parrhesiatic madness 
needed to be added for them to have done so right through to the end.
For these biophysical economists, the last few decades point to the 
conclusion that market mechanisms, and even international agree-
ments, have shown themselves to be thoroughly inadequate ways of 
reducing emissions and, more generally, of governing this transition. 
There is no doubt that this is the lesson of recent history thus far, and 
it is for these kinds of historical reasons that Theodore Kaczynski 
has long ceased to believe that it is possible to hope to govern today’s 
globalized ‘self-propagating supersystems’ (Kaczynski’s name for 
planetary-scale complex exorganisms).330 For this contemporary mad-
man, it has become clear that the adoption of long-term strategies by 
one such supersystem will only lead, because of competitive disad-
vantage, to its short-term decline with respect to the others. For this 
reason, he contends from his maximum-security cell, the global tech-
nosphere as a whole will prove, through the pressures of this competi-
tive struggle, to be inevitably bound to abandon such considerations 
– incapable of begetting thoughts divorced from the immediate battle 
with the pressure of circumstances, even at the cost of the destruction 
of its own future prospects.
Less apocalyptically than the Unabomber, the Finnish biophysi-
cists conclude that in all likelihood ‘a group of progressive states’ will 
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have to ‘take the lead’.331 But even if this is ‘factually’ correct, can we 
not ultimately see in this pronouncement another species of denial: 
while they acknowledge that ‘dramatic reductions in emissions at cur-
rent high levels of consumption are very challenging’, are the authors 
capable of confronting the degree to which the current global eco-
nomic model is fundamentally tied to increasing consumption and 
sustained purchasing power, that is, to avoiding under-consumption? 
In short, if dramatic reductions in emissions are ecologically neces-
sary, nevertheless the dramatic reductions in consumption required 
for emission-reduction themselves entail genuine economic and polit-
ical risk. Hence if we are to avoid economic collapse and the misery 
and poverty that accompany it, the economic transition called for by 
the authors must be governed in a way that takes account of entropic 
considerations beyond these thermodynamic and biophysical ques-
tions. What the world lacks more than anything is a persuasive vision 
not just of economic transition, but of the transition to a profoundly 
new economic model.
Walls, borders, membranes
Niccolò Machiavelli dwelt in a world where the value of values sup-
plying the archi-criterion by which simple and complex exorganisms 
(exorganisms at different orders of magnitude) are to be arranged was 
collapsing. For his prince, therefore, a crucial question followed from 
this collapse of economic meaning: whether or not to build a fortress 
– a question that, according to Machiavelli, proves to be a matter of 
knowing whether doing so is more likely to be useful or harmful. His 
conclusion is that it may be necessary under certain conditions, but 
that if the walls of such a fortress prevent the prince from understand-
ing and influencing (communicating and controlling, as the science 
of cybernetics describes it) what his subjects are saying and thinking, 
then it may expose him to serious risk, or to what in a more recent 
terminology could be called ‘existential risk’, whereas the ‘best for-
tress’, the best protection for a prince, is simply ‘not to be hated by the 
people’.332 There are many ways of understanding this ‘ethical’ debate 
about the condition of possibility, the conditional possibility, or con-
dition of impossibility of ‘autonomy’, but this question of fortresses 
and hatreds and peoples is ultimately a question of the informa-
tional porosity or otherwise of the walls, borders and membranes of 
all kinds that form the edges of localized systems at different orders 
of magnitude.
In Machiavelli’s day, these walls and fortresses were ‘physical’ in 
the sense of being geographical, because value lay in the possession 
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of the land whose division Carl Schmitt still (that is, even further 
along into the collapse of the notion of the ‘highest’ value, described 
by Nietzsche as the ‘death of god’) thought was the only genuine basis 
of nomos. In the nineteenth century, it was the knowledge of machines 
and how to use them and how to program them – knowledge extracted 
from those not-yet-proletarianized workers who were the craftsmen 
and artisans in possession of such knowledge thanks to intergenera-
tional transmission – that became the information to be kept behind 
the legal walls of patent protection.
Today, all these earlier walls remain, and more than ever they 
remain political issues, possessing us, but they now exist in a world 
of rapidly shifting energy return on investment, and a world where 
completely new kinds of walls and borders are being erected. For 
Machiavelli’s prince, the best solution is to both have and not have 
walls, that is, to have walls that are porous but guarded, controlled: 
it is a question of the ‘interface’ between localized systems at differ-
ent orders of magnitude. It is a question, in other words, of both: (1) 
the psychic systems of the simple exorganisms that in the past were 
the citizen, or the subject, or the faithful, but that today are largely 
reduced to being consumers; and (2) the higher-order complex exor-
ganisms that are not just cities, states, universities, art galleries and 
companies, but the planetary-scale exorganisms that are Alphabet, 
Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Tencent, Alibaba and so on.
For these vast electronic monsters, network behemoths forming a 
digital leviathan that is a technosphere incorporating both exosphere 
and cinesphere, what passes and does not pass through the new walls 
of their planetarily-localized cybernetic systems is, first and foremost, 
data, in a way that is ultra-porous and yet ultra-protected, collected 
and treated in the name of a growth model based on continuously 
increasing consumption, for which this data serves the primary pur-
pose of enabling systematic and performative targeting of the limbic 
systems of simple exorganisms qua smartphone-equipped consumers, 
and to control the limbic resonance processes of those same exorgan-
isms qua social network users.
The biophysical economists may be right to point out that twentieth-
century economics largely ignored the second law of thermodynamics 
and the vast ‘sink costs’ (or negative externalities) that arise for the 
ecosystems that support these economies, but there is another question 
of EROI, the question of the computational effort spent on harvest-
ing data so that it may be invested in exploiting the libidinal energy 
of these consumers – that is, on constructing a global digital tertiary 
layer designed to bypass the neocortical layer and directly target the 
limbic layer – and of the sink costs of this libidinal investment (but in 
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the economic sense of investment: investing in the libido) that leaves 
all our psychic apparatuses deregulated and in want of ‘limbic revi-
sion’. In this situation, we find it impossible to prevent the membranes 
of our exorganism from being polluted by the toxicity we ourselves 
generate (just like the protists confined within the closed system of 
the petri dish described by Freud), and this immunitary failure strikes 
us at the level of the simple exorganism and its three psychic layers, 
and at the level of the collective exorganisms that consequently find 
themselves incapable of cohering.
Privatized Keynesianism and the aporia of sustainability  
in consumerist capitalism
Keynesianism is a brand of historically-informed macroeconomics 
based on the idea that the boom-and-bust ‘cycles’ of the capitalist 
system are best ameliorated by mechanisms designed to keep such 
fluctuations within tolerable limits. The main instances of such mech-
anisms are: increasing state investment in down times (and, more 
politically difficult, reducing it in boom times), and maintaining con-
sumer demand via the purchasing power derived from employment 
and a functioning welfare state. This was supposed to be capital’s 
‘compromise’ to ensure its own long-term solvency in the age of mass 
production: the ultimate goal of these Keynesian mechanisms is to 
minimize the likelihood of systemic crises reaching threshold levels 
by maintaining positive socio-economic conditions for the stable rise 
of mass consumption. The virtue and the necessity of such a compro-
mise became belatedly apparent to capitalists themselves after their 
disastrous flirtation in the 1930s with the possibility of divorcing 
from representative democracy and embracing Nazism and fascism.
In the 1970s, however, Keynesianism itself encountered insuper-
able crises: the difficulty of reducing stimulus in boom times, espe-
cially in countries without a corporatist model (one enlisting busi-
ness and trade unions in the compromises required for the struggle 
for economic ‘stability’), led to irresistible inflationary pressures. 
Keynesianism thus proved to be an ineffective immune system for 
the global capitalist economy. ‘Fortunately’, another model, based on 
the rejection of the Keynesian compromise and the unfettering of the 
market, had been waiting quietly in the wings.
What followed the crisis of Keynesian economics was, broadly 
speaking, neoliberalism, which is usually understood, rightly enough, 
as a kind of market fundamentalism that wants as far as possible to 
remove these protective elements that are ‘governmental structures’ 
and social systems. Colin Crouch has argued, however, that the real if 
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perhaps accidental function of neoliberal economics has not been well 
understood, for it also constituted a genuine response to the threats 
to the Keynesian growth model. Crouch contends that neoliberalism 
can be understood as a kind of ‘privatized Keynesianism’ founded on 
a vast extension of credit made possible by the deregulation of finan-
cial institutions, the marketing of debt and the subordination of the 
production economy to the financial economy: the real function of 
neoliberalism is to keep the economic system more stably maintained, 
even in times of economic stagnation, and to do so via credit-fuelled 
consumption.333 This vast extension of credit becomes the fuel added 
to this open system in order to try, desperately, to support ‘stable 
growth’. Of course, the inadequacy and short-termism of this kind 
of privatized Keynesianism as a means of stabilization have become 
obvious to all, especially since 2008 – now already ten years ago, but 
also only ten years ago – but its accidental ‘necessity’ at the time lay 
in the real fear of economic collapse and resulting poverty if this con-
sumption-engine was not prevented from stalling by the failure of its 
Keynesian-consumerist engines.
Not unrelated arguments can be found in the Trade and 
Development Report 2018, published by the secretariat of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, a profoundly criti-
cal and thoroughly reasoned macroeconomic document. After growth 
halved between 1973 and 1986,334 there began a new period of hyper-
globalization, stimulated by both supply side and demand side fac-
tors. Three months to the day after the global television broadcast 
of the events of 9/11 starkly revealed the contours, significance and 
geopolitical performativity made possible by the cinesphere,335 there 
occurred another fundamental macroeconomic event: the accession 
of China to the World Trade Organization on 11 December 2001, 
‘which lowered the cost of labour by enlarging the globally available 
reserve army of workers’, enabling Chinese exports to increase ‘from 
less than 2 per cent of world trade in the mide-1980s to more than 13 
per cent in 2016’.336 And in terms of demand, the report concurs with 
Crouch that neoliberalism can ultimately be understood as a transfor-
mation of Keynesian mechanisms:
On the demand side, the end of full employment and the 
growing deregulation of financial markets encouraged a 
shift from wage-driven to debt-driven aggregate demand in 
large advanced economies.337
What comes after the inevitable collapse of privatized 
Keynesianism? Crouch, a good social democrat, and one perspica-
cious enough to see before most others the rise of post-democracy, 
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doesn’t really have a good sense of how to ‘transition’ a global mac-
roeconomic system in which neoliberalism, even in its ‘strange non-
death’, can no longer contain the propensity for (and in fact systemi-
cally produces) bubbles and collapses. The Trade and Development 
Report 2018, too, points to the strong existing incentives for large 
corporations to seek to ‘boost profitability through means other than 
raising productivity’, despite the long-term implications of doing so:
such strategies only make the broader economic system 
more fragile and vulnerable, since together they lead to more 
inequality, underconsumption, debt and, consequently, mac-
roeconomic vulnerability.338
For the secretariat of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 
the privatized Keynesianism of hyper-globalization is thus funda-
mentally exposed to macroeconomic risk by ongoing under-consump-
tion. But it is impossible not to notice that the report’s prescription of 
a revival of the focus on employment339 is matched by a downplaying 
of the impact of automation,340 an inability to distinguish employment 
from work, a belief that automation can increase both employment and 
income,341 and an almost complete silence on the relationship between 
consumerist hyper-consumption and ecological sustainability (the last 
of these making this critical report on sustainability almost the mir-
ror image of the equally critical ‘Governance in Economic Transition’ 
report, which is almost completely silent on the macroeconomic risks 
of under-consumption).
It is because of this fundamental contradiction with respect to con-
sumerism that it is necessary to refer to an aporia of sustainability. 
And this aporia, of course, and today’s potential for crisis, does not 
end there: what comes after privatized Keynesianism in a global eco-
nomic system where automation may indeed be a significant threat 
to employment, with large-scale consequences both for jobs and pur-
chasing power, where the EROI is becoming an increasingly expen-
sive calculation, where the ecosystems and geosystems (and not just 
climate systems) that support all economic existence are themselves 
being anthropogenically forced to their limits, and where the libidi-
nal economies of the simple exorganisms that we are and hope to be 
are mined and exploited by social networks in a way that produces 
an id writ large incapable of producing limbic resonance yet prone to 
mimetic contagion (Peter Thiel was perhaps the first to understand 
this and so to speculate on it, philosophically and economically, via 
René Girard, who is in a way Facebook’s very own philosopher of 
unlife342), all of this together producing a vast propensity for entropic 
implosion and explosion?
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Macroeconomic and civilizational extinction risk
How much significance should be attributed to this aporia of sustain-
ability? If, as the subtitle of this chapter suggests through a quotation 
taken from McIlwain, we are witnessing the running-down of human-
ity’s mainspring, then are we entitled to view this as a question of 
what Nick Bostrom – the probability-calculating shamanic philoso-
pher from whom Musk acquired the notion that our entire existence 
may in fact be a ‘simulation’ – used to call ‘existential risk’, but now 
prefers to call ‘extinction risk’? For Bostrom and Musk, immedi-
ate sources of existential risk can be found in catastrophic climate 
change and the possibility that superintelligent AI could effectively 
take all possibility of decision-making out of the hands of the human 
species. Does what we are arguing here make any difference to this 
kind of risk assessment?
In this regard, we can construct an analogy between the biological 
and the technical (that is, human) worlds. In the case of the destruc-
tion of ecological systems, there is a subspecies of ecological denial 
that consists in admitting the fact of anthropogenically-forced climate 
change but ignoring or minimizing other forms of ecological disrup-
tion such as habitat destruction and loss of biodiversity. It is only on 
the condition of practising this species of denial that it is possible 
to believe in the possibility of ‘saving’ human civilization through 
some vast geoengineering program: the latter essentially consists 
in the hope that it is possible to maintain terrestrial habitability for 
human beings while simultaneously allowing the anthropization of 
the planet to reach such a point of saturation that non-agricultural 
(non-anthropized) life would inevitably succumb to a mass extinction 
event. But in fact, it is highly likely that allowing the mainspring of 
biological evolution to run down will have profound consequences 
that in turn massively increase the existential risks to which humanity 
itself is exposed, because the complexity of the functional integra-
tion of the global ecosystem exceeds our ability to predict the conse-
quences arising from its destruction. It is on this denial that the hubris 
of geoengineering solutionism is founded.
Analogously, the real questions of AI turn on another subspecies 
of denial with respect to, not biodiversity, but what Gerald Moore 
calls noodiversity.343 All of the forms of knowledge that have arisen 
and declined, or that have been lost or transformed, are the ongoing 
product of a similar kind of noological (and artificial) evolution, pro-
ducing forms of functional integration operating within and between 
the complex exorganisms that are tribes, ethnicities, cities, countries, 
religions, civilizations and so on. But we already live in a world where 
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there exists exceedingly powerful computation dedicated to gather-
ing so-called ‘big data’ (that is, data that is too big to be treated by 
anyone other than a few planetary-scale exorganisms such as Google, 
Amazon, Facebook and so on, and China344) and using it to influence 
and control behaviour. Influence and control of this kind are firstly 
assigned to the commercial imperatives associated with the consum-
erist economy, but they are also utilized for the purposes of political 
influence and control, as shown by the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
associated with the election of Donald Trump, which is symptomatic 
both of the power of big-data control and the potential it contains to 
lead to wild uncontrollability: the vast performativity that continues 
to unfold in this direction amounts to what can be described as both a 
telecracy and a datacracy.
The problem is that the performativity this involves (which is the 
entire aim of this algorithmic governmentality) depends on the cal-
culability of the data acquired, that is, on the reduction of noodiverse 
knowledge to information that is susceptible to computational and 
probabilistic processing. And the circuit that runs from gathering 
this data to performatively feeding the computational results of its 
treatment back to the users and consumers who are its source (where 
this performativity ultimately stems from the enormous speed of this 
process compared to that of human neural circuits) has the effect of 
destroying these forms of knowledge, thereby systematically and 
systemically eliminating noodiversity even as increasingly orderly 
‘patterns’ and correlations can potentially be discerned, maintained 
and exploited. As we are about to see in the next section, this is the 
distinction to which Robert Smithson drew attention in pointing out 
that processes of crystallization, while seemingly increasing ‘order’, 
are nevertheless entropic: this orderliness is anything but functional 
organization.
In short, this destruction of knowledge raises the possibility that 
extinction risk is to be found not just in the production of artificial 
intelligence, or superintelligence, but equally if not more so in the 
production of artificial stupidity on a vast scale that we might be 
tempted to call superstupidity. Inextricably entwined with this process 
is the influencing and control of affect (in order to control behaviour) 
through what Moore calls ‘dopamining’, necessitated by a consump-
tion system that is fundamentally dependent on dependence, that is, on 
logics of addiction. Despite these forms of limbically-targeted control, 
the misery generated by the latter tends to lead to desperation, that 
is, to a generalized unsanity (to borrow a term from a recent movie 
by Steven Soderbergh) that ultimately increases the unpredictability 
and uncontrollability of the behaviour supposedly being ‘controlled’. 
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This in turn is capable of being exploited by parties and movements 
founded on resentment, regression and the designation of scapegoats.
Actuaries of the future of humanity such as Bostrom seem oblivi-
ous to the aporia of sustainability and the intensification of the vicious 
circle to which it gives rise via the systemic and systematic artificial 
stimulation of unintelligence, de-emotion and unsanity. At the theo-
retical level, this is ultimately because they, like Musk, for all their 
dedicated futurism, are operating with a notion of the collective as 
the mechanistic sum of atomized logical individuals, that is, with a 
decidedly eighteenth-century social ‘physics’, subject to the first but 
not the second law of thermodynamics. Countering this theoretical 
deficiency requires not just the economics of endosomatic entropy 
and negentropy delineated by Georgescu-Roegen (and visible again 
in the ecological economics of the Finnish biophysical economists), 
but also an account of the entropic and anti-entropic tendencies of the 
noesis and noodiversity made possible by what Alfred Lotka called 
exosomatic processes. At the political and organizational level, such 
a theoretical deficiency is ultimately because the institutes concerned 
with these extinction risks are not ‘authorized’ to elaborate new mac-
roeconomic models or new data architectural models. At the psycho-
logical level, it may well be that they, too, like Musk, like all of us, are 
afflicted with melancholic moods and a propensity for denial.
But if we assume that those who have their hands on the power-
ful hardware and software behind the operation of this production are 
not themselves so completely dumbed down and numbed down and 
blinded by their blind profit-making as to be incapable of seeing that 
their actions are now giving rise to this production of artificial stupid-
ity and unsanity, then we must conclude that they believe that their 
systems are (or soon will be) so powerful as to enable even these prob-
lems to be ‘solved’ (in terms of their own immediate interests) through 
a kind of algorithmic geoengineering. In other words, the crystal pal-
aces and fortresses these new princes (such as Peter Thiel) are build-
ing, whose walls will undoubtedly be inordinately thick, will, so they 
hope, be protected by an algorithmic, performative, telecratic and 
datacratic governance powerful enough to counter any existential risk 
to which they themselves would otherwise be exposed, including via 
the mass deployment of ‘escapement mechanisms’ in an automated 
post-work and post-labour world.
An ‘optimist’ among their number might say that, thus far, this 
strategy, which too is a kind of anti-social sculpture, has ‘worked’ in 
the sense that a global systemic collapse has yet to eventuate. But this 
vicious circle – where a vast project of data collection has the effect 
of destroying knowledge and producing stupidity on a planetary scale 
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– inevitably leads to recursive consequences that will rebound upon 
the macroeconomic, financial and technical systems on which this 
strategy ultimately depends: all these global crystal palaces will find 
themselves increasingly fragile and vulnerable, however superintel-
ligent they may have in the meantime become. This algorithmic pro-
duction of artificial stupidity and unsanity, combined with the aporia 
of sustainability for which the risks of hyper-consumption and under-
consumption present a seemingly unsolvable macroeconomic and 
ecological conundrum, amounts to an entropic vortex: evidence that it 
introduces whole new levels and kinds of macroeconomic and civili-
zational extinction risk, rebounding upon the ability to address other 
kinds of extinction risk, is abundant.
Spirals, crystals, desolation
Robert Smithson’s monument to entropy, Spiral Jetty, is no longer 
submerged beneath the waters of the Great Salt Lake that had long 
been subjecting it to the entropic forces of fluvial geomorphology: 
thanks to an extended drought in Utah, it has returned to visibility, 
sparking attempts to preserve this work of art from 1970, but where 
these counter-entropic efforts would seem to go against the wishes 
of the artist himself. Smithson’s accidental death in a plane crash in 
1973 was itself a great entropic loss for the attempt to think entropy 
in cosmological terms beyond the confines of the fields from which 
it emerges. In an interview conducted two months before his death, 
for example, Smithson, a reader of Georgescu-Roegen (he points out 
that for Georgescu-Roegen, Sadi Carnot could be called an econo-
metrician), showed clearly that, long before the United Nations 
Global Sustainable Development Report, or the United Nations Trade 
and Development Report, he understood that economics, including 
Keynesianism (and now, privatized Keynesianism), is based on a fun-
damental evasion of the second law of thermodynamics:
Economics seems to be isolated and self-contained and con-
ceived of as cycles, so as to exclude the whole entropic pro-
cess. […] So that a kind of blindness ensues. I guess it’s what 
we call blind profit making. And then suddenly they find 
themselves within a range of desolation and wonder how 
they got there. So it’s a rather static way of looking at things. 
I don’t think things go in cycles. I think things just change 
from one situation to the next, there’s really no return.345
But beyond economics, Smithson also understood the general 
challenge of integrating and exceeding the question of entropy as it 
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appears distributed across various disciplines. In a text from 1966, 
after noting the ‘attempt to formulate an analog between “communi-
cation theory” and the ideas of physics’ on this question, he imme-
diately refers, not to Schrödinger or Wiener but to A. J. Ayer, who 
‘pointed out, not only do we communicate what is true, but also what 
is false’, where ‘often the false has a greater “reality” than the true’. 
Smithson concludes:
Therefore, it seems that all information, and that includes 
anything that is visible, has its entropic side. Falseness, as an 
ultimate, is inextricably a part of entropy, and this falseness 
is devoid of moral implications.346
Here Smithson sees that the question of integrating and extending the 
question of entropy beyond the confines of physics and information 
exceeds the objectivity of science itself, leading to the necessity of a 
consideration of the true ‘falseness’ of what is almost a kind of unlife 
beyond the pleasure principle:
There’s a certain kind of pleasure principle that comes out 
of a preoccupation with waste. Like if we want a bigger and 
better car we are going to have bigger and better waste pro-
ductions. So there’s a kind of equation there between the 
enjoyment of life and waste. Probably the opposite of waste 
is luxury.347
We tend to associate entropy with the rather fuzzy concept of ‘disor-
der’, but Smithson, himself no fool, quotes the Nobel-prize winning 
physicist Percy Bridgman to show this may mislead us in our every-
day judgments about what counts as entropic:
But I think nevertheless, we do not feel altogether com-
fortable at being forced to say that the crystal is the seat of 
greater disorder than the parent liquid.348
Contemporary disruption is precisely this kind of entropic crystalli-
zation, not just in terms of the crystal palaces of nineteenth-century 
industrial capitalism but the digital crystal palaces that form the exo-
spheric and cinespheric tertiary layers of twenty-first century algo-
rithmic capitalism. If the latter do not make us totally insane, we 
nevertheless find all about us the evidence that the rationalized but 
irrational unlife of this strange non-death is at the very least turning 
us unsane. Diagnosing this entropic crystallization of contemporary 
life means bringing ‘Descartes’ cosmology […] to a standstill’, re-
introducing ‘delayed action, inadequate energy, general slowness’ 
into a picture of existence capable of grasping that the instantaneity of 
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pre-formatted protentions offers only the illusion of movement.349 For 
Smithson, this requires the artist, the philosopher, or all of us, to con-
struct new kinds of conceptual ‘ready-mades’, but through a kind of 
artistic practice whose condition of possibility lies within Bergson’s 
account of the history of philosophy as clothed in ‘ready-made gar-
ments of […] ready-made concepts’. Yet at the same time, he argues, 
such ready-mades must be an-artistic in the Duchampian sense, which 
is their condition of impossibility, as monstrosities beyond the limits 
of conceptual idiomaticity, a material necessity and a necessary mate-
rialization, yet always bound to be off the mark, and thus ‘definitely 
outside of Bergson’s concept of creative evolution’.350 A kind of mad-
ness of pre-formatting is required.
The exospheric and cinespheric digital tertiary layer seems to head 
off in advance the rise of any kind of positive bifurcation, whether 
it is a matter of the disruptive innovation of the Muskatel variety, 
or the transition to a new economic governance of the Finnish vari-
ety, or Crouch’s recommendations of a renewed ‘creative tension’ 
between state, market, corporation and civil society.351 Beyond all 
these approaches and analyses, countering this vast negative disrup-
tion requires the large-scale implementation of a new macroeconomic 
model based on a new resolution of the aporia of sustainability, tak-
ing account not just of the biophysical constraints of thermodynamic 
entropy and Schrödingerian negentropy but of the bio-techno-affec-
tive constraints of informational entropy (the entropy of falseness 
that in the 1970s Smithson identifies with both movies and printed 
matter352). Moreover, it is a question of going beyond the integration 
of these two entropies, which Smithson glimpsed as the new work of 
the new a-transcendental an-artist capable of inhabiting the highly 
improbable madness of planning for anything positive today,353 and 
which Stiegler refers to in terms of the sur-real cosmology of a (theo-
retical and practical) neganthropology of what he calls ‘anthropy’ and 
‘neganthropy’.
As Musk says, the cortex is not completely independent of the lim-
bic system: the former remains functionally tied to the latter, even if 
this partially independent cortex has from the outset existed only in 
relation to a tertiary layer with which it forms a circuit, and where 
what circulates along this circuit is the libidinal energy via which the 
drives are sublimated into desires that have not just detachable but 
infinite aims. All this means that, contrary to transhumanist ideol-
ogy, reason is always ultimately a question not just of calculations 
or computations or cogitations but of reasons, and not just a ques-
tion of the speed of calculation but of the slowness of thinking. It 
involves motives and decisions that are always singular, that is, never 
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completely calculable, and always involving randomness, chance and 
accidentality, in their positivity and paradoxical improbability – it is a 
question of life, but of life lived noetically. This necessary accidental-
ity is essential to biological evolution,354 but also to the work of art:
This necessary accident reveals itself in each work of art, as 
the jumping out of a singularity that is literally improbable, 
unprovable, and that goes much further than a simple, prov-
able universality – provable as apodictic universality, which 
can in this respect be subsumed under the concept of a deter-
minate judgment. That such a singularity opens up another 
dimension, another plane, means that this dimension, this 
plane, is that which spontaneously leaps forth from any 
desire – to the extent that desire renders its objects infinite as 
the object of a singularity [that does not exist but consists].355
What does not exist but consists, the infinite that lies beyond calcula-
tion and as object of desire, is that with which we can struggle against 
the entropic tendency, but, as Smithson seems to understand, we can 
do so only through a quasi-causal twist on the falseness that we are 
bound to produce through our circuits between the primary, second-
ary and tertiary layers (whether printed matter, movies or the directly-
cortical magical wizard hats pursued by Neuralink), a twist that 
adopts and realises what is not true, what does not exist, that makes 
it real, however improbably. This is why, for Smithson, the entropic 
falseness we inevitably produce with these exosomatic instruments is 
never just entropic: in and of itself, it is ‘devoid of moral implications’.
And this is why, for Whitehead, the function of reason is the pro-
motion of the art of life, where this includes its transformation – not 
just to live, or to live well, but ‘to live better’356 (or in limbic terms: 
not just to resonate, not just to achieve healthy regulation, but per-
petually open to unexpected limbic revision). Strange as it may seem, 
all this bears fundamentally upon the question of global sustainable 
development in a situation where such sustainability depends not just 
on regulation or transition but on transformation, that is, on a bifurca-
tion through which we can live better. The aporia of sustainability, 
and the necessity of an affirmative bifurcation with respect to this 
aporia, thus undeniably lead (despite the proliferation of forms of 
denial) to an imperative to invent a new macroeconomic art of life on 
the basis of this ‘neganthropological’ question of entropy, but where 
entropy must be conceived beyond thermodynamics and information 
theory, or, at the very least, to prepare the grounds for such for those 
remaining after what seems to be an impending and perhaps inevi-
table global collapse. The sur-real function of ‘art’, today, can only be 
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to foster, beyond the pre-formatted ready-mades of platform capital-
ism, a social sculpture capable of promoting the self-discipline of this 
originative element.
5 Carbon and Silicon: Contribution to an Elemental 
Critique of Political Economy
Introduction: aporia of sustainability and the blind-spot
We are confronted in the twenty-first century with an array of seri-
ous problems but among them two immense challenges stand out: on 
the one hand, those problems presented by carbon technologies, and, 
on the other hand, those posed by silicon technologies. While it may 
seem that nothing can trump the planetary threat of climate change, 
in fact both of these challenges involve existential threats and dan-
gers amounting to what is sometimes called ‘extinction risk’, not least 
because these two challenges are absolutely inextricable.
What follows is an attempt to outline the stakes of this situation in 
an age that has come to be known as the Anthropocene. An idea of the 
conditions within which those stakes are unfolding can be illustrated 
by juxtaposing two recent official declarations:
1 On 8 October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) published a special report on Global 
Warming of 1.5°C: the ‘Summary for Policymakers’ argues 
for the urgent necessity of aiming to limit global tempera-
ture increases to no more than 1.5°C, stating that keeping 
climate change at or near this limit can today be achieved 
only if global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions are reduced 
by 45% (from 2010 levels) by 2030 and are reduced to zero 
by 2050, which can be achieved, according to the IPCC, 
only with rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented transitions 
in energy, land, urban, infrastructure and industry systems, 
far beyond what would be possible under the current nation-
ally-stated mitigation ambitions.357
2 One month after this declaration by the IPCC, on 5 
November 2018, President Xi Jinping of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) spoke at the opening of the China 
International Import Expo in Shanghai, reportedly stating 
that ‘China is a big market of over 1.3 billion people’ and 
that he ‘would turn his country of 1.3 billion into global 
consumers’358 by increasing imports to USD$45 trillion 
over the next fifteen years, as well as continuing to pursue 
economic policies aimed at a correspondingly large increase 
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in the domestic consumption of domestically manufactured 
consumer products.
The IPCC claims with ‘high confidence’ that there are ‘a wide range 
of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate change’. 
Furthermore, the PRC shows evidence of understanding the serious-
ness of global warming and at least some commitment to pursuing 
climate policies that encourage the development of renewable energy 
resources, the transition away from fossil fuel-based transport and 
so on.359 Despite these positive signals and efforts, we nevertheless 
believe that throughout the world there is a fundamental disconnec-
tion between discourses and policies on ecology and discourses and 
politics on economics: can commitments to large decreases in global 
carbon emissions really be maintained while at the same time main-
taining commitments to large increases in global consumption and 
manufacturing? We believe that the disconnection if not irreconcil-
able contradiction between these discourses and commitments ulti-
mately reflects what could be called an aporia of sustainability.
In other words, contemporary geopolitics seems marked by the 
virtual impossibility of finding a viable macroeconomic pathway out 
of the contradiction between economic imperatives founded on the 
existing ‘perpetual growth’ global macroeconomic model and eco-
logical imperatives founded on the discoveries by climate science 
about the effects of anthropogenic atmospheric emissions. More than 
that, we contend that the difficulties involved in the attempt to resolve 
this aporia are greatly exacerbated by technological processes of other 
kinds, processes presently giving rise to what Bernard Stiegler has 
recently termed an ‘immense regression’.360
With respect to the last of these questions, we believe that there is 
a widespread intellectual and political blind-spot about the economic, 
political, psychological and sociological significance of the vast tech-
nological transformation that has unfurled across the past quarter 
of a century. More specifically, it is today crucial to understand the 
complex and fundamental ways in which the economic and ecologi-
cal poles of this aporia of sustainability relate to and are compounded 
by the transformation of computation, information, network technolo-
gies, and the algorithmic technologies that link them all together.361
The elimination of this blind-spot should therefore be an urgent 
priority, and the combination of the aporia of sustainability and the 
unfolding of a process of immense regression incontestably amounts 
to a global crisis. If so, then this, like any crisis, calls for a critique, on 
the basis of which alone it is possible to make good decisions. In that 
light, what follows can be considered as a preliminary contribution to 
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what we propose calling an ‘elemental critique’, that is, a new critique 
of political economy founded on the respective technologies of carbon 
and silicon.362
On the notion of an ‘elemental’ critique
Before attempting to identify the content of any such critique, some 
words concerning the term ‘elemental’ may be advisable.
1 The focus on ‘carbon’ and ‘silicon’ indicates that this is 
indeed a matter of the crucial place of the sixth and four-
teenth atomic elements of the periodic table in the tech-
nological transformations of the nineteenth, twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, the span of time covered by the so-
called Anthropocene era. To this extent, the ‘elemental’ 
character of the critique we are proposing means that it does 
not forget the fundamentally ‘material’ character of these 
transformations, even if this is always and everywhere a 
question of what these materials can be organized to do and 
what they can organize us to do, in terms of both support-
ing and undermining the possibility of individual and collec-
tive autonomy.
We could also relate this notion to Whitehead’s account 
of mathematics as a ‘primordial element’ in the history of 
thought that, combined with today’s physical understand-
ing, suggests the possibility of ‘some new doctrine of 
organism which may take the place of […] scientific materi-
alism’.363 For us, however, this element is not just scientific 
but technical, and the ‘organism’ under the microscope is 
not just organic but, in Stiegler’s terms, ‘organological’.364 
In the case of silicon technologies, digital and computa-
tional technologies have also made it possible to analyse, 
isolate and manipulate the chemical elements of the peri-
odic table, as well as the genetic elements of which DNA 
is composed, giving rise to new and powerful technologies 
combining and recombining these elemental materials in 
ways that can be both beneficial and monstrous.
2 More importantly, however, by ‘elemental’ is meant the 
Aristotelian notion that, for sensible beings, each of the 
senses has its own ‘element’. The distant echo of this can 
be heard, for instance, in the quotidian English expression 
according to which those who find themselves in circum-
stances to which they are very well-suited can be defined as 
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being ‘in their element’ (a professional swimmer in a swim-
ming pool, for instance, or a river365).
For Aristotle, the element is what suffuses the milieu of 
a sensible being, through which perception operates (in the 
case of vision, for example, it operates not through light 
but, more primordially still, through ‘the transparent’366). 
This element itself, however, is very difficult for the sen-
sible being to perceive: as Stiegler has often mentioned, 
Aristotle offers the example of the fish, which, according to 
Aristotle, ‘would not notice that the things which touch one 
another in water have wet surfaces’.367
The element of the fish, water, is so intimate to its exis-
tence as to escape perceptibility (with the possible excep-
tion of the flying fish, who may have an intermittent experi-
ence of this element, in briefly leaving it). One of the most 
recent formulations of this idea by Stiegler is the following:
A change of technical system always initially entails a disad-
justment between this technical system and what Bertrand Gille 
called the social systems, which had hitherto been ‘adjusted’ to 
the preceding technical system, and which had therein formed, 
along with it, an ‘epoch’ – but where the technical system as such 
fades into the background, forgotten as it disappears into every-
dayness, just as, for a fish, what disappears from view, as its ‘ele-
ment’, is water.368
In the case of the elemental critique being proposed here, 
this does not mean that we have no awareness of the suf-
fusion of carbon and silicon technologies in our surround-
ings: the thick anthropotechnical film of automobiles, elec-
trically-powered devices, smartphones and internet devices 
that covers the earth and surrounds our existence is trans-
parently obvious to everyone. Rather, what is meant by the 
quasi-imperceptibility of the element is that there is some-
thing about our entanglement with these technologies, and 
in particular with silicon technologies, that we find very 
difficult either to pinpoint or to grasp.
This is so precisely because of this suffusion and because 
there is no positive prospect of any disentanglement (other 
than through a shift towards some post-silicon technolo-
gies, which are likely in any case to bear many of the same 
characteristics as silicon technologies in terms of being 
digital, networked, algorithmic and so on). Contemporary 
technologies, and especially silicon technologies, are so 
difficult to perceive because, although they consist in 
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nothing but external devices (or the possibility of internal 
devices such as those of neurotechnology), they are never-
theless always and constantly occupying us and within us, 
almost haunting us. Technics is the spectral element that 
constitutes ‘the transparent’ for noetic beings: our attention 
perpetually operates through such technologies but is only 
intermittently attentive to such technologies.
3 ‘Elemental’ has a third sense, indicated for instance in 
Sigmund Freud’s description of the fate of microscopic 
organisms in a petri dish:
An infusorian, therefore, if it is left to itself, dies a natu-
ral death owing to its incomplete voidance of the products 
of its own metabolism. (It may be that the same incapac-
ity is the ultimate cause of the death of all higher animals 
as well.)369
What Freud describes here amounts to the entropic conse-
quences for any kind of being occupying a closed system in 
which it lacks the means to eradicate the toxicity brought by 
its own waste products, throwing the system into uncontrol-
lable disequilibrium and ultimately leading to its collapse. 
In the case of the ‘metabolism’ with which we are dealing 
for the ‘higher animal’ that we ourselves form, a being that 
in Aristotle’s terms is not just sensible but ‘noetic’, which 
is to say a being that knows, this ‘metabolism’ is not just 
biological but fundamentally and irreducibly psychological, 
sociological and technological.
The ‘metabolic’ productions of the technical, knowing 
beings that we ourselves are also contain the possibility of 
exposing our ‘element’ to potentially fatal toxicity, when 
we lose the intergenerationally transmitted capacities of 
knowledge and care required to take care of life in any par-
ticular technical system. But when this becomes a matter of 
our ‘noetic element’, the entropic consequences entailed by 
this ‘self-poisoning’ are no longer just thermodynamic or 
biological but psychic and social. All technical systems are 
localized, but the locality of today’s technical system has 
reached the scale of the biosphere itself (producing what we 
can call the technosphere): in such circumstances, where 
there is effectively no ‘outside’, the risks of toxicity are that 
much greater.
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The division of twenty-first century technologies
Some remarks are necessary about the attempt we are pursuing here 
to distinguish carbon technologies from silicon technologies. The 
first is that this is neither an absolute distinction nor an opposition: 
in the world in which we live today, almost every internal combus-
tion engine that is manufactured for an automobile is also a computer, 
with the ICE powering the CPU and the CPU governing the rhythms 
of the pistons and so on. Even more obviously, every digital device is 
powered by electrical energy, a high proportion of which is produced 
through carbon combustion of one kind or another.
These specific examples point to a far more general characteristic: 
just as we are inextricably entangled with the technical milieu we 
have constructed across the entire biosphere, so too are the various 
kinds of technologies inextricably entangled with each other (and 
with us), thereby forming what Bertrand Gille called a technical sys-
tem. It is a ‘structural’ or synchronic system in the sense that each 
technical artefact finds its possibility only in relation to a plurality of 
others which it cannot do without.
The second thing to say is that these names, carbon and silicon, 
are to some extent an abstraction in the sense that we are creating a 
very broad categorization that is in some way just a useful fiction. In 
practice, they could be construed in a more inclusive way as refer-
ring to technologies lying outside the strict (atomic) bounds of these 
‘elemental’ characteristics. There exists a complicated relationship 
between the dominant technologies involved in the technical system 
of a particular epoch and the form of thinking that is possible in that 
epoch. Norbert Wiener, writing at the midpoint of the last century, 
argued that the ‘thought of every age is reflected in its technique’,370 
and he delineated the shifts of technical system from the eighteenth 
to the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries in a way that is congruent 
with the division we are proposing here:
If the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries are the age 
of clocks, and the later eighteenth and the nineteenth centu-
ries constitute the age of steam engines, the present time is 
the age of communication and control.371
Wiener associates the first of these epochs, that of Newton and 
Huyghens, with the age of navigation made possible by precision 
instruments, opening up a new scale of maritime commerce based 
on ‘the engineering of the mercantilists’, while from the nineteenth 
century and ‘almost to the present time’, the Newcomen engine and 
its heirs would give rise to all those large-scale industries based on 
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thermodynamics and irreversible processes, and most recently the 
communication age, based on a ‘split between the technique of strong 
currents and the technique of weak currents’, has led to a proliferation 
of electronic instruments opening onto the age of the ‘automatic com-
puting machine’.372 The range of technologies included in each of the 
very broad categorizations we are describing here is thus quite large. 
Furthermore, it is always the result of local and historical processes 
that can both begin and end, where the end is not determined in any 
teleological way by the beginning, and where there is nothing perma-
nent or eternal about this distinction.
Nevertheless, thirdly, our contention is that, in this epoch, an 
account of these particular abstractions can nevertheless be fruitful. In 
the technical system of the twenty-first century, or at least of its first 
few decades, it is indeed possible to make this distinction between two 
vast technological categories. For example, a high proportion of the 
largest global companies measured by revenue are based on carbon 
technologies,373 while a high proportion of the largest global compa-
nies measured by market capitalization are based on silicon technolo-
gies374 (these two facts also indicating something about the relation-
ship between the present and the future, as perceived by investors). 
More than that, it is necessary to make this distinction in order to 
elucidate fundamental questions of political economy that have thus 
far tended to be avoided in most theoretical or policymaking consid-
erations with respect to the consequences generated by our own meta-
bolic products.
For these reasons, we will now outline what is intended by each of 
these categorizations respectively, in relation to their genesis, func-
tion and fate.
Carbon technologies
Hominims acquired the ability to create and use fire as early as the 
Lower Palaeolithic and the controlled use of carbon combustion 
became common in the Middle Palaeolithic. From that moment, the 
beings that would become ourselves found themselves within a fiery 
element defined by the capacity for artificial, controllable energy 
production and consumption founded on the flammability of organic 
materials. From the moment cooking was invented, this capacity was 
a matter of the potential to produce and consume energy in order to do 
work, thereby opening the possibility of ‘ways of life’, or what Marx 
called a ‘mode of consumption’:
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the hunger that is satisfied by cooked meat eaten with knife 
and fork differs from hunger that devours raw meat with the 
help of hands, nails and teeth.375
Both dangerous and beneficial, controllable within the risks of being 
extinguished or turning wild, this first symbol of technics was also 
the first object of care, long before the Neolithic Revolution. In addi-
tion to warmth and cooking, the development of the controlled use of 
carbon combustion gave rise to other technologies, such as smelting, 
forging and gunpowder.376
But the modern history of carbon technologies obviously begins 
with the invention of heat engines powered by hydrocarbons derived 
from fossilized organic matter. More specifically, it begins with 
the external combustion engine, and more specifically still with 
the industrial (or thermodynamic) revolution that was set off by the 
steam engine envisaged by the University of Glasgow repairman 
James Watt, which he patented in 1781 and which was to transform 
manufacturing and rail and maritime transport throughout the nine-
teenth century.
In the twentieth century, fossil fuel power plants linked to elec-
tricity grids would further vastly transform both production and 
consumption, and automobiles equipped with internal combustion 
engines would transform road transport and make possible the rise of 
global aviation. The combustion of hydrocarbons, however, inevita-
bly releases a significant level of ‘metabolic products’: while for the 
ten thousand years prior to the industrial revolution the global atmo-
spheric CO2 concentration was 280 parts per million, in 2018 it stood 
at 410 ppm, with annual emissions and concentrations continuing to 
increase.377
Silicon technologies
Turning to the history of silicon technologies, the first integrated cir-
cuit was produced in 1958, the first CPU in 1971, the Apple II and 
Commodore PET home computers entered the market in 1977, the 
Microsoft Windows ‘operating environment’ was first released in 
1985, the World Wide Web was opened to the general public in April 
1993, Amazon was founded in July 1994, the domain name google.
com was registered in September 1997, the Tencent and Alibaba con-
glomerates were founded in 1998 and 1999 respectively, the Facebook 
social network was made universally open in September 2006 (with 
active users rising from 100 million in August 2008 to two billion 
in June 2017), the capacitive multi-touch smartphone known as the 
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iPhone was launched in June 2007 and Uber’s mobile app and trans-
port services were officially launched in July 2009.
It is notable that this timeline of significant dates increasingly 
focuses on consumer-based silicon technologies, reflecting the vast 
entrance of these transformational technologies into the consumer 
market over the past forty years. It is also notable that we have chosen 
to end it in 2009, reflecting that the last decade has seen a period of 
consolidation and monopolization of the silicon economy in the hands 
of a small number of super-giant corporate players.
Today, it has become transparently clear to everyone that silicon 
technologies have transformed every aspect of production and con-
sumption,378 along with scientific and technological research of every 
kind, and this is especially so in the quarter of a century that has 
transpired since the internet became public and global. All of this 
amounts to a vast ‘disruption’ of the technical system, along with 
every other psychosocial and institutional system.
This history is obviously familiar, and its facts are moreover avail-
able to anyone anywhere with a smartphone and internet access. 
Compared with the history of carbon technologies, however, which 
have existed in one form or another for hundreds of thousands of 
years, the silicon technologies just listed have a history lasting just 
a few decades. On what basis can this amount to some vast and fun-
damental division, or does their rapid ascent and ubiquity generate 
a kind of illusion of exaggerated significance? In fact, silicon tech-
nologies must be inscribed into a much older genealogy, even if still 
not quite as long as the history of the acquisition and use of fire. But 
this is possible only if we consider these technologies not in terms of 
their atomic or molecular composition but in terms of their elemen-
tal function.
Retentional technologies and the industrial  
capitalism of production
If the elemental function of carbon technologies fundamentally con-
sists in the production of chemical energy in order that it can then 
be transformed into mechanical or electrical energy and consumed 
as work, then the elemental function of silicon technologies funda-
mentally consists in the production of an artificial memory that, too, 
can be put to work in manifold ways. Silicon technologies are reten-
tional technologies (to borrow a term from Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy). In Stiegler’s work, this very long history of retentional tech-
nologies (and especially of what he calls hypomnesic technologies, 
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those technologies that are purposely rather than accidentally reten-
tional) has been explored in detail and with respect to a wide variety 
of dimensions.
If we here prefer to refer to silicon technologies – while keeping in 
mind the mnemotechnical history that extends through cave painting, 
the invention of writing systems (including alphabetization, which 
remains an almost unchanged standard from the Roman Empire to the 
Digital Leviathan), the printing press, the phonograph, the radio, cin-
ema, analogue television and the becoming-digital of everything that 
we now see unfolding with silicon technologies strictly speaking – if 
we refer to silicon technologies, therefore, it is only because the prolif-
eration of uses, services and functions associated with this latest stage 
of memory technology seems so greatly to exceed the mere ability to 
‘record the past’. And yet, this is precisely the basis of all of them.379
The industrial revolution whose possibility we previously ascribed 
to Watt’s steam engine could never have occurred without retentional 
technologies of a kind we have hitherto failed to mention: those tech-
nologies by which the complex and continuous gestures of workers of 
all kinds were broken down analytically into their discrete elements, 
in order to be then programmed back into machines powered by the 
heat engines of Watt and his successors: the paradigmatic case of 
such a machine is Jacquard’s loom, but a thousand examples could no 
doubt be cited.
The basis of this analytical process is what Stiegler refers to as 
‘grammatization’, the process of turning something temporal (like 
speech) into something spatial (like writing), by turning the continu-
ous into the discrete, on the basis of which it can be analysed and 
reproduced. The noetic, political and economic consequences of gram-
matization can be to support new forms of knowledge, but grammati-
zation can also lead to what Stiegler calls ‘proletarianization’ (draw-
ing on Gilbert Simondon’s reading of the Grundrisse’s ‘fragment on 
machines’). If proletarianization has in traditional Marxist discourse 
been understood to refer to the systematic separation of workers from 
the means of production, Stiegler’s use of the term draws attention to 
the way in which those means firstly consist in the knowledge pos-
sessed by workers and transmitted intergenerationally.
It is this knowledge that is literally removed from the minds of 
weavers and programmed into Jacquard’s loom and a thousand other 
machines, dispossessing the workers of their knowledge and literally 
destroying the intergenerational transmission of all manner of skills 
and crafts. In addition to the ownership of the energy-production 
capacities of the heat engine, what in fact made the rapid accelera-
tion of the industrial revolution possible was thus the ability of the 
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capitalist to dispossess the worker of the knowledge of how to make 
things, knowledge that was then turned into information and recorded 
and exploited in the retentional technologies of machines: it is here 
that the history of industrial automation and artificial intelligence 
truly begins.
Industrial capitalism based on production thus arises from the con-
centration of carbon technologies in the hands of capital, but equally 
from the capitalist acquisition of retentional technologies through 
which workers, systematically dispossessed of knowledge, become 
labourers, that is, servants of the machine. From this vast process is 
born that great division between capital and proletarianized labour 
on the basis of which Marx and Engels would construct a revolution-
ary politics.
In fact, of course, this founding moment of the industrial revolution 
was only the first step of a history that would continue through many 
chapters, including ones that Marx could never have anticipated: one 
key way in which to understand this set of chapters is as the unfolding 
of the epochs of grammatization. To pursue this history in terms of 
the distinction between carbon and silicon, it is worthwhile returning 
to the recent proclamation by the Chinese president concerning his 
country’s ambition to produce 1.3 billion ‘global consumers’.
On the vision of a nation of 1.3 billion ‘global consumers’
An issue that has been raised many times by many commentators, with 
potentially very significant global macroeconomic consequences, 
is the wage pressure in China that seems bound to result from the 
enormous rise of Chinese prosperity. This prosperity has been gen-
erated by clever and concerted development policies, and by the so-
called ‘opening up’ of China to the world, but what was primarily 
made available through this opening up was the vast army of low-cost 
labour that China was able to supply to domestic and foreign manu-
facturers of all kinds. In this way, the consumers of the industrialized 
democracies became able to purchase low-cost consumer goods, cor-
porations became able to inexpensively mass produce products and 
thus maintain profitable businesses, and China was able to attract an 
increasingly large proportion of the global manufacturing sector to 
the mainland, together driving an economic transformation not just of 
the economy and society of the PRC but of the whole global economy.
Increasingly of course, and by design, this is not a one-way street: 
exports into China are themselves increasingly profitable for foreign 
manufacturers, and likewise the enormous rise in Chinese prosperity 
opens up new opportunities for domestic producers. Hence President 
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Xi’s declaration. His quantification of import levels is of course 
highly conditional upon global and Chinese economic conditions 
that could easily and unexpectedly shift (with the vagaries of what is 
wrongly called the economic ‘cycle’). Beyond that, however, China’s 
economic rise inevitably leads to pressure for the redistribution of the 
wealth that has been generated, ultimately including to the millions 
of subsistence labourers in Chinese factories. As this wage pressure 
becomes increasingly difficult to resist, even for an economy that is 
still subject to strong centralized control, the very basis of that gen-
eration of wealth is potentially threatened.
None of this would in any way count as news for President Xi. 
But if it is not news, then what is his strategy for dealing with this 
pressure? What are the implications of his statement that he wants to 
produce a country of 1.3 billion global consumers, especially given 
that he is also asserting the PRC’s capacity for long-term planning, 
at least compared with the government of his American ‘rival’ (who 
could argue?)? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that behind such a 
pronouncement is the thought that the solution to this dilemma lies in 
a transformation of manufacturing through which a high proportion 
of these labourers will become dispensable. In other words, to build 
this market of global consumers, a very great number of these labour-
ers will, in the medium term at most, need to be replaced, not by some 
new army of cheap human labourers, but by automation and AI, that 
is, by a process of robotization.
Such a transition obviously implies other questions concerning the 
need for a new basis for redistribution to replace the disrupted wage 
labour (and welfare) model that has been the engine of the Keynesian 
model for many decades. Such questions are difficult and fundamen-
tal, amounting to the question and the challenge of what Stiegler has 
called ‘automatic society’: in a world where labour requires fewer 
and fewer human beings to operate machines, what is the future of 
work (where we are thus distinguishing work from proletarianized 
labour, and where it is only the worker and not the labourer who has 
the possibility of transforming his or her conditions through such 
work) and what is the basis of the distribution of the income without 
which these ‘consumers’ will be unable to consume?380 It is ultimately 
these questions that are implied by the declaration of an intention to 
create a market of 1.3 billion Chinese global consumers, along with 
those ecological questions implied by the aforementioned aporia of 
sustainability.
The vision that lies behind such a declaration, therefore, bears some 
resemblance to that described by Marx and Engels in The German 
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Ideology: a vision of a society that no longer forces me to constrain 
my existence to a fixed, limited role in order to subsist, and instead
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear 
cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner.381
For Herbert Marcuse in 1969, this ‘early Marxian example’ did 
indeed sound ‘embarrassingly ridiculous’, but only because the vision 
it offers in fact refers to merely ‘a stage of the development of the pro-
ductive forces which has been surpassed’.382 With ‘the development 
of the productive forces beyond their capitalist organization’, he sug-
gests, a transformation may well be accomplished in which the ‘quan-
titative reduction of necessary labor could turn into quality (freedom)’ 
and ‘the stupefying, enervating, pseudo-automatic jobs of capitalist 
progress would be abolished’. But Marcuse argues that this will also 
require a transformation of the noetic beings that we ourselves are: 
it ‘presupposes a type of man with a different sensitivity as well as 
consciousness’.383
Today, this vision might be reinterpreted as one in which the revo-
lutionary expansion of automation and artificial intelligence opens up 
prospects for the emergence of new forms of autonomy (ignoring, for 
the moment, the question of what it would mean to go ‘beyond capi-
talist organization’). In such an interpretation, it would be as if the 
technological system becomes a new kind of ‘preindividual milieu’ 
(in Simondon’s terms), simply supplying the background condi-
tions from out of which, liberated from the enervating toil of prole-
tarianized labour, new noetic beings will crystallize.384 But in 2018, 
President Xi’s concern does not seem to be with how to produce new 
forms of autonomy or noesis: by this statement at least, he wants to 
create neither new kinds of workers nor new kinds of citizens but 
‘global consumers’. The possibility of raising the latter prospect with-
out considering the former challenge, we argue, is symptomatic of a 
failure to address the real stakes of silicon technologies in the twenty-
first century.
Rising prosperity may well be bound by economic law to lead to 
rising consumption, but the manner of the correlation is dependent 
on numerous other factors. In China and Asia generally, for exam-
ple, there is a well-known tendency to save rather than spend (com-
pared with Western consumers), with overall macroeconomic effects 
on investment and consumption, not to mention the ‘global savings 
glut’ diagnosed by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2005, 
which is to say, a potentially unstable tendency in which savings 
are favoured too greatly over investment (from the standpoint of the 
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existing macroeconomic model). In short, ‘global consumers’ are arti-
ficial beings, not natural ones: con-sumers must be pro-duced – they 
must be made.
Protentional technologies and the hyper-industrial  
capitalism of consumption
The twentieth century can be understood as the age of the global cine-
sphere.385 The pharmacological (which is to say, both entropic and 
negentropic) character of this cinesphere can be discerned by con-
joining two statements that appear in the first episode of Jean-Luc 
Godard’s Histoire(s) du Cinéma: first, that cinema replaces our gaze 
with a world that conforms with our desires, and second, that for fifty 
years, in the dark, we burned imagination (that is, libidinal energy) in 
order to heat up reality.386
That consumers must be produced through cinespherical means 
was precisely the realisation that came to capitalist producers at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. For Marx, the spread of machines 
(powered by carbon technologies and programmed by retentional 
technologies of mechanical grammatization) amongst the capitalist 
class was bound to make it increasingly difficult for any one capitalist 
to maintain an edge over others, leading to his diagnosis of a tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall. Economists ever since have disparaged this 
analysis, above all on the grounds that it is not what is observed in the 
economic history that has unfolded since it was described by Marx, 
‘natural’ boom-and-bust ‘cycles’ notwithstanding. Indeed, this his-
tory does not seem to confirm Marx’s analysis. But this may be the 
result less of analytical error than of a fundamental transformation 
of capitalism resulting from this tendency: in short, what Marx could 
not imagine was the development of a capitalist imagination capable 
of solving this dilemma, even if this solution is itself only a postpone-
ment of this tendency.
The essence of this ‘solution’ was the realisation that it is possible to 
create new markets, not just by geographical expansion, but through 
the possibility of manipulating consumer desire and therefore con-
sumer behaviour. If capitalism is a perpetual economic competition 
giving rise to perpetual technoscientific innovation, this is not just a 
matter of R&D and production: it is also a matter of the socialization 
of that innovation – all those processes through which new products 
are taken up by consumers, by which they are adopted.
The shift to a hyper-industrial capitalism of consumption was in 
part a matter of the new organization of consumption that arose when 
Henry Ford realised that the wages he was paying to those employed 
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on his assembly lines could in turn be used by them to purchase the 
very products they were producing. But the large-scale investment 
required to achieve the productivity gains to be realised from mass 
production was feasible only if consumer behaviour could be more 
or less reliably predicted, which is to say, produced: for this new con-
sumer market in transport vehicles powered by internal combustion 
engines to succeed, it was necessary to invent public relations, or in 
other words, marketing.
As Stiegler has shown on many occasions, this invention was made 
possible not just by the discovery of this ‘idea’, but by the develop-
ment of new forms of grammatization, and specifically the ‘gram-
matization of the sensible’ inaugurated with audiovisual technologies 
such as radio, cinema and television. It is not technological change as 
such that Marx could not anticipate, but the significance of the new 
analytical and programming possibilities opened up by these new 
retentional technologies (Guglielmo Marconi patented his wireless 
telegraphy system in 1896, Marx having died in 1883). With these 
powerful new tools that could be used to access and influence the 
minds of potential consumers on an industrial scale, it became pos-
sible to completely transform the basis of profit-making in industrial 
capitalism, by constantly manufacturing the market for the new prod-
ucts that could then be constantly introduced and updated.
By accessing consciousness and targeting the unconscious, mar-
keting and its associated technologies and techniques have progres-
sively learned how to make consumer behaviour controllable, by 
interpolating (in the literary sense) tertiary retentions into the stream 
of consciousness. The basis on which it can do so, however, depends 
on reducing desire as much as possible to a calculable phenomenon, 
which is to say, grammatizing the relationship to the future. In other 
words, this amounts to a grammatization of protention, Husserl’s term 
for my immediate expectation, but expanded here to include every 
form of motive, reason, expectation, dream and desire.
This in turn involves a detachment of desire from everything incal-
culable, incomparable and long-term (including every form of edu-
cation and intergenerational transmission), inducing a regressive ten-
dency that aims instead only at the finite and short-term goals of the 
consumer behaviour required by the market. But this ultimately risks 
being self-destructive for the consumerist model itself, setting up a 
tendency for the libidinal economy (on which the macroeconomic ‘per-
petual growth model’ fundamentally depends) to collapse, as libidi-
nal energy is depleted: the ability to stimulate the perpetual increase 
in consumption required by the consumerist economy is thereby 
threatened. It is ultimately for this reason (along with the aporia of 
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sustainability) that consumerist capitalism can be nothing but a post-
ponement of Marx’s diagnosis with regard to the rate of profit.
Silicon technologies and the ultra-industrial  
capitalism of algorithmic platforms
The protentional grammatization technologies of the twentieth cen-
tury had only limited means of accessing the information and data 
that is necessary in order to calculate and predict the relationship 
between, firstly, grammatized content (for example, a television com-
mercial that, in Husserl’s terms, amounts to a kind of industrial tem-
poral object), secondly, protentional conditioning, and thirdly, con-
sumer behaviour: the clearest indicator was ultimately the success 
or otherwise of a marketing campaign. But with the introduction of 
silicon technologies that now dominate the twenty-first century, this 
question is fundamentally transformed, because the consumers of 
such grammatized content are ceaselessly and immediately sending 
data back to producers. On the basis of such data, producers can ever 
more finely calculate the relationship between particular content and 
particular responses from particular ‘kinds’ of users.
The extreme speeds at which these processes occur in contem-
porary algorithmic silicon systems means that it is also possible for 
these producers to adjust content in a very rapid and targeted way that 
was simply impossible in the twentieth century. This speed exceeds 
that of noetic processes themselves, and this rapid exchange and algo-
rithmic control of vast amounts of user data gives rise to a kind of 
informational and protentional shock wave, analogous at the noetic 
level to the ‘sonic boom’ produced at flight speeds above Mach 1.387
Every major consumer platform today utilizes ultra-powerful algo-
rithmic techniques of this kind in order to absolutely maximize their 
ability to performatively influence consumer behaviour. Furthermore, 
global ‘platforms’ such as Alphabet and Facebook are now among the 
largest corporations on the planet and have become so through the 
new market they have created for the vast amounts of data generated 
by their users.
If the capitalism of analogue audiovisual technologies was already 
hyper-industrial and performative (in Austin’s sense), then the new 
market of platform capitalism based on silicon technologies, user 
profiling and social networking is highly performative and can thus 
be considered an ultra-industrial capitalism of algorithmic plat-
forms.388 But this only intensifies the deleterious effects of such pro-
cesses on the libidinal economy of consumers. And this in turn is 
bound to intensify the self-destructive tendencies of the consumerist 
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macroeconomy, since it ruins the very basis of its ‘success’: the con-
trol of desire.
The anti-politics of ultra-industrial populism in the Entropocene
Behind this highly paradoxical intention to produce consumers lies 
the even more paradoxical belief that this mass of consumers can 
continuously drive the engine of the global economy like a perpetual 
motion machine, and drive it to new heights. But perpetual motion is 
a myth based on the notion of an abstract machine that is thermody-
namically impossible, and the ‘heights’ to be reached are in this case 
transparently at odds with the unambiguous imperatives declared by 
the IPCC. But in addition to that, the billions upon billions of bytes of 
data gathered from consumers by producers and platforms, fed into 
increasingly powerful and increasingly intelligent automated algo-
rithms designed to calculate and control behaviour according to the 
imperatives not of the IPCC but solely of the market, has an extremely 
ruinous effect on the psyches of the individual consumers of whom 
this market is composed (who are today targeted almost from birth, 
if not from before birth), giving rise as it does to an infernal spiral of 
consumerist addiction.
Evidence abounds throughout the industrialized democracies of 
the political consequences towards which this ruination tends. And 
these consequences are intensified by the fact that all these performa-
tive techniques are applied also in the political realm. If, as Stiegler 
suggests, this entails the replacement of the adoptive performativ-
ity of ‘democracy’ with the adaptive performativity of ‘telecracy’,389 
where the demos no longer finds itself in possession of any kratos, 
then the algorithmicization of this telecracy via the silicon technolo-
gies of platform capitalism is already exposing the utter vulnerability 
of ‘representational’ political systems to a thoroughgoing disintegra-
tion at the hands of the ‘owners’ of this data and the manipulators of 
these algorithms.
This can be described as an ultra-industrial political regression (a 
new form of what is often called ‘populism’) to which ultra-industrial 
capitalism tends to give rise. But regardless of the degree to which 
the leading industrial populists imagine they can cynically keep hold 
of the reins of power as they exploit the fears and irrationality of the 
crowd, the enormous risk that they are precipitating is of hubristically 
engendering processes that will completely run out of all control. All 
of this is what first began to get going with the shift from an indus-
trial capitalism of production to a hyper-industrial capitalism of con-
sumption a century ago, for which the immensely destructive wars of 
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the twentieth century stand as testament, and it is all this that remains 
at stake in the wish to create a society of global consumers in an ultra-
industrial capitalism of algorithmic platforms.
On crystallization and crystal palaces
For Marcuse, as we have already mentioned, the reduction of the 
need for labour made possible by automation opens up the prospect 
of a new age of autonomy. Such autonomy, however, is by no means 
a guaranteed outcome: it ‘presupposes a type of man with a different 
sensitivity as well as consciousness’. Marcuse himself describes what 
this means only rather abstractly as involving a ‘union between cau-
sality by necessity and causality by freedom’, which he problemati-
cally understands in terms of an ‘instinctual transformation’.390
In Simondonian terms, we might say that, in the age of silicon 
technologies, the invention of a new noetic milieu is in principle 
entirely possible (and, what’s more, that there is no future for knowl-
edge, understood in the broadest possible sense, other than through 
silicon technologies, all knowledge always being a possibility for 
noetic beings that is only ever opened up intermittently, technically, 
retentionally and protentionally). But this possibility of a new noetic 
element is realisable only provided that the arrangement between the 
technical and the psychosocial is re-organized so as to foster (rather 
than undermine) psychic and collective individuation processes giv-
ing rise to the new sensitivity and consciousness (new noesis) for 
which Marcuse calls.
Simondon’s first, ‘physical’ model for the emergence of individua-
tion from out of a preindividual milieu is the way that crystals emerge 
from out of a parent liquid possessing just the right molecular compo-
sition for a process of crystallization to be catalysed by a germ. But as 
the artist Robert Smithson pointed out (via the work of the physicist 
Percy Bridgman), the crystals produced by this process run counter to 
the commonly-held layman’s conception of entropy as always leading 
from states of order to states of disorder:
But I think nevertheless, we do not feel altogether com-
fortable at being forced to say that the crystal is the seat of 
greater disorder than the parent liquid.391
The crystal seems to be organized, because it appears to our eyes to 
be orderly. In fact, as a perfectly ordinary thermodynamic process, it 
complies with the ‘arrow of time’ and corresponds to a lower state of 
potential energy: the regularity of the crystal gives rise to the illusion 
of what only seems to be counter-entropic organization.
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Genuinely counter-entropic processes are possible at the biologi-
cal and noetic levels – even if these counter-entropic tendencies, too, 
can only ever be localized and temporary. For exosomatic beings, 
such processes depend on the accumulation of past noetic wealth, the 
improbable memory of which they cultivate and transform in order 
to maintain the rich cohesion of a particular locality on a particular 
scale, and to produce new improbable futures.
Contemporary disruption and regression are, however, precisely a 
kind of illusion of counter-entropy of the sort produced at the molecu-
lar level by crystallization. This is not just a question of the crystal 
palaces of industrial capitalism but also of the silicon crystal palaces 
that form the exo-techno-cine-spherical tertiary layers of algorith-
mic and ultra-industrial capitalism. They may be highly ordered and 
regularized, but beneath this deceptive surface they are thoroughly 
entropic for noetic processes, precisely because they fail to cultivate 
and draw upon this wealth of knowledge, instead destroying it and 
replacing it with the dictates of the market of calculable information.
For Smithson, writing in the 1960s and 1970s, it was a question of 
thinking thermodynamic entropy beyond the pleasure principle:
There’s a certain kind of pleasure principle that comes out 
of a preoccupation with waste. Like if we want a bigger and 
better car we are going to have bigger and better waste pro-
ductions. So there’s a kind of equation there between the 
enjoyment of life and waste. Probably the opposite of waste 
is luxury.392
Smithson’s raising of the question of entropy also extended beyond 
the relationship between thermodynamics and the death drive already 
suggested by Freud. Hence his call for an ‘attempt to formulate an 
analog between “communication theory” and the ideas of physics’.393 
Unfortunately, how far he may have been led by these speculations 
will remain forever unknown, thanks to his untimely death in a plane 
crash in 1973.
Reinventing economics as the science of counter-entropic 
struggle in exosomatization
Carbon technologies are thermodynamic: their function is to contrib-
ute to the struggle of noetic, technical (that is, exosomatic) life against 
its irreducible entropic conditions. But in utilizing these technologies 
to pursue anti-entropic ends, and given that all negentropic systems 
are localized systems that are bound to remain entropic in an overall 
sense, we inevitably produce entropic consequences elsewhere. And 
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when those systems have extended across the entire biosphere, cine-
sphere, technosphere and exosphere, then this ‘elsewhere’ remains 
precisely here, and the toxicity they produce is unavoidably self-poi-
soning, ruining its biospheric element just as does the infusorian in 
Freud’s petri dish.
Silicon technologies are informational: their function, too, is to 
contribute to the struggle of exosomatic life against its irreducible 
entropic conditions. But in this case, the toxicity they produce pol-
lutes not the biosphere but the noetic element of the knowing, techni-
cal beings who must nevertheless find the noetic resources to address 
all of these self-poisonings, whether carbonic or noetic, and to do so 
by making good collective decisions. It is this division between two 
kinds of entropic toxicity, and the necessity of recognizing the gravity 
of informational entropy, that we here seek to highlight.
Most economic theory (like most philosophy) has, to its detriment, 
remained rooted in a mechanistic physical conception that predates 
the discovery of the second law of thermodynamics, at least if we 
believe the economic historian Philip Mirowski.394 This means that 
economic systems are not truly viewed as dynamic processes in per-
petual struggle against entropic tendencies but are instead understood 
as involving one or another kind of static or cyclical equilibrium mak-
ing possible the fantasy of perpetual growth.
From the work of the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, the mathemati-
cal biologist Alfred J. Lotka and the economist Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen, however, it becomes possible to see biological (endosomatic) 
evolution as precisely involving manifold processes amounting to 
so many struggles against entropy, where these struggles are always 
localized – at the scale of the cell, the organism, the species, the 
ecosystem or the biosphere. And it also becomes possible to see that 
economic processes are what replace these evolutionary tendencies 
when life becomes technical (exosomatic), still always localized – 
at the scale of the tribe, ethnic group, society, nation or global eco-
nomic system.
Mirowski’s work has focused largely on the history of economics 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and more specifically on 
the way in which the history of neoliberalism has interacted both with 
the notion of information and with the integration of computation into 
economic theory and practice.395 From Hayek’s argument in 1945 that 
the ‘decentralized’ market makes better use of knowledge in society 
than do ‘centralized’ authorities and bureaucracies, the history of neo-
liberalism has amounted to the history of the notion of ‘the market’ 
as a vast ‘information processor’. In the unfolding of this history, the 
market-qua-information-processor is found by neoliberal economists 
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to depend less and less on the ‘rational agents’ of neoclassical eco-
nomics, as the concept of (economic) knowledge is reduced more and 
more to calculable information that may escape the level of the indi-
vidual altogether.
In turn, economists take advantage of this conception by redefining 
their function less as scientists and advisers and more as engineers 
and designers of markets, whether the market is being designed to 
facilitate the sale of the electromagnetic spectrum, to mitigate carbon 
emissions or to find market-based solutions for the market-induced 
problems of the global financial crisis.396 This, however, entails a con-
tradiction: setting out from an idea of ‘the Market’ as the best and 
most efficient guarantor of correct outcomes, if not as a transcenden-
tal and universal processor of truth, neoliberal economists then start 
to manufacture diverse and specific markets. But the good outcomes 
promised by the purveyors of these markets (in competition with pur-
veyors of other markets) absolutely depend on the initial conditions 
set by economists, who are able to do so, they claim, thanks to their 
‘expertise’, which they then market to governments, institutions and 
other economic actors, including at the highest levels, arguing that 
this is the only way to ensure positive outcomes, since there is no such 
thing as the market itself.
The contradiction is thus between an absolutized, ‘universal’ con-
ception of ‘the Market’ and a localized (but still informational and 
computational) conception of specific but highly artificial markets, 
where the assertion of this universality in fact ends up authorizing 
the elimination of the wealth of actual knowledge embodied in insti-
tutions of exchange of all kinds. Furthermore, the consumer market, 
as we have already seen, is premised upon systemically depriving 
these consumers of knowledge in a way absolutely at odds with the 
conception of an economy of ‘rational actors’ contributing to some 
market-based information processor. Mirowski’s work makes clear 
that the dangerous turn of recent macroeconomic history – charac-
terized by neoliberalism, financial crisis and proletarianization (in 
Stiegler’s sense) – has everything to do with the failure of economic 
theory to incorporate an understanding of entropic and counter-entro-
pic processes, at both the thermodynamic and informational levels. 
The implicit question it raises is how to reinvent economic theory 
and practice by incorporating such an understanding from its found-
ing premises.
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For a general theory of entropy
This in turn raises the question of the necessity of a theory of gen-
eral entropy. Such a theory would on the one hand seek to juxtapose 
and articulate the thermodynamic notion of entropy with the infor-
mational notion, and to exceed the limitations especially of the lat-
ter.397 And it would also be in this way an account of the relationship 
between every kind of counter-entropic system, which is to say every 
kind of localization and de-localization process that works against the 
tendency towards the elimination of improbabilities, which is to say 
the elimination of the past (as what, for any noetic system, opens the 
possibility of a future). But as Smithson’s association of entropy with 
both waste and luxury already suggests, this also bears upon Georges 
Bataille’s ‘notion of expenditure’ and ‘general economy’ (not forget-
ting that for Bataille, expenditure beyond subsistence is not a question 
merely of waste but of an irreducible necessity of life).
What this implies, ultimately, is that any such theory is compelled 
to integrate difficult mathematical, scientific, economic, anthro-
pological and technological questions with others that exceed these 
divisions between fields of knowledge, in the first place because 
what is at stake is the counter-entropic function of knowledge itself. 
Stiegler has indeed begun a project to open up this question of entropy 
in terms of its thermodynamic, biological, informational and noetic 
dimensions (in all of its ‘exorganological’ dimensions, in Stiegler’s 
recent terms), drawing on the work of Vernadsky, Georgescu-Roegen 
and Lotka, among others, and in discussion with scientists such 
as Giuseppe Longo, but in truth it is extraordinarily complex and 
requires large-scale transdisciplinary contributory research projects 
to be established involving scholars across a wide variety of fields. 
Despite this apparent daunting complexity, it is the conclusion of this 
‘elemental critique of political economy’ that, in the context of the 
Anthropocene, such a theory of general entropy has today become an 
urgent necessity.
Why is such a theory necessary? Because what is ultimately at stake 
in the complex field that is unfolding between carbon technologies 
and silicon technologies in the Entropocene is the need to completely 
reinscribe old values in new terms, where values are what supply 
the criteria on the basis of which decisions are taken and resources 
invested in order to generate wealth (as distinct from narrowly cal-
culable economic ‘value’ or ‘prosperity’). Investment must here be 
understood in every sense and in a general sense as that ‘putting in 
reserve’ – that work – that alone is capable of opening the possibil-
ity of another future. Every question of investment is in this way a 
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question of struggling to differ and defer entropy in general, in the 
movement of what Derrida called différance (but where this is also a 
differentiation beyond the limits of Derrida’s formulation).
In a context in which the globalized systems of consumerist capi-
talism are reaching their limits, and in the process dragging many 
other systems past their limits, including geophysical systems such 
as the climate system, and also including the noetic systems through 
which alone good collective decisions can ever hope to be made – in 
such a context, where a cascade of catastrophic system failures seems 
entirely possible if not highly probable, it is solely on the basis of such 
a theory that counter-entropic investment prospects with the poten-
tial to bifurcate away from such a globally dangerous and monstrous 
situation can be identified, imagined, invented and realised. Such a 
bifurcation, and the general theory on which it can be established, 
will presuppose a reconsideration of the very basis and division of 
fields of knowledge, but it will also require a complete reorganiza-
tion of silicon technologies at least as profound as the elimination 
of carbon technologies called for by the IPCC, and on a comparably 
short timespan.
For a new critique of global governance
Finally, for all the seeming ‘straight talking’ by the IPCC, it remains 
captive to the institutional conditions it is compelled to occupy. If the 
questions raised by this body concern not just scientific understand-
ing but policy and action (in relation to which the term ‘mitigation’ 
is entirely inadequate), then this too is a question of the conditions 
of making good collective decisions. In truth, if the IPCC is to be 
something other than a diarist of the downfall, then it (or some related 
body) cannot avoid the question of the relationship between policy 
recommendations and the conditions of actual decision-making and 
actual transformation (or ‘transition’), including the conditions of 
will, belief and expectation, or alternatively of apathy and nihilism. 
In that case, it is also obvious that the question of the future of the 
noetic element cannot avoid confronting the question of the future 
of international decision-making, and vice versa – the question, pre-
cisely, of the wealth and diversity of elemental conditions required for 
neganthropic choices to be made and actions to be taken.
The United Nations is a body composed of a General Assembly 
whose individual autonomous members have a commitment to 
addressing the issues of carbon technologies that can be described 
as patchy at best, and subject to a Security Council with even less 
resolve, not least because of the economic fear generated by the aporia 
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of sustainability. This General Assembly and Security Council are 
themselves premised on the sovereignty of nation-states, whose polit-
ical systems, whether representative or otherwise, are entirely sub-
ject to what we have called ‘telecratic’ tendencies. Furthermore, what 
ecologists and the IPCC must not avoid reckoning with, without deny-
ing the processes of psychosocial and economico-institutional denial 
that are also clearly operative, is the possibility that the fear generated 
by the aporia of sustainability is in many ways legitimate, and that 
this fear is itself a very significant threat in terms of the possibility 
of becoming a panic, even if it is also true that the paralysing conse-
quences of such fear and panic in turn catastrophically seal the fate of 
the biosphere.
In short, it is a question of the possibility of dealing noetically 
with the aporia of sustainability. But the fact is that this society of 
nations is also composed of members almost none of whom have any 
effective analyses or policies with respect to silicon technologies that 
reflect any true weighing of the stakes of the immense transforma-
tions such technologies have wrought and are continuing to bring. Yet 
these technologies are well on the way to destroying the local condi-
tions for the flourishing of noetic and exosomatic life (at all scales of 
locality), just as carbon technologies are well on the way to destroying 
the local conditions for the flourishing of biological and endosomatic 
life (at all scales of locality).
What this ultimately suggests is that a critique of the political econ-
omy of silicon technologies cannot avoid a critique of the character 
and institutions of decision-making at every level of locality from the 
sub-national to the international and global, as well as of the elemental 
conditions in which they operate. And the purpose of such a critique 
can only be the reformulation and reconstruction of these institutions 
and bodies on the basis of new values legitimating new criteria for 
investment to be derived from the kinds of considerations whose first 
steps we have tried to outline in this paper, and whose ultimate basis 
must lie in a theory of general entropy and counter-entropy. For in the 
case of international governing and advising bodies such as the IPCC 
and the United Nations, these organizations, too, form a sometimes 
almost imperceptible aspect of the global element.
6 Psychic and Collective Anaphylaxis: For an 
Organological Critique of Sovereignty
Prefatory remarks taking account of the current context
This chapter, like the others of which this book is comprised, was 
written prior to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic that has brought a vast 
and rapid change to the entire global political and economic land-
scape. It has also exposed the enormous risk that has been run for 
decades by the unfettered progression of what Bernard Stiegler calls 
generalized proletarianization, leading to the so-called ‘post-truth’ 
era characterized by a loss of belief, faith and trust in every form of 
authority and knowledge, and afflicting populations, the news indus-
try and governments. At the time of writing, the full cost of this 
risk remains unknown, but, a century after the flu pandemic and the 
efforts to form a league of nations that occurred in the aftermath of 
the First World War, the globalized technosphere is today vastly more 
complex and sophisticated, and perhaps therefore more fragile and 
susceptible, than was the case in 1918 or 1920. Suffice it to say that a 
concatenation of unpredictable events has every chance of unfolding 
in a descending spiral that could end in global economic catastrophe, 
leading the ‘final and greatest bubble in history’ to burst, and in turn 
making much more probable all manner of other catastrophes.
Hopefully such a spiral ending in global depression and war can 
be averted through collective efforts that draw upon the noetic and 
cultural resources that human civilizations have accumulated, main-
tained and transformed across millennia. What seems clear is firstly 
that this pandemic event amounts to the greatest ever test of those 
resources on a global scale, in a situation where the quality and speed 
of decision-making is paramount, and secondly that the industrial 
democracies of the West have proven themselves to suffer from a per-
petual and underreactive lateness of reason and decision-making. Not 
only were the countries of Europe and North America slow to act, but 
the decisions they eventually made were less wise and less rational, 
it seems, than those made by Eastern nations, for reasons that have 
everything to do with the fact that the Western virtues of ‘freedom’ 
and ‘democracy’ have shown themselves over half a century to be 
highly vulnerable to corrosive infection by, firstly, the analogue mass 
media, and, secondly, algorithmic platform capitalism.
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It is precisely such a constitutive lateness that is thematized in this 
chapter, which argues that for reasons more general than viral pan-
demics, the feverish speed and danger of contemporary technologi-
cal transformation forces us to confront the fact that our models and 
institutions of collective decision-making are afflicted by a dangerous 
tendency to lag. What SARS-CoV-2 shows is both that viral forma-
tion operates more quickly than human transformation, and that viral 
transmission in the age of mass global transportation tends to (but 
does not necessarily) operate more quickly than the transmission of 
knowledge capable of taking care of the risks posed by that transmis-
sion, and that this exacerbates the dangers of both underreaction and 
overreaction. As economies collapse, and as overreactive and scape-
goating resentments build between one civilization (or ‘self-propagat-
ing supersystem’) and another, then, in the absence of prophylactic 
treatments, this anaphylactic danger is bound to reach extreme levels.
Ultimately, all these problems stem from an inability of current 
models of decision-making and political economy to conceive the 
relationship between all scales of locality, from the individual organ-
ism to the family, the tribe, the ethnic region, the nation, the civi-
lization and finally that global locality that is the anthropized (that 
is, technicized) biosphere – it is precisely this insufficiency that is 
exposed by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which has shown beyond all 
doubt the irreducibility of the question of borders, their necessity and 
their necessary porosity. For that reason, despite the fact that the ani-
mating questions here concern the significance of the (only slightly) 
longer-term ecological crisis with which the planet remains con-
fronted, and despite the fact that it has not been rewritten to take into 
account more recent developments, it turns out that the ‘biological’ 
themes of immunity, auto-immunity and anaphylaxis pursued in this 
chapter have a more than metaphorical significance with respect to 
the global crisis that is currently unfolding.
What we are up against
As ever, it is worth knowing what we are up against before decid-
ing which assumptions to keep and which to challenge, which forms 
of ‘common sense’ or orthodoxy to throw out or reinforce, or which 
scale of problems to try to think through. For that, a necessary if not 
sufficient starting point is a cursory examination of the progression 
of the rate of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere,398 of the 
distribution of those emissions by region of the world,399 and by type 
of fuel.400 What such an examination makes apparent is that, what-
ever strategies are being adopted, whatever claims are being made 
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that the climate problem is eminently solvable, whatever reassurances 
are being given about future progress, the fundamental fact is that 
emissions have continued to increase at an accelerating rate, where 
the only real – albeit brief – deceleration was the result not of any 
rational amelioration strategy but of the unplanned and nearly cata-
strophic global financial crisis of 2008. The recent claims by the UK 
to be planning to adopt a ‘net zero’ emissions policy to be achieved 
by 2050 are the latest in this series of non-claims and non-solutions.
What we are confronted with, therefore, amounts to a constitutive 
and systemic underreaction to a real emergency. The more or less con-
tinuous acceleration of the rate of CO2 emissions, in the context of 
the increasingly dire predictions of the IPCC and the short deadline 
they insist is necessary if we are to prevent the worst case scenarios, 
should be enough to give pause to those intellectuals and academics 
who would like to dismiss, as either ‘utopian’ or ‘apocalyptic’ – that 
is, as ‘unrealistic’ – attempts to face this crisis by considering the 
necessity for systemic transformation at the planetary scale…that is, 
a real dream of revolutionary transformation (the question being what 
‘realism’ and ‘revolution’ really mean today and in this context).
To open the question of planetary-scale transformation, not just of 
the use of energy technologies but politically, culturally and so on, is 
to enter into a kind of madness, since it seems to be entering the zone 
of some absolute impossibility. But if continuing the current path 
without changing direction inevitably heads towards catastrophe, then 
it itself depends on the rise and persistence of new forms of unreason 
and insanity, amounting to a situation that Leo Strauss described as 
‘retail sanity and wholesale madness’.401 And it becomes crazy not to 
open alternatives, however highly improbable they may appear or be 
(within the limits of our protentional finitude): there is no alternative 
but to consider alternatives that seem to be impossible, and therefore 
mad. It is for this reason that I asked in the second chapter:
Is there a madman who, by dint of an uncommon willingness 
to peer more deeply into the shadowy parts of our collective 
souls, can illuminate these tenebrous sources [of rising mad-
ness], and so aid in re-orienting our disorientation?402
I then discussed two madmen who try to propose another response to 
the current apocalyptic path, and we can both recapitulate and extend 
that discussion a little further now.
Theodore Kaczynski, who since his capture and conviction has 
continued to write from his prison cell, does not doubt that ‘mod-
ern society is heading for disaster’, and he conceives the nations and 
civilizations of which it is composed as ‘self-propagating systems’ 
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engaged in perpetual competition. But he concludes that, faced with 
planetary systemic limits, these self-propagating systems, which have 
now formed into massive supersystems that tend to eliminate smaller 
systems, will fail to ensure their own survival, for two reasons: (1) 
in this perpetual competition at the limit of the global system, short-
term exigencies will conflict with long-term strategies, and so such 
supersystems will tend to ‘rationally’ decide to act against their own 
long-term survival interests; (2) all attempts at ‘rational human con-
trol’ of such self-propagating systems have failed, to a significant 
extent simply because of the great difficulty of anticipating future 
developments of complex systems, whether internally or in external 
relation to other complex systems. The terrorist’s ultimate conclusion 
from these arguments is thus strictly logical: if all life depends on the 
biosphere, and the technosphere that now lies across its entire sur-
face is bound to lead to its destruction, then there is no choice but to 
destroy this global technical system, even at the cost of destroying 
human collective decision-making systems as a whole.403
On 29 January 2008, which means, after the first indications of the 
coming global financial crisis but before it became ‘full blown’, Peter 
Thiel, member of the PayPal mafia, Facebook investor, and devotee 
of René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, responded to the feeling 
of wholesale madness from the perspective of the investor, or the 
speculator, that is, one who purports to calculate risk in relation to 
the economic future. While he acknowledged the great risks and inju-
ries that accompany globalization and its hegemony of calculation, he 
argued that ‘the real alternative to good globalization is world war’, 
and that ‘all versions of anti-globalization are incoherent’. Hence he 
concludes that there are ‘no good investments in a twenty-first cen-
tury where globalization fails’, and therefore that ‘investors have no 
choice but to bet on globalization’.404 This is so, even though ‘the line 
between good and bad (or no) globalization is very thin’, and hence 
‘catastrophic approximations abound’, and even though ‘the competi-
tion close to the core of “globalization” may become military’ and 
‘may run into a version of the apocalypse’.
Thiel thus argues in January 2008 that the great financial bubbles 
of recent times (the ‘China bubble’, the ‘technology bubble’, the 
‘hedge fund bubble’) may be less irrational than they at first appear. 
On the one hand, bubbles involve a ‘serious miscalculation about the 
true probability of successful globalization’, because, like Kaczynski, 
he sees the limits of the ability to forecast or control the unfolding of 
highly complex processes: ‘the greatest uncertainties about the future 
of the world have involved questions about the rate and the nature 
of globalization’. On the other hand, futures in which globalization 
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fails end badly for all investments, and from this fact a ‘rational’ ten-
dency forms, which is rational despite and because it consists in over-
investing in possible futures where globalization succeeds, and thus 
Polanyi’s great transformation (which Thiel calls the Great Boom) is 
either ‘not a bubble at all’ or ‘it is the final and greatest bubble in his-
tory’. But by April 2009, by which time the bubble had definitively 
burst, Thiel perceives a world in which financial crisis is ‘facilitated 
by a government that insured against all sorts of moral hazards’, a 
government that had forgotten the invigorating and dynamic effect of 
real ‘Schumpeterian “creative destruction”’, leading Thiel to a con-
clusion regarding the powerlessness of politics that is identical to the 
Unabomber’s, even if reached by a diametrically opposed path:
I no longer believe that politics encompasses all possible 
futures of our world. In our time, the great task for liber-
tarians is to find an escape from politics in all its forms 
– from the totalitarian and fundamentalist catastrophes 
to the unthinking demos that guides so-called ‘social 
democracy’.405
It is on this basis that Thiel goes on to declare his faith in the trans-
humanist solutionism of cyberspace disruption, outer space coloniza-
tion and the legal and political vacuums opened up by seasteading, 
intensifying the power of the technosphere against the uselessness 
of the political and especially ‘democratic’ realms. Like Kaczynski, 
then, Thiel has lost all faith in modern collective decision-making 
processes as a means of stabilizing systemic relationships, but the 
prescription he ultimately favours, which consists in maximizing glo-
balization and minimizing its governance, is diametrically opposed to 
the Unabomber’s willingness to eliminate both.
In the madness of globalized ecotechnics, can anyone  
but a madman avoid denial?
Why these two figures? Because neither of them are in denial about 
(1) the scale of today’s problems and the planetary character of the 
risks they entail, (2) the systemic character of these problems and 
risks, or (3) the fact that the question raised by these planetary-scale 
problems and risks concerns a globalized technical system insepara-
bly tied to a globalized economic system. In other words, they under-
stand, more or less, the scale of the problem raised by what, in 1993, 
which is to say prior to the opening of the World Wide Web that would 
vastly deepen and transform this process, Jean-Luc Nancy had already 
called ‘ecotechnics’:
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The economy can no longer be represented as an ‘infra-
structure’. There is no longer an economy. Rather, there 
is ecotechnics, the global structuration of the world as the 
reticulated space of an essentially capitalist, globalist, and 
monopolist organization that is monopolizing the world.406
Globalization can thus be characterized as the inextricably economic 
and technological (ecotechnical) unfolding of a planetary process of 
monopolization, today (after 1993) including those functional monop-
olies that are also the ‘functional sovereignties’407 of platform capital-
ism (where we can in fact define functional sovereignty as a destruc-
tion of the function of the sovereignty of what Stiegler calls higher 
complex exorganisms).
If we do not wish to participate in the dismissals and denials of 
ordinary madness, and if we do not wish to resort to the extraordinary 
madness that would simply accelerate destruction, either in the name 
of globalized anti-ecotech terrorism or in the name of globalized pro-
ecotech disruption, then the issue at stake can only be to find another 
relationship to these globalizing ecotechnical processes, which is 
to say their transformation. It then becomes a question of what sys-
tems need to be transformed for today’s global crises to be able to be 
addressed, in what way they need to be transformed, and how it is 
possible to set out in a direction that increases the likelihood of such 
a transformation.
The systems that most obviously need to be transformed are the 
economic and industrial systems, given their direct responsibility for 
so many elements of contemporary crisis by virtue of the consumer-
ist perpetual growth model that virtually guarantees a constant rise 
in energy production and the pollutants associated with that produc-
tion. But when we observe the worldwide failure of will, at all levels 
of the population, in the face of this ‘extinction risk’, and the cor-
responding rise of suspicion about all claims to knowledge, author-
ity and reason that has come to be called the ‘post-truth age’, we are 
drawn to a less obvious but perhaps more fundamental answer: what 
needs to be transformed are the systems influencing and undermin-
ing individual and collective motivation and belief. Despite their open 
acknowledgment of the scale of risk we currently face, what neither 
Kaczynski nor Thiel can offer is any insight into the existential char-
acter of our contemporary crisis, which is also to say the degree to 
which it is precisely a matter of the destruction of the possibility of 
‘ek-sistence’ as such.
Today, it is the global system of digital networks that plays the 
greatest systematic role in this influencing, this undermining and this 
Psychic and Collective Anaphylaxis 209
destruction. Digital networks form the engine of the consumerist per-
petual growth model by making possible the algorithmic exploitation 
of the libidinal economy of every individual in order to drive ever 
more intensive consumer behaviour. In the pursuit of the aims of this 
consumerist perpetual growth model, these networks are depleting 
the capacities for long-term thinking and caring required for deal-
ing with any systemic crisis, which is reflected in the fact that, in 
their current form, they are leading to the reign of suspicion, doubt 
and uncertainty in all areas of knowledge and decision-making. If it 
is true that Thiel and Kaczynski are not in denial about the scale of 
these ecotechnical challenges, nevertheless they both fail to address 
these existential and systemic questions of the relationship between 
always localized systems and the function of knowledge and desire in 
the operation of those systems.
The internation from 1920 to 2020
In other words, what must be addressed are the entropic character-
istics of the industrial-economic system, and the entropic character-
istics of the systems of desire and knowledge – these latter systems, 
too, being wholly industrial. These are the conclusions that follow 
from Stiegler’s philosophy, and it is for this reason that he has far 
more to tell us about the character of our present predicament than 
the pro-ecotech and anti-ecotech madmen we have examined thus far, 
who are above all symptoms of this globalized ecotechnical process. 
Ecotechnics, taken as a general convergent tendency, can neither be 
simply denounced nor celebrated, and to do either is already to begin 
to seek a scapegoat: what matters is how well we socialize or fail to 
socialize the relationship between technics and economics.
In recent works, this concern with localized systems at the plan-
etary and sub-planetary scale has led Stiegler to call for a revival and 
reinterpretation of a concept introduced by Marcel Mauss in 1920: 
the internation. In ‘The Internation and Internationalism’, a title that 
refers to Mauss’s own ‘La nation et l’internationlisme’,408 Stiegler has 
argued that Mauss’s neologism is a precise articulation of these issues 
concerning locality and globalization, framed in terms of the future of 
the relationship between the national scale and the international scale:
What in Mauss barely amounts to a thesis, outlined in a para-
graph entitled ‘L’internationalisme’ in which he makes the 
case for an internation where nations would co-individuate 
and transindividuate (if we can consider it in Simondonian 
terms), must be reconsidered starting from the question of 
what we should apprehend as constituting this neganthropy 
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[…]. It then becomes possible to imagine the program of a 
new critique of political economy that would be based above 
all on a reconsideration of work as insoluble into labour or 
employment, inasmuch as work projects itself beyond the 
fact of proletarianization leading to the automation described 
in the Grundrisse as the constitution of vast automatons. 
The latter are, however, condemned to become closed sys-
tems, […] to contribute further to the increase in the rate of 
entropy (by anthropization), an increase that lies at the root 
of the problem of the Anthropocene era.
Such a reconsideration of economics […] obviously poses 
a major problem for Marxist-style proletarian interna-
tionalism, given that negative entropy, as well as negative 
anthropy, or neganthropy, can occur only within localities.409
But to take up Mauss’s concept of the ‘internation’ as referring to 
the necessity of producing, through a new critique of political econ-
omy, a new neganthropic relationship between the national level and 
the international level, is also to acknowledge that there is an unavoid-
able need to address transformational questions at the political level 
and the institutional level, or in other words at the level of political 
institutions, and more particularly still, sovereign institutions. What 
then did Mauss himself intend with this idea, how should we inter-
pret Stiegler’s call to revive it, and to what problem can it constitute a 
response today?
Internation, then, is the name Mauss gives to a new way of conceiv-
ing the relationship between different scales of political institution – 
the national scale and the international scale – implying some ‘third 
way’ beyond either a nationalist ‘localism’ or an internationalist ‘uni-
versalism’, preserving the notion of locality while acknowledging that 
no process of territorialization exists without a corresponding process 
of deterritorialization, with the consequence that, today, localization 
can be strongly delocalized. And Mauss seems to combine the social-
ist’s future-oriented interest in reinventing the apparatus of collective 
decision-making with the anthropologist’s past-oriented interest in 
the wealth of cultural life (Mauss being both an anthropologist and a 
socialist), that is, with the functional richness of localized knowledge, 
and the possibility of either strengthening or weakening this noetic 
soil, grounded in what Stiegler will call the noetic necromass.
In a set of texts on the nation and internationalism dating from 
around 1920, then, Mauss was preoccupied with the relationship 
between scales of localities and the consequences of this relation-
ship for the future of international relations after the First World War. 
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For Mauss, not all localities are the same, and those ‘institutions of 
institutions’ whose tasks include ‘establishing and enforcing social 
norms’ (as Jean Terrier puts it) are what he mostly calls ‘states’, but 
where the ability to establish and enforce these norms derives from an 
‘extrinsic’ relationship to an exteriority such as a religious or cosmic 
order.410 We can thus understand ‘states’ in Mauss as more or less cor-
responding to what Stiegler calls higher complex exorganisms, as dis-
tinct from lower complex exorganisms such as a factory or an institu-
tion, which rely upon a higher complex exorganism for access to the 
criteria through which such norms are formed and maintained. Only 
such higher complex exorganisms possess the character of being able 
to access such criteria directly, through a directly extrinsic relation-
ship, so to speak.
But at the same time, this extrinsic relationship is also the basis 
for a differentiation between states and nations, or societies and 
nations: for Mauss, not all states or all societies rise to the level of 
nations, and in his estimation, in fact, very few have done so through-
out history. A nation necessarily entails a ‘system of legislation and 
administration’, as well as the notion of rights and duties of the citi-
zen and of the patrie, but these ‘beautiful flowers’ of human civiliza-
tion and progress remain rare and fragile, as he puts it in ‘La nation 
et l’internationalisme’.411 For nations, the in principle applicability of 
these rights and duties to all is established, which presupposes the 
formalization of law – the writing of the law and the literacy of a pub-
lic capable of reading it, of interpreting it, and, when necessary, of 
transforming it. But for this, formalization is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition. Hence in a contemporaneous text, Mauss defines 
the nation as a
society materially and morally integrated, with a stable and 
permanent central power, with determinate borders, whose 
inhabitants possess a relative moral, mental and cultural 
unity and consciously adhere to the state and its laws.412
Terrier highlights that with this understanding of the nation, Mauss 
is contesting two other ways in which the nation could be and has 
been conceived. For nationalists, the nation is a cultural phenom-
enon, a set of existing traditions transmitted from the past, leading 
to the fetishization of national culture and legitimating a politics 
based on defending against threats to cultural identity.413 For others, 
the nation tends to be conflated with the state itself, that is, with its 
apparatus and institutions, a conception that Mauss argued amounts 
to ‘“hypostasising” and “divinising” the state instead of the nation’.414 
For Mauss, both the ‘cultural’ and the ‘formal’ aspects of the nation, 
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both the set of traditions and understandings and the apparatus of law 
and administration, are fundamental to the specific character of the 
nation, which we might also describe as its ‘localist’ and ‘universal-
ist’ tendencies. But this is more than just a balancing act on Mauss’s 
part. What makes it possible for Mauss to hypostasize neither the state 
nor the nation is also the fact that what defines them is not just how 
they exist, the facticity of national cultures and state mechanisms, but 
how they are themselves nothing but orientations towards a possible 
future, objects of desire in which we invest, on the basis not that they 
exist but that they consist (as Stiegler would say). As Terrier states:
There is one further aspect which makes Mauss’s under-
standing of the nation a fundamentally political one. In his 
reflection, the nation appears primarily as an object of the 
future, as an object of desire, yet to be attained.415
For this reason, Terrier concludes that Mauss was ‘trying to offer a 
sociological analysis of a social organisation that was still in the mak-
ing’, and hence that it was ‘a declaration of hope that the future of pol-
itics would see the triumph of the national principle’ thus understood, 
a ‘political intervention, disguised as a sociological treatise’. Mauss’s 
hope was that the lessons of the First World War would be learned 
by nations, making it possible to ‘move away from false notions of 
nationhood which nurtured hatred and violence’.416
This account of what Mauss means by the nation is necessary for 
an understanding of his position with respect to internationalism. The 
wealth of the nation, for Mauss, we could say, lies in the future-ori-
ented neganthropic potential of the relationship between its cultural 
richness and its decision-making apparatus, both of which are in fact 
historically singular. Cosmopolitanism, for Mauss, was the name of 
those species of internationalism that ignored this relational source of 
wealth and advocated the dissolution of the national into the interna-
tional. Such a universalist cosmopolitanism, Mauss argues, denies the 
virtuous singularity embodied in the nation. Against such cosmopoli-
tan internationalism, the aim of a reinvented internationalism should 
be to forge greater interdependence between nations, firstly in order 
to render military conflict an increasingly unpalatable and impossible 
way of resolving international tensions.
Even though Mauss rejects any ‘idealist’ conception of cosmopoli-
tanism (idealist because assuming an abstract humanness that would 
transcend the material concreteness of social life) based on some or 
other notion of global citizenship, his appreciation of the role of bor-
rowing and cross-cultural transmission means that his understanding 
of this transnational interdependence is not just a question of aligning 
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common interests, signing treaties or founding international admin-
istrative bodies. Mauss recognizes genuine interdependence as that 
which opens the possibility, not of the desirability of world govern-
ment, but of the advent of ‘global human civilisation’, a ‘hypersocial 
system of social systems’, which is to say a genuine process of tran-
sindividuation operating at a scale above that of the nation.417 If, in the 
life of the nation (or the higher complex exorganism), the selection 
criteria are fundamentally extrinsic, that is, related to an order of mag-
nitude exceeding the national level, then so too must we conclude, as 
Terrier puts it, that ‘the social is a function of the intersocial’,418 or as 
Mauss puts it, that
it is an abstraction to believe that the internal life of a nation 
is not for a large part conditioned by that which is external to 
it, and vice versa.419
Here, finally, we can get a sense of what Stiegler means when he 
describes the internation, Mauss’s name for this reconsideration of 
internationalism, as the site of the co-individuation and transindi-
viduation of nations. If it is possible that this process of the interna-
tion could ultimately lead to one planetary-scale civilization, then, as 
Terrier concludes, the paradoxical result must nevertheless be under-
stood as a ‘global civilisation of interdependent nations […] accom-
panied not by a diminution, but by an increase of the individuality 
of each composing part’, a ‘more fortuitous diversity of nations’ that 
‘will transform them into collective individuals’.420 It is with all this in 
mind that we can understand what is ‘barely a thesis’ in ‘La nation et 
l’internationalisme’:
The second stream of ideas [about internationalism] is begin-
ning to be clarified […] due to the proximity of the utopias 
and cosmopolitanism from which it was born. We propose to 
keep for this the name of ‘internationalism’. It is the move-
ment that tends to unite nations and not to destroy them. 
Inter-nation is the opposite of a-nation. Internationalism is, 
if we agree to grant this definition, the set of ideas, feelings, 
rules and collective groupings that aim to conceive and gov-
ern the relations between nations and between societies in 
general. Here, we are no longer in the realm of utopia but in 
that of facts, at least in that of anticipations of the immediate 
future. In reality, there is a whole movement of social forces 
that tends to practically and morally regulate the life of the 
relations between societies.421
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The internation in the age of proletarianization  
and carbonization
The relevance of Mauss’s analysis is clear and indisputable. Currently 
we are living through a time in which there is an increasing split 
between those who, in Mauss’s terms, hypostasize the nation and 
those who hypostasize the state. That is, there is an increasing split 
between those who see the role of politics today as defending against 
threats to cultural identity and those for whom no geopolitics is con-
ceivable outside the framework of cosmopolitan globalization. In 
fact, it is the vigour with which the latter is pursued, eliminating the 
‘whole movement of social forces that tends to practically and mor-
ally regulate the life of the relations between societies’, that produces 
the former as a counter-reaction, both poles thus missing the lesson 
taught by Mauss that the social is a function of what he calls the 
inter-social. The invention of the printing press that led to the print-
ing of the Bible in national languages rather than transnational Latin, 
thereby giving birth to a new deterritorializing spirit, would also, and 
by the very same act, contribute to the rise of the nationalist spirit. In 
this way, the very poles that Mauss hoped to transcend with the notion 
of the internation may be thought to have formed into an oppositional 
schema precisely because of the pharmacological character of literal 
tertiary retention.
In any case, the contemporary version of the problem first identi-
fied by Mauss was already identified by Arnold Toynbee in Mankind 
and Mother Earth, published posthumously in 1976:
Mention has already been made of the discrepancy between 
the political partition of the Oikoumenê into local sovereign 
states and the global unification of the Oikoumenê on the 
technological and economic planes. This misfit is the crux 
of mankind’s present plight. Some form of global govern-
ment is now needed for keeping the peace between one local 
human community and another and for re-establishing the 
balance between Man and the rest of the biosphere, now that 
this balance has been upset by Man’s enormous augmenta-
tion of human material power as a result of the Industrial 
Revolution.422
It might seem from Toynbee’s invocation of ‘global government’ as 
if he is arguing for the necessity of the elimination of the local in 
favour of the global, on the grounds that only by overcoming ‘politi-
cal partition’ will it be possible to match the vast processes unfolding 
as technological and economic ‘global unification’. In fact, however, 
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Toynbee’s position is more complex: sovereign states, he argues, are 
far too large to be able to take advantage of the psychic and collec-
tive processes that depend on scales of locality in which interpersonal 
relations can form the basis of processes of trust and confidence; at 
the same time, they are too small to be able to take care of the bio-
sphere, because the competition between them produces short-term 
interests leading to war and empire (a position echoed more or less by 
Kaczynski). He therefore advocates the strengthening of locality at 
the microcosmic level of the town or village, combined with a kind of 
global sovereignty based on networks of communication:
The present-day global set of local sovereign states is not 
capable of keeping the peace, and it is also not capable of 
saving the biosphere from man-made pollution or of con-
serving the biosphere’s non-replaceable natural resources. 
[…] What has been needed for the last 5,000 years, and has 
been feasible technologically, though not yet politically, for 
the last hundred years, is a global body politic composed 
of cells on the scale of the Neolithic-Age village-commu-
nity – a scale on which the participants could be personally 
acquainted with each other, while each of them would also 
be a citizen of the world-state.423
The problem he identifies is that this realignment of scales of locality, 
made possible by the speed and breadth of technological communica-
tion achieved over the past century, cannot be won by military con-
quest in an age that has also given rise to nuclear technologies capable 
of global-scale destruction. But nor can we count on global commu-
nications to be sufficient to produce the will or wisdom for such a 
realignment, leading Toynbee to a stark conclusion that seems all the 
more probable today, almost half a century later:
In the age in which mankind has acquired the command 
over nuclear power, political unification can be accom-
plished only voluntarily, and, since it is evidently going to 
be accepted only reluctantly, it seems probable that it will be 
delayed until mankind has brought upon itself further disas-
ters of a magnitude that will induce it to acquiesce at last in 
global political union as being the lesser evil.424
It is because of the current intensification of such pharmacologi-
cal threats that Stiegler has argued for a ‘new wealth of the nation’, 
which wealth is fundamentally and very broadly conceived as knowl-
edge – of every kind. Today, the consequences of this elimination 
are evidenced by the depths of what Stiegler calls proletarianization 
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(understood as this destruction of knowledge, which is also to say, 
of the ability to work, live, care and so on), and it is for this reason 
that, for example, he has argued that the problem of decarboniza-
tion is inseparable from the problem of deproletarianization. But if 
we raise this question of carbon, that is, of climate change and the 
Anthropocene in general, then we cannot also avoid the question of 
time limits.
From this perspective, the problem of the internation, if we wish 
to retain this word, has a character absent from Mauss’s reflections 
a century ago. We live in a paradoxical if not aporetic time, in which 
the necessity of thinking and the urgency of decision-making are both 
equally undeniable, however much they are denied. We cannot pos-
sibly ‘choose’ one of these imperatives over the other, even though 
one depends on taking our time and the other on absolutely refusing to 
do so any longer. The impossibility of resolving this contradiction has 
thus far produced a kind of stalemate between thought and action, a 
vacuum that functions as a form of paralysis.
But if we cannot resolve this contradiction, our problem can only 
be to inhabit it in another way, to make this apparent impossibility 
the source of the dynamism of a new process. This is precisely what 
Stiegler knows and understands, and for him the internation signifies 
the need to foster a new wealth of nations that opens up the conditions 
of knowledge and belief that alone make good decisions possible. 
With this we cannot but agree, but the question remains of whether the 
tireless energy he expends and encourages us to expend on the work 
of the internation in fact does justice to the imperative of urgency. 
To weigh this question, we require a critique of political economy 
focused not only on those aspects that Mauss attributes to the nation, 
but equally to those he attributes to the state, that is, the apparatus of 
decision-making (law, politics, administration and so on).
What we must undertake is therefore an exorganological critique 
of sovereignty at all scales of locality, and we aim to sketch out the 
stakes of such a critique in what follows. As an opening statement, 
what we propose is that this macro-institutional question of a cri-
tique of national and international sovereignty is (1) necessary, and 
(2) something that extends beyond the concepts of (a) ‘digital sover-
eignty’, or (b) some form of, let’s say, ‘counter-institution’ (the open-
ing of a counter-globalization, say). Both of these, it seems to me, are 
necessary questions, but, as we have tried to suggest, they tend to try 
to address the anthropologist’s concern for the noetic verdancy of 
locality (by reconceiving both wealth and locality) while tending to 
leave unaddressed the socialist’s question of a reinvention of the most 
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fundamental mechanisms of deliberation and decision-making oper-
ating at these macro-institutional scales.
The necessity of such a critique is obvious when one considers the 
current relationship between the national and international levels of 
political institution given that the founding principle that made the 
United Nations possible (without which it would never have been 
agreed to by the founding nations) is that the principle of national sov-
ereignty must be guaranteed, and thus that international sovereignty 
is essentially just the name of a mechanism for peacefully resolving 
problems at the supra-national level. Nevertheless these resolutions 
are the result of collective processes that take the sovereignty of the 
nation-states of which these collectives are composed as sacrosanct 
and inviolable (in theory, if not in practice). If a supra-national sover-
eignty is thereby constituted at the international level, it is only as the 
sum of these national sovereignties, and it has always been beholden 
to the collective will as embodied in this sum of national wills rep-
resented in the General Assembly or the Security Council (the lat-
ter being the embodiment of the other condition without which the 
United Nations could never have formed: the condition that assured 
the hegemony of the major powers).
Wherever new international sovereign elements are instituted, it 
is only through a ratification premised on national sovereign bodies 
as the only legitimate deciders. The problems and impossibilities of 
this system are theoretically, practically and historically obvious. The 
question is: what other way of relating the national and the interna-
tional, beyond just a rearrangement of various actually existing pow-
ers (that is, deckchairs, and ones that are increasingly clearly steering 
towards the iceberg that they can already see), could be contained in 
the resources made available by the concept of the internation?
Elements of an exorganological conception of sovereignty
So as to pursue this question further, let us begin to inquire about 
the elements required in order to subject the concept of sovereignty 
to an exorganological analysis. What exorganological understanding 
can we offer of the concept of sovereignty and what implications can 
we draw from it? The first point it is necessary to make in this regard 
is that sovereignty, especially in the modern world, involves a double 
spatialization.
The first spatialization entailed by sovereignty is the delimita-
tion of a zone of applicability, a territorialization of law, which is to 
say a localization. It is this with which Alain Supiot is concerned in 
‘The Territorial Inscription of Laws’, where he draws attention to the 
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historical contingency and future uncertainty of what came to be a 
strongly-defined association between a particular legal regime and a 
specific territory in the so-called nation-state: there was a time before 
this association, and we seem today to be headed towards its disso-
lution.425 In terms of a time before law was strictly associated with 
a determinate bordered area, there were, for instance, epochs during 
which it was possible for different legal regimes to apply to differ-
ent individuals within the same space of land.426 Like Mauss, Supiot 
understands that the strict territorial sovereignty of the nation-state 
was an outcome centuries in the making and involving multidimen-
sional factors that may both strengthen or weaken the social cohesion 
underlying sovereign institution.
Mauss’s notion of a new internationalism, involving an increas-
ingly interdependent ‘internation’, was motivated by the horror of an 
unprecedented war of nations that seemed to demand reflections on 
how to truly establish the conditions of a lasting peace, so that it may 
be possible to avoid the repetition of destruction on such a scale. What 
Mauss could not have anticipated in 1920, but which Supiot can see 
clearly in 2009, is that the territorializing trajectory that gave right to 
the strong association between territory and sovereign law can also 
be weakened by the intensification of interdependence, and, more spe-
cifically, by the intensification of the economic interdependence that 
results from ecotechnical globalization. The new ideology of ‘univer-
sal laws’ does not exactly correspond to the kind of political ‘cosmo-
politanism’ that Mauss had feared would become the dominant form 
of internationalism, but rather involves those economic pseudo-laws 
propagated by the doctrine of the ‘Total Market’.427
This ‘dissolution of the singularity of territories into an abstract, 
measurable and negotiable space’ is accomplished by processes such 
as ‘law shopping’, or by ‘scoring’ each country in terms of how favour-
able it is for business investment (where the highest score is given 
to the country with the lowest taxes, the least stringent regulatory 
regime, and so on), as the World Bank does, forcing all the nations of 
the world to ‘vie with each other in “territorial competitiveness”’.428 
What Mauss could not see, therefore, was that interdependence, which 
he hoped would foster the conditions of a new peace, would, when 
it took the form of processes of economic interdependence operating 
according to the ideology of the universal market, lead both to a deter-
ritorializing dissolution of the very sovereignty of the nation itself, 
and at the same time to a vast economic war. The consequences of a 
war of this kind, in which we find ourselves thoroughly enmeshed 
today – where the ‘legal supports […] established at the national level 
[…] are being eroded by the process of globalisation’ and thus ‘the 
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rules of the free market are no longer subtended by anything’ – can be 
as devastating as any military conflict, given that, as Supiot concludes, 
these conditions ‘will ineluctably generate insanity and violence’ and 
‘can only lead to ecological, social or monetary catastrophe’.429
Supiot’s analysis is undeniably perspicacious. At the same time, 
this dissolution of sovereignty has what seems to amount to a kind of 
limit, which Supiot describes but perhaps without drawing out all its 
implications (especially since it is with the mention of this limit that 
he concludes the first part of his analysis, on the ‘institution of territo-
ries’, and does not return to this question in the second part, on global-
ization and the ‘deterritorialization of law’). As Supiot rightly points 
out, the basis of all these processes is the law of property, which itself 
has a long and complicated history. But whatever the philosophical 
basis of any supposed right to property, such as Locke’s argument that 
it lies in the ability to work the land with the instrumented hand and 
thereby make it fruitful, the juridical basis cannot be anything but a 
framework of localized laws ultimately dependent on a claim of sov-
ereignty. Hence whatever the tendency towards the erosion of legal 
supports due to globalization, there is also a kind of limit to that ero-
sion, as Supiot acknowledges:
The dominium eminens of the State has not disappeared com-
pletely, however. […] More generally, the right to property 
must operate in conformity with the law. Exercising this 
right even supposes the existence of a sovereign State to 
ensure that the property of each is respected by all.430
This might be framed as a tension between territorialization and 
deterritorialization in the making of a globalized animal with the 
right to make promises (to put it in the terms of Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morality).
It is also, however, a question of the relationship between this 
first spatialization that Supiot describes in terms of the territorial 
inscription of laws, and the second spatialization to which we have 
referred, which concerns the space of literal inscription, and which, 
unlike those tribes and societies based on customary rules, neces-
sarily involves writing down the law.431 In addition to territorial spa-
tialization, then, modern sovereignty is also a matter of the spatial 
materialization of laws in the form of literal tertiary retention – of 
writing. All political sovereignty in the contemporary world is based 
on a foundational document, an artefact printed on paper and signed 
in ink by pen-equipped hands, whose declaratory and performative 
characteristics are taken as marking the commencement of a bordered 
locality and the foundation of a sovereignty lasting in perpetuity. It is 
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probable that there is no lawful constitution of political locality and 
sovereignty anywhere on this planet, on the scale of the nation-state, 
that does not take the form, ultimately, of a written document (and 
it is almost a tautology to say so, since to refer to something as law-
ful essentially means, today, that it has reference to written law). To 
say this is to make a statement about the tertiary retentional basis, 
which is also to say the technical and exosomatic basis, of the endur-
ing nature of what, in ‘Critique of Violence’, Walter Benjamin called 
‘law-making violence’ (or ‘law-positing violence’, a translation that 
better emphasizes the ‘autotelic’ character of this violence, although it 
correspondingly de-emphasizes the fact that such violence is a doing-
that-makes and a making-that-does, a fabrication that performs, as the 
performance of an institution), one of the two kinds of violence that 
Benjamin argues circumscribe the entire field of what he calls ‘vio-
lence as a means’.
In that essay from 1921 (which is to say, at almost the same time 
that Mauss was barely elaborating his thesis on the internation), 
Benjamin argues that the two kinds of violence-as-a-means are law-
making violence and law-preserving violence. To what does the word 
‘violence’ refer here? We can say, firstly, that it has to be understood 
in relation to the kinds of considerations that Nietzsche associates 
with ‘the animal who can make promises’, that is, the being who is 
capable of entering into contracts, because Benjamin is explicit that 
no matter how ‘peacefully it may have been entered into by the par-
ties’, a legal contract always ‘leads finally to possible violence’, and 
thus that ‘the origin of every contract also points toward violence’.432 
For Benjamin as for Nietzsche, the origin of law lies in the possibility 
of enforcing contracts – it is primarily for this reason that it consti-
tutes a ‘means’, and why it is ultimately a question of the means of 
violence: the promise involved in a contract always contains, as its 
basis, the implication of a threat.
But if what Benjamin is concerned with here is violence as a means, 
then, in the case of law-making violence that institutes and consti-
tutes, we can also understand this ‘as a means’ as referring to the abil-
ity to break open a path in existence as Heidegger describes it in 1935, 
which leads Rudolf Boehm to describe Heidegger’s logic as follows:
That the being of man is tekhnē means that he is violent. 
That man is violent means that his being is tekhnē. What, 
then, is the meaning of this word [tekhnē]?433
For Heidegger, this violence of the violence-doer who is ‘man’ (as 
Heidegger says here, rather than Dasein) is what comes out of, runs 
up against, and breaks into the violence of the overwhelming that we 
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have every reason to read (despite Heidegger’s own understanding) as 
referring to the entropic character of the universe, one sign of which is 
the following statement:
There is only one thing against which all violence-doing 
directly shatters. That is death.434
The violence of man that is tekhnē could then be interpreted as refer-
ring to that anti-entropic, or rather anti-anthropic possibility which is 
that of man-the-law-maker (or positer), which, in his turn, Heidegger 
indicates in 1935 by describing the polis not just as the Greek name 
for the state, but as ‘the site of history’ that can be called political only
insofar as, for example, the poets are only poets, but then are 
actually poets, the thinkers are only thinkers, but then are 
actually thinkers, the priests are only priests, but then are 
actually priests, the rulers are only rulers, but then are actu-
ally rulers […] because they as creators must first ground all 
this in each case.435
In other words, they are only an emergence from an originary default 
of origin, but one that must actually quasi-causally and neganthropi-
cally adopt that default so as to be worthy of what happens to them-
selves and their institutions. There is thus an affinity here between 
what Heidegger is talking about and what Benjamin is talking about: 
violence-as-a-means means violence-as-tekhnē, as long as we hear ‘as 
a means’ in this fundamental sense of the enigma or the mystery of 
tekhnē. Violence then means an irruptive possibility, the inscribing 
of a future into becoming by the self-positing of a new law: the ‘auto-
nomous’ character of all sovereignty relates to its capacity for vio-
lence in this sense, and the weakness of the Weimar Republic was for 
Benjamin the sign of the loss of the consciousness of this character:
When the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in 
a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into decay. 
In our time, parliaments provide an example of this. They 
offer the familiar, woeful spectacle because they have not 
remained conscious of the revolutionary forces to which 
they owe their existence. […] They lack the sense that they 
represent a lawmaking violence; no wonder they cannot 
achieve decrees worthy of this violence.436
What Benjamin is describing here (which might well also be 
taken for a description of the nascent League of Nations, if not the 
United Nations) is the decay of representative democracy from the 
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autonomous law-making violence that is the ‘revolutionary’ founda-
tion of any constitutional sovereignty and to the automatisms of a law-
preserving violence unworthy of the name, that is, an empty vessel 
of power unworthy of our collective effort. And this decay from the 
autonomous to the automatic, from sovereign law-making violence to 
merely its preservation, is also what is perceived, rightly or wrongly 
(but often enough rightly), by those who see national sovereignty 
being dissolved into international institutions or economic global-
ization, in both cases seeing the larger locality into which this dis-
solution occurs as amounting to a kind of non-localized machine or 
leviathan that operates purely by calculation, that is, automatically – a 
sovereign without sovereignty, or a functional pseudo-sovereignty: a 
sovereign automaton.
Power and knowledge, care and control, locality and journeying
It is not at all difficult to see that Benjamin’s account of violence-as-a-
means can be reinscribed into an account of the irreducibly localized 
character of exorganic and noetic life, which, as Stiegler has pointed 
out, always involves a primordial opening and a deterritorialization. 
This forms the heart of political life
inasmuch as, essentially, it negotiates a compromise 
between power, which tends to synchronize locally, but 
always in excess of its own locality […], and knowledge, 
which tends to diachronize locally, but always in excess of 
its own locality.437
In these terms, which also relate to and deepen the Maussian idea that 
the social is a function of the intersocial, local diachronization qua 
knowledge corresponds to Benjamin’s law-making violence, while 
law-preserving violence amounts to what Stiegler calls local synchro-
nization qua power. In relation to these correspondences, two points 
are worth making in passing, although we will not have time to go 
into either of them in detail here.
1 This pair, knowledge/power, associated here with the dia-
chronic/synchronic couple and, we are suggesting, with 
Benjamin’s law-making/law-preserving distinction, can 
also be written as care/power: conceived functionally (in 
Stiegler’s Whiteheadian sense, where reason is a funda-
mental and essential characteristic of exosomatization), 
knowledge is always a form of care, such as for example the 
therapeutics required by any transformation of the technical 
system, through the practices of which, alone, the shocks 
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produced by a new technical development can be fruit-
fully adopted thanks to a metastabilizing ‘second moment’. 
What we would like to insist upon is that this knowledge-
as-care is always also a question of control: all culture, as 
a form of care and cultivation, is a form of control – in a 
positive sense.
In associating control with diachrony rather than syn-
chrony (rather than power), therefore, we do not mean ‘con-
trol’ in the sense that Deleuze deploys it in his discussion 
of ‘control society’. And yet: such a control society, which 
is to say the performative modulation of behaviour through 
the desire technologies of the analogico-digital apparatus, 
is possible only because of the prior and irreducible fact 
that all culture is, as knowledge-and-care, a kind of control, 
which is to say, a kind of technically-mediated behavioural 
performativity (in Austin’s sense) operating through pro-
cesses of adoption, involving rituals, games, festivals, cal-
endars, laws, rules and work, a performativity that arranges 
expectations and motivations (that is, behaviour) in time 
and space. This primordial form of control has a relation-
ship to power, we could say, that is akin to the relationship 
of justice to law, or of ethics to morality: control is per-
formative in an infinite way in the sense that it does not 
itself exist (only power exists), but it orientates behaviour 
by knowledgeably aiming it at improbable consistences that 
do not themselves exist except asymptotically – at infinity.
2 It was the Antigone chorus that allowed Heidegger to think 
the being of man in terms of violence-as-tekhnē, and he 
returns to this reading in 1942. If he again takes up the 
Sophoclean ‘ode to man’, it is to press this analysis into the 
service of a reading of Hölderlin’s hymn ‘The Ister’, a poem 
concerned with flows and counter-flows between East 
and West, home and foreign, ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’, past 
and future, space and time. More particularly, Heidegger 
inscribes this analysis of violence-as-tekhnē into a very 
elaborated account of the relationship between locality and 
journeying, or in other words into a relationship between 
territorialization and deterritorialization, that is, between 
locality and the excess over locality that, according to 
Stiegler, conditions the relationships between the syn-
chronic and the diachronic. It is only at and as the first step 
of his account that Heidegger makes the following claim:
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Our claim is this: the river is the locality of the dwelling of human 
beings as historical upon this earth. The river is the journeying of 
a historical coming to be at home at the locale of this locality. The 
river is locality and journeying.438
The stakes involved in Heidegger’s decision to once 
again take up the Antigone chorus in this context and in this 
year have yet to be weighed, and have yet to be weighed in 
particular in the context of the twenty-first century, but, we 
would argue, this forms a crucial hinge between the exis-
tential analytic and the question concerning Gestell in the 
post-truth Anthropocene.
Poetic revolution and the deconstruction of sovereignty
Let us return to Benjamin’s argument that the loss of the knowledge 
of the violence latent in legal institution leads to institutional deca-
dence, or in other words to a regression of sovereignty from the auton-
omous to the automatic, or again, to an elimination of the diachronic 
under the hegemony of the synchronic. Benjamin’s criticism is typi-
cal of many arguments about the fate of sovereignty under technoc-
racy, ecotechnics or Gestell, as the leviathan of politics succumbs to a 
calculating automaton that eliminates in advance the very function of 
sovereignty: collective deliberation and decision on the basis of rea-
son. Such arguments, however, ultimately rest on opposing autonomy 
and automatism: if they must indeed be distinguished, nevertheless 
the automatic is the condition of the autonomous – or, rather, of disau-
tomatization (just as one cannot become a great, that is, autonomous, 
pianist without first and for a long time practising one’s scales).439 
With this thought, we can reinterpret Benjamin’s lament about con-
temporary politics not in terms of an opposition between the automatic 
and the autonomous, but in terms of what Benjamin actually says: this 
woeful spectacle concerns a loss of consciousness, that is, a process 
of forgetting, which threatens every institution. It is a question not of 
opposition but of composition, because the same thing that opens the 
possibility of autonomy (the consciousness of possibility) is the same 
thing that closes it off in forgetting: its tertiary retentional basis.
It is with all this compositional thought in mind that we should 
interpret how Derrida deconstructs sovereignty in early-twenty-
first century (post-9/11) texts such as Rogues and The Beast and the 
Sovereign (and see also a recent article by Mauro Senatore in rela-
tion to Derrida’s ‘deconstruction of the Freudian Trieb’440). In ‘The 
Reason of the Strongest (Are There Rogue States?)’, delivered on 15 
July 2002, Derrida strives to describe the performativity involved in 
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the law-making violence of ‘sovereign self-determination’, that is, 
‘the power that gives itself its own law, its force of law’, in terms of a 
‘desire’ for ‘autotelic’ self-institution.441 The presupposition of sover-
eignty, in order for it to be sovereign, then, is, as Derrida says, that it 
be ‘indivisible’, ‘ahistorical’ and ‘a force that is stronger than all the 
other forces in the world’, hence rooted in what must always be one 
species or another of political theology, but where this then becomes 
the condition of something like democracy but also its perpetual 
threat, which Derrida calls its risk of ‘autoimmunity’. We can hear a 
faint echo and a complication of Mauss’s rejection of the ‘idealism’ of 
cosmopolitan universalism in Derrida’s conclusion that
sovereignty is incompatible with universality even though it 
is called for by every concept of international, and thus uni-
versal or universalizable, and thus, democratic, law.442
Derrida gives the example of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which is not opposed to and does not limit the sovereignty of 
the nation-state: rather, it is an instance of performative law-making 
violence that institutes another sovereignty, that of the human being. 
His conclusion: ‘it thus reveals the autoimmunity of sovereignty in 
general’.443 Or taking the concept of the ‘rogue state’ as an example, 
it can be considered a compensatory fantasy by which states try to 
boost their own national sovereign legitimacy by associating them-
selves with an international sovereignty in relation to which they say 
some other nation-state is deficient, thereby exposing, he thinks, that 
there is no pure sovereignty: sovereignty can only ever be a desire 
that tends, and a tendency that, as a tendency, may always succumb to 
a counter-tendency (which is how Derrida interprets the actions of the 
United States after 9/11).444
Related questions had already been discussed by Derrida four 
months earlier, on 13 March 2002. On that day, Derrida took up his 
argument from earlier in the course that became The Beast and the 
Sovereign, according to which
a political revolution without a poetic revolution of the polit-
ical is never more than a transfer of sovereignty and a hand-
ing over of power445
(but we would immediately want to add that it is also necessary to 
consider the converse: that a poetic revolution without a political 
revolution, or, let’s say, without an organological revolution of the 
mechanisms of power or the technics of sovereignty, risks becoming 
only an epiphenomenal ‘resistance’ within a sovereign context that 
remains untouched, because unreinvented).
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In other words, Derrida is arguing that a real revolution is always 
more than just a transfer of sovereignty: it is a revolution of sover-
eignty itself, which is also to say, a revolution of the political itself, 
a ‘poetic’ revolution in the sense that it ‘breaks into’ existence as a 
transformation of the conditions of singular, idiomatic locality itself. 
It is here that it would be necessary to really enter into the questions 
that Heidegger raises about Hölderlin in relation to ‘locality’ and 
‘journeying’, his assertion that the rivers are the poets,446 and his 
reading of the opening lines of the Ister hymn, ‘Now come, fire! / 
Eager are we / To see the day’, and what they mean for the advent of 
the Ereignis.447 But it is also here that Derrida’s argument that a politi-
cal revolution must also be a poetic revolution is highly reminiscent 
of Heidegger’s stance in 1935 that the polis is the site of history only 
if it contains actual poets (1935: when Heidegger seems to want to 
say, after the failure of the rectorate that had already taken place, that 
the ‘revolution’ of 1933 will not actually be a revolution unless it is 
redoubled with a poetic revolution, raising highly complex and diffi-
cult questions not just about Heidegger’s discourse and politics at this 
time but about the way it is mirrored in Derrida’s in 2002 – the only 
meaningful point being that this difficulty is ours, and we must make 
it ours, as Derrida well knew448).
In short, the problem of sovereignty can never be reduced to a polit-
ical question founded on an opposition between, for example, legiti-
mate and illegitimate violence. This leads Derrida to seek a new kind 
of language with which to describe this problem of sovereignty, that 
is, a non-oppositional language no longer based on ‘pure’ or ‘indivis-
ible’ sovereignty, or on an opposition of the autonomous and the auto-
matic, but on a compositional struggle that needs to be described with 
different kinds of concepts – those of the complications and co-impli-
cations of economy and desire. If what is at stake in politics, he argues,
is not only an alternative between sovereignty and nonsover-
eignty but also a struggle for sovereignty, transfers and dis-
placements or even divisions of sovereignty, then one must 
begin not from the pure concepts of sovereignty but from 
concepts such as drive, transference, transition, translation, 
passage, division. Which also means inheritance, trans-
mission, and along with that the division, distribution, and 
therefore the economy of sovereignty. […] For in fact, as we 
know well, wherever – today more than ever but for a long 
time now – wherever we think we are up against problems 
of sovereignty, […] the question is not that of sovereignty 
or nonsovereignty but that of the modalities of transfer and 
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division of a sovereignty said to be indivisible – said and 
supposed to be indivisible but always divisible.449
And the way we need to view this deconstruction of sovereignty, first 
of all, is as a critique that we must interpret through what we know 
well, in our today: that this compositional struggle for sovereignty is 
also a struggle against the de-composition of sovereignty, that is, the 
decomposition of politics itself, a destitution of political constitution 
that today seems to be unfolding before our every eyes, and precisely 
in those sovereign localities where constitutionality had seemed to be 
most firmly established. And this is so, despite and because of the 
need for a poetico-political revolution of sovereignty itself (which 
is nothing other than the question of the Ereignis – provided that we 
reinterpret this question neganthropologically).
Canguilhem’s immunology of propulsive and repulsive constants
Derrida in this way translates the discourse of sovereignty into the 
language of psychoanalysis. Or, it would be better to say, the ques-
tion of the sovereignty of the higher complex exorganism is translated 
by Derrida into the psychic language of the noetic soul, or, in other 
words, the simple exorganism. For in addition to the (psychoana-
lytic) relationship of desire and drive that it implies (or: does not quite 
imply, but which we can interpret in these terms, Derrida himself, I 
think, leaving some confusion here about the relationship of desire 
and drive), what is at stake is the compositional relationship of physi-
ology and pathology, in Canguilhem’s sense in The Normal and the 
Pathological.
Having defined the object of physiology as the exosomatic being 
who can extend its organs but who can also succumb to the temp-
tation to fall sick, and who thus exceeds its biological constants, 
Canguilhem defines physiology as ‘the science of the stabilized modes 
of life’,450 or, we would say after Simondon, the metastabilized modes 
of life, that is, a threshold of stability always on the way to an instabil-
ity requiring a new stabilization:
There are two kinds of original modes of life. There are 
those which are stabilized in new constants but whose sta-
bility will not keep them from being eventually transcended 
again. These are normal constants with propulsive value. 
They are truly normal by virtue of their normativity. And 
there are those which will be stabilized in the form of con-
stants, which the living being’s every anxious effort will 
tend to preserve from every eventual disturbance. These 
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are still normal constants but with repulsive value express-
ing the death of normativity in them. In this they are patho-
logical, although they are normal as long as the living being 
is alive.451
New modes of life, new metastabilizations, however, ‘can be estab-
lished only after having been put to the test by disrupting an earlier 
stability’.452 Canguilhem identifies two such modes of life, associated 
with two kinds of constants:
 ▪ there are those modes that are associated with constants 
that do not prevent, and in fact enable, their own ‘transcen-
dence’, that is, adjustments based on an encounter with dis-
ruption, leading to the stabilization of a new mode with new 
constants – these constants being in this way ‘propulsive’, 
or, we can say, associated with the regularization of dia-
chronic processes;
 ▪ there are modes that are associated with constants that try 
only to conserve themselves at all costs, without any leeway 
for any disturbance, holding to a normal state without any 
passage to a new normativity (hence containing the ‘death 
of normativity’) – these constants being in this way ‘repul-
sive’, or, we can say, associated with a hyper-synchroniza-
tion leading to unbound hyper-diachronic pathologies.453
In other words, in no way are Canguilhem’s notions of propulsive and 
repulsive constants a question of an opposition between states defined 
as normal/healthy and abnormal/pathological. Rather, these are ten-
dencies and counter-tendencies within the dynamic of the unfolding 
of a disruption that provokes a crisis, tendencies that expose the phys-
iological or pathological character of an existing ‘normal’ in relation 
to that unfolding critical situation.
Hence Canguilhem compares immunity and anaphylaxis, both 
of which are cases of immunological reaction, where the for-
mer leaves the organism ‘insensible’ to an intrusion, while the lat-
ter is an ‘acquired supersensitivity’ that provokes an overreaction. 
Anaphylaxis involves a shock overreaction that can in fact be so dis-
ruptive of the metastability of the systems of the organism that it can 
quite easily prove to be fatal. Immunity, on the other hand, represents 
the immune system’s normal functioning, maintaining its resilience 
and cohesion by neutralizing pathological elements.
The presence of antibodies in the blood is common to both 
forms of reactivity. But while immunity makes the organism 
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insensible to an intrusion of microbes or toxins in the inner 
environment, anaphylaxis is an acquired supersensitivity 
[…]. After a first modification (by infection, injection or 
intoxication) of the inner environment, a second break-in is 
ignored by the immunized organism, while in the case of 
anaphylaxis, it provokes a shock reaction of extreme gravity, 
very often fatal.454
Canguilhem’s primary point, however, is that both immunity and ana-
phylaxis must be considered ‘normal’: they are both forms of reactiv-
ity producing antibodies. It is simply that, in the case of anaphylaxis, 
that reactivity overreacts to a ‘second break-in’ in a way that proves to 
be harmful to the organism:
The presence of antibodies in blood serum is thus always 
normal, the organism having reacted by modifying its con-
stants to a first aggression of the environment and being reg-
ulated by it, but in one case the normality is physiological, in 
the other, pathological.455
Political constitution, constitutive slowness  
and anaphylactic risk
How does this bear upon Derrida’s question: the problem of impure 
sovereignty and the discourse required to describe it? More impor-
tantly, how does it bear upon the organological critique of sovereignty 
insofar as the internation is the name of the problem of locality and 
political constitution at the scale of the national, the international, and 
the relation between them? How does it do so in the context of the 
Anthropocene as a systemic terminus calling for a transformational 
(that is, revolutionary) reinvention of economics, industry, knowl-
edge and desire?
What we are arguing here is that the organological critique of 
political institution we outlined above needs to be inscribed into the 
kind of physiological/pathological standpoint we have just seen via 
Derrida and Canguilhem (which is really to say, an exorganological 
or neganthropological standpoint, in Stiegler’s terms). If temporaliza-
tion means the organized processualization of space, and, more spe-
cifically, the presentation and proliferation of diverse improbabilities 
against the repulsive entropic tendency towards the probable and the 
average, then sovereignty refers to the default of origin that always 
forms the more or less violent basis of the propulsive regularization 
of these improbability-producing diversifications in a locality whose 
singularity is defined and preserved less by this default of origin than 
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by what it opens up: the possibility of a collective belief in the future 
of the sovereign process. What that means, specifically, is that it is a 
question of understanding how the tertiary retentional basis of sov-
ereignty that exists throughout the modern world as the prime arte-
factual foundation of political constitution requires a critique of the 
ways in which it functions propulsively or repulsively in relation to 
the transformation of the Anthropocene called for by the IPCC in the 
space of a single generation of human life, and in which it seems so 
disastrously impossible for any of us today to truly believe, or to find 
the will to truly effect.
If we can say that economics has tended to remain within an eigh-
teenth-century ‘Newtonian’ social physics, in the sense that it is 
based on the notion of psychic atoms who make individual decisions, 
or rather purchasing ‘choices’, motivated by ‘individual’ reasons and 
interests, and who do so in a market context conceived in pre-entropo-
logical terms, then precisely the same claim can be made about politi-
cal conceptions: modern ‘representative democracy’ is premised on 
the notion of psychic atoms who make individual decisions, or rather 
electoral ‘choices’, motivated by ‘individual’ reasons and interests, 
and who do so in a political context conceived in pre-entropological 
terms. Today, these psychic atoms, whether economic or political, 
have been fused into audiences.
Unlike the economic conception of the consumer, however, perpetu-
ally propelled to make increasingly rapid choices about the acquisi-
tion of consumer products to which this consumer must continuously 
adapt, the conception of the citizen on which representative democ-
racy is initially founded (before this atomic fusion based on turning 
citizens into consumers), there is an in-built slowness: the diachroni-
zation towards which representative democracy aims is built on the 
idea that there must be time for deliberation and reflection, both at the 
level of citizens and at the level of their representatives. Parliament, 
congress, assembly, council: such bodies aim towards a spacing of 
the time of decision by relying on the propulsive constants of regu-
lated deliberative processes based on written laws enacted on the 
foundation of political constitutions that are artefactual and artificial 
(defaults of) origins of new localized, singular collective processes 
(and to which can also be added the cumulative character of common 
law mechanisms of legal evolution, which as we will see below have a 
particular status in relation to biological metaphors).
This constitutive slowness is a fundamental notion informing the 
literal tertiary retentions that are the law-making documents of politi-
cal constitution (such as the ‘Declaration of Independence’ leading 
to the ‘United States Constitution’, or the ‘Declaration of the United 
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Nations’ leading to the ‘Charter of the United Nations’: the default of 
origin, which as Benjamin and Heidegger argued is always a kind of 
violence, always also and necessarily involves a tekhnē, and is as such 
complicated). Such documents aim to inaugurate new localized, sin-
gular collective processes not only by opening a mechanism for law-
preserving processes of deliberation and legislation, but also by insti-
tuting the diachronization of their own reproduction across time in the 
form of processes of constitutional change or amendment. But these 
anti-anthropic processes (in Stiegler’s sense) changing or amending 
the foundational document, processes that we could describe as the 
negotiation and arrangement of the diachronic and the synchronic, 
or of the autonomous (or the dis-automatized) and the automatic, 
are always intentionally difficult: they are always framed in order to 
favour a certain inflexibility, which is to say, to guarantee that con-
stitutional evolution operates slowly (the US Constitution has been 
amended a total of 27 times in two centuries, the 27th Amendment 
being ratified 27 years ago in 1992, with this particular amendment 
having been first proposed for ratification in 1789, while the UN 
Charter has never received any substantive amendments other than to 
facilitate the inclusion of new members).
The reason for this principle is clear enough: the framing and found-
ing of a political constitution is or should be a careful (or care-filled) 
process, because such a document is an extreme kind of pharmakon: 
potentially highly beneficial (that is, negentropic) but also highly dan-
gerous (that is, entropic), and the risks brought by any change, and 
especially by rapid and hastily-considered change, always contain 
the threat of becoming a mutation that may send political diachrony 
into a self-destructive vicious spiral. History is littered with examples 
where a constitution too easily amended (or, if not ‘too easily’, then 
as the result of deliberate interference and manipulation, that is, cor-
ruption by power) leads to a distortion and perversion of the political 
process, and is one prime mechanism by which ‘democracy’ regresses 
to ‘demagoguery’. Better too slow than too fast, better too difficult 
than too easy: this is the conservative thought, favouring synchrony 
over diachrony, taking care of subsistence (survival) before existence 
(transformation in the name of what does not exist but consists), that 
lies behind the tendency towards ‘repulsion’ contained in most of the 
‘propulsive constants’ embedded in the foundational documents of 
constitutional sovereignty. What this implies is that, if there is a phar-
macology of speed, then this cannot be divorced from a pharmacology 
of slowness.
But if this is the outcome of an eighteenth-century, pre-entropolog-
ical political conception based on the notion of individualized social 
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atoms, it is nevertheless also the case that there is a strong parallel 
between this conception of constitutional reproduction and the repro-
duction involved in biological evolution. The reproduction of the 
genetic molecule that is the retentional diachronic mechanism of life 
functions, and must function, almost perfectly, which is also to say, 
automatically. This ‘almost’ perfect automatic reproduction is the key 
to the proliferation of life through biological evolution: were there no 
copying errors, a kind of perfect automation of biological reproduc-
tion, then the form of life would be frozen in time, hyper-synchro-
nized, and species would be unable to adapt to changes in the local 
ecosystem. But if there are just a few too many copying errors, then 
this failure and inadequacy of the automatisms of reproduction pro-
duces a preponderance of hyper-diachronic mutations inevitably lead-
ing to fatal distortions and perversions, to unviable monstrosities.456
By keeping such errors to a small but essential minimum, the pro-
cess of reproduction operating via selection and mutation is capable 
of producing a transformation and proliferation, a deferral of entropy 
via the diversification of organs and species, operating at a very slow 
rhythm. What does ‘fast’ or ‘slow’, which are relative rather than abso-
lute concepts of speed, mean in this context? Firstly, it could mean 
compared to the length of a generation or the lifespan of an individ-
ual: evolutionary change necessarily occurs at a rate far slower than 
that of the succession of generations. More fundamentally though, it is 
a question of the relationship to the rhythm of the change of the eco-
system itself, where an ecosystem is above all a milieu or a niche con-
sisting, primarily, in the co-existence of species in perpetual struggle, 
against each other and against entropy, within a localized geographi-
cal and geological environment that itself mostly changes extremely 
slowly relative to the pace of biological evolution.
Extrapolating from this sense, we can see that the biological organ-
ism and the constitutional organism are both, in a way, negentropi-
cally conceived: they are both founded on a necessarily slow, multi-
generational process of self-transformation, where this ‘engineered’ 
slowness is the very basis of propulsive survival against the entropic 
tendency, which is thus presupposed. In this sense, political consti-
tution has always been founded on an intuitive or unconscious rec-
ognition of entropic risk, in spite of the fact that it has remained 
within a Newtonian conception lacking any awareness of the con-
cept of entropy.
But this principle of slowness is itself founded on one fundamental 
assumption: that the rhythm of change of the milieu itself remains 
slow. In the context of the 1930s with which we have been occupied 
here, this is reflected in origins of neoliberalism. As Barbara Stiegler 
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has shown, these origins lie in Walter Lippmann’s conception of polit-
ical economy as a response to the ‘lag’ of the human species, the dis-
crepancy in rhythms between human inclinations that have resulted 
from a long evolutionary history and the demands of a rapidly chang-
ing environment arising much more recently from the great accelera-
tion that is the industrial (or thermodynamic) revolution. Hayek, too, 
as we will see in the next chapter, wishes to root his conception of 
political economy in an understanding of biological evolution and its 
consequences, and in both cases, Lippmann and Hayek, this attempt 
will prove to be somewhat more complex, and thus more of a chal-
lenge, than their critics are willing to acknowledge. For Lippmann, 
this lag, this constitutive slowness of the human species compared 
with the perpetual flux of industrial life, produces a tension between 
flux and a more desirable and liveable ‘stasis’, and the political prob-
lem to which it leads, and which for Lippmann is the problem legiti-
mating the questions of neoliberalism, is that this divorce, this disad-
justment of rhythms, will give rise to nationalisms, fascisms and all 
those isolationisms that amount to so many reactions and overreac-
tions to the instability of a world dominated by endless flux.457
That Lippmann (like Hayek) is an originator of neoliberalism458 does 
not in and of itself invalidate the problem to which he draws atten-
tion – that the relationship between the rhythms of life and industrial 
rhythms can lead to dangerous oscillations – and, as Barbara Stiegler 
concludes, simply avoiding the questions of biology and politics only 
ends up conceding the ground to the most reductive characterizations 
of this relationship.459 A derisory condemnation of Lippmann’s ‘natu-
ralism’ in the name of some superior ‘constructivism’ denuded of any 
biological connection is likely only to end up introducing and relying 
upon a metaphysical opposition that is philosophically regressive and 
politically impotent (and where, what’s more, Hayek himself relies 
on just such an opposition, but with the polarities reversed when he 
distinguishes the spontaneous ordering of kosmos from the artificial 
orders of taxis). Here, we will not attempt to redraw the contours of 
the relationship between biology and politics in any detail, even if we 
agree about the necessity of the project, but we will nevertheless sug-
gest that Lippmann’s question remains ours, now more than ever, and 
in multiple ways, and above all as the question of a new politics and 
philosophy of locality that, precisely, exceeds the metaphysical oppo-
sition of naturalism and constructivism.
Hence, for example, we wish to affirm that if it is true that what 
defines the biological milieu is, firstly and most importantly, all those 
other species occupying a locality and with which the organism inter-
acts or avoids interacting, then one fundamental distinction between 
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species from this perspective is their generational timespan, which is 
also to say, correlatively, their mutation rates. The lifespan of a bacte-
rium before division, for example, is infinitesimally short compared 
to the lifespan of a human being or any animal, which means that 
productive mutations in bacterial forms can occur much more rapidly 
than the ability of animal life to adapt to it through the mechanisms 
of accidental mutation and natural selection. Likewise, the success of 
a virus is a function of the conjunction of the speed of transmission 
between individual hosts and the speed of mutation, opening up the 
possibility, for example, of a seasonal transformation of the milieu 
of a species completely at odds with the pace of its own evolution-
ary adaptive mechanisms. Hence the rapidity of this reproduction and 
mutation mean that these changes have the potential to introduce new 
disease phenomena that may rapidly affect the survival chances of 
more slowly adapting species (and, we can add, this dangerous poten-
tial can easily be exacerbated when it comes into contact with, and 
combines with, the rhythms of industrialization and consumerism that 
contain the possibility of precipitating and transporting pandemics).
The function of the immune system is precisely to make it possible 
for the organism or the species to cope with these rapid evolutionary 
changes affecting its milieu and thus affecting the chances of its exis-
tence: the immune system is an adaptive mechanism operating within 
the individual organism but with prophylactic effects for the species 
as a whole. But we must immediately add that every immune system is, 
strictly speaking, a retentional system, one completely disconnected 
from the nervous system, operating behind the back of consciousness 
but retaining the past in the present in order to recognize the return 
of past threats and neutralize their entropic risk. It is for this reason 
that one cannot (within limits) catch the same cold twice, and this is 
how a perpetual war is set up between the organism and its milieu, 
but fought ‘internally’ and with a different retentional apparatus than 
that utilized in its ‘external’ war. Yet like the psychic apparatus, it is a 
retentional system evolutionarily set up precisely in order to cope with 
evolutionary rhythms that exceed that of the organism and its species. 
Antibiotics and vaccines amount to the exosomatization of the means 
with which this war is conducted, and antibiotic resistance stands as 
testament to the ferocity with which it is conducted and the poten-
tial consequences of losing ground. And, again, it is quite possible to 
see common law as the exosomatic equivalent of this kind of immune 
system at the level of the nation (in Mauss’s terms), common law 
being a retentional apparatus that adapts to changing circumstances 
without constitutional or legislative change but by remembering the 
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lessons learnt from past cases in order to facilitate future judgments, 
that is, decisions.
The conception of modern sovereignty ultimately remains pre-
entropological, however, to the extent that it fails to take account of 
the possibility of disruptions to the milieu occurring more rapidly 
than the ability of constitutional or common law mechanisms to adapt 
to these disruptions – or, rather, to adopt them. Political sovereignty 
remains an eighteenth-century concept because it was only in the 
nineteenth century that rapid changes in the socio-technical milieu 
began to occur (with productivist industrialization founded on heat 
engines and the grammatization of gesture), it was only in the twen-
tieth century that highly rapid psycho-socio-technical changes began 
to occur (with consumerist marketing and the grammatization of the 
audiovisual), and only in the twenty-first century that these muta-
tions of the milieu took the form of that ultra-rapid destabilization of 
‘everything’ that we now call ‘disruption’ (with platform capitalism 
and the digital grammatization of ‘everything’). When change in the 
surrounding environment begins to hasten to this extent, however, 
the pharmacological virtue of slowness turns into an absolute vice, 
as the governing mechanism built on these longstanding propulsive 
constants can no longer keep pace with the rhythm of environmen-
tal change, and thus progressively finds that the constitutional and 
immuno-logical mechanisms designed to cope with these intrusive 
disturbances instead give rise to shock reactions that, more than just 
instances of autoimmunity, prove increasingly to be catastrophically 
anaphylactic.
In relation to endosomatic evolution, one way in which we can 
define the Anthropocene is as the suspension of the basis for this fun-
damental fact of biological life that the milieu will, in general terms, 
always change slowly. The Anthropocene is precisely a question of 
the inability of the propulsive mechanisms of genetic diachrony to 
cope with the vast acceleration of the change of the local milieu that 
is the biosphere-cum-technosphere. The many-generational processes 
required for species adaptation simply cannot cope with an environ-
ment that is completely transformed at the rhythm of centuries, let 
alone decades. Faced with this vast differential of speed between exo-
somatic différance and endosomatic différance, the propulsive con-
stants governing the evolution of life themselves become pathological 
in the sense that what was a synchronized metastability comes to func-
tion as a hyper-synchronic rigidity, inflexibility and non-adaptability.
Yet this is precisely the same situation in which we ourselves, as 
exosomatic beings, find ourselves in this Anthropocene of which we 
ourselves are the authors (however complex a proposition this ‘we 
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ourselves’ may be): the propulsive constants of the institutions with 
which we hope to respond to the vast acceleration of technospheric 
change, constants that hitherto had been the prophylactic mechanisms 
preventing the regression of democracy, find themselves powerless 
– because too slow – to any longer deliberate and decide about such 
reactions. This in-built slowness that was hitherto conceived as a 
guarantor against the slide from democracy to tyranny thereby turns 
into the very lumbering and underreacting inefficacy that precipitates 
this slide, as normative immunological processes, faced with disrup-
tion, succumb to shock reactions leading not just to ‘autoimmunity’ 
but to the risk of catastrophic political anaphylaxis on the largest pos-
sible scale. Political anaphylaxis: that is, suicidal overreactions on the 
civilizational scale, if not the planetary scale.
Furthermore, as we know well today, this is not just a question 
of the growth of technology in general but of the consequences of 
the introduction of those specific technologies that are new tertiary 
retentional systems, firstly analogue and then digital: the risk of psy-
chic and collective anaphylaxis is today greatly exacerbated by the 
vast speed of the algorithmic mechanisms producing proletarianiza-
tion and denoetization relative to the speed of the cultivation and 
transformation of knowledge. In endosomatic life, the evolution of 
nervous tissue and the brain was the elaboration of an entirely new 
retentional system (as was the immune system, as we have seen), one 
whose advantages meant that those species lacking the memory and 
therefore adaptability made possible by the brain found themselves 
in a completely changed milieu, but one in which their own survival 
still depended on change that could occur only at the pace of genetic 
drift. The political organisms of constitutional sovereignty in exoso-
matic life largely find themselves, with respect to these new tertiary 
retentional systems of what is now called ‘platform capitalism’, in the 
same position as plants did in the world into which animals arose: at 
their mercy.
Constitutional political systems are stuck with propulsive constants 
deliberately and with good reason set to a metronomic pace com-
pletely at odds with the rhythms of the tertiary retentional systems 
of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and in particular the sys-
tem of global digital networks. And when we refer to the ‘speed’ at 
which these operate, what this means, first and foremost, at least as 
far as the systems of political sovereignty are concerned, is that the 
performativity of (essentially consumerist) behavioural control made 
possible by these systems is vastly greater than the adoptive perfor-
mativity of citizenship, vastly greater than the engineered speed of 
deliberation and decision-making on which political constitutions are 
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premised. ‘Choice’, for the consumer, the citizen and the representa-
tive, becomes an illusion, and a delusion or a hallucination itself engi-
neered by the very mechanisms that destroy the possibility of actual 
decision, which is to say, the possibility of making (a) différance.
It goes without saying that this is not an easy problem to solve. As 
mentioned, this constitutive slowness is well-founded, because the 
mortal risks of rapid constitutional change are real. Is it a question, 
then, of increasing the pace and loosening the bonds of constitutional 
‘adaptability’, which courts these risks, or of insisting on remem-
bering the continuing virtuousness of institutional slowness, which 
courts the risk of a perpetual lag translating into permanent political 
impotence? If we (somehow) change mechanisms of political consti-
tution so that they can ‘keep pace’ with technological change, if we 
(somehow) shift the basis of sovereignty from a written document to 
some more easily malleable tertiary retentional basis, on the grounds 
that we must move at the pace of disruption, so that we can keep up, 
then is this not almost certainly a recipe for anaphylactic disaster of 
one kind or another?
Yet the reality of the Anthropocene is that the technosphere is 
changing at the pace of disruption, and catastrophically so, requir-
ing transformation at a speed greater than that enabled by the pro-
pulsive mechanisms and institutions of the sovereignties of literal 
tertiary retention. This means that such mechanisms and institu-
tions underreact, lagging further and further and further behind in 
their attempts to deliberate and decide with respect to this transform-
ing environment: hence the graph of carbon emissions continues its 
unabated upward trend. And the symptoms of this lag, combined with 
the hyper-performativity of algorithmic behavioural manipulation, 
themselves produce a vast pathology of overreactive madness and 
stupidity and an immense regression from democracy and towards 
unprecedented and perhaps unimaginable forms of tyranny, within a 
‘post-truth’ age that in turn destroys the capacity for deliberation and 
rational decision-making, neutralizing in advance any possibility of 
a ‘poetic revolution’ and precipitating a headlong rush into a political 
anaphylaxis that could itself easily prove fatal – at a civilizational and 
biospheric scale.
To propose some genuine reinvention of the notion of sovereignty 
itself, at the level of the nation and at the level of the relations between 
nations, is obviously to raise a vast problem, since, in Derrida’s terms, 
it would be to raise the question of a planetary-scale revolution, not 
just political but poetic, that is, idiomatic, localized, knowledgeable, 
desiring, desirable and singular. To raise such a question is surely to 
enter into another kind of madness that consists in gesturing to the 
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absolutely impossible. But if the Neganthropocene is the name of a 
necessity of reinvention of macroeconomics, of industry, of data sys-
tems and of knowledge and desire themselves, at a profound level 
and on a planetary scale, as the only way of addressing the crisis that 
has come to be known by the name of the Anthropocene, then the 
ability or inability of current decision-making macro-institutions to 
effect transformation is an unavoidable question. The function of this 
chapter has been to draw attention to this unavoidability, by conduct-
ing an exorganological critique of the tertiary retentional basis of the 
speed of those institutions, founded as they all are on artefactual and 
artificial written documents designed to regulate the pace of delibera-
tion and decision-making at the national and international levels. Our 
contention is that the internation is, or should be, or must become, also 
the name of the problem this raises in terms of the mismatch between 
the rhythms of change at the levels of different tertiary retentional 
systems and in the context of the anaphylactic risk we face today at 
every level.
7 For a Neganthropology of Markets
Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, 
human beings would perish from the effects of social 
exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social 
dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. 
Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods 
and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety 
jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials 
destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing 
power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for 
shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to 
business as floods and droughts in primitive society.
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
Introduction
What is usually called globalization can be understood as a simulta-
neously and inextricably economic and technological process through 
which the singular character of human localities is ever-increasingly 
undermined and destroyed by the effort to make every aspect of exis-
tence a ‘standing reserve’ for the extraction of profit. Human locali-
ties are defined by all kinds of rules and systems that amount to ways 
of life, forms of culture and political processes, and it is all these that 
are progressively eradicated as globalization continues to produce 
what might well be considered as the universalization and absolutiza-
tion of the market. Nevertheless, it is crucial not to start any analysis 
of these processes by making the error that would consist in opposing 
‘technology’ and ‘culture’, because culture, politics and ways of life 
themselves all have technical conditions – for example, the technics 
of writing, and all the forms of knowledge of how to read and write 
that it entails.
If culture consists of rules and systems, ways of programming 
the relationship to the future, then these always rely, in one way or 
another, on memory supports. In exosomatic life, it is no longer pos-
sible for the rules of genetic or instinctive behaviour to navigate the 
dangerous currents that arrive in the course of an evolution that is no 
longer just biological but technological, and it becomes unavoidably 
necessary to rely on these memory supports and the possibilities they 
offer for retaining, accumulating, transmitting and transforming the 
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lessons that are learned about how to subsist and exist within tech-
nical systems. All of the rules and laws and systems and cultures 
that have arisen in human collectivities amount to localized ways 
of intervening in or stabilizing the process of exosomatic evolution 
that has been ongoing for two or three million years, adding up to so 
many ways of selecting from among exosomatic possibilities, where 
the criteria for such selections consist in forms of knowledge (under-
stood in a very broad sense). It is all these forms of knowledge, and 
the education and transmission systems that support them, that, too, 
are destroyed by the relentless advance of globalized exosomatiza-
tion, including in its most technologically developed and accelerated 
stage, for which various names have been offered, such as platform 
capitalism, algorithmic governmentality, and disruption.
One significant consequence of this progressive destruction of 
localities and local specificities has been the counter-production of 
all manner of reactive symptoms, through which individuals and 
groups of one kind or another express and act out their feelings of 
frustration, powerlessness and resentment about this seemingly inevi-
table process of technologization devoid of socialization. But these 
attempts to in one way or another resist the onslaught of unsocialized 
and delocalized globalization inevitably remain reactive precisely in 
the sense that these individuals and groups have been dispossessed of 
forms of knowledge that would make it possible to take action, that 
is, to effectively imagine and realize positive alternatives, which is 
also to say, alternative selections from among exosomatic possibilities 
and new ways of relating to and exchanging these exosomatic pos-
sibilities. If politics remains a possibility of human existence today, it 
cannot consist in the reactive attempt to resist the deterritorialization 
of globalization without addressing the loss of knowledge that is the 
very condition of possibility of locality; politics can consist only in 
the struggle against those tendencies undermining knowledge and for 
new tendencies likely to re-engage forms of knowledge and to gener-
ate the desire to live well, both locally and de-locally (that is, globally, 
because the latter also has the perpetual possibility of opening up new 
localities and forms of locality).
It is important to recognize that these reactive symptoms, which try 
to hold back the tide of the destruction of localities without leading 
to new knowledge-able and reason-able and desire-able possibilities, 
are not limited to the politics of nationalism or xenophobia found in 
reactionary forms of right-wing politics or religious fundamentalism 
or terrorism. They are also common in forms of left-wing politics 
fixated on questions of identity, resistance to power or spectacles of 
protest unaccompanied by meaningful visions of a pathway towards a 
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deproletarianized future. Whether right-wing reactions are more dan-
gerous than left-wing reactions is beside the point: what makes this 
situation most dangerous is the way all of these poisonous reactions 
combine and reinforce each other. In all of these symptoms, there is 
something that is right, which is to say that all of them reflect one 
or another form of real suffering, one or another form of real prole-
tarianization, one or another form of injustice, but there is always 
also something wrong, because they are based on a distorted pictured 
since they are not founded on any critique capable of shifting from 
resistance to invention, that is, to the possibility of inventively bifur-
cating towards an alternative future.
At the same time, globalization and disruption have led to the 
destruction not just of human localities but of biological ones, that is, 
ecosystems, including the planetary-scale ecosystem that is the bio-
sphere. In particular, the continued extensive use of fossil fuels as the 
means of powering these global processes, ever since the thermody-
namic revolution that began in the nineteenth century, has proven to 
have disastrous consequences for climatic systems, and consequently 
for all those ecosystems whose sustainable functioning depends on 
the more or less stable continuation of similar climatic conditions. 
But fundamental to the continuation of this biospheric crisis is that 
destruction of all the rules, systems and knowledge that hitherto had 
been the very basis for struggling against the dangerous possibilities 
always brought by technological evolution (but previously always on 
smaller scales): the destruction of human localities is thus also the 
destruction of the possibility of responding positively and inven-
tively to the destruction of ecosystemic localities and the biospheric 
locality itself.
Without doubt, this very dangerous situation risks both macroeco-
nomic crisis and what we have referred to in the previous chapter as 
political anaphylaxis, and as such demands a new critique of politi-
cal economy, as Bernard Stiegler has argued.460 Karl Polanyi argued 
that it was the very rise of the self-regulating market, which is to say 
the automation of economic exchange processes, that necessitated 
‘the institutional separation of society into an economic and a politi-
cal sphere’,461 so that the latter might curtail the absolute character 
of the former. For Mauss, the notion of the internation examined in 
the previous chapter had to address both these dimensions of the 
political and the economic. It would necessarily entail a reinvention 
of the national that, as Jean Terrier describes, implies ‘the extension 
of popular control to the economic sphere, i.e. the development of 
social property in the form of cooperatives’.462 For Stiegler, whatever 
the internation names, it must be accompanied by and is inseparable 
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from a new economic approach, which he refers to as the ‘economy 
of contribution’ or the ‘contributory economy’. Despite this acknowl-
edgment, and the significant work undertaken to reinvent forms of 
accounting and certification, especially at the microeconomic and 
mesoeconomic levels, Stiegler’s neganthropological account has yet 
to delineate a vision of how this new economy, taking the struggle 
against entropy and anthropy as its fundamental criterion and value, 
could be scaled up to the global macroeconomic level evoked with the 
concept of the internation. This chapter aims to sketch out elements 
of this problem by turning to some key economic thinkers of the past 
and present.
The contributory economy and the market
The essence of the idea behind the contributory economy consists in 
acknowledging that the disembedded, absolutized and computational 
market, as the destroyer of localities and knowledge, must be replaced 
by new economic models that facilitate and encourage the creation 
of localities and knowledge, including new kinds of localities and 
new kinds of knowledge, through a reinvention of work conceived as 
knowledgeable economic action (as opposed to proletarianized labour, 
itself increasingly replaced by automation and robotization). The 
internation, at least as Mauss sees it, amounts to a call for the inven-
tion of a new geopolitical process, distinct from the ‘universalized’ 
internationalism of globalization but also from the reactive ‘particu-
larism’ of nationalism. Only such a political reinvention, enriching 
the wealth of nations while simultaneously intensifying their mutual 
interdependence, combined with the widespread introduction of local 
contributory economies, so the argument goes, would be capable of 
producing political processes capable of making good collective deci-
sions with respect to the highly urgent and large-scale problems with 
which we are currently faced, not just in terms of the toxicity being 
unleashed on the biosphere but equally the toxicity we are introducing 
into our political, cultural and social atmosphere.
One virtue of this two-pronged response consists in the fact that, 
contrary to most defences of the local against the global, the cosmo-
politan or the universal, it conceives human locality on a basis other 
than the opposition of ‘culture’ (or ‘society’ or ‘nation’) to ‘technol-
ogy’. Behind the notions of contributory economy and internation is 
the thought that every kind of locality stems from the irreducibly local 
character of the endosomatic or exosomatic struggle against entropy, 
that is, against the tendency towards the flattening out of difference 
and diversity brought by the tendency towards the probable and the 
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average. And it recognizes that, in the case of human localities, this 
struggle against entropy, a struggle conducted for and with the means 
of knowledge, is never opposed to technology but rather always occurs 
in technological conditions, that is, exosomatic conditions, and more 
precisely in mnemotechnological conditions, that is, in hypomnesic 
conditions. Economics always involves forms of knowledge con-
cerned with what to do with, how to deal with, and how to exchange 
the products of exosomatization in a particular epoch, within a local-
ity and between localities (whether adjacent localities or between 
scales of locality).
One potential problem with this approach, however, consists in the 
possibility that the economic and political elements of this response 
may not have been drawn deeply enough from the critique of political 
economy that forms their basis. This critique asserts not just that glo-
balization, disruption, algorithmic governmentality and platform cap-
italism destroy localities, knowledge and the biosphere, but that they 
do so for systemic reasons connected to the character of the global 
macroeconomic model. But more than that, it argues, as far as I under-
stand it, that this model destroys itself, by asserting:
1 that the basis of this model lies in the entropy-denying fan-
tasy of perpetual growth;
2 that the basis of this perpetual-growth model lies in the fan-
tasy that consumption can perpetually increase;
3 that in the twentieth century capitalists learned that to 
invest in mass production and conquer new markets they 
must capture the desire of consumers in order to influence 
their behaviour, which, they discovered, it is possible to do 
on a mass basis through the calculated use of audiovisual 
technologies;
4 that what fuels the attempt to perpetually increase con-
sumption today is the exploitation of desire and libidinal 
energy by algorithmic marketing exploiting both audiovi-
sual technologies and digital, network technologies;
5 that this exploitation of libidinal energy has the self-defeat-
ing tendency to deplete the energy of those consumers on 
which it depends, by undermining long-term desire and 
exploiting the drives;
6 that this consumerist perpetual-growth model also drives 
a shift towards a large new wave of automation and 
robotization;
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7 that this drive to automate has the self-defeating tendency 
to undermine the employment base on which this post-
Keynesian consumerist model also ultimately depends in 
order to ensure the purchasing power and confidence neces-
sary for the continuous increase of consumption.
The contributory economy responds to this final point – the destruc-
tion of employment – by introducing new forms of local economic 
activity conducive to new forms of work, that is, new forms of indi-
vidual economic behaviour capable of producing knowledge rather 
than destroying it. It is also an attempt to reverse the depletion of 
libidinal energy by introducing mechanisms that will have the effect 
of stimulating ways of life and fostering long-term desire. The way it 
does so is by experimenting with and elaborating new economic mod-
els based on the possibility of either remunerating non-market activ-
ity (outside employment) or forming anti-entropic local markets.
It is less clear, however, how these mechanisms (contributory econ-
omy and internation) can respond to all the elements of the critique 
from which they emerge: if the cause of the current urgent biospheric 
crisis lies in the very foundations of the consumerist perpetual-
growth macroeconomic model, then how can the contributory econ-
omy in fact replace that model with another macroeconomic model on 
the scale of the whole planet? If such a thing were imaginable, would 
it be a matter of (a) applying the contributory model to the whole 
global technosphere, or would it on the contrary be a matter of (b) 
somehow scrapping the global system altogether and replacing it with 
a diverse set of medium-scale contributory economies, each related 
according to some principles other than those of the market? If (a), 
then the question is: but how can an entire planet function according 
to a contributory model? If (b), then the question is: but how can a 
planetary network of local economies sustainably interact according 
to principles other than those of the market? The simple and naïve 
answer would be: through the recognition that however much short-
term national interests may differ between nations, they share the 
same long-term interest of ensuring the sustainability of their com-
mon biospheric locality, and therefore ought to be capable of nego-
tiating principles of exchange founded on anti-entropic criteria. But 
if this then implies that the answer to either (a) or (b) is, ‘through 
the formation of new global regulatory institutions’, then a further 
political question becomes: what is the basis of the legitimacy or sov-
ereignty of such institutions? And the economic question becomes: 
what are the mechanisms by which such institutions either control or 
replace the global market?
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One reason for this dilemma is ambiguity about the concept of 
‘market’. As mentioned, Stiegler’s work makes clear that the funda-
mental question of economics is the generation of selection criteria 
for exosomatic possibilities and impossibilities, and that these crite-
ria changed in the Anthropocene age: from spiritual, religious and 
also scientific criteria to those of the hegemonic market – calculation 
and rationalization applied at every level and in every dimension and 
field. It thus makes clear that the problem is not economics but the 
market, or rather, a shift in the nature, extent and function of markets. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the contributory economy and 
the market still seems somewhat unclear, and this lack of clarity lies 
at the root of the problem of relating the small-scale notion of the con-
tributory economy (producing new kinds of markets on non-consum-
erist foundations) to the very large-scale problem of the consumerist 
perpetual-growth macroeconomic model itself (on which all smaller 
scale markets currently ultimately depend).
Stiegler on information, knowledge and the market
Stiegler’s article, ‘The New Conflict of the Faculties and Functions: 
Quasi-Causality and Serendipity in the Anthropocene’, published in 
Qui Parle in 2017, is a version of a text that will be published the 
following year in another version as the afterword of the French re-
publication of the three volumes of Technics and Time, intended as 
a bridge to subsequent volumes. It begins by making a connection 
between the concept of negentropy and the Derridian notion of dif-
férance (given that both of these name deferrals that produce dif-
ferentiations), and by noting the numerous attempts to take account 
of the concepts of entropy and negentropy in other scientific fields. 
In another text, he notes that, as far as ‘conceptual transfers’ of the 
concepts of entropy, negentropy and anti-entropy into the human and 
social sciences are concerned, the results have all been ‘more or less 
disastrous’, and mostly ceased after the publication of an article by 
René Thom in 1980.463 Yet he argues that these failures do not jus-
tify the abandonment of these questions, and to pretend otherwise 
amounts to ‘a regression and a denial’.464
Stiegler then takes specific note of the work of Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen, for whom our economic behaviour involves negentropic 
processes associated no longer with the biological beings that evolve 
through endosomatization but with the technical beings associated 
with what Alfred Lotka called ‘exosomatic evolution’, a key differ-
ence of the latter being that behaviour is conditioned no longer by 
instinct but by desire and knowledge, both of which are irreducible to 
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instinct. Such knowledge is acquired and contained not on the scale 
of the species, but on the territorial scale of the tribe or the ethnic-
ity or the society, a singularization and idiomatization always also on 
the way to becoming deterritorialized. Stiegler argues that the pro-
cesses whereby knowledge is now deterritorialized, industrialized 
and automated on a planetary scale – processes whose common names 
are globalization and the Anthropocene – call for a new approach to 
knowledge in general, and in terms of its faculties and functions in 
particular. More pointedly, he argues that these processes, which are 
also equivalent to the furthest, computational development of what 
in the Grundrisse Marx called ‘fixed capital’, are ultimately entropi-
cally self-destructive and thus require a ‘new economy […] based on 
the constant critique of the limits of exosomatization insofar as it is 
pharmacological’.465
From there, Stiegler returns to an argument put forward in Technics 
and Time, 2 concerning the difference between knowledge and infor-
mation, and with the way this distinction arose in the nineteenth 
century with the development of newspapers, advertising and tele-
communication networks. Despite the seeming difficulty that these 
notions have produced in the history of, for example, information 
theory (as well as in economics), Stiegler’s distinction between them 
is perhaps surprisingly straightforward: whereas information tends to 
lose value over time, this is not the case for knowledge, which can 
continue to rise in value and for unpredictable reasons. What causes 
this loss of value of information? In these terms, value means the dif-
ference a bit of information makes or can make to me, in the sense of 
an advantage I can have that others don’t have. If so, then the spread 
of information that occurs when it is broadcast (for example, in news-
papers, on television, over the internet) decreases that difference as 
this information becomes a difference held in common (which is to 
say, no longer a significant difference).
Yet this is so only because information is then also a commod-
ity and because the space in which it is diffused is also a market, ‘a 
computational milieu that turns behaviors into inherently calculable 
objects’.466 On this market that has developed since the nineteenth 
century, knowledge is more and more turned into information, which 
is to say turned into calculable value for particular interests. Since 
this general spread of information depends on eliminating everything 
incalculable, however, it ultimately leads to the evaporation of its 
value, which is to say that it succumbs to informational entropy. It 
is also to say that it undermines psychosocial negentropy, because, 
as irreducibly singular, local and idiomatic, knowledge and desire 
always exceed the calculable, aiming at idealities that exist only at 
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infinity, or in other words that do not exist, but consist. Even the geo-
metrical point, for example, does not exist, and is even defined by 
its inexistence, but it is starting from this consistent but non-existent 
point that geometry has extended a chain of knowledge lasting more 
than two and a half millennia.
Stiegler’s conception of knowledge, then, is grounded in the thought 
that philosophical questions about, for instance, the division of fac-
ulties, cannot be separated from economic or bioeconomic questions 
about the function of knowledge, where the latter provides the local-
ized criteria for selections among individual and collective behav-
ioural possibilities. Before it is understood in relation to information, 
knowledge must be conceived as an evolutionary process for forms 
of life that are no longer just endosomatic, in which the struggle for 
the continuation of this evolution is no longer just biological, but eco-
nomic. Because epistemological concepts therefore possess an eco-
nomic dimension, and vice versa, Stiegler argues that the ‘new econ-
omy’ must be ‘founded on a neganthropology’, that is, on a form of 
thought that is also a form of care, in which the critique of the limits 
of exosomatization implies the need not just for concepts of entropy 
and negentropy, but ‘anthropy’ and ‘neganthropy’ – addressing the 
absolutely irreducibly ‘pharmacological’ character of exosomatiza-
tion as a form of life that is dependent upon artificial and technical 
(organized but inorganic) forms of memory (which Stiegler calls ‘ter-
tiary retention’ and more particularly hypomnesic tertiary retention).
It is the circuits of these retentional forms that open up the pos-
sibility of the accumulation of knowledge, but it is these same reten-
tional forms that make it possible to turn knowledge into calculable 
information, and then computationally calculable information. More 
generally, this pharmacological character of the tertiary retentional 
systems of exosomatic evolution means that the processes involved 
in exosomatic evolution, which are not just biological but economic, 
can, if we are insufficiently careful, lead to increases of entropy and 
anthropy at the expense of negentropy and neganthropy. Thus far, 
we, exosomatic beings, have not been careful enough, especially as 
the absolutized market extends its reach to every corner of the planet 
and every field of existence. The aim of any ‘new economy’ capable 
of responding to the limits of the Anthropocene must therefore be to 
maximize negentropy and neganthropy while minimizing entropy 
and anthropy, within that ‘locality’ whose dimensions are today those 
of a thoroughly anthropized biosphere. Essential to a new negan-
thropic macroeconomic system, therefore, is the cultivation of forms 
of knowledge and desire capable of engaging in the perpetual struggle 
to take care of contemporary exosomatic evolution.
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Individuation, disindividuation and the market
Stiegler thus presents an account of the Anthropocene as essentially 
involving the rise of a form of economic organization in which the 
market becomes increasingly ‘absolutized’ and ‘hegemonic’, with the 
consequence that knowledge is increasingly turned into information 
within the locality of a market that is itself increasingly de-localized, 
that is, globa-loca-lized. But do all markets contain this tendency 
towards absolutization insofar as calculation forms an irreducible 
element of market behaviour, in which case the problem of the abso-
lutized market is simply what arises with the exacerbation of this 
tendency as markets extend beyond sustainable limits? Or does this 
absolutization stem from a transformation of the very notion of the 
market, so that it stops being one kind of thing and instead becomes 
another kind of thing, implying that there could be or have been mar-
kets that are not founded on calculability at all, or for which this ele-
ment remains inessential? What is a market?
Stiegler’s ‘general organology’, or more recently his ‘exorganol-
ogy’, is describable in modified Simondonian terms as involving three 
strands of individuation – psychic, collective and technical individu-
ation. None of these three unfinished and ongoing individuation pro-
cesses can be extricated from the other two without collapsing, which 
does not mean that the unfolding of this collapse cannot last a long 
time. The opening of exosomatization (or what Leroi-Gourhan called 
exteriorization) leads to the advent of a technical individuation pro-
cess that is both cause and consequence of hominization. The latter 
is irreducibly psychosocial in the sense that the individuation of the 
individual is not possible outside of the individuation of the group, 
while the individuation of the group is possible only insofar as it is 
composed of different individuals, each individuating singularly, this 
separation and connection of psychic and collective individuation 
(via technical individuation) being in contrast to the vital individu-
ation processes characteristic of endosomatic evolution, which defers 
entropy by differentiating itself into organs and species within the 
possibilities that arise within a niche or an ecosystem.
From such a perspective, should we conclude that a market is a col-
lective individuation process, such as, for example, the village mar-
ket in which farmers, artisans and other locals would congregate to 
exchange goods, whether by barter, truck, exchange or sale, but also 
to exchange knowledge about many things directly related to those 
goods but also about many things only indirectly related to them? 
Are such markets – which are, precisely, local in the sense of form-
ing more or less centralized meeting points of exchange, inhabiting a 
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localized system of multi-dimensional knowledge – of a completely 
different type from the market (or the Market), or does the latter just 
amount to the accentuation of the negative pharmacological charac-
teristics of the technical aspect of any such market?
Would what we today call ‘the market’ then amount to a disindivid-
uation process resulting from these negative pharmacological charac-
teristics, where this form of the market doesn’t truly catch hold until 
the nineteenth century (even if the enclosure of the commons and the 
extension of global trade through colonial enterprise set the condi-
tions for the rise of this market), and which has now become compu-
tational, premised on the ‘general equivalence of everything’ (that is, 
on the calculability of information, to some extent no longer premised 
on money but on data ‘itself’) and thus on its ‘universality’ (that is, 
its absolute delocalizability)? Or could it be that what happens in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries is that the market disindividuates 
itself as a collective individuation process and hypostasizes itself as 
a technical individuation process, and a highly pharmacological one 
at that, with the power to unravel from, and undermine, all forms 
of collective individuation? But under what conditions and through 
what mechanism could a collective individuation process find itself 
transformed into a purely technical individuation process? And if so, 
is this transformation reversible: is it possible for the market to once 
again become a collective individuation process, even at a planetary 
scale, and under what conditions? Or must we look towards some new 
dream in which the market assumes some form never hitherto seen, in 
which case what?
The neganthropological purpose of such questions would be to 
enable us to begin forming an idea of: (1) how the Stieglerian presen-
tation of markets and information relates to the way these are con-
ceived in economics; (2) what role the market or markets would then 
play in the ‘new economy’ called for by Stiegler; and (3) how this new 
neganthropic economy of contribution can possibly be scaled up to 
replace the global market responsible for the vastly anthropic charac-
ter of the so-called Anthropocene.
Polanyi and the disembedding of the market
Michel Bauwens has a conception of a possible economic future 
that is quite closely related to Stiegler’s, although the two are far 
from identical. In an introduction to a report on P2P Accounting for 
Planetary Survival, he argues that new economic tools are required 
in order to respond to our increasing recognition of ‘systemic crisis 
and its relation to ecology’.467 For Bauwens, the idea of the ‘commons’ 
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amounts to a ‘third dimension’ beyond the two poles represented by 
Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Polanyi in the so-called ‘calculation 
debates’ concerning the relative merits of the free market economy 
and the centrally planned economy. By taking up the tools of mutual 
coordination, shared logistics and shared accounting, new ethical 
exchange mechanisms, and a new planning framework in which eco-
nomic choices are embedded in an understanding of the needs of the 
biosphere, Bauwens argues in favour of what he calls ‘cosmo-local 
production’, where knowledge will be shared globally but production 
will be as local as possible, so as to optimize the reduction of the so-
called human footprint.
Bauwens thus wants to transcend an opposition between two eco-
nomic poles, understood in terms of planning versus freedom and 
corresponding politically to the positions of socialism and liberalism. 
The planned economy that lies behind the scenes of this picture is 
that of the Soviet Union and the free market referred to here is that of 
Hayek, understood as the father or the grandfather of the free market 
absolutism that has come to be commonly known as neoliberalism. 
Yet neither of these positions characterized the global ecotechnical 
system that dominated the second half of the twentieth century, based 
on Keynesianism, the welfare state and consumerism, and whose 
vestiges remain even today, even if greatly modified. Insofar as the 
Keynesian economic model whose seeds were planted after the Great 
Depression and which bore fruit until the 1970s was neither a social-
ist planned economy nor the naked neoliberalism that would not take 
hold until the 1980s (by taking advantage of the opportunity pre-
sented by the crisis of Keynesianism), was this not already a matter of 
transcending these two poles?
This Keynesian model, which formed the macroeconomic basis 
of consumerist capitalism, arose only when it became clear that the 
economics of capitalism could dismiss the politics of representative 
democracy only at its peril. That is, it arose from out of a power strug-
gle in which centralized planning and brutal but empty ‘freedom’ 
were already framed as the opposition to be overcome, even if this 
was only after the capitalist ‘flirtation’ with extreme authoritarian-
ism, a context described well by Colin Crouch:
But equally, and increasingly during the course of the 19th 
century, property owners sought defence from interfer-
ence in their rights by the property-less, the great mass of 
the population. Democracy was the potential enemy of the 
capitalist economy. As political movements representing the 
industrial working class gravitated towards Marxist ideas, 
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these fears became very real. Often property owners decided 
that, if forced to choose between an anti-liberal regime that 
would still defend property rights and a liberalism that was 
sliding towards democracy, they would prefer the former. 
During the 1920s and 1930s this led many to make a further 
compromise, preferring the demotic anti-liberalism of fas-
cism and Nazism, antithesis though that was to 19th-century 
liberalism, to a democracy that increasingly seemed to imply 
Bolshevism.468
Polanyi offered a similar analysis in 1932, and in addition made clear 
how this situation gives rise to what Benjamin called the decay of 
political institutions when the consciousness of their latent violence 
is lost. He also clarified the way in which this decay is virtually 
bound to be expressed in two forms: on the one hand, the ‘woeful 
spectacle’ that Benjamin observes when politics forgets its origins 
and is thereby left barren, and which Mauss calls cosmopolitanism; 
on the other hand, the reactionary authoritarianism of the local poli-
tics of nationalism, fascism and so on. Here, Gareth Dale summarizes 
Polanyi’s position, after discussing the latter’s notion of Übersicht, a 
capacity for oversight without which, for Polanyi, a rational economy 
is impossible, which is to say an economy that knows how to form 
prices neganthropically:
The loss of overview, Polanyi concluded, is ‘the deepest 
cause of the chasm between democracy and economy’.
Polanyi wrote those words in 1932, and the chasm to 
which he refers was to become a central element in his 
explanation of the interwar crisis. Capitalism and democ-
racy, he argued, had once been bedfellows. But now they 
had entered a condition of permanent conflict, in which lib-
eralism had rallied to the interests of capital, tossing aside 
the flame of democracy. Once a tribune of democracy and 
competition, liberalism had since the 1870s been ‘barren’; 
it now kowtowed to monopoly capital and supported either 
‘neo-democracy’, a pale and derivative reflection of the real 
thing, or out-and-out authoritarian reaction.469
The difference in these portrayals is only that the turn to an authori-
tarianism willing to guarantee property rights is presented by Crouch 
as a turn away from bourgeois liberalism and by Polanyi via Dale 
as a turn of that liberalism. In any case, pale, barren, sterile pseudo-
democracy or out-and-out authoritarian reaction are the political 
poles that seemed to appear in the interwar period as a consequence 
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of the historical divorce of capitalist economics and representa-
tive democracy.
If for Benjamin this distribution of outcomes stems from the forget-
ting of the revolutionary violence of political institution, for Polanyi 
it is much more directly a long-term consequence of a particular revo-
lution – the Industrial Revolution – whose fundamental characteris-
tic was the shift from markets to a ‘market economy’. Polanyi rec-
ognized, however, that this shift ‘cannot be fully grasped unless the 
impact of the machine on a commercial society is realized’,470 which 
in Stieglerian terms we would express as the fact that this market 
economy was made possible by the thermodynamic revolution of the 
steam engine and the revolution of grammatization exemplified in 
Jacquard’s loom. For Polanyi, a market is simply ‘a meeting place for 
the purpose of barter or buying and selling’.471 What’s more, markets 
originate to a large extent as meeting places for the transacting of long 
distance trade, that is, trade between localities, and, for this reason, in 
‘primitive society […] local markets are of little consequence’ for an 
understanding of the economic cohesion and functioning of the local-
ity itself.472 It is only as society becomes more complex, and espe-
cially with the introduction of the industrial machine, that the ‘market 
pattern’ begins to assume a larger role conditioning the character of 
local economies, because the greater the complexity of an economy, 
the more necessary it is to ensure that the elements of that complex-
ity are arranged and supplied in a highly coordinated way, for which 
prices become the regulatory mechanism.
Even so, such market relations continued to be embedded in what 
Polanyi calls social relations, where the latter served as an external 
regulatory mechanism, through which, for example, ‘the peace of 
the market was secured at the price of rituals and ceremonies which 
restricted its scope while ensuring its ability to function within the 
given narrow limits’.473 Only with a great phase-shift in complexity 
did this situation change to one in which social relations would be 
embedded in the ‘economic system’, as the functional character of the 
market shifted to become a self-regulating system directed by prices 
and nothing but prices:
The step which makes isolated markets into a market econ-
omy, regulated markets into a self-regulating market, is 
indeed crucial. The nineteenth century […] naïvely imag-
ined that such a development was the natural outcome of 
the spreading of markets. It was not realized that the gear-
ing of markets into a self-regulating system of tremendous 
power was not the result of any inherent tendency of markets 
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toward excrescence, but rather the effect of highly artificial 
stimulants administered to the body social in order to meet a 
situation which was created by the no less artificial phenom-
enon of the machine.474
What Polanyi here describes is an automation of market function-
ing, through the introduction of artifices in the form of new automa-
tisms. This came at the expense of social autonomy, ultimately giv-
ing rise, through being unrestricted, unlimited and disembedded, to 
the alternative between the ‘woeful spectacle’ of political automation 
and the anaphylactic reaction to it represented by those authoritarian 
crystallizations that sacrificed psychic autonomy to the automatisms 
of the crowd.
The shift from markets to ‘One Big Market’475 involves more than 
just an agglomeration of markets, for Polanyi, because these ‘highly 
artificial stimulants’ transform non-commodities into commodities. 
While a commodity is something made for the purpose of being sold 
on the market, the vast complexity of the machine-based economy 
means that all elements necessary for the functioning of that economy 
must be treated according to the fiction that they are commodities 
when they are not. More specifically, it was necessary to create new 
markets ‘for labor, land, and money, their prices being called respec-
tively […] wages, rent, and interest’.476 Neither labour, nor land, nor 
money, Polanyi insists, are so made, and thus their commodification 
as wages, rent and interest count precisely as the introduction of pro-
cesses based on such highly artificial stimulants.
What necessitates the introduction of these particular stimulants is 
the advent of ‘more complicated industrial production’. In societies 
based on industrial production, capitalists must ensure a ready supply 
of labour, land and money, but these three elements could only be ade-
quately guaranteed by liberating them from the constraints of social 
embedding. For that reason, industrial society depended on these non-
commodities ‘being made available for purchase’, an ‘extension of the 
market mechanism’ that was ‘the inevitable consequence of the intro-
duction of the factory system in a commercial society’.477
Now this consequence is for Polanyi based on something false; 
these artificial stimulants are essentially fictitious:
But labor, land, and money are obviously not commodi-
ties; the postulate that anything that is bought and sold 
must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in 
regard to them. In other words, according to the empirical 
definition of a commodity they are not commodities. Labor 
is only another name for a human activity which goes with 
Daniel Ross 254
life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for 
entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached 
from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only 
another name for nature, which is not produced by man; 
actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power 
which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being 
through the mechanism of banking or state finance. None 
of them is produced for sale. The commodity description of 
labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious.478
This commodification of labour, money and land can be reinter-
preted today as describing the processes referred to as proletarian-
ization, financialization (including and enabling Crouch’s priva-
tized Keynesianism) and the anthropization by which the biosphere 
becomes a thoroughgoing technosphere. For Polanyi, all of these 
are symptoms of that great disembedding by which the market was 
able to continue the unfettered pursuit of self-regulation, via ‘highly 
artificial stimulants’ and ‘fictitious commodities’, and to do so 
beyond all limits.
Hayek and the two sources of order
As we have seen, Michel Bauwens argues for a ‘cosmo-local’ 
approach to the economics of production, in which knowledge is 
shared globally but production is kept as local as possible. Without 
wishing at all to challenge this idea, we would like however to draw 
attention to the complexity of the concept, which Bauwens frames as 
a matter of transcending the classical economic opposition between 
planning and freedom, represented respectively by Polanyi and 
Hayek. But is Hayek a straightforward enemy of the cosmic or local 
character of knowledge? It’s complicated. Given Polanyi’s position as 
the economist who thinks the great transformation that we now call 
the Anthropocene in terms of the disembedding of the economy, that 
is, as the distillation of the market considered as an abstract machine 
divorced from all localized knowledge and social relations, we might 
well assume that Hayek, as the patron saint of what Philip Mirowski 
calls the Neoliberal Thought Collective, simply endorses this disem-
bedding from local conditions and unequivocally advocates adapting 
to those purportedly ‘universal’ rules embodied in market calcula-
tions. But while it is no doubt the case that this is the historical effect 
of Hayek’s work concerning the use of knowledge in society, never-
theless the form of his argument does not fit at all neatly into an oppo-
sition between the universality of market calculations and the singu-
larity of local knowledge. Quite to the contrary.
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Hayek’s position in 1945 is of course well known, but let us restate 
that his starting point for the evaluation of economic systems is the 
existence of two different kinds of knowledge. He wants to redress 
what he perceives as a tendency in economic planning to overvalue 
expert or scientific knowledge and undervalue other forms of knowl-
edge. What are these other forms of knowledge? Hayek is explicit that 
he means knowledge of locality, in both senses of the genitive:
Today it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific knowl-
edge is not the sum of all knowledge. But a little reflec-
tion will show that there is beyond question a body of very 
important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possi-
bly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general 
rules: the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time 
and place.479
In Hayek’s view, such localized forms of knowledge of the circum-
stances of time and place tend to be downplayed. He wants to argue 
that if there is such a thing as economic truth, then it is something 
generated through the collective and combined interaction of all these 
localized knowledges, in a manner that exceeds each of these local 
knowledges and, in total, exceeds the capacities of so-called expert 
knowledge. The market operates through the delocalization of local 
knowledge but on the essential basis of local knowledge, and the latter 
may often be of a kind that resists formalization, that is, a kind that is 
‘very important but unorganized’. The odd thing here is that by ‘unor-
ganized’ Hayek does not at all mean that it is not organic, quite the 
contrary, if by organic we mean arising from processes of ‘natural’ 
growth (in his terms, and as we shall see). Rather, this unorganized 
knowledge is, precisely because of its being organic in its origins, of 
a kind that cannot easily be reduced to calculable processes – or more 
specifically, in his view, the calculability necessary for a so-called 
planned economy.
His argument is thus that what a market does is itself not reducible 
to calculation: its work consists in this mutualizing delocalization. 
This is the basis of his most famous and most fundamental claim: that 
the market must, as far as possible, be left to its own devices, so to 
speak, without interference from those who arrogantly imagine that 
their technical expertise trumps what the market unconsciously and 
collectively ‘knows’. Central planning, on the other hand, without 
the benefit of this mutual interaction of localized knowledge, will 
always be forced to rely on other forms of information, such as statis-
tical aggregation, which is to say, calculations of probabilities on the 
basis of accumulated information.480 It is precisely the universality of 
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calculation, then, turned into aggregations of statistical information, 
that Hayek rejects as a basis for economic organization, because of 
the hubris implied in the belief that, divorced from local knowledge, it 
becomes possible to calculate everything.
To more fully understand Hayek’s theoretical conception, how-
ever, and notwithstanding Edward Nik-Khah and Philip Mirowski’s 
no doubt correct assertion that ‘Hayek changes his mind’,481 it is nec-
essary to examine Hayek’s work of political economy dating from 
almost thirty years after ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, that is, 
his three-volume work, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973).
Hayek’s organizing concept, as set out in the first volume, is not 
negentropy, but order. Order is defined by Hayek in terms of a strong 
interdependence of elements, which together form a dynamic driv-
ing a path towards future states of those elements and future states of 
their interdependence. While there are many forms of order found in 
biological life, Hayek distinguishes the order found among the kinds 
of beings that we ourselves are by the degree to which it depends 
on ‘co-operation with others’, which means, he immediately adds, 
that it depends on the predictability of others as the basis for coordi-
nated action:
we depend for the effective pursuit of our aims clearly on 
the correspondence of the expectations concerning the 
actions of others on which our plans are based with what 
they really do.482
Hayek does not ask why our species is distinguished by the kind and 
extent of its cooperative behaviour, or why it is that human beings 
are capable of such a wide variety of improbable behaviour, and yet 
remain capable of producing this correspondence between what we 
expect others to do and what we anticipate for our own future. Had he 
reflected on the fact that what opens this infinite behavioural field is 
tertiary retention and especially hypomnesic tertiary retention, then 
he may not have fallen so easily into the metaphysical trap of oppos-
ing culture and technics, as we shall see.
For Hayek, it is this potential correspondence of the behaviour of 
others with my own expectations that defines the forms of order pos-
sible for our species, or for what he calls ‘social life’. At bottom, this 
is a question of asking how ‘culture’ always involves (techniques 
and technics of) control, but we might well also relate this to the 
Nietzschean question of the production of an animal with the ability 
to make promises, that is, as we have said in the previous chapter, to 
sign contracts. But for Hayek, and even though we might think that 
the rule of the promise and the law of contracts are the very basis of 
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market behaviour, this kind of deliberate production of order, which 
Nietzsche argues always has its origins in violence, thus leading to 
the association between order, command and obedience, and therefore 
with authoritarianism and totalitarianism, is only one way in which 
order arises in social life. The economist argues that there are, on the 
contrary, two sources of order: exogenous and endogenous sources.
In other words, the authoritarian form of order, based on command 
and obedience, would be exogenous, because, to put it in Aristotelian 
terms, the principle of the movement of this form of ordered system 
lies outside itself, having been introduced and constructed. Not hav-
ing the principle of its movement arising from within itself, endog-
enously, it therefore lacks a soul moved by desire (in the Aristotelian 
sense), being instead a kind of hybrid being, an ‘artificial order’ that 
would be a ‘directed social order’ – directed, that is, from the out-
side.483 An endogenous order, for Hayek, is a ‘grown order’, self-gen-
erating, a ‘spontaneous order’ whose movement arises from its own 
internally localized source.
This distinction between exogenous order and endogenous order is 
an attempt by Hayek to deepen his 1945 distinction between systems 
in which the assumption of expert knowledge justified the command 
and obedience of central planning, and systems in which local knowl-
edge of the circumstances of time and place operate according to other 
rules, ‘orderly structures which are the product of the action of many 
men but are not the result of human design’.484 In other words, these 
‘grown’, ‘spontaneous’ endogenous structures are the product of the 
interaction of many localized forms of knowledge, ‘unorganized’ in 
the sense that they arise without predetermined purpose or teleology, 
while order of the exogenous kind is applied and constructed from the 
outside, and designed with specific purposes in mind, like a machine.
Kosmos and taxis
The names that Hayek gives to these two kinds of order are drawn 
from ancient Greek: for the ‘made order’, taxis, and for the ‘grown 
order’, kosmos. Hayek defines cosmic order, which we can understand 
as a kind of transindividuation of local collective knowledge, in terms 
that oppose it to what he sees as the artifices of command and calcula-
tion. From 1945 until 1973, Hayek will continuously associate ‘the 
Market’ entirely with this endogenous form of order. His argument for 
doing so rests essentially on the claim that markets are nothing tech-
nical, that they do not ultimately reflect processes of technical indi-
viduation. Instead, they are just the sum total of the transindividuation 
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of economic knowledge within and between processes of psychic and 
collective individuation.
This is so because the market arises spontaneously, he thinks, in this 
way ‘comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain 
or manipulate’,485 that is, calculate or compute. Yet the market still 
somehow generates ‘purposive action’ that tends to ‘secure the preser-
vation or restoration of that order’, which is to say that ‘the elements 
have acquired regularities of conduct conducive to the maintenance 
of the order’.486 Since purposiveness can easily be heard to imply tele-
ology or design, Hayek, reasonably enough, prefers to describe this 
kind of conduct in terms of ‘function’, and it is these functional recur-
sive patterns that produce negentropic metastability.
In endosomatic life, the forces that produce biological endogenous 
orders are the selection pressures associated with biological evolution. 
The endogenous orders of noetic souls, however, necessarily involve 
another kind of behavioural selection process, producing not the laws 
of biology but the rules of society:
Society can thus exist only if by a process of selection rules 
have evolved which lead individuals to behave in a manner 
which makes social life possible.487
Despite this admission, Hayek never acknowledges that this other 
selection process, producing not scientific laws but social ‘rules’, 
has anything to do with anything artificial. For Hayek, unlike for 
Polanyi, the market never involves the introduction of ‘highly artifi-
cial stimulants’, because it is always the expression of that diversity 
of knowledge and behaviour that conforms to psychosocial human 
nature. Hayek wants to insist that the non-biological selection pro-
cesses played out on the market nonetheless operates like biological 
selection, with a spontaneity that is neither exogenous nor biological.
A taxis, on the other hand, is purely exogenous, while a kosmos is 
purely endogenous, even though both are the result of spontaneous 
but non-biological selections. Here we can see the roots of a form 
of social Darwinism, based on the notion that the superiority of one 
set of ‘rules’ rather than another lies precisely in their having arisen 
spontaneously, that is, endogenously, through a kind of blurring of 
the distinction between these two forms of selection. The question 
remains: what is the source of this ‘spontaneity’?
What Hayek’s distinction between kosmos and taxis really describes 
is a metaphysical opposition between culture and technics. In the case 
of endogenous order, the knowledge animating its dynamic is itself 
endogenous, product of a particular time and place, where the epis-
temological guarantee of the validity of that knowledge lies in the 
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degree to which it serves non-teleological but functional ends. In the 
case of exogenous order, the knowledge dictating events is itself exog-
enous, which is to say, at perpetual risk of proving to be an inadequate 
set of (technical) instructions, because they have not arisen from out 
of a true, which is to say spontaneously generated, relationship to the 
function of reason (if we may use Whitehead’s terms).
It is for this reason that, for Hayek, only an endogenous order can 
be described as a kosmos. Exogenous orders are simply the external 
products of a mechanistic universe, and are thus more vulnerable to 
the entropic tendency. Only endogenous orders are capable of achiev-
ing the autonomy and resilience required for dealing spontaneously 
with the shocks of existence. For Hayek, the function of an exoge-
nous organization such as government is indeed like ‘the maintenance 
squad of a factory’, best limited to ensuring ‘that the mechanism 
which regulates the production of […] goods and services is kept in 
working order’.488
Yet a taxis, wherever it forms the basis of systems of highly-devel-
oped exogenous orders such as forms of government, is inevitably 
encumbered, Hayek argues, by
the problem which any attempt to bring order into complex 
human activities meets: the organizer must wish the indi-
viduals who are to co-operate to make use of knowledge that 
he himself does not possess.489
The great difficulty of government, then, even in terms of this limited 
function, is the inability to engineer command and control structures 
(themselves ‘highly artificial stimulants’) capable of maintaining the 
production mechanism in working order.
Government is on the side of exogenous taxis (that is, technics) and 
the local knowledge arranged by market operations is on the side of 
endogenous kosmos (that is, culture). This surprising logic perhaps 
becomes more comprehensible when we consider it in relation to 
Canguilhem’s attempt, undertaken for completely different purposes, 
to distinguish the machine from the living organism:
In a machine, its construction is foreign and presupposes the 
ingenuity of the mechanic; conservation demands the con-
stant surveillance and vigilance of the machinist, and we 
know how irreparably certain complicated machines can be 
damaged through lack of attention or surveillance.490
This maintenance – requiring attention and vigilance in the face of 
the degradation of entropy and the disruption of shocks, which Hayek 
sees as possible only for the endogenous orders of a kosmos – is really 
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the question of the care necessary to maintain negentropic tendencies 
or facilitate anti-entropic novelty.
If it is not maintained, cleaned or even occupied, even a house (and 
not just a ‘complicated machine’) will before long succumb to entropic 
tendencies. How a house is built, and how it must be kept, are thus a 
question of the negentropic resilience made possible by the knowledge 
of life, and this knowledge might seem to arise ‘spontaneously’, that 
is, transgenerationally through the transindividuation of knowledge, 
but it is nevertheless strictly exosomatic, not ‘endogenous’ or ‘natural’ 
in any way that could oppose the organic and the organological. In 
other words, what is at stake, here, is the knowledge of care that pro-
cesses of technical individuation always require, if they are not to fall 
apart or become dangerous. It is thus a question of the second moment 
of the doubly epokhal redoubling, which Hayek excludes as a possi-
bility for the exogenous orders of taxis. And, of course, he never asks 
about the conditions of the production of a political economy of atten-
tion or vigilance capable of keeping its mechanisms in working order.
The cybernetic kosmos
If Hayek would nevertheless be right to think that care is necessar-
ily and essentially a question of localized knowledge that cannot be 
reduced to the statistical aggregations of computation, what is then 
very odd is that the science to which he ascribes the possibility of 
elucidating endogenous order is precisely that science of control that 
Heidegger would see as characteristic specifically of Gestell:
The study of spontaneous orders has long been the pecu-
liar task of economic theory, although, of course, biology 
has from its beginning been concerned with that special 
kind of spontaneous order which we call an organism. Only 
recently has there arisen within the physical sciences under 
the name of cybernetics a special discipline which is also 
concerned with what are called self-organizing or self-gen-
erating systems.491
Hence for Hayek, this ‘special discipline’, cybernetics, does indeed 
seem to replace both biology and economics (the sciences of endoso-
matic and exosomatic selection) as the science of phusis, which is to 
say, of every form of endogenous order, and especially the market. It 
is in this manoeuvre that the computational turn is opened up, through 
which economics authorizes its own disassembly, even though his 
basis for doing so can be seen to consist in a defence of local knowl-
edge against the notion of universal calculation or computability.
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On the one hand, the market is associated with the natural world, 
with the wealth arising from the rich soil of (naturally human) locali-
ties, the particular circumstances of places and times, forms of spon-
taneously generated knowledge exceeding the narrow understandings 
of technical hierarchies. The market would then amount to a device 
that arises in complex societies, which are always based on exchange, 
but a device that arises in a way that is somehow both spontaneous 
and yet non-biological. And the function of this market device would 
then be nothing other than to amplify the combined effects of micro-
cosmic kosmoses, scaling them up macroeconomically.
But on the other hand, the form of knowledge capable of knowing 
the endogenous order of a kosmos is the highly technical (not to say 
technological) and very recent science of cybernetics. So: the mar-
ket is assigned by Hayek to phusis, precisely because of the locally 
cosmic character of the knowledge that operates the market, but, in 
the same gesture, the knowledge of phusis is then itself assigned to 
that ‘new fundamental science which is called cybernetics’, in which, 
as Heidegger said in 1964 (nine years before Law, Legislation and 
Liberty and twenty years after ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’), 
the ‘operational and model character of representational-calculative 
thinking becomes dominant’.492 Is there not a kind of parallel here 
between the use Hayek makes of cybernetics and the role Simondon 
wants to give to his so-called ‘mechanology’?
(It would also be possible to relate Hayek’s distinction between 
two forms of order, exogenous and endogenous, to Edgar Morin’s 
distinction between two forms of causality, endo-causality and exo-
causality.493 Exo-causality, for Morin, refers to the causality of the 
physical universe, which simply concerns statistical probability and 
the ‘general’ possibilities of equilibrium and disequilibrium that exist 
for states of matter and energy. Endo-causality, on the other hand, is 
‘circular’, ‘local’ and ‘temporary’, that is, the causality of negentro-
pic life, involving retroactive loops that improbably ‘repel external 
causality from the looped zone’.494 Hayek’s gesture with regard to the 
respective endogenous and exogenous orders of kosmos and taxis mir-
ror’s Morin’s distinction between two causalities, where exogenous 
orders alone participate in exo-causality, that is, thermodynamic 
entropy, as if the mechanical artifices of machines and institutions 
are not part of retroactive loops that also involve endo-causal forms 
of life, and as if markets are simply endo-causal expressions of life 
that involve no artifice. It is for this reason that we can conclude 
that Hayek’s distinction functions in a classically metaphysical way, 
which also means that it functions to eliminate the question of the 
pharmacology of all of those ‘orders’ that are formed precisely from 
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the complex relationships of exorganic life, a form of life whose con-
dition of possibility is its relationship to its prostheses.)
It might well be thought that Hayek’s underlying manoeuvre is 
to conceive the localized knowledge of a kosmos essentially as the 
kind of knowledge involved in running a firm, that is, microeconomic 
knowledge. It would then be possible to argue that what Hayek is 
actually undertaking is a reduction of local cosmic knowledge to the 
calculability of cybernetics, with no actual concern for the destruc-
tion of localized forms of the knowledge of how to make and do, the 
knowledge of how to live, and so on. No doubt this is not false: if 
endogenous knowledge is amenable to being elucidated by cybernet-
ics, it is surely because it is for Hayek above all the organizational 
knowledge required for running a business that is at stake. Yet the 
hierarchies and command structures of a business, which more than 
anything are what are open to cybernetic reduction, but which are not 
themselves examples of the ‘use of knowledge in society’ that hap-
pens on a market, are surely a question of taxis rather than kosmos. 
But the kosmos, for Hayek, is not the firm, but the market itself.
More than anything else, Hayek’s argument is about the limits 
of control. In a taxis, we might have a considerable ability to fash-
ion or tailor a system according to the dictates of specific require-
ments, but, in the case of a kosmos, ‘the degree of power of control 
over the extended and more complex order will be much smaller’.495 
To illustrate this point he offers the example of a crystal or complex 
organic compound, which we can never produce by arranging indi-
vidual atoms one at a time, he says in 1973, but what we can do is cre-
ate the conditions in which the atoms will by the action of their own 
forces begin to produce these complex forms.496 Likewise, we cannot 
mechanically engineer endogenous orders to guarantee expected out-
comes, given the dispersal of actors and the specificity of their local 
knowledge, and, for Hayek, there can be no better process than the 
endogenous market for sifting and ordering this diversity and speci-
ficity, even if it can do no more than secure ‘a certain probability that 
the expected relations will prevail’.497
Attempts to ‘intervene’ in the economic universe by trying to ‘sup-
plement the rules governing’ the market order, therefore, ‘can never 
improve but must disrupt that order’, because it will always be the 
case that the directing authority itself only possesses localized (that 
is, partial) knowledge, and thus acts in ignorance of the functional 
role played by knowledge held by other actors.498 Hence he concludes 
about any such attempt:
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What it overlooks is that the growth of that mind which can 
direct an organization, and of the more comprehensive order 
within which organizations function, rests on adaptations 
to the unforeseeable, and that the only possibility of tran-
scending the capacity of individual minds is to rely on those 
super-personal ‘self-organizing’ forces which create sponta-
neous orders.499
For Hayek, this ‘transcendence’ of individual minds means that the 
localized knowledge of a kosmos may be embodied in each of its mem-
bers, but at the same time exceeds and thus eludes those members. It 
is thus a quite peculiar kind of knowledge that may very often not be 
known as such by those in whom it is, precisely, embedded. For this 
reason, efforts to artificially engineer the endogenous market order by 
adding exogenous command structures (laws and regulations beyond 
those arising ‘endogenously’) are bound to tip the balance from the 
side of liberty and towards authoritarianism: exogenous command is 
necessarily weaker because it is not based on a relationship between 
the local and its delocalization.
The metaphor by which Hayek defines this risk is that of physical 
systems, that is, thermodynamic systems, entropic systems that tend 
to ‘perfect disorder’. It is evident, he says, ‘that in society some per-
fectly regular behaviour of the individuals could produce only disor-
der’. What Hayek thus seems to gesture towards, here, is the near con-
temporaneous observation made by Robert Smithson: that a perfect 
crystalline structure seems highly ordered but is in fact entropic com-
pared with the mother liquid from which it emerges, no matter how 
subtly the conditions may have been arranged at the outset. Likewise, 
a society of perfectly regulated individuals would be similarly entro-
pic, because, we might add, a degree of irregularity (that is, diversity) 
is fundamental to the immune function, but where this is a question, 
not just of thermodynamic entropy, but of informational entropy – of 
that ‘fascist ant-state with human material’500 about which we were 
warned by Norbert Wiener. For Hayek, however, the threat of such 
a fascist ant-state falls purely on the side of the statistical aggrega-
tions of ‘central planning’: it does not seem to occur to him that such a 
threat might be entailed by the (taxical) application of cybernetics to 
that endogenous order that he understands market operations to be, let 
alone by applying cybernetics in the manner of today’s performative 
algorithmics (a ‘soft’ taxis, we could say).
Hayek can indeed be understood as a perverse and metaphysical 
champion of the ‘cosmo-local’ and its knowledge, against the control 
society built on the ‘statistical aggregations’ of forms of taxis. But 
Daniel Ross 264
the assumption that lies behind all of his work is that the endogenous, 
non-teleological but unconsciously cybernetic ends of the market order 
will always be less entropic than any exogenous, and presumably non-
cybernetic, form of conscious-but-artificial control. Hayek’s version 
of the cosmo-local is therefore fundamentally based on a denial of 
Stiegler’s demonstration that the condition of all neganthropic order 
is artificial, and that the function of neganthropic reason arises and 
can arise only from processes of artificial selection, where shifts in 
these processes disrupt existing systems and existing forms of knowl-
edge, and therefore present a problem requiring the care-ful reinven-
tion of knowledge and not just the assumption that existing knowledge 
guarantees successful adjustment to changed economico-technologi-
cal conditions.
What Hayek wants to argue, by distinguishing and indeed opposing 
kosmos and taxis, is that care is only ever really a property of micro-
cosms (simple exorganisms and lower complex exorganisms, that is, 
microeconomic exorganisms), and hence that macrocosms (higher 
complex exorganisms that authorize or legitimize forms of taxis, that 
is, macroeconomic rules and laws) are only capable of being taken 
care of through the market-produced amplification effects of micro-
economic care. But there is another way of stating this conclusion: it 
is to claim that society, and in particular a society regulated ‘endog-
enously’ by market operations, should not be understood on the basis 
of the metaphor of a nervous system, that is, of a central nervous sys-
tem, because there is no centralized regulatory mechanism capable 
of taking care of all its dimensions. Rather, the systems of a society 
more closely resemble an immune system, where it is microcosmic 
encounters, occurring at very small localities but very widely dis-
persed throughout the social organism, that produce the greatest gen-
eral systemic benefit, and do so without coordination, and precisely 
without any awareness, and with barely any need for a taxis of any 
kind. Hayek’s epistemology could be construed as fundamentally 
immuno-logical in this sense.
But for those coming after Hayek, the lesson from his work is also 
that there is little point in invoking the cosmic or the local unless we 
know very clearly what we mean by these terms, what they have to 
tell us about the relationship between the biological and the techno-
logical, and how they relate to conceptions of entropy, negentropy and 
anti-entropy. What Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah will show, 
in The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information, is that the crystal pal-
aces of neoliberal capitalism emerge in a complex and symptomatic 
way from their contradictory Hayekian provenance, taking the cyber-
netic cue as a basis for ‘taxically’ transforming economic systems, 
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but in so doing progressively eliminating from their argument the 
Hayekian faith in the localized knowledge of endogenous orders.
It is the Hayekian fact that individuals do not necessarily know 
what they know that will become the basis for the progressive elimi-
nation of knowledge from economic ideology in favour of forms of 
calculable and computable information available only to economists 
themselves, or, ultimately, only to the machines themselves. The 
effect is played out across the last fifty years of efforts to exogenize 
the endogenous by forgetting Hayek’s suspicion of the engineering 
of rules. Mirowski details how economists themselves will become 
entrepreneurs engineering new markets, building these supposedly 
pure crystalline structures atom by atom, and progressively liberating 
themselves from the vaguely-remembered shadow of the notion of the 
market as a locus of endogenous and localized knowledge. What will 
thus be gradually but relentlessly expunged from the economic theory 
of the Neoclassical Thought Collective is any remnant of the virtue of 
knowledge, local or otherwise.
Philip Mirowski, the stabilizing archi-criterion  
and the war against reflection
Philip Mirowski is an economic historian and philosopher whose per-
spective may be far from that of most economists but where this may 
prove to be the very thing that opens the way to a critique of the last 
half-century of economic theory in terms of the kinds of questions 
that underlie Stiegler’s analysis. Mirowski’s first major work, for 
example, More Heat Than Light. Economics as Social Physics: Physics 
as Nature’s Economics, is dedicated to ‘the most profound economic 
philosophers of the 20th century: Thorstein Veblen and Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen’, that is, respectively, the economic philosopher of 
consumerism and the economic philosopher of entropy.
After paying his respects to these two saints, Mirowski proceeds to 
unfold a work devoted to the way in which economists have suffered 
from ‘physics envy’. By this, he means (as he summarizes it in a reply 
to critics) that ‘neoclassical economics was born of the inept imita-
tion of early nineteenth-century classical mechanics’.501 Neoclassical 
economists, in other words, longingly admired the billiard-ball preci-
sion of classical mechanics: he would later summarize the book by 
stating that it described these as aspiring to imitate a
physics prior to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, a sci-
ence most assuredly innocent of the intellectual upheav-
als beginning at the turn of the century and culminating 
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in the theories of quantum mechanics and statistical 
thermodynamics.502
Had they paid attention to the question of entropy, they would not 
have been able to persist in fantasies of ‘natural cycles’ and ‘perpetual 
growth’, and they may, especially if they had also read Schrödinger, 
have had a way of reflecting on how behavioural decisions in the bio-
logical world of endosomatic evolution are a function of the localized 
systems formed by organisms and species in their improbable strug-
gle to persist against the entropic tendency. They may then also have 
had a way of reflecting on how, in exosomatic evolution, the capacities 
for making those decisions are furnished by criteria that are no longer 
just biological but economic. Such criteria are therefore essentially 
historical, but they are also pharmacological, which is to say, a locus 
of struggle to ensure that a transformed economico-technological sys-
tem functions positively within the limits of its operation.
The criteria by which selections are made from among behavioural 
possibilities in exosomatic evolution are commonly called values: 
these are first and foremost the orienting principles according to 
which care is taken of life within the technical systems of this or that 
epoch of exosomatization. Values are the orienting principles through 
which care is taken of these technical systems via the social sys-
tems that arrange these technical systems with the individuals living 
within any particular locality, and through which care is taken of the 
social systems themselves and the individuals of which they are com-
posed. Abandoning the standpoint of ‘early nineteenth-century classi-
cal mechanics’ might have led to a way of reinterpreting John Locke, 
for whom the source of value was the work done upon a milieu by the 
instrumented hand of man in order to extract utility. But without such 
a revised social physics, Mirowski finds that the basis for this or that 
economic approach, the way of divining those first orienting princi-
ples, always seems to turn out to be based on some or other metaphor, 
where these metaphors are mostly more or less false ideas about equi-
librium and invariance – or in other words on an acknowledgment of 
the necessity of some kind of account of so-called ‘feedback loops’, 
but at the same time a denial of the fact that such loops exist only in 
localized dynamic systems still subject to the overall tendency.
When Mirowski himself asks about this need of economists to grab 
onto one founding metaphor or another, he turns for illumination to 
the anthropologist Mary Douglas, and to the following quotation from 
her book, How Institutions Think:
Equilibrium cannot be assumed; it must be demonstrated 
and with a different demonstration for each type of society…
For a Neganthropology of Markets 267
Before it can perform its entropy-reducing work, the incipi-
ent institution needs some stabilizing principle to stop its 
premature demise. That stabilizing principle is the natural-
ization of social classifications. There needs to be an anal-
ogy by which the future structure of a crucial set of social 
relations is found in the physical world, or in the supernatu-
ral world, or in eternity, anywhere, so long as it is not seen as 
a socially contrived arrangement.503
With this consideration of the need for a founding analogy or meta-
phor, for a stabilizing principle by which to ‘naturalize social clas-
sifications’, Douglas and Mirowski are addressing fundamental issues 
lying at the base of any economic science, past, present or future: (1) 
the fact that there is a need for an archi-criterion to function as the 
value of values; (2) the fact that this archi-criterion can be bestowed 
only by what Stiegler calls a higher complex exorganism and as a 
local and historical expression of the struggle against entropy; and (3) 
that, as an archi-criterion, it cannot be something ‘real’, and thus its 
relationship to the ‘supernatural world’ or ‘eternity’ is always a kind 
of ‘sur-real’ and ‘cosmic’ analogy or metaphor, a de-spatialization or 
de-temporalization concealing that the higher complex exorganism 
is itself only ever local and temporary. What we might also add to 
Douglas’s and Mirowski’s economico-anthropological diagnosis is 
that, prior to the naturalization of social classifications, societies are 
characterized by the naturalization of technical existence, one of the 
consequences of which is to obscure that economics and economic 
values are a socially and technically contrived (or highly artificial) 
arrangement whose function is to perform the entropy-reducing work 
required to prevent any technical system from destroying the society 
it ostensibly serves.
As for the sur-reality of the cosmic metaphor or analogy underly-
ing these processes of arrangement, the difficulty lies in the fact that 
such a founding metaphor is scarcely capable of deriving an adequate 
‘theory of moral sentiments’ from any kind of mechanistic physics. 
With hindsight, we can see that Newtonian physics is itself nothing 
other than a kind of de-localizing conception founded in a placeless 
universal space. The struggle against entropy conducted by those exo-
somatic beings who are also noetic beings is not just a question of 
information about the ‘particular circumstances of time and space’ 
within an abstract mechanistic universe or perfectly balanced cos-
mos, through which some fantasy of a permanently stable existence 
can be maintained. Rather, it is a question of the localized and dif-
ferentiated knowledge that takes care of a locality that is not just a 
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space but a place and not just a time but an epoch, and that does so 
by always striving to rise above the anthropy that this dynamic situ-
ation always also produces. This is what Stiegler argues in ‘The New 
Conflict of the Faculties and Functions’:
These forms of knowledge [savoirs] produce tastes [saveurs], 
differences, noodiversified nuances through which the exo-
somatic being constantly raises itself toward a noesis that is 
more than human, which is always sur-human (just as the 
cosmos is always sur-realist: the cosmos, which is not just 
the universe, is composed of places within which improb-
able possibilities – sur-real possibilities – well up).504
Within these new perspectives, the duty of the economic 
beings that we must be is no longer just moral: it is cosmic. 
Based on the noetic power of dreaming (and of realizing 
our dreams, which is the condition of exosomatization), we 
must, using every means at our disposal, make this duty 
serve a sur-realist and serendipitous cosmology, a quasi-
causal cosmology.505
On the genealogy of cyborgian economics
In Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science, Mirowski 
argues that these founding and orienting metaphors shifted in the 
history of twentieth-century economic theory: whereas neoclassical 
economics was based on the notion of the ‘rational individual’ as the 
atom of social physics, in neoliberal economics this individual tends 
to become, instead, an elementary cog within a giant machine, one 
that may not need any longer to be presumed to be ‘rational’, and one 
that, eventually, may almost be dispensed with altogether, at least for 
the purposes of calculation. But this cannot be understood simply 
as a fall from a humanistic economics to an inhuman one, or from a 
critical sense (in Kantian terms) to an a-critical one. Mirowski argues 
that the deficiencies of the original models – the fact that they implied 
some kind of full psychology or anthropology but never elaborated 
either, and hence that this economics cannot even truly be considered 
‘Newtonian’ because it never defined the character of the billiard balls 
that would be its social atoms – helped to make this change possible:
the ‘methodological individualism’ to which neoclassicals 
pledge their troth is an empty creed, for there are no full-
blooded individual humans in their models. Hence all those 
methodologists who whine about the ‘atomistic’ character of 
orthodox economics mistake the promotional verbiage for 
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substantive content. I would add that the models are not so 
much atomistic as ‘machinic’, and that once one meets that 
conceptual requirement, then all other ontological commit-
ments go flying out the window.506
This abandoning of ‘ontological commitments’ in favour of an 
already-implied machinic conception reaches its culmination, accord-
ing to Mirowski, when economics turns computational, that is, infor-
mational. Economics becomes a ‘cyborg science’ when it possesses 
the following characteristics, or rather, when it begins to be pos-
sessed by them:
1 it makes use of the computer as a primary metaphor and ref-
erence point, especially the fact that it apparently ‘straddles 
the divide between the animate and the inanimate, the live 
and the lifelike, the biological and the inert, the Natural and 
the Social, and makes use of this fact in order to blur those 
same boundaries in its target area of expertise’;507
2 from this blurring of boundaries, it begins to attribute 
machine-like or computer-like attributes to biological or 
human functioning, and to construct approaches based on 
assemblages of these likened elements: ‘it agglomerates a 
heterogeneous assemblage of humans and machines, the 
living and the dead, the active and the inert, meaning and 
symbol, intention and teleology’508
3 as the distinction between the biological and the social 
becomes vague, the ‘sharp distinction between “reality” 
and simulacra’509 is also weakened, with the consequence 
that cyborg science increasingly operates in the field of 
simulations;
4 questions of ‘order’ and ‘disorder’ become ‘veritable obses-
sions’,510 relating these in various ways to thermodynamic 
entropy but even more to concepts such as noise, signal deg-
radation and chaos;
5 concepts such as ‘information’, ‘memory’ and ‘compu-
tation’ come to be seen as physical, the first then tending 
to be conceived ‘as an entity that has ontologically stable 
properties’;511
6 the genealogy of these sciences does not arise from the 
discovery of new facts or the genius of a new idea but 
from a planned exercise, usually techno-scientific and 
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techno-economic but also often military, or in other words 
they are themselves products of what Hayek would call 
exogenous rather than endogenous design – the ‘new cyborg 
sciences did not simply spontaneously arise; they were con-
sciously made’ – and their ‘blurred ontology’ arose from 
similarly ‘exogenous’ concerns, given that it ‘derives from 
the need to subject heterogeneous agglomerations of actors, 
machines, messages, and (let it not be forgotten) oppo-
nents to a hierarchical real-time regime of surveillance and 
control’.512
It is not that any one of these notions is inherently wrong, and in fact 
they mostly have origins in intuitions about the necessity of over-
coming previous limits that are rooted in something true and neces-
sary. The relationship between the animate and the inanimate, the 
living and the dead, the biological and the social, and the relation-
ship between these relationships (as Heidegger would say), are all 
unavoidable questions that arise over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury. Similarly, the meaning of order and disorder in various scientific 
fields (in both the ‘life sciences’ and ‘human sciences’), the function 
of simulation and modelling in science (which is also to say, of pre-
diction), and the relationship of information and memory to matter, 
are all absolutely crucial to a reinvention not just of economics but 
of science and philosophy in general. But under the influence of a 
confluence of forces, these notions all tended to be interpreted and 
conjoined in a confused manner that proved incapable of lifting their 
underlying significance from the veil of ideological obfuscation. In 
this way, they ultimately served to legitimate the concept of the abso-
lute market while simultaneously undermining the Hayekian defence 
of that concept on the grounds of its endogenously-produced distrib-
uted knowledge.
The rise of neoliberalism and the market  
as an information processor
Mirowski and Nik-Khah turn again to the fate of this raft of ques-
tions in The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information: The History of 
Information in Modern Economics, to a large extent dating this turn 
from the ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, which is also to say, 
from one of the key moments of the inception of what would become 
neoliberalism. In other words, the shift to a machinic conception of 
economics begins when the question of the knowledge held by the for-
merly-conceived ‘rational’ economic agents of neoclassical economics 
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begins to be re-conceived as a question of computable information. 
Mirowski shows that this information will be increasingly understood 
as lying somewhere other than in the heads of agents. For Hayek, and 
in one way or another for almost all mainstream economists thereaf-
ter, the values of things and hence the basis of their distribution do not 
lie in something known to the individuals of a society, but something 
that exists only in ‘the Market’ itself, and from this thought arises 
the notion that the true function of any market is to operate as a giant 
‘information processor’. In this sense, we can say that the funda-
mental premise of neoliberalism is that the market itself becomes the 
stabilizing principle, the naturalization of social classifications, the 
archi-criterion.
For Mirowski and Nik-Khah, following on from the former’s work 
in Machine Dreams, it is thus strictly impossible to separate the infor-
mational and computational concept of ‘the Market’ from neoliberal-
ism. They identify six important tenets of the latter:
1 As stated, the neoliberal market is to a large extent ‘pos-
ited to be an information processor more powerful than any 
human brain, but essentially patterned upon brain/computa-
tion metaphors’.513
2 The meaning of being a ‘human person’ is fundamentally 
revised: no longer a producer who through his or her works 
produces value, but instead a repository of ‘human capital’ 
(according to Gary Becker, whose significance was seen 
clearly and early by Michel Foucault) from whom value can 
be extracted.
3 ‘Freedom’ is conceived as value of values, but the concep-
tion of freedom to which neoliberals are willing to com-
mit is mostly limited to choices within a society rather than 
extending to questions about the use of knowledge as an 
anti-anthropic means of social transformation, and this is 
so because ‘contemplation of how market signals create 
some forms of knowledge and squelch others’514 would pose 
a threat to the conception of the Market as a transcendental 
(that is, non-pharmacological, independent of its supports) 
information processor.
4 ‘Inequality’ is considered not as an unfortunate by-product 
of the operation of the capitalist market but as a functional 
necessity and a source of the dynamism of the Market as a 
motor force.
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5 If indeed it turns out that ‘the Market’ causes problems, 
then such problems will always turn out, for neoliberals, to 
themselves require market solutions (whether those prob-
lems are a decline of education, a rise in greenhouse gases, 
or the global financial crisis itself).
6 While their dedication to ‘freedom’ means that neoliber-
als oppose ‘regulation’ as a fetter on economic behaviour 
(which Stiegler would say is their opposition to the regula-
tion of the technical system in general by the social systems 
in general), they make an exception for criminal law. As 
Richard Posner put it, the ‘function of criminal sanction in 
a capitalist market economy, then, is to prevent individuals 
from bypassing the efficient market’.515
Neoliberal market fundamentalism would thus consist in the two-
fold claim that the ‘freedom’ of the market is what guarantees its 
capacity to function as an efficient information processor, and that 
its ability to function as an information processor is what demands 
that it remain ‘unfettered’. From this standpoint, it is impossible to 
separate the rise of neoliberalism from the rise of the computer as 
information processor. Nevertheless, according to Mirowski and 
Nik-Khah, the notion of the market ‘as such’, as ‘something that has 
always existed in a quasi-natural state, much like gravity’,516 faces 
a challenge when two things begin to occur: (1) the computer itself 
changes, from a device for making calculations to a network of ‘dis-
tributed all-purpose communication devices […] culminating with the 
spread of the Internet’;517 (2) regulators begin to intervene in economic 
affairs, making efforts ‘to improve or otherwise reconfigure specific 
markets’.518 In other words, the neoliberal notion of the market-qua-
information processor as archi-(non)criterion of the most efficient 
truth (the ‘truth’ of Gestell) both establishes itself through and is 
challenged by the transformations in computational technics and eco-
nomic institutions.
We can have no trouble understanding how ‘the Computer’ is in 
fact a process of technical individuation that has been vastly defunc-
tionalized and refunctionalized over the past several decades: even 
beyond Mirowski’s point, it has been transformed from a machine for 
making calculations to the prime interface between the noetic soul 
and its milieu, via which every possibility of information and knowl-
edge is opened up and closed off, within a network of networks that 
is increasingly enslaved to consumerist ends pursued through the har-
vesting of ‘big data’. But it is necessary to offer some examples to 
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elucidate how ‘the Market’, too, can be defunctionalized and refunc-
tionalized, manufactured, engineered and sold as a product. Does not 
this fundamentally conflict with the Hayekian notion of markets as 
endogenous repositories of cosmo-local knowledge, which, if tam-
pered with according to exogenous imperatives, are bound to become 
dangerously unbalanced? What does it mean to say that there were 
efforts to improve or reconfigure markets, how could Hayek’s work 
possibly lead to such efforts, and what has been the impact on the 
notion of ‘the Market’ qua information processor that has formed the 
perverse archi-criterion of the non-necessity of the truth?
The first example of such intervention given by Mirowski and Nik-
Khah concerns the effort of the United States government across the 
second half of the twentieth century to promote the growth of the 
national mortgage market. After the privatization of Fannie Mae in 
1968, the foundations were laid for the securitization of mortgages, 
and over time this gave rise to numerous other forms of ‘financial 
innovation’. This trajectory, which forms a key part of the shift towards 
what Colin Crouch calls ‘privatized Keynesianism’,519 through which 
the role of Keynesian mechanisms for maintaining stable levels of 
consumption were replaced by the invention and growth of consumer 
credit, leads to the proliferation of new instruments that produce new 
markets (the market is the product of the inventing and sanctioning of 
such instruments). What Mirowski and Nik-Khah describe in this way 
is the evolution of all of these kinds of financial instruments, which 
are also new and strange markets, and which would eventually culmi-
nate in the global financial crisis that would reveal the self-poisoning 
toxicity lurking within these instruments and markets.520
A second example offered by Mirowski and Nik-Khah is the 
set of electromagnetic spectrum auctions run by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) starting in 1993.521 This cen-
trally-conceived example of the creation of a new market was pre-
mised on the ideas:
 ▪ that ‘the Market’ can most efficiently reconcile political, 
scientific and economic considerations;
 ▪ that this implies that ‘market design’ engineered by eco-
nomic experts can thus serve public policy;
 ▪ that the best measure of the quality of this service is the 
revenue brought by the auctions themselves.
What became clear in the lead-up to these auctions, however, is that 
it is not ‘the Market’ that would determine these outcomes, but the 
set of rules determined for the particular form of auction or market 
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algorithm chosen by the regulatory body. Furthermore, the partici-
pants in these FCC auctions themselves hired their own game the-
orists in order to influence the initial choice of form and algorithm 
(not only in order to ‘win’, but in order to increase the likelihood of 
the auctions generating lower revenues generally). The most impor-
tant outcome of the purported ‘success’ of these spectrum auctions 
was the evolution of a market in market design itself, with numer-
ous economists taking out patents on various ‘made-to-order’ market 
forms, along with the software and other elements necessary to create 
a full market ‘package’ with which to compete for government and 
other contracts.
The final example they offer is the attempt to find market solutions 
to the global financial crisis itself, whose causes can to a significant 
extent be traced precisely to the earlier attempts at market creation 
and design. In the face of the undeniable reality of that crisis, and 
the risk it posed to the entire global economic system, key figures of 
economic governance in the United States attempted to fashion the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) into a market solution for a 
market problem. The crucial moment in the unfolding of that crisis, 
in which it became absolutely necessary for action to be taken, was 
the moment when the extent and spread of the toxicity of securiti-
zation became undeniable, because it was at this moment that banks 
and investors suddenly understood that there was nowhere that could 
be considered immune from catastrophic risk. And it was this under-
standing, this moment of economic anaphylaxis, that threatened to 
freeze the entire financial system, as banks and investors recoiled in 
fear and desperation from the possibility of increasing their exposure 
any further.
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman 
Ben Bernanke had the idea, or were given the idea by ‘experts’ in 
market engineering, that market designers could resolve this crisis 
through the design and implementation of a TARP market whose auc-
tion system would successfully differentiate between toxic assets and 
genuine assets. The highly dubious assumption behind this idea was 
that, in all these bundles and packages of loans and securities, there 
must be some that were still worth something, and the problem was 
thus not value but information about its location. Through the infor-
mation-processing characteristics of such a market, the idea went, the 
government would come to discern where true value lay, and would 
be able to offer fair prices for these assets, lubricating and unfreezing 
the financial system.
The most perverse aspect of this scheme lay in the fact that it had to 
aim at a particular threshold of value: too low, and it would confirm 
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the essentially worthless character of all these assets in general, inev-
itably leading to a crash; too high, and it would seem like a waste-
ful and politically indefensible throwing of government money in the 
direction of those responsible for the crisis in the first place. In short, 
the ‘real value’ of the assets such a market was supposedly there to 
divine was really a question of engineering the right value for the 
(economic and political) circumstances. In practice, it turned out that 
the difference between, on the one hand, the ideological notion that 
the Market functions as the most neutral and efficient information 
processor and, on the other hand, the competition between economists 
about which particular market design would deliver the right out-
come, rendered the solution unworkable (especially given the crisis 
timeframe faced by governments and regulators), and was abandoned 
by Paulson and Bernanke.
The overall lesson of these examples for Mirowski and Nik-Khah 
is threefold:
1 There is a progressive elimination of the noetic role of the 
psychic individual (or the simple exorganism) from the con-
ception of the market qua information processor, an elimi-
nation that occurs as economists strive to reduce markets to 
calculable and programmable elements, as ‘the profession 
came to hold that its task was to build markets in such a way 
that agent cognition should be irrelevant to their successful 
operation’,522 a situation the authors describe as the produc-
tion of ‘artificial ignorance’;
2 There is a contradiction between, on the one hand, the neo-
liberal ideology of the Market as most efficient information 
processor, and, on the other hand, the plurality of actual 
markets, a contradiction that is brought to an extreme when 
economists become designers and engineers of markets, 
even if this is a plurality of the calculable, so to speak, rather 
than genuine neganthropic diversity, and where the possibil-
ity and the necessity of maintaining this contradiction arises 
because knowledge has been systematically eliminated 
from the agents of the market as well as from governments 
and institutions, and hence the ‘god’s-eye knowledge’523 
required to sculpt market outcomes must be ascribed solely 
to those experts who will then become the economist-soph-
ists selling markets designed and marketed as ‘boutique’ 
solutions rather than ‘universal’ information processors;
Daniel Ross 276
3 All of this unfolds not just as an inevitable tendency of 
knowledge to regress to information, or as if an inevitable 
effect of the rise of computation is to eliminate psychic 
and collective individuation, but rather as an ideologi-
cal economico-political program in which neoliberalism 
‘influenced the way computational themes would enter 
economics’,524 a neoliberalism whose battle cry might be 
freedom but whose fundamental goal remained power, to be 
obtained by the means of power.
From cybernetic neoliberalism to platform capitalism
Some questions, problems and conclusions suggest themselves on the 
basis of Mirowski’s work:
 ▪ In addition to exposing the notion of the universal market 
qua information processor as an ideological fantasy, it also 
shows that all of those diverse, engineered, idiomatically-
calculable (so to speak) markets are themselves based on 
models of the relationship between information and eco-
nomics that are largely performative fictions, informa-
tional prostheses whose function is to serve particular aims 
(favour particular selections) while still partaking in and 
taking advantage of the fantasy of the universal, neutral and 
efficient information-processing market.
 ▪ While Mirowski exposes the failure of economics to incor-
porate the question of thermodynamics, and is thus con-
cerned with the way in which economic phenomena are sub-
ject to entropy, he also has a notion that markets ‘reproduce’ 
in an essentially negentropic way, ‘by extruding copies of 
themselves’, which are ‘then “selected” for persistence by 
the human beings who make use of them and constitute 
the environment in which they grow and reproduce’. It is 
the irreducibly non-mathematizable character of the goals 
of these human beings that means that markets can never 
converge to a single form, but where there is, nevertheless, 
a negentropic ‘arrow of time’ in ‘market evolution’, a ten-
dency towards increased complexity according to principles 
of ‘von Neumann (not Darwinian) evolution’.525 But is this 
so-called market evolution process really capable of being 
characterized as negentropic or neganthropic, whether 
according to biological or informational metaphors? To what 
extent does the answer to this question depend on whether 
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the effect of these markets on psychosocial individuation 
is to foster the latter or undermine it, and to what extent is 
it possible to engineer markets to these neganthropic ends?
 ▪ According to Mirowski, the source of the dynamic but 
pharmacological mutation of these evolving markets lies in 
attempts to ‘“bend” or “break” the rules; this source of ran-
domness [is] beneficial for the evolutionary process, if kept 
within certain bounds’.526 But is the notion that the dyna-
mism of this evolutionary process comes from the hubris of 
the rule-breakers (who want to take advantage of the con-
straints and limits of existing markets) not rather too close 
to the very ideology of the libertarian disruptors, who are 
no longer merely neoliberal precisely to the extent that they 
are even more likely to conceive criminal sanction as itself 
a brake on market efficiency, and who for that reason prefer 
to engineer and occupy legal vacuums by always being in 
advance of the law, whether criminal or otherwise?
 ▪ If Mirowski’s goal is to describe the ‘history of informa-
tion in modern economics’, and if for that reason he focuses 
on the shift whereby economists become not just scientists 
but purveyors of market design, then in the twenty-first 
century isn’t it necessary to recall some other kinds of 
examples too? Did not platforms such as Amazon and eBay 
create new markets with specific sets of rules designed to 
serve particular goals and objectives? More importantly 
still, did not Google and then Facebook design new algo-
rithmic markets that have enabled them to dominate global 
advertising, by taking advantage of the vast bi-directional 
flow of information occurring on their search engines and 
social networks? In short, are not the platforms of platform 
capitalism nothing other than new forms of market design 
resulting from new kinds of collaboration between compu-
tational and economic engineers, but forms whose goal is to 
eliminate the economists themselves in favour of a purely 
automatic information processor?
A fundamental lesson from Mirowski’s work is, as mentioned, that 
governments and institutions have been proletarianized by economists 
with respect to economic knowledge itself. It is this economic prole-
tarianization that subsequently forces these governments to turn back 
to economists in order to find market-informational solutions (pur-
portedly useful performative fictions) to problems caused by markets 
Daniel Ross 278
themselves, including the problem of climate change, but where this 
‘turning back’ simply introduces new chances for new problems. On 
the other hand, the engineered algorithmic markets of platform capi-
talism operate automatically to disrupt other markets, in the name 
of freedom but according to imperatives that would seem to exceed 
Mirowski’s notion that neoliberalism is concerned only with freedom 
within society rather than about it. It is hard not to conclude that this 
dual process of market evolution does indeed evince an ‘arrow of 
time’, but one that seems thoroughly entropic, a complexification of 
markets, perhaps, but one that is also the creation of a new, standard-
ized hegemony, in a shift that seems to define the Anthropocene as a 
period across which markets of every kind cease to have anything to 
do with collective individuation processes and are ever-increasingly-
automatic technical individuation processes. But a technical individu-
ation process that is not transductively entwined with psychic and 
collective individuation processes is itself unsustainable…
There is also, obviously, a great practical contradiction involved in 
this Hayekian and post-Hayekian position: on the one hand, the claim 
that all interventions into the operational mechanisms of endogenous 
markets are forms of taxis that ‘can never improve but must disrupt 
that order’; on the other hand, through the Mont Pelerin Society and 
a thousand other ways, being engaged precisely in a concerted effort 
to intervene in how those mechanisms are organized and to disrupt 
the rules that govern them, and eventually in the engineering of new 
markets with highly artificial rules, from Fannie Mae and Freddy 
Mac, and the FCC’s electromagnetic spectrum license auctions, to 
Amazon, Alibaba, Facebook and Google, via the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program that tried to ameliorate the 2008 financial crisis. In 
yet another book, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, Mirowski 
highlights this practical contradiction between what Hayek claims 
and what he does, which is, precisely, an ideological contradiction:
All this taxonimizing was fine; but the question that was 
motivating Hayek, even if he never adequately addressed it 
directly, was: What sort of ‘order’ was the MPS, and what 
sort of order was the Neoliberal Thought Collective dedi-
cated to bringing about? […] Here he elided acknowledg-
ment that the MPS and the larger NTC did not themselves 
qualify as a spontaneous order […]. When you unpacked all 
the shells of the Russian doll, it was just another elaborate 
hierarchical movement. […] Either the dividing line between 
kosmos and taxis was bright and clear, and the MPS was an 
example of a taxis, which was thus illegitimate by his own 
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lights, or else kosmos and taxis were hopelessly intertwined, 
but then there was no dependable way in his system to sepa-
rate ‘government’ from ‘market’, and the politics of the NTC 
would threaten to become unintelligible. The Hayekian wing 
of the thought collective has never been able to square this 
circle, so it has to resort to double-truth tactics.527
That to which Hayek gave birth, that of which he was the patron saint, 
or the godfather, was fundamentally a political program whose tele-
ological objective is to promote a very particular ideology. And the 
great ideological contradiction on which this program rests is that it 
starts from the valuation and necessity of localized knowledge, but 
only in order to wage a war against local knowledge, against educa-
tion – and against reflection:
Though it sounds paradoxical to say that in order to make 
ourselves act rationally we often find it necessary to be 
guided by habit rather than reflection, […] we all know that 
this is often necessary in practice if we are to achieve our 
long-range aims.528
The glue that binds all the open cracks in this political ideology 
masked as economic wisdom is the notion that information is inde-
pendent of its supports. Even if we conceive of localized knowledge 
as forms not just of neganthropy but of immunity, always potentially 
anthropic and auto-immune, we can do so only on the condition that 
we conceive what circulates through such an immuno-logical system 
as being retentional, not informational.529 Retentionality (and, corre-
spondingly, protentionality) can never be thought independently of its 
supports, and this means that it can never be abstracted from the func-
tions it serves, poorly or well, where these functions include that of 
reason as the path not just to living or living well, but to living better, 
that is, the path that leads to the possibility of a transition from one 
metastable state to another. The consequence is that today, when such 
a transition is more crucial than ever before, and specifically at the 
macroeconomic and biospheric scale, the path towards such a transi-
tion is fundamentally impeded by the computerized automation of all 
forms of knowledge and the subsequent proletarianization of politi-
cians, citizens, the media and experts – all layers of the population.
The contributory economy and the global macrocosm
Let’s return to the question of the contributory economy. It has the 
explicit aim of reversing the neoliberal tendency identified by 
Mirowski through which the psychic individual is reduced to ‘human 
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capital’ and ceases to be the producer of value by his or her works. 
By re-establishing the possibility of work, by remunerating it, and by 
measuring its value according to the ultimately incalculable archi-cri-
terion of neganthropy, the individual (worker) again becomes a gen-
erator of knowledge in a way that can then be shared and in this way a 
contributor to genuine local wealth.
Beyond the level of individual work and its social effects within 
a city or even a country, however, the necessity of a new economic 
model is established by a critique of the global economic system that 
shows this system is reaching its limits – in terms of the destruction 
of its own basis in the conditions of the biosphere, the destruction of 
its own basis in terms of the exploitation of libidinal energy (and the 
belief in knowledge it makes possible), and the destruction of its own 
basis in terms of the elimination by automation of the post-Keynesian 
distribution mechanism necessary for a consumption-based model. As 
stated, the potential problem with the contributory economy is that it 
seems at first glance to be a model applicable to the scale of the local 
community, and perhaps even to the national scale, but it is more dif-
ficult to see how it can be scaled up to a planetary-scale locality, even 
though that is the scale that ultimately necessitates a new model. The 
problem is that, unless this upscaling occurs, the contributory econ-
omy risks remaining an epiphenomenal half-solution, akin, despite all 
its virtues, to a kind of grand, and in itself very worthwhile, tending 
of one’s own garden.
What we can see by reading Mirowski is that this is not just a ques-
tion of the hegemony of the Market, but of the combined unfolding of: 
(1) the history of computation; (2) the economic problem of the role 
of information and markets in society; and (3) a neoliberal economics 
that drives the reduction of (economic) knowledge to information, but 
where this unfolding history nevertheless in fact leads to a prolifera-
tion of variegated markets rather than a truly universal market. It is 
markets that become universal, rather than the Market, but this appar-
ent diversity of markets is also an industrialization of the market itself, 
as markets become products bought and sold by economists, and, pre-
cisely, marketed by them – yet one more ‘highly artificial’ process of 
commodification, as Polanyi would say.
What we can see by going beyond Mirowski is that platform capi-
talism is the attempt to exceed all these scales and dispense with 
economists themselves, except as in-house engineers dedicated 
to ceaselessly improving the algorithms that function automati-
cally within these platforms, without need for the ‘selections of the 
human beings who make use of them’. Economists may have been 
drivers of proletarianization, including the proletarianization of 
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political representatives who thereby become dependent on their for-
sale expertise, but the overtaking of such schemes by platform capital-
ism demonstrates the degree to which this ends up rebounding upon 
them as the proletarianization of economics itself.
In the universe of algorithmic platforms, it is not individuals who 
‘bend’ or ‘break’ these rules in order to drive market evolution but the 
platforms themselves that are designed to operate as far as possible 
outside of all rules by being in advance of all rule-makers, and where 
these platforms are markets. They do so in order to generate addictive 
processes for the human beings who are still necessary for the system 
as producers of clicks and ultimately so that they will click the ‘buy’ 
button as frequently as possible. At the same time, energy markets 
and carbon market mechanisms continue to be formed or proposed, 
as market solutions utilizing different indicators but still devised by 
economists as a way of solving problems caused by global markets 
themselves. If, as seems to be the case, such solutions prove to be fan-
tastical, then does the internation name a non-market mechanism that 
would amount to a global institution operating according to qualita-
tive neganthropic criteria rather than calculable economic indicators? 
Does it name a more-than-market solution that incorporates global 
markets into a broader transformation of the conditions of globaliza-
tion? Or might it, considered in relation to macroeconomics, amount 
to a placeholder name in lieu of an upscalable remedy?
It seems indubitable that Stiegler is right to argue that decarbon-
ization is impossible without deproletarianization. The neganthropic 
economy of contribution aims precisely at renovating new knowl-
edge, locally and on the basis of a ‘cosmic’ conception of the differ-
ence between knowledge and information, which is precisely lacking 
from other attempts to reimagine the function of the market in rela-
tion to the contemporary crisis. In this way, it hopes to generate not 
just ‘awareness’ of the necessity of fundamental transformation, but 
the will required for the shift to a new model and on a short timescale.
Yet the fact remains that today, seven of the ten largest corporations 
in the world by revenue remain fossil fuel energy companies (and the 
largest of all is the emblem of consumerism that is Walmart), and 
seven of the ten largest corporations in the world by market capitaliza-
tion are the leading companies of platform capitalism. By whatever 
measure of their size, these planetary giants are not just expressions 
of a universal market: they define and engineer the markets in which 
they operate. At the same time, they are the leading drivers of climate 
change, addictive consumerism and automation – that is, they are fun-
damental agents of the headlong rush towards limits. There no lon-
ger seems to be any doubt that merely tinkering with the mechanisms 
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operating at the microcosmic levels of this macrocosmic global econ-
omy will not make a difference to its overall operation sufficient to 
alter its fundamental and fatal trajectory.
It is thus strictly impossible to deal with the question of what it 
means to reinvent economic processes without paying close and spe-
cific attention to the details of the mechanisms operating on the larg-
est scale of this entropic and anthropic reality. To pay attention to this 
entropic reality implies asking what macroeconomic model cannot 
just ameliorate but replace the consumerist perpetual-growth model, 
and this in turn implies asking what function markets fulfil in such 
a model and at every scale, including the largest. It means knowing 
whether those markets need to be re-engineered by knowledgeable 
economists, and whether and how the role of markets would no longer 
be to computationally process ‘correct’ information about calculable 
‘exchange values’ and instead be to generate real but incalculable 
knowledge defined according to neganthropic values in order to gen-
erate real but incalculable neganthropic wealth. What would it mean 
for a global market to be a generator of such knowledge, and how is 
such a thing even conceivable, let alone achievable?
Wolfgang Streeck and the interregnum
In his diagnosis of the current state and prognosis of the coming end 
of capitalism, Wolfgang Streeck shows that before it ‘will go to hell’, 
capitalism will ‘for the foreseeable future hang in limbo, dead or 
about to die from an overdose of itself’, which is to say that it will 
‘issue, not in another order, but in disorder, or entropy’.530 He neatly 
sums up the absence of epoch brought about by the efforts of the post-
Hayekian Neoliberal Thought Collective:
As long as the capitalist dynamism continues to outrun col-
lective order-making and the building of non-market institu-
tions, as it has for several decades now, it disempowers both 
capitalism’s government and its opposition, with the result 
that capitalism can neither be reborn nor replaced.531
Streeck characterizes this interregnum as an ‘age of entropy’ 
dominated by an ideology of disruption and resilience. Beyond 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction, disruption is the ideology of the 
‘Darwinian battlefield of global capitalism’.532 Resilience is its coun-
terpart: ‘adaptive adjustment’, whose function is to make the inevita-
bly individualistic characteristics of an ‘under-institutionalized’ and 
‘de-socialized’ society survivable, and thus:
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The more resilience individuals manage to develop at the 
micro-level of everyday life, the less demand will there be 
for collective action at the macro-level to contain the uncer-
tainties produced by market forces – a demand that neoliber-
alism could not and would not fill.533
Streeck explains in perfectly clear terms where this age of entropy, 
dominated by a disruption that is anything but anti-anthropic and 
a resilience that is anything but immunizing, leaves those who 
remain within its localities, and who are effectively no longer citi-
zens, but users:
The de-socialized capitalism of the interregnum hinges on 
the improvised performances of structurally self-centered, 
socially disorganized and politically disempowered indi-
viduals. Four broad types of behaviours are required of the 
‘users’ of post-capitalist social networks for the precarious 
reproduction of their entropic social life, bestowing resil-
ience both on themselves and on an otherwise unsustainable 
neoliberal capitalism, summarily and provisionally to be 
identified as coping, hoping, doping and shopping.534
Today, in the midst of the economic fear brought by the pandemic, we 
see the immense dangers to which Streeck points coming to fruition 
at lightning speed. But we are also bearing witness to the return of 
the idea that government and centralization are fundamental to eco-
nomic operations, along with the idea that the market absolutely can-
not survive without massive exogenous (in Hayek’s terms) interven-
tion, in the form of ‘stimulus packages’ on an unprecedented scale. 
But these vast centralized fiscal operations are today being organized 
around repulsive constants that are premised on the desperate wish 
to maintain the current state of the system (that is, to freeze the fas-
cist ant-state in place, so as to keep the rich rich and lessen the risk 
to that crystallized state posed by the threat of the poor revolting), 
which may be utterly understandable in an emergency, but is bound to 
be ultimately highly entropic, given that this under-institutionalized 
and de-socialized system is undeniably (however frequently denied) 
reaching its threshold limits.
The consequences of pursuing such repulsive constants while the 
cosmos collapses will inevitably be to intensify auto-immune, if not 
anaphylactic, tendencies, but the question of the economic immune 
function of centralized higher complex exorganisms is at least thereby 
raised. If, as Modern Monetary Theory insists, money is nothing 
other than a form of grease held by currency-issuing governments in 
Daniel Ross 284
limitless supply, through which the contours and flows of the produc-
tion-consumption dynamic can be shaped, then what other possibili-
ties might such an approach offer for vastly and rapidly reshaping the 
Anthropocene?
Do such ideas make it possible to conceive a way of escaping from 
an interregnum that is ultimately doomed by the aporia of sustain-
ability? Is it possible to replace the current environmental paradigm, 
which consists in the fanciful notion of decoupling the consumption 
of matter and energy from the existing macroeconomic system, with 
a real conception of macroeconomic reinvention, founded on the 
functional, perpetual, temporary and local struggle against all forms 
of entropy, whether thermodynamic, biological or informational? A 
great part of the challenge of economic transition is to rethink this 
economic function in relation to propulsive constants, which is to 
say, in a way that might prove capable of taking care of all scales and 
dimensions of our cosmic sur-reality. A dream, what else?
Postscript: Bernard Stiegler on the future  
of economics and information
This chapter has tended to focus on the difficulties and improbabili-
ties of shifting from one global economic model to another, however 
certain it seems that without such a shift the current system is bound 
to collapse. For Bernard Stiegler, the questions raised by this situation 
cannot be addressed without rethinking the very foundations of the 
notion or the concept of information lying at the heart of the compu-
tational systems powering that model in today’s algorithmic and plat-
form capitalism. This is not at all a question of wanting to eliminate 
algorithms or any other form of the applied mathematics utilized by 
such platforms in their treatment of ‘big data’.
But it is a question of the necessity of providing a critique, not just 
of the use of algorithms and so on, but of the basis underlying them, 
so as to go beyond a use of algorithmic technology premised on elimi-
nating everything incalculable. It is for this reason that Stiegler refers 
to the necessity of a ‘refoundation’ of informatique théorique.535 Such 
a refoundation raises questions that exceed the discussion undertaken 
in this chapter (even if they are at least implied), but those questions 
seem at once highly necessary, very complex and a little obscure. On 
10 May 2020, Stiegler wrote to the author about these questions, and 
it seems right and just to reproduce his words in this context, so as to 
leave these questions open, as a building site for further reflection, 
critique and construction, if not at the centre of our macroeconomic 
problem, then at the edges, where tolerable variabilities may have the 
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chance to germinate, flourish and eventually transform the whole, 
provided that we learn how to cultivate and care for an anti-anthropic 
planetary garden.
Bernard Stiegler, Communication to Daniel Ross, 10 May 2020
To refound [refonder] is probably one of the weightiest verbs imagin-
able. Yet it is necessary to refound: we need foundations. The question 
is: how long should they last?
For a Sahara nomad, his stay is based on sand, and although it is 
only for a short time, he does not pitch his tent just anywhere. For the 
Dakota Indian, it is different, but the tepee, too, needs a ground [sol], 
less shifting, but still temporary. The question is: what is the ground 
when it comes to computer science [informatique]? Whether it is gran-
ite, even steel, or basalt, in any case this ground will disappear in the 
ineluctably growing chaos. What constitutes metaphysics is what is 
blind to this fate. But to struggle against metaphysics is to refound 
while expecting to have to refound once again – still one more effort! 
The question is then also: what is the scale of time, and therefore: 
what is the extent [circonscription] of its locality?
This having been said, I absolutely do not want to use the verb 
‘refonder’, and if I have used it, it is also for strategic reasons.
On the other hand, the theoretical computer science [informatique 
théorique] that underlies the whole of today’s exploitation of informa-
tion is based on what claims to be a foundation, and one that would 
purport to be eternal: Turing’s theory of calculability. It is therefore 
a matter of causing this to collapse so as to refound something else.
What is computer science, informatique? It is a stage of grammati-
zation, which is itself a dimension of exosomatization.
What is theoretical computer science, informatique théorique? It 
is what claims to state the foundations of this grammatization like 
Aristotle’s theory of categories claims to found the grammatization 
of the glossa (here, I consider that Derrida is a bit too quick to dismiss 
Benveniste’s questions), and, through that, of logos. ‘Like’ means 
here: just like Aristotle, it ignores what grammatization is, and ratio-
nalizes it, beyond all reason.
Computer science is not just a theory of calculability, it is also a 
theory of mathematical logic – one that keeps all the metaphysical 
attributes of logic in general. It establishes the functions of what it 
claims to be a rational calculation, that is, an automatic system of 
the production of truth. To ‘refound’ computer science is therefore to 
reconsider the meaning of ‘rational’ and ‘true’.
Daniel Ross 286
The metaphysical attributes of theoretical computer science cur-
rently consist in:
 ▪ not seeing that in any grammatization there are techno-
logical physical conditions, and that this involves the 
hyper-material;
 ▪ the fact that truth is a processual function (of which the 
vicissitudes of sociology and anthropology, along with eco-
nomics, are avatars);
 ▪ the fact that in this process, truth is pharmacological and 
never finally established.
What could a ‘refounded theoretical computer science’ be? It would:
 ▪ be a computer science that takes entropy into account 
through and through, in its three forms;
 ▪ aim to produce information in order to put it at the service 
of knowledge, and by convoking such knowledge;
 ▪ for this purpose, define the new basic functions, no longer 
of calculability or of mathematical logic, but of an auto-
matic and networked system for reactivating Kant’s lower 
functions and everything that has since been added to such 
functions (for example, the transitional dimension of the 
imagination, the unconscious content of reason, the reten-
tional content of the schematism, and so on);
 ▪ do so, where these functions are implementable on net-
works accessible through interfaces themselves conceived 
in relation to these functions.
It would therefore be a computer science that would start from 
Kant’s critique of Leibniz’s failure to differentiate understanding and 
reason, Leibniz being himself the starting point of what will lead to 
computerized grammatization.
I do not think that it is the economists who functionalize informa-
tion technology in order to find a solid basis: it is capitalism that has 
the imperative need to calculate everything, which the economists 
rationalize instead of critiquing (including the so-called Marxist 
economists who understand absolutely nothing about all of this, even 
though it was something that Marx understood so well). Theoretical 
computer science has served as an ideology amounting to a hyper-
rationalization (in Adorno’s sense of rationalization) well beyond 
economists: everyone, every day, tells themselves that calculation 
is still more efficient than anything else, and everyone bows to this 
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fact – which is the fact of the market having become computational 
through and through.
In this context, theoretical computer science claims to be able to 
impose itself as the law of all exchange. It has done so by ‘hypertro-
phying’ the function of the understanding, which is irrational. And if 
it is irrational, it is not for Kantian metaphysical reasons (the kingdom 
of ends, and the freedom that is attached to it, etc.), but because of 
entropy (from which the kingdom of ends flows as a counter-current).
What I therefore call ‘new theoretical computer science’ designates 
nothing other than the hyper-critical theory of the exorganogenesis of 
perpetually pharmacological noesis (in the absence of such a hyper-
critique, negatively pharmacological), where mathematics is a dimen-
sion of the world in concrescence, and which, as soon as it is instru-
mentalized as ‘applied mathematics’, loses all its privilege of being an 
‘eternal foundation’, which it is only on the condition that it is useless: 
as soon as it is used, this ‘foundation’ collapses [ef-fondre], that is, 
accelerates entropy.
You ask, ‘what is the real basis of the connection between informa-
tion and economics in exosomatization?’, and you add: ‘the starting 
point has to be the idea of “exchange”, where what is exchanged is 
always some kind of hyper-material object and its significance’.
I was delighted to see you raise this question because at the time I 
sent you this text, I wrote another one, which I have not finished, to 
answer a question from a high school girl of the Thunberg generation 
about automation, employment, etc. – an unfinished response that I 
reproduce below:
The economy is above all a system – in this instance, a sys-
tem of exchange. And a human society cannot do without 
such an economy. What is exchanged? Above all, products 
of exosomatization, or products obtained thanks to exosoma-
tization (raw materials, subsistence products, services, etc.).
As exosomatization transforms – during exosomatic evo-
lution – the conditions of such exchanges vary, sometimes 
very profoundly: the objects or services exchanged evolve, 
and the types of exchanges themselves evolve (through the 
division of labour, social hierarchies, juridical relations, the 
nature of the knowledge required, etc.).
The anthropological theory of exchange is very impor-
tant: we could say that it founds anthropology as a science – 
and it is generally related to the system of kinship in ‘ethnic 
cells’ (if we can use the terminology of Leroi-Gourhan, who 
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himself is interested in the technical exchanges made pos-
sible by the detachability of organs).
When Georgescu-Roegen posits that we must read 
Schumpeter with Lotka, this means that we must put back, at 
the centre of observation, the conceptualization and organi-
zation of the economy, the fact of exchange, inasmuch as it is 
required by the exosomatic form of life.
Every economy is therefore a system of exchange, and, 
in the economies before history (in Lévi-Strauss’s sense, in 
the sense that there are societies with ‘slow history’, which 
are also the economies organized by the clan, the tribe or 
the ethnic group), symbolic exchange, sexual exchange 
and the exchange of material goods (resulting from exoso-
matization) are inseparable. There is no ‘economic system’ 
outside of the ‘symbolic system’ that governs exchanges in 
their totality.
As social organizations become differentiated, and of 
course, in particular, starting from the moment when sed-
entarization leads beyond the hunter-gatherer economy, this 
differentiation gives rise to what Georges Dumézil called 
the ‘three functions’536 (today highly contested, in particular 
by Jean-Paul Demoule, who shows that this theory has fed 
into the discourse of the ‘new right’ and the far right in gen-
eral, and even into anti-Semitism).
The differentiation of social organizations is inseparable 
from the transition from the predatory economy (hunting, 
gathering, war) to the economy of inter-ethnic and inter-
national trade and exchange. There are, however, overlaps 
between dominant forms of predation, on the one hand, and 
forms of peaceful trade, and peaceful economico-political 
entities can indeed shift to a war-predation economy when 
their peaceful economy weakens, or when they covet access 
to new resources, including as the practice of slavery. On all 
of this, we should read Kojin Karatani.
There are stages in exosomatization that correspond more 
or less directly to changes in social organizations and their 
economic and political systems. I will not recall them here, 
except to point out that over the last six centuries (since 
the late fifteenth century, which means both the discovery 
of America and the printing press), very clear-cut stages of 
exosomatic evolution correspond to very clear-cut stages of 
economic systems.
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The fifteenth century saw the beginning of the movement 
of the planetarization of exchange that will lead – starting 
from slavery and ‘triangular trade’ – to what is today called 
globalization. The latter amounts to the stage in which, 
de facto if not de jure, the economy becomes planetary, in 
the sense that between North America, Europe and Asia 
(including the Middle East), constant, more or less contrac-
tual relations are established, organizing a planetary divi-
sion of labour, and intensifying the quantity, quality and 
speed of flow, to a point that would have been unimaginable 
even fifty years earlier – all of this systemically mobiliz-
ing automated financial flow management systems, ‘agile’ 
design, production and distribution processes, new tracking 
and transport systems such as containerization, etc.
What has been called interdependence has thus crossed 
a major and undoubtedly irreversible threshold, which pre-
supposes exospheric infrastructure and infrasomatization, 
that is, the concentration and synchronization on a planetary 
scale of all types of flows by means of statistical calculation 
algorithms, and which, as I have tried to show elsewhere 
in various contexts and analyses, is absolutely toxic and 
unsustainable.
That being said, whoever claims to act to change this lit-
erally infernal becoming (hell being the absolute destruction 
of all grounds for hope, and what generates this destruction 
– in the form of fires, hurricanes, pandemics, addictions, 
denoetization, economic ruin, etc.) has the obligation to take 
into account the fact that the economy is firstly a system, and, 
more precisely, a system of exchange, and therefore to take 
into account the fact that if it is indeed a question of chang-
ing this system, this can be done only by cultivating new 
dynamics within the system (first of all, on its edges), and in 
no circumstances outside it.
This is why, as I told you, if a proletarian consumes more 
energy than a robot, which is often the case, it is more ratio-
nal to use the robot than the proletarian. This is all the more 
the case, given that the proletarian can then deproletarianize 
himself or herself, that is, decarbonize himself or herself, 
and in so doing decarbonize the economy (political as well 
as libidinal) as a whole.
We are now in a situation of possible short-term global 
collapse. This is undeniable, even if we can have lengthy 
and even interminable discussions of the meaning of this 
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‘possibility’. In this situation, the first obligation is to guar-
antee subsistence. It is a moral obligation, but it is also a 
political one: without such a guarantee, the ultra-violent 
explosion of social bodies is assured. And along with it, the 
total domination of the far right.
This means, for example, that if we take the question 
of the dependence of urban centres on food producers into 
account, but also the dependence on food distributors, which 
forms a highly complex and tangled network, then we can-
not ignore the issue that the conditions of exchange between 
these urban centres and across these networks, both to 
reduce dependence and vulnerability and to assure day-to-
day subsistence, will be dictated according to the dominant 
exchange system.
Under these constraints and many others that I will not 
mention here, it is a question of ensuring that the inventive 
and creative edges of the system (which are fed by it), which 
I call transitional edges in a sense that I will specify later, 
allow tolerable variabilities to proliferate – if not by this or 
that dimension of the system (for example, purely specula-
tive shareholders who control what no longer amounts to 
investment but to speculation, itself based on strategic mar-
keting that is fully subject to the constraints and canons of a 
total economic war), then at least by the central dimensions 
of the generation of utility as well as knowledge – inso-
far as these alone can contribute to limiting anthropy and 
generating, via neganthropy, anti-anthropic, inventive, cre-
ative and transitional bifurcations, such that they make the 
global system of exchange percolate and transindividuate 
in a new way.
To do so, it is necessary:
 ▪ to have a reality principle that is well-tested in the 
various features that make up the global system of 
exchange in which we find ourselves;
 ▪ to have critical concepts that make it possible to 
identify and overcome internal and external limits;
 ▪ to have a method for concretizing such concepts in 
such a way as to constitute platforms for the negotia-
tion of new collective agreements within the global 
exchange system, but by differentiating such agree-
ments on various scales, whose diversity must be 
reconstituted;
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 ▪ to define clear objectives, based on rigorous concepts 
and in-depth analyses, in order to initiate ‘on the 
edge’ actions that converge from these various edges, 
and, in so doing, come closer to what, within the sys-
tem, constitutes its dominant and toxic aspects ‘at 
the centre’;
 ▪ to pose the question of a new public power that would 
make it possible to implement this method and these 
objectives through a cooperation based on a capaci-
tation of various actors, not just in terms of knowl-
edge that would make it possible to critique and 
overcome a state of fact, but in terms of their rela-
tional practices within transitional existential terri-
tories, which must be constituted, leading to forms 
of cooperation operating according to new criteria of 
wealth and value, and of the production of this value, 
the latter being understood as what makes it possible 
to transform wealth (knowledge) into organizations.
It is by integrating these factors that we must ask our-
selves the question of automation, of employment, of 
work, of energy costs, but also of the energy gains that can 
be generated.
8 Towards an Exergue on the Future of Différance
Introduction: Leroi-Gourhan, Derrida, Stiegler
We must repeat what Derrida says, go back to his text and say again 
what we find there, which we will, of course, find unchanged, because 
it will never change, remaining exactly the same for as long as paper 
or digital copies remain. We must do so, not in order to repeat it but 
so as not to repeat it, or to repeat it differently, to find the play of a 
different interpretation and to discover what it could say and what it 
could not say, and even to discover, if we dare, what it might have 
said and should have said, even if, in such circumstances, perpetrating 
violence to the letter of the text is not just an irreducible possibility 
but a vital necessity. Only in this way can Derrida’s work live on, in 
a perpetual struggle against the entropic but probable fate that would 
consist in closing in upon itself and closing off new improbabilities 
until ‘there will be nothing left’, as he said himself while pondering 
the fate of his work on the cusp of his own becoming-a-ghost.537
Bernard Stiegler attempts to do just this in Technics and Time, 1, by 
pointing to ‘something of an indecision around différance’.538 Before 
describing this indecision, it is worthwhile reminding ourselves of the 
epochal significance that Derrida ascribes to what is ‘neither a word 
nor a concept’ but a term that is ‘the most proper in order to think, if 
not to master […] what is most irreducible about our “epoch”’. The 
starting point for thinking différance, then, is
the place and the time in which ‘we’ are, even though […] it 
is only on the basis of différance and its ‘history’ that we can 
allegedly know who and where ‘we’ are, and what the limits 
of an ‘epoch’ might be.539
In relation to those limits, Of Grammatology already famously stated 
that, with respect to a future that can present itself only as a kind of 
monstrosity in which the values of sign, speech and writing will be 
made to tremble, and with respect to that which will guide us towards 
this future, ‘there is still no exergue’.540
It is no doubt the case that différance should be thought as the ori-
gin-without-origin of the play of difference, signifying that there is no 
sign whose meaning does not refer to other signs, no signified that is 
not itself a kind of signifier, signalling the inscriptive detour neces-
sary for language or speech of any kind to arise. Différance thus forms 
a significant part of the arsenal of Derrida’s critique of the structural-
ist tendency to neutralize time and history, and to ‘totalize’ structure, 
that is, to close the system. Nevertheless, it is also a matter for us, the 
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‘we’ of this epoch that has come to be called the Anthropocene (and 
which Stiegler takes as the new name for what Heidegger was trying 
to describe in terms of Gestell), of rethinking what it means that dif-
férance and its ‘history’ are the sole basis on which it would be pos-
sible to know who and where ‘we’ are. And it is a matter of doing so 
together with what Derrida also says in Of Grammatology: ‘the history 
of life – of what I have called differance’.541 It is in the elucidation of 
this topography that seems to map différance onto the history of life 
that Derrida refers to the work of André Leroi-Gourhan, and it is the 
character of this elucidation that will lead Stiegler to pinpoint what 
seems to him to be Derrida’s indecision.
Here we will not replay all of the intricacies of Stiegler’s delinea-
tion of this Derridian moment,542 nor draw out the consequences of 
Stiegler’s account of how the Anthropocene reaches the very limits of 
the possibility of epochality. But we should at least recollect some of 
what is contained on that single page of Of Grammatology:
 ▪ différance is conjoined with the history of life at the 
moment when Derrida introduces Leroi-Gourhan in order 
to think ‘man and the human adventure’ no longer in oppo-
sition to nature, but as simply a stage in a history of life that 
would be ‘the history of the grammè’;543
 ▪ this history is thus that of forms of ‘inscription’ and a ‘lib-
eration of memory’ that runs from ‘elementary programs 
of so-called “instinctive” behavior up to the constitution 
of electronic card-indexes and reading machines’ and that 
thus ‘enlarges differance’;544
 ▪ Derrida draws this into the question of the ‘program’, refer-
ring to cybernetics but expanding this to a larger ‘history of 
the possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double move-
ment of protention and retention’ that ‘goes far beyond the 
possibilities of the “intentional consciousness”’;545
 ▪ this relationship of memory and program, retention and pro-
tention beyond intentional consciousness, is thus an epochal 
history through which we can begin to know who and where 
we are, not just by tracing the emergence of writing back to 
the history of Homo sapiens but, as Francesco Vitale says, 
by conceiving différance as ‘a genetico-structural condition 
of the life of the living and of its evolution’.546
Derrida recognizes that this succession, from the amoeba to the ‘pas-
sage beyond alphabetic writing’, ‘structures the movement of its his-
tory according to rigorously original levels, types, and rhythms’.547 
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Leroi-Gourhan divides the evolution of instinct and intelligence into 
the lower invertebrates possessing very short action sequences, social 
insects that seem capable of a good deal of complexity in terms of 
behavioural programs, the vertebrates, with an increasing ability to 
vary behaviour according to what is retained in a ‘potential’ mem-
ory recording past experience in increasingly detailed ways, and 
the higher vertebrates that alone possess the possibility of choosing 
between action sequences.548 In terms of ‘the criteria of humanity’, 
Leroi-Gourhan shows that the process of hominization (which by def-
inition predates Homo sapiens sapiens, and by a long way) required 
the freeing of the hand and is thus ‘conditioned by erect posture’:
Freedom of the hand almost necessarily implies a techni-
cal activity different from that of apes, and a hand that is 
free during locomotion, together with a short face and the 
absence of fangs, commands the use of artificial organs, that 
is, of implements.549
Leroi-Gourhan refers to the process of the increasing use of artifi-
cial organs (which Alfred Lotka calls exosomatic organs) as exteri-
orization, because it opens up new vistas of the relationship between 
hand, face and brain, but also because it simultaneously and acciden-
tally opens up the realm of a new kind of memory not possessed by 
other species – an exterior, non-living memory – giving rise to all the 
related but separate possibilities of gesture, language and graphic rep-
resentation (long before writing in the strict sense):
In this book the term ‘memory’ is used in a very broad sense. 
It is not a property of the intelligence, but any kind of sup-
port or medium for action sequences. That being so, we can 
speak of a ‘species-related memory’ to define the fixing of 
behaviour patterns in animal species, of an ‘ethnic’ memory 
that ensures the reproduction of behaviour in human societ-
ies, and in the same way of an ‘artificial’ memory, which in 
its most recent form is electronic, which, without recourse 
to either instinct or reflection, ensures the reproduction of 
mechanical action sequences.550
This rupture between species and memory results in the creation of a 
potential memory ‘whose entire contents belong to society’, so that, 
at birth, individuals are ‘faced with a body of traditions’, that is, an 
ethnic past they have not lived but which they must adopt.551 Hence 
Leroi-Gourhan understands the kind of beings that we ourselves are 
in terms of the tripartite division between ‘species-related memory, 
social memory, and “mechanical memory”’,552 where the last of these, 
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ensuring the reproduction of sequences of mechanical actions such 
as those formerly manual gestures programmed into the factory 
machines of the industrial revolution, refers to that passage beyond 
alphabetic writing described by Derrida.
Here we must make two points:
1 Some confusion remains in Leroi-Gourhan, because the 
‘social memory’ possessed by Homo sapiens already has 
artificial conditions, mediated by technical artefacts. It is to 
clarify this relationship between social memory and tech-
nical memory that Stiegler will turn from Leroi-Gourhan 
to the Simondonian account of individuation, insisting 
(beyond Simondon) on the inextricability of its psychic, 
social and technical strands. Hence ‘mechanical memory’ 
is certainly not the beginning of exteriorized memory but 
its fate, threatening to displace social memory (as an-
epochal Gestell).
2 Although Leroi-Gourhan refers to the ‘criteria of humanity’ 
and to ‘the uniquely human phenomenon of exteriorization 
of the organs involved in the carrying out of technics’,553 
this in fact amounts to a displacement of the animal/human 
distinction and a rejection of anthropocentrism. It is not 
at all a question of metaphysical essences but of epochs of 
inscription, leading to the extended co-causal co-origina-
tion of technics and the expanding brain as each forms the 
condition of the other in the initially very slow (no longer 
genetic) evolution of exteriorization.
But in general, what Stiegler gains by going back from Derrida to 
Leroi-Gourhan is first the realization that it is necessary to think what 
Jacques Derrida calls différance – which constitutes the process of the 
production of traces, which he also calls supplements – precisely as a 
process.554 And second, it is the thought that it is necessary to distin-
guish, within différance that is the history of life, a new age of this 
process: from the moment there appears what Georges Canguilhem 
calls the technical form of life, différance must also be understood as 
the advent of the process of exteriorization, that is, a change begins 
when organisms begin to put themselves outside themselves, and 
therefore to inaugurate a new form of memory.
While Stiegler acknowledges the complex history of rigorously 
original levels, types, and rhythms, his own reading of Gesture and 
Speech thus more clearly delineates three great epochs of memory:
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genetic memory; memory of the central nervous system (epi-
genetic); and techno-logical memory (language and technics 
are here amalgamated in the process of exteriorization).555
But Derrida himself pays little attention to the epochs of this succes-
sion, despite the very reason for him turning to Gesture and Speech in 
the aid of a deconstruction of the metaphysical opposition of human/
animal (or culture/nature) lying precisely in the fact that it is through 
this consideration of kinds of memory that the question is shifted from 
‘the human’ and to the adventure that begins when life starts to pro-
duce organized inorganic material things. With the advent of exteri-
orization, the lessons of experience can be conserved and transmitted 
between the generations, starting from the earliest flint tool. With the 
advent of forms of exteriorization dedicated to this conservation, it 
becomes possible to systematically accumulate such lessons – becom-
ing the history of knowledge, that is, of noesis as a function of life, or 
what Stiegler calls a différance of différance.
Derrida’s indecision and the uninterestingness  
of the question of the human
Derrida’s gesture with respect to Leroi-Gourhan consists neither in 
making différance ‘scientific’ nor in deconstructing Leroi-Gourhan’s 
scientific discourse: it is a question of allowing a kind of mutual 
exposure with the aim of opening up the possibility of ‘a new logic of 
repetition and the trace’ giving rise to new ‘histories different in their 
type, rhythm, mode of inscription’.556 What Stiegler suggests is that 
Derrida did not quite take the full measure of this exposure to Leroi-
Gourhan, not quite seeing that this history of life as modes of inscrip-
tion is firstly that of the passage from the genetic to the nervous to the 
technical, and so never managed to open up these new and different 
histories.557
It is with this in mind that we should conceive Stiegler’s account of 
Derrida’s ‘indecision’. In brief, if différance is the genetico-structural 
condition of life and evolution, that is, if it refers to the trace and the 
putting in reserve that together open the possibility of the prolifera-
tion of life in general, then how are we to understand that Derrida also 
seems to ascribe différance to that which opens up after life intro-
duces the new economy of retention and protention that will arise 
with technical memory?
The trace is the differance which opens appearance 
[l’apparaître] and signification. Articulating the living upon 
the nonliving in general,…558
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culture as nature different and deferred, differing-deferring; 
all the others of phusis – tekhnē, nomos, thesis, society, free-
dom, history, mind, etc. – as phusis different and deferred, 
or as phusis differing and deferring. Phusis in différance.559
For suggesting that the break in différance is at least as important 
as its continuity from physis to nomos, Stiegler has periodically suf-
fered the rebuke of anthropocentrism.560 In fact, Stiegler:
 ▪ learns from Leroi-Gourhan the lesson that what matters is 
not the human but the rupture of the link between species 
and memory (a rupture that predates the human) brought 
by artifices;
 ▪ responds to Derrida’s call for histories different in their 
type, rhythm and mode of inscription, understanding that 
this is firstly the question of artificial exteriorization as the 
advent of new retentional forms;
 ▪ recognizes that these new histories also open a history of 
new kinds of protentions, that is, expectations, anticipations 
and desires.
Stiegler has no investment in ‘the human’, nor in any positivist or 
empiricist metaphysics.
General organology posits that the organological – under-
stood in the sense of the technical and technological supple-
ment – is what modifies the organic, that is, the process of its 
différance: of its differentiation and its delay [temporisation], 
its spacing and its temporalization, and in such a way that a 
new process of individuation emerges, that is, a new form of 
life. […] And in this regard, I must say that I myself do not 
relate the technical form of life to the human: it is a subject I 
do not wish to debate because, from a philosophical perspec-
tive, the question of the human has never seemed to me to be 
of any great interest.561
Stiegler has no investment in ‘the human’, nor in any positivist or 
empiricist metaphysics. If, for Derrida, retention and protention 
already go far beyond intentional consciousness, it is because he sees 
retentionality and protentionality as characteristics of the whole his-
tory of life qua différance, prior to the evolution of any intentional 
consciousness. What is crucial for Stiegler, however, is that the ‘liv-
ing present’ of any organism possessing something that Husserl could 
come to call intentional consciousness necessarily passes through 
the non-living, and for this reason he completely agrees with Derrida 
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that the relationship of spacing and temporalization must therefore be 
understood grammatologically before it is understood phenomeno-
logically. What continues to be at stake in Stiegler’s work is this life-
death of retention and protention, but conceived explicitly in terms 
of the succession of retentional-protentional forms that have emerged 
and tend to persist: persist against what?
Even if it seems obvious that life is a process that temporarily 
defers entropy by differentiating itself through the flourishing of spe-
cies, the answer to this question was not something made as clear as it 
could have been, either in Of Grammatology or in Technics and Time, 
1. This is in part because the earliest of these forms – the genetic mol-
ecule that has persisted, differently, ever since the dawn of biological 
evolution – was insufficiently theorized in its relation to subsequent 
retentional forms.
Derrida, Jacob and retentional confusion
In what follows, therefore, we will follow out a line of consequences 
that can be seen to flow from the Derridian indecision diagnosed by 
Stiegler, and we will ask whether these consequences led to further 
deficiencies and ultimately to an inability to conceive a new logic of 
the trace and repetition. For what has plagued Derridian thought is the 
threat of sterility: an inability to reproduce differently. Our contention 
is that these consequences begin to be played out in a seminar series 
that was given in 1975–76 but not published in French in its entirety 
until 2019. We will then see that this leads to another step not being 
taken: the translation of this problematic of différance, the trace and 
modes of inscription, retention and protention into the problematic of 
entropy and what struggles to counter it, and the relationship of these 
struggles to the question of information.
That Derrida entitles this seminar Life Death [La vie la mort] with 
no conjunctive ‘and’ or ‘is (not)’ serves to indicate that ‘this alterity or 
this difference was not of the order of what philosophy calls opposi-
tion’562 but instead involves another logic, or another ‘topos’ [topique] 
– some uncertainty seems to remain here.563 The issue at stake with 
this deconstruction of the opposition of life and death is precisely that 
of the future of the question of différance qua history of life opened 
up in 1967, but eight years later the interlocutor is no longer Leroi-
Gourhan but the geneticist François Jacob. Derrida wants to decon-
struct what he sees as an oppositional logic set up by Jacob between 
two kinds of memory, but, as we will see, Derrida tends to project into 
Jacob’s text that which he already expects to find, seemingly without 
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memory of what he should have learned from his earlier reading of 
Leroi-Gourhan.
It is worth noting that a large portion of what Derrida tries to do 
in this seminar consists in showing (and in trying to ‘deconstruct’) 
the way that Jacob both undoes the logic of metaphysical opposi-
tion through the very discoveries of genetic science and falls back 
into such oppositions, in particular through the ‘models’ and ‘analo-
gies’ he uses to describe these discoveries. But what is the status of 
these models and analogies: does their importance for Jacob really go 
to the heart of his research or do they merely facilitate the task of 
popularizing scientific knowledge for an untrained audience? These 
deconstructions, in particular of Jacob’s assertions about the origin of 
sexual reproduction or the origin of death ‘in the proper sense’, that is, 
about the evolutionary introduction of these new distinctions into the 
history of life, themselves tend to raise metaphorical eyebrows about 
Derrida’s judgment about what to deconstruct and how.
The opening lines of La logique du vivant (1970) introduce the sci-
entific question of life in terms of reproduction, that is, ‘the begetting 
of like by like’.564 It is not that molecules produce identical copies of 
themselves but that the macro-molecules of life shape the slightly dif-
ferent molecules that will then be produced: the repetitive begetting 
of like from like is also and necessarily the begetting of difference. 
Jacob notes that this process, heredity, is now described ‘in terms of 
information, messages and code’.565 The organism is thus ‘the realiza-
tion of a programme’ in which ‘the intention of a psyche has been 
replaced by the transmission of a message’.566
With this conception of message transmission, Jacob wants to 
replace the obsolete notion that evidence of design implies evidence 
of intention, that is, of a designer. His scientific goal is to conceive 
the organism in a radically dynamic way as itself only a mediation 
between past and present, ‘a transition, a stage between what was and 
what will be’, emphasizing that it is reproduction itself that is the only 
actor on this stage in the theatre of life, bearing witness to the final 
disappearance of a whole set of ‘antitheses’: ‘finality and mechanism, 
necessity and contingency, stability and variation’.567 The organism is 
but an eddy in the process of biophysical becoming, through which 
run rivers of matter and energy, carried along by currents whose 
understanding requires a new concept: the program.
The concept of programme blends two notions which had 
always been intuitively associated with living beings: mem-
ory and project.568
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Derrida notes that with this concept Jacob does not rely on the refer-
ence to inscription or to the graphic, or to phonetic writing or non-
phonetic writing.569 But having noted it, he immediately adds that 
he will come back to it later, and we are immediately led to wonder 
whether this acknowledgment will prove to be limited or conditional. 
Jacob wants to emphasize the way in which genetics overcomes a 
confusion surrounding reproduction that has existed for centuries: 
the belief that environment influences heredity. As Derrida says, 
this confusion consists in confounding what must be distinguished 
(epochally): two memories, ‘genetic and nervous (cerebral)’.570 Two 
terms marked with three words, one in parentheses: will these signs 
need to be made to tremble? Derrida is referring to the following pas-
sage in The Logic of Life:
For modern biology, the special character of living beings 
resides in their ability to retain and transmit past experi-
ence. The two turning-points in evolution – first the emer-
gence of life, later the emergence of thought and language 
– each corresponds to the appearance of a mechanism of 
memory, that of heredity and that of the brain. There are cer-
tain analogies between the two systems. Both were selected 
for accumulating and transmitting past experience, and in 
both, the recorded information is maintained only insofar 
as it is reproduced in each generation. But the two systems 
differ with respect to their nature and to the logic of their 
operations. The suppleness of mental memory makes it par-
ticularly apt for the transmission of acquired characters. The 
rigidity of genetic memory prevents such transmission.571
In writing ‘nervous (cerebral)’, Derrida is thus following Jacob, who 
describes this second emergence firstly in terms of the brain and sec-
ondly in terms of ‘thought and language’ – even though the emergence 
of the brain predates the emergence of ‘thought and language’ by hun-
dreds of millions of years. A reader of Leroi-Gourhan would surely 
know that this is a question of the second and third emergences, as we 
have seen, but it seems impossible at this point to decide exactly what 
the geneticist intends. Derrida’s ‘nervous (cerebral)’ almost seems 
like the emergence of a repressed memory of having read Gesture and 
Speech, but where the rigidity of the archaeologist’s printed text may 
not have fixed itself strongly enough in the philosopher’s supple brain.
Jacob exacerbates this confusion by characterizing these memories 
as respectively rigid and supple (which will be a key part of Derrida’s 
‘deconstruction’ here), on that basis describing them as variously 
preventing or allowing the transmission of acquired characteristics. 
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‘Rigid’ means that what happens to the individual organism in the 
course of its existence makes no difference to what it transmits 
genetically to the next generation; ‘supple’ means that the individual 
organism learns lessons from experience with the potential to alter its 
behaviour. But these lessons retained by an individual are lost with 
the death of the organism: only with the third emergence, with exteri-
orization, can these lessons be acquired, transmitted and accumulated, 
through the re-interiorization of what has been exteriorized, thereby 
leading in return to the possible emergence of the noetic processes of 
‘thought and language’. But exteriorized memory has this character-
istic precisely because it possesses a technical ‘rigidity’ that nervous 
memory lacks: forms of artificial memory such as writing have the 
potential to retain their structure rigidly (exactly) over the course of 
many generations, precisely because they are not living but the articu-
lation ‘of the living upon the nonliving’.
How do we explain this confusion? In Jacob’s case, his primary 
concern is with the ‘first emergence’, that is, genetic heredity: he is a 
geneticist concerned with human reproduction and those emergences 
that followed and led to the distinction of the technical living thing 
are merely of tangential or analogical interest. He can allow him-
self to forget the succession of epochs that he seems to collapse into 
the ‘second emergence’ because his reason for raising this division 
of emergences is only to elucidate that the scientific discovery of the 
genetic molecule as the basis of the first emergence enabled a correc-
tion of the Lamarckian error.
In Derrida’s case, this confusion of memories (and of memory) 
threatens more significant consequences. Perhaps Derrida is just fol-
lowing Jacob’s text in order to allow the oppositions it contains to 
‘undo themselves’. But Derrida never does allow this confusion to be 
brought to light. What he does do is try to undermine this ‘opposition’ 
between two kinds of memory and therefore the analogy between 
them, by describing the relationship between rigidity and suppleness 
as ‘economic’ or ‘quantitative’, on this basis concluding that it is not a 
question of analogy but of resemblance:
If, therefore, within the analogy, rigorous criteria are lack-
ing to oppose the two systems, so that one can today also 
describe institutional memory, the institutional program […] 
in the same terms as the genetic program, then the analogy 
is no longer simply an analogy between different things but 
a resemblance within the element of homogeneity.572
It is as if institutional memory were simply the expression or extension 
of cerebral memory. But if ‘institutional memory’ can be described as 
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resembling genetic memory by a certain character of rigidity and yet 
also possesses an ability to transmit acquired characteristics across 
generations, is this not precisely because institutional memory is not 
the expression of a memory but the coalescence of two memories, ner-
vous memory and technical memory, and is this not precisely what 
Leroi-Gourhan means by socio-technical memory?
‘Rigidity’, in this case of institutional memory, means that its evo-
lution operates according to a dynamic that exceeds the knowledge 
of its members, who are largely ignorant of the consequences that 
will follow from changes introduced into the system. Hence Derrida 
himself will refer to ‘cerebral-institutional programs (psychic, social, 
cultural, institutional, politico-economic, etc.)’ as evincing a causal-
ity that ‘Jacob seems to want to reserve for genetic programs’. All 
these strange qualifications and hyphenations of the psychic and the 
technical, from the ‘nervous (cerebral)’ to the ‘cerebral-institutional’, 
ultimately lead Derrida, when he wants to point to Jacob’s error in 
imagining that institutional programs are changed deliberately, 
to introduce his own rigid opposition between two memories, now 
termed with misleading simplicity the genetic and the non-genetic:
Similarly, the heterogeneity between causes and effects […] 
characterizes the non-genetic program as well as the genetic 
program. Where does Jacob get the notion that, outside the 
genetic system and the genetic programs, changes in pro-
gram are deliberate, essentially deliberate? Where does 
he get this notion if not from an ideologico-metaphysical 
opposition that determines superior or symbolic programs 
(with humanity at the very summit of these) on the basis of 
meaning, consciousness, freedom, knowledge of the limit 
between the inside and the outside, objectivity and non-
objectivity, etc.?573
For Derrida, Jacob’s suggestion that non-genetic programs (such as 
institutions) are subject to deliberate change stems from his having 
blindly adopted a set of metaphysical oppositions, essentially those 
of the natural and the human. But is this overly general and simple 
but peripheral claim by Jacob really enough to justify Derrida’s accu-
sation of ‘ideologico-metaphysical opposition’? Isn’t it rather Derrida 
who effects a conflation of the psychic and the technical in order to 
form an opposition between the genetic and the non-genetic?
It is at this point that Derrida’s reading of Jacob’s description of 
genetic science meets up with the structuralism of the social sci-
ences. Derrida points out that the singular achievement of structural-
ist science is to have shown that the systems linked to language, the 
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symbolic, cerebral memory and so on, function through an internal 
regulation that, like the genetic program, escapes deliberation and 
consciousness, so that there can be no rigorous opposition between 
these two programs. Hence Derrida calls for a general notion of pro-
gram, in the absence of which any ‘philosophy of life’ is bound to fall 
into a logocentric teleology and a humanist semantics.574 But this call 
is founded on an opposition of the genetic and the non-genetic, itself 
arising from the conflation of the psychic and the technical. Such a 
conflation, however, is possible only by forgetting Leroi-Gourhan’s 
focus on the emergence of different kinds of memory, forming dif-
ferent epochs, ages and eras of différance qua history of life, and this 
forgetting is precisely what Lévi-Straussian structuralism authorizes 
through its tendency towards the exclusion of the diachronic.
According to Derrida, the absence of such a general notion of pro-
gram means that Jacob inevitably falls into logocentrism because his 
use of analogy brings into play the ‘whole conceptual machine of 
logos’ in order to describe what amounts to a form of non-phonetic 
writing. Derrida’s own chapter on ‘The Program’ in Of Grammatology, 
by contrast, exists precisely so as not to avoid the necessity of the 
deconstruction of this logocentric machine.575 Yet if Jacob’s approach 
to the general reconstruction of the program in this work of popular 
science is not ‘deconstructive’ in the strict sense, nevertheless we have 
also seen that Derrida’s opposition of the genetic and the non-genetic 
in relation to forms of memory is itself a reduction to oppositional 
terms of the retentional aspect of any such general programmatics.
Life-death and the illusory isomorphism  
of energy and information
The price to be paid for this confusion is the inability to pursue as far 
as possible the notion of différance as the history of life-death, the risk 
being that it leads to the sterilization of the Derridian project. In fact, 
Jacob’s ‘memory and project’ might have been conceived in terms of 
such a general notion of program, and thus in relation to a history of 
retention-protention, but where this is conceived less in grammato-
logical terms as the arche-writing of life than, more dynamically, as 
the arche-cinema of life: anima being always already cinema.576 On 
this basis, a genuine encounter might have been staged between the 
phenomenological, the scientific and the deconstructive – exceeding 
all three terms while tying them together inextricably. It is possible to 
see the inklings of such a project in the remainder of Life Death, but 
we can also see how and why it stalls.
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In the fifth session, Derrida’s reading of Jacob brings him to the 
question of the difference between what the bacterium does and 
what Dasein does, or in other words to the question of ‘world’ and 
the Heideggerian problematic of beings that are with or without 
world (or poor in world), and more pointedly to the question of the 
world in which it is possible to raise the question of this difference 
of worlds. This world within which the world of Dasein can be con-
sidered together with the bacterium’s Umwelt would be, he argues, a 
world without homogeneity or totality, operating according to a logic 
neither of the is nor of the and, neither of identity nor of opposition, 
but, precisely, of différance.577 We can interpret this question – of the 
world in which we could think the bacteriological (non)world together 
with the noetic world of Dasein – as the question of the open system 
of knowledge with which it would be possible to think this difference 
that bifurcates the history of différance.
The 1975–76 seminar is the one in which this bifurcation could have 
been thought because it is here that there almost arises the questions:
 ▪ of how the deferral that makes a difference is ultimately the 
question of life as that which struggles against the entro-
pic tendency;
 ▪ of how this question is not just a question of deconstructing 
the relationship between the animal and the human but also 
the relationship between the animal and the machine;
 ▪ of how this implies the necessity of reconstructing a gen-
eral programmatics on the basis of new distinctions, requir-
ing new terms with which to consider the counter-entropic 
character of endosomatic and exosomatic systems.
Our contention is that the entire issue of life-death lies here, in these 
questions that remain just below the visible horizon of Derrida’s dis-
course, provided that we take them as gesturing towards the mon-
strosity in which consists our epochal problem.
If the organism is an eddy in becoming, it is because what it emerges 
from, and what then irrigates all of its genetic tributaries, rearranging 
the contours of the counter-flow that is its functioning, behaviour and 
reproduction, are rivers of energy and matter (without opposing these 
terms) that both turn against and contribute to the entropic current, as 
Edgar Morin describes:
living organization […] succeeds, once constituted, in emerg-
ing and perpetuating its improbability, that is to say in creat-
ing islets and networks of probability in the ocean of disor-
der and noise. And it is the idea of negentropic organization, 
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which bears in itself this idea of re-ascent against the current 
of entropy, but also, and this is the complicity of the concept 
of negentropy, in following and feeding this very current.578
The formation of these memorious and projective contours is what 
shapes the flow of the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time 
of space. But what guides this formation of temporalization and spac-
ing that appears in the course of disappearing is also open to being 
conceived as informational (without initially presuming to know 
what this word means). It is this informational aspect that leads Jacob 
from the analogy of animal and human to the analogy of animal and 
machine, and to the basis of such an analogy in the fact that both of 
them may be considered as localized and temporary counter-entropic 
systems: ‘Animal and machine, each system then becomes a model for 
the other.’579 Jacob is thus led to a conjoined reading of Schrödinger 
on the genetic organism as negentropic and Wiener on the computa-
tional machine as anti-entropic, both of these being systems enabling 
a temporary and local reversal of entropy through the ‘messages’ cir-
culating along and between sensorimotor systems and feedback loops.
Derrida’s primary question in the sixth session is the reciprocal 
character of these models and analogies. Establishing the informa-
tional character of the messages of such counter-entropic systems is 
possible only via informational systems that themselves arise from 
these systems, and this would indicate both the technico-phenom-
enological basis of the scientific investigation of these systems and 
the limits of the entangled objectivity of such a scientific project.580 
The scientific ‘world’ in which there can be an analogy between the 
counter-entropic character of (1) the bacterium, (2) Dasein and (3) 
the computer is a world but is bound to be only a world: knowledge 
itself has the character of an open, local and temporary system, some-
thing Derrida himself indicated from the beginning of the seminar 
when he described the process of life in terms of (that which defines 
access to) knowledge.581 If we seem to be able to detect an echo of 
Canguilhem here, it also seems to point us to Whitehead’s reflections 
on the function of reason in the struggle between the upward and 
downward trends.
Yet as Derrida points out, the risk implied by this kind of ‘isomor-
phism’ indifferently linking energy and information with respect to 
any kind of ‘system’ consists in concluding that the basis for this 
co-modelling of diverse systems lies in the analogous character of 
‘exchange’. Such a conclusion makes it easier and easier to shift focus 
from exchange to ‘communication’, and to privilege ‘information’ 
as the what being exchanged, so that the ‘content without content’ 
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of exchange as matter and energy are abstracted away, since they 
are merely variables between different kinds of systems.582 But in 
so doing, the matter and energy of this what are hypertrophied into 
non-existence:
The circulating, circular model is at once informatic [infor-
matique] (if information is only a formal message) and ener-
getic. That which one might have wanted – and can always 
still want – to eliminate surreptitiously by privileging the 
message or communication or form, namely, the energetic, 
does not let itself be reduced.583
It is for this reason that it is strictly impossible, as Derrida himself 
knew, to conceive différance and the trace as if they have nothing to 
do with the material or the energetic, and therefore with the scientific 
approach to these questions, even if it can never be reducible to sci-
ence. And therefore, he adds, ‘whenever one speaks of textuality, the 
value of relations of force, of a difference of force, an economic ago-
nistics, will be just as irreducible’, just as, he concludes, every textual 
system opens onto an outside (which is also to say, arises from out of 
the complicated origin of a différance).584
Here, Derrida is engaged with considerable foresight in what 
amounts to a critique of the tendency of the contemporary age to view 
all systems through a narrowly-conceived cybernetic lens, in which 
‘information’ would be the universal element. With this thought of 
the irreducibility of energy and of an economic agonistics that never 
forms a closed system (including textual systems, or systems of 
knowledge), Derrida might well have been on the way to reinscribing 
différance into a history of life-death, that is, of more than one kind of 
struggle against entropy (or the struggle against more than one kind 
of entropy), in a way that opens up a programmatics founded on a 
critique of both structuralism and cognitivism. Hence, he does go on 
in this session to recognize that it is not possible to separate the mes-
sage as such from the feedback loop or regulation system with which 
it is involved:
we do not have two concepts here (message plus energy 
regulation): in the message there was selection or sorting, 
and the principle of this selection that is constitutive of 
the very operation of the message had to obey certain eco-
nomic laws.585
A message is ‘informatic’ to the precise extent that it is an improbable 
selection from among a set of possibilities, and this selection must 
occur according to criteria, which are supplied by the energetic and 
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biological and economic functionality of the recursivity of the sys-
tem. This recursivity consists in reintroducing into the system (and 
this is the very thing that makes it a ‘system’ in a sense that is not true 
of a purely ‘physical’ system such as a hurricane or some other meteo-
rological ‘system’) the results of past action (‘already, in one form or 
another, a memory or an archive of messages’) in order to ‘redress’ 
the tendency of the mechanism towards disorganization. Derrida is 
explicit that this produces, ‘locally and temporarily, a reversal of the 
tendency or the direction of entropy’:
Regulation thus consists in compensating for each local 
deterioration by means of a certain work or energy that 
comes from elsewhere within the organism or from outside 
the organism. This work or this local supplementary energy 
is itself then subjected to the same law, the same tendency, 
as will each one that follows, each loss being compensated 
by a gain, though in such a way that, if the system were 
closed, and according to the second law of thermodynamics, 
the disorder and the deterioration would go on increasing. 
The living being, insofar as it tends to reestablish the prior 
order or maintain the preexisting order, can thus never be a 
closed system.586
Derrida might then have asked about the relationship between the 
difference and deferral of différance and the local and temporary 
redressing of the second law of thermodynamics that is always in 
some way a question of an archive or a memory. He might then have 
reflected on the different (and différant) character of the ‘economic 
laws’ operating on the selection involved in exosomatic versus endo-
somatic diachrony, given the degree to which the former involves the 
continuation of biological evolution via the suspension of its selection 
criteria.587
To do so, however, would have required recollecting Leroi-
Gourhan’s argument that exteriorization always constitutes a kind of 
memory because it is an archive. It would then have been a matter 
of asking what forms the criterion for selection when these feedback 
loops involve a circuit that passes through exteriorization qua artifi-
cial memory, and what kind of energy circulates along such circuits, 
where this energy is what makes possible the protentional, performa-
tive or ‘procursive’ aspects of ‘work’. It is possible to ask such a ques-
tion, for example, by giving a critique of Lévi-Strauss’s rejection of 
Mauss’s use of hau to describe the energetics of gift exchange: contra 
Lévi-Strauss, the question is not whether this energy can be said to 
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‘exist objectively’, but rather of what existence means when it does 
not involve the ‘objectivity’ of physical science.588
Instead of that, Derrida takes the ‘structural openness of every liv-
ing system’ as a way of quasi-deconstructing Jacob’s claims about sex-
uality and death: for Derrida, this openness means that reproduction 
and death have always involved a relation to the outside, to however 
minimal an extent, and to ascribe this contamination of the inside by 
the outside to accidentality is to remain within an opposition between 
them that would still be metaphysical. In addition to acknowledging 
that the cybernetic notion of feedback that Jacob takes from Wiener 
‘displaces’ the opposition of animal and machine, Derrida attends at 
length to the limit of the analogy by which each ‘becomes a model for 
the other’, focusing on the relationship between the notion of anal-
ogy, the notion of model and the notion of reproduction that under-
lies and breaks with these quasi-analogous models. We are unable to 
provide a treatment of all this here, which is at times interesting but 
rather tangential to what seems to this author to be the key outstand-
ing questions implied by the notion of ‘life-death’. Suffice it to say 
that Derrida seems to want to say that Jacob has become too invested 
in the analogous character of information, message, text and code in 
these various systems, and yet the last lines of Jacob’s book make 
apparent that Jacob understands the world he is creating through his 
scientific work as involving systems of knowledge that are inevitably 
locally-inflected and temporary.589
The problems posed by the energetic model  
in psychoanalysis and its deconstruction
1 How the process of exteriorization amounts to an artificial-
ization of memory giving rise to the technical and noetic 
life of mortal souls who thereby enter into a co-emergence 
of interior and exterior…
2 How this technical life implies, especially after the advent 
of hypomnesic forms of retention deliberately designed to 
store memories and project dreams (rupestrally, literally, 
mechanically, cinematographically or digitally, each tem-
poralizing and spacing in rigorously original ways and 
thus making new différances), the pharmacological (that 
is, simultaneously and irreducibly distributed between poi-
sonous and curative possibilities) artificialization of desire 
through the circulation of libidinal energy in circuits run-
ning through and between noetic souls and their reten-
tional systems…
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3 How this libidinal energy locally produced by exosomatic 
beings can be exploited and degraded by a consumerist 
perpetual growth macroeconomic model that leads to the 
entropic exploitation and degradation of all the matter and 
energy on which the biosphere depends, and to the nihilistic 
destitution of the diversity of ‘social memory’ and the noetic 
procursivity it makes possible and on which it depends…
…these three questions (exteriorization, pharmacology, entropy) 
roughly correspond to the three phases of Stiegler’s work.590 It is 
undoubtedly through his intimate familiarity with the ‘fascinating 
inheritance’591 of his master and supervisor that Stiegler was able to 
engage on this path of care-ful thinking. But Derrida himself was 
prevented, or prevented himself, from seeing the possibility of such 
a path, seemingly by failing to remember what he should have read 
in Leroi-Gourhan and failing to see how Leroi-Gourhan should have 
informed his reading of Jacob. We will now see that he also failed 
to see how the questions of thermodynamic and cybernetic entropy 
raised in that seminar ought to have recurred in his reading of Freud 
on the life and death drives. The upshot is that after 1976 Derrida 
withdraws from the question of the relationship between deconstruc-
tion and the sciences, at the precise moment when he might have taken 
further steps in that direction: a chance was thereby missed to elabo-
rate and constitute the question of the relationship between retention, 
entropy, desire and technics.
The symptom of the withdrawal occurs in the eleventh session, 
where Derrida considers Freud’s decision to privilege ‘the economic 
point of view’ and the sources of that view of energy and its circu-
lation. After noting that the Freudian distinction between free and 
bound energy refers back to Hermann von Helmholtz and ‘the prin-
ciples of Carnot-Clausius and of the degradation of energy’, Derrida 
simply decides to ‘leave aside, at least for the moment, this tricky 
question of borrowing an energetic model’.592 He thus retreats from 
any engaged reading of Jean Laplanche’s chapter on the death drive 
in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, despite this being (as he adds in 
a footnote in the version of this text that appears in The Post Card) ‘a 
chapter which I presume to be read here’.593
Laplanche begins that chapter by considering the ‘economic prob-
lem of masochism’, then turning to the account of the death drive in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and the ambiguity contained in Freud’s 
statement that the pleasure principle ‘endeavours to keep the quantity 
of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it con-
stant’.594 Freud thus repeats what he said in the Project for a Scientific 
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Psychology, where he writes that ‘the nervous system is obliged to 
abandon its original trend to inertia (that is, to bringing the level [of 
Qη] to zero)’ and ‘put up with [maintaining] a store of Qη sufficient to 
meet the demand for a specific action’.595 Laplanche asks whether we 
can really conjoin, as Freud seems to want to do, the notion of keeping 
excitation as ‘low as possible’, at ‘zero’, to the notion of maintaining it 
at a level that is ‘constant’ or ‘sufficient’.
Laplanche notes that the issue of excitation and its circulation 
concerns what amounts to a ‘homeostatic system’, but in that case 
zero and constant are hardly equivalent: the first refers to the final 
inert equilibrium of a closed system receiving no additional energy 
whereas the second refers to the metastable equilibrium of an open 
system that both receives and expends energy. It is we who introduce 
this Simondonian term, metastability, into Laplanche’s argument: 
limited stability at the limit of instability. Hence metastability refers 
to a composition, a play or a tension between equilibrium and disequi-
librium, which is to say between synchrony and diachrony, tending to 
synchronize but also to desynchronize, that is, to diachronize.
One would surely think that the functioning of an organism, 
an open system fed with rivers of matter and energy, involves a 
(dis)equilibrium that is irreducibly limited to achieving no more than 
such metastability, always on the way to becoming unstable, and that 
the drives, of whatever kind, are, as a product of aeons of evolution, 
ultimately premised on the struggle for such synchronic maintenance 
and, where necessary, diachronic transformation. This is what one 
would be inclined to think, given what it also implies: that when the 
synchronic and diachronic tendencies composed within an organism 
begin on the contrary to decompose, the organic systems it contains 
find themselves stretched beyond their limits and the organism suc-
cumbs – to the inert state of entropic ‘equilibrium’ otherwise known 
as death. But with the focus on the death drive as a fundamental ten-
dency of the biological organism, it is not ‘constancy’ but this entro-
pic ‘zero’ that Freud finds himself increasingly unwilling to dis-
card from life:
And it is quite true that with Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
it is the same priority of zero which, under the name of 
Nirvana, is being reaffirmed. The displacement of the term 
‘pleasure principle’ should not mislead us: the pleasure prin-
ciple, insofar as, throughout the text, it is posited as being 
of a piece with ‘its modification’ as the reality principle, is 
henceforth situated on the side of constancy. It is ‘its most 
radical form’ or its ‘beyond’ which, as the Nirvana principle, 
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reasserts the priority of the tendency towards absolute zero 
or the ‘death drive’.596
It is at this point that Laplanche introduces the link to the Helmholtz 
school (via Ernst Brücke) and Helmholtz’s distinction, based on 
Carnot and Clausius, between ‘free energy’ and ‘bound energy’. 
Helmholtz – who among other things is responsible for the popular 
dissemination of the idea of the heat death of the universe (by con-
sidering it as a closed system subject to the second law of thermo-
dynamics) – understood the ‘freedom’ of free energy to refer to its 
availability for use, whereas bound energy would be that unavailable 
energy uselessly dissipated by the system. As Derrida notes, what 
Laplanche shows is that, in borrowing this energetic model to describe 
the free and bound energy of the psyche, in creating a ‘certain anal-
ogy’597 between mechanical energy and libidinal energy, Freud in fact 
reverses its terms:
Freud takes up terms charged by Helmholtz with the mean-
ing of the second law of thermodynamics; he more or less 
reverses their meaning, interpreting the adjective ‘free’ in 
the sense of ‘freely mobile’ and no longer ‘freely usable’.598
Whereas in engineering free energy is what can be used, that is, 
‘invested’ in work (as for instance in a combustion engine, converting 
chemical energy into mechanical energy and in the process making 
the latter freely available for work, but also inevitably giving off heat, 
that is, unusable energy), for Freud, energy that has been invested (in 
objects of desire, in the aims and work of psychosocial life) is bound 
energy. It is at this precise and delicate point that Derrida decides to 
‘leave aside, at least for the moment, this tricky question of borrowing 
an energetic model’.
Laplanche explains how these problems arise from the ‘naïve 
model’ that Freud deploys in order to understand the energy circulat-
ing around the nervous system, ‘as if what were under consideration 
were a hydraulic draining system’ controlling bodily movement and 
evacuating its energy. It is this death-driven tendency towards ener-
getic evacuation, hypothesized on the basis of an obsolete ‘mechanis-
tic’ understanding of biological functioning, that leads Freud to the 
notion of a ‘reserve of energy’ that the system must ‘learn to tolerate’ 
but that it also, Freud thinks, wants to keep as low as possible. What 
then makes it possible for this minimal constancy of excitation kept 
in reserve to be nervously triggered in appropriate directions are the 
‘exigences of life’, or in other words the functional pressures of an 
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existence that Freud still considered to be mechanically biophysical, 
so to speak:
Thus, in the transition from a mechanism regulated only 
by the death drive to an organization subject to the con-
stancy principle, it is the very idea of life that would serve 
as mediator and catalyst. And on every occasion on which 
Freud refers to the ‘biological standpoint’ in the Project for 
a Scientific Psychology, he does so in order to bridge the gap-
ing discontinuity in the ‘mechanistic’ argument.599
In other words, although the Freudian conception of the organ-
ism, premised on a hydraulic mechanics, wishes to see this drive 
for the entropic zero as lying behind all observed behaviour, Freud 
must nevertheless account for the différance that seems evidently to 
be expressed by all those efforts to maintain the constancy of life – 
to keep it going – yet he has no way of accounting for such efforts 
other than by contradictorily invoking the ‘exigencies of life’ as such. 
Ultimately, these ‘exigencies’ amount less to the invocation of some 
teleological ‘final cause’600 than to the long-term and as such virtually 
automatic consequences of the evolutionary pressures of selection.601
Beyond Laplanche, however, it is necessary to point out that 
Freud has at his disposal only Helmholtz: unlike Laplanche, unlike 
Jacob and unlike Derrida, he is writing several decades before 
Schrödinger’s Dublin lectures. In other words, Freud is trying to con-
ceive the ‘mechanical’ functioning of the psychic organism at a time 
when the problem of the biological standpoint with respect to the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics was far from being clearly elucidated. It 
is Helmholtz, after all, who first speculated that chemical processes, 
too, must be analogous to physical ones in terms of the relationship 
between free and bound energy: the question of biological processes 
remained a step yet to be taken.
These terms, of course, were initially formulated not with the heat 
death of the universe in mind, but in order to theorize the limits of 
efficiency of heat engines, that is, closed mechanical systems. It was 
only through a long historical course that the concept of entropy 
was then able to gain a progressive foothold from physical to chemi-
cal processes, then biological processes, and eventually (in some 
way by mathematical analogy, and in the search for another kind of 
technological efficiency) to informational processes. In falling back 
on mechanistic misconceptions, Freud’s ‘gaping discontinuities’ 
in this regard prove to be largely continuous with those of his age: 
how closed systems of the kind described by Carnot, Clausius and 
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Helmholtz relate to the programming involved in the open homeo-
static systems of organized life remained an open question in 1895, 
and even in 1920.
It is this complicated origin of the second law of thermodynam-
ics that leads to all the confusions that underlie Freud’s borrowing of 
the energetic model, and it is the complicated origin of information 
theory that leads to all those confusions associated with the ‘isomor-
phism’ and ‘inseparability’ of entropy and information. This prolif-
eration of confusions remains to be disentangled, including in relation 
to the economic ‘detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfill-
ment of “desire” or “will”.’602 It is all this that might have been elu-
cidated, deconstructed and reconstituted, had Derrida not ‘arbitrarily 
left aside’ these energetic questions, and had he not already wavered 
in indecision about the questions he himself asked eight years prior 
to giving his seminar on life: ‘What differs? Who differs? What is 
différance?’603
The issue is not the undecidability of the term but the indecisive-
ness of its elaboration, and it stands as the symptom of what, despite 
everything, amounts to Derrida’s own repression of technics. It is 
not that one cannot understand différance as Of Grammatology does, 
as the history of life: on the contrary, Derrida reiterates this under-
standing of différance as the history of life as late as 2002.604 But this 
gesture cannot, on the one hand, authorize a thought of différance as 
an ‘exteriorization always already begun’, while, on the other hand, 
accepting the specificity of exteriorization as a ‘third emergence’ that 
opens onto all the ‘others’ of phusis – or at least, it cannot do so with-
out theorizing the relationship between these alternative formula-
tions. Between these two possibilities, the passage remaining to be 
thought consists in the différance that exosomatization makes to the 
history of life qua différance:
At issue is the specificity of the temporality of life in which 
life is inscription in the nonliving, spacing, temporalization, 
differentiation, and deferral by, of, and in the nonliving, in 
the dead.605
There can be no bio-deconstruction that would not always already 
have been a psycho-deconstruction and a techno-deconstruction, 
because the grammatological question is fundamentally organologi-
cal, in Stiegler’s sense.
It is true that this term, organology, does not appear until the sec-
ond phase of Stiegler’s work, where it will be shown to be irreducibly 
a pharmacology, for which grammatization will be the key analyti-
cal concept and proletarianization the fundamental political one.606 
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Together, these concepts alone make it possible to understand how the 
steps taken in the unfolding of différance in the nineteenth, twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries were what enabled the grammatized exploi-
tation of desire and its proletarianizing regression to the drives, which 
bears crucial responsibility for the advent of our current predicament 
consisting in a global techno-economic system that is reaching the 
limits of its functioning while threatening the very biosphere itself.
It is thus only in this second phase of Stiegler’s work that it becomes 
totally clear that what he develops are the concepts for thinking the 
history of noetic différance as the history of the intertwined charac-
ter of desire and technology, giving rise to the current dysfunctional 
system and also to the inability to muster the collective intelligence 
or will to address the crisis it has produced. It is nevertheless also 
clear that, already in Technics and Time, 1, the critique of Derridian 
différance amounts to the question of the differing-deferring that is 
the history of life referred to by Schrödinger as the history of ‘negent-
ropy’, and where the decisive question to be addressed to Derrida, 
Schrödinger and Wiener is what différance (it) makes when this local-
ized systemic struggle against entropy, this pursuit of life by means 
other than life, plays out no longer just endosomatically but exoso-
matically, and what différance (it) makes when this playing out is no 
longer just technological but industrial, and then hyper-industrial.
The seeds of everything that will be cultivated and ultimately 
bear fruit in the most recent, third epoch of Stieglerian thought are 
thus planted in his initial critique of this passage that Derrida might 
have thought, had not the latter’s own readings of Leroi-Gourhan and 
Laplanche suffered from what seem to be bouts of retentional fini-
tude that prevented him from opening a conjunction between Jacob 
and Freud in which the future of différance might have begun to play 
out. Hence Stiegler has argued that différance as the history not just 
of life but of life-death requires at least a doubling of the concepts 
of entropy and negentropy with anthropy and neganthropy. It is by 
reading and rereading Derrida that Stiegler, unlike Derrida, has sup-
plied the weapons with which we can reinvent the question and the 
problem that towards the end of Derrida’s life was given the more-
than-epochal and less-than-epochal name of the Anthropocene – and 
which amounts to an anthropic, all too anthropic Entropocene.
9 The End of the Metaphysics of Being  
and the Beginning of the Metacosmics of Entropy
On the ethical plane the most conspicuous and enigmatic 
feature of human nature is the extent of Man’s ethical 
gamut. The range of his ethical potentialities between the 
two poles of diabolism and saintliness is as remarkable a 
feature of human life as the ethical dimension itself. Both 
features are peculiar to Man among all the denizens of the 
biosphere. Now that Man has acquired the power to wreck 
the biosphere, we cannot be sure that he will not commit 
this suicidal crime; but we also cannot be sure that he will 
not redeem the biosphere from the state of nature in which, 
so far, love and strife have been at issue with each other 
inconclusively. It is conceivable that, instead of wrecking 
the biosphere, Man may use his power over the biosphere 
to replace the state of nature by a state of grace in which 
love will prevail. This would transfigure life from a 
pandemonium into a communion of saints.
Arnold Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth
Introduction: on aethers and souls
What follows is an oblique attempt to say something about what local-
ity means in relation to an account of what Bernard Stiegler has called 
a neganthropology.607 It might also be construed as the first visible ris-
ing to the surface of some questions and themes that have been brew-
ing for some time but hitherto remained latent. Whether the distilla-
tion of those questions and themes leads to a genuine step of thought 
will probably have to be determined on the basis of future works and 
decided by future hypothetical readers of those future hypothetical 
works. Nevertheless, if what follows is offered under the limited aus-
pices of these kinds of qualifications, it is nevertheless an earnest 
attempt to cultivate some prospects for a speculative venture, with 
hopes that it will at some point prove to be an investment capable of 
yielding fruit worth savouring.
The chapter consists of two halves stitched together with rather 
rough sutures. The first part asks whether what has been called meta-
physics could be conceived as the history of a repression of a style of 
thinking that we can discern by reading Empedocles, a suppression 
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that we would thus claim begins with Aristotle. It then posits a kind 
of continuation of what failed to get going after this putative initial 
Empedoclean foray. We will risk a new term, ‘metacosmics’, for what 
might then become a kind of reinitiating (including in the sense of 
rites of initiation) or reinitializing (including in the sense of comput-
ing) of thinking after the factual history of what has been metaphysics 
up until now, which is to say, up until the long history of its end.
The second part asks what conceptual room might be opened up in 
this future history for an encounter between Stiegler’s exorganologi-
cal neganthropology and Peter Sloterdijk’s immunological spherol-
ogy. The original paper that became this chapter arose mainly from a 
longstanding interest in Stiegler’s work in general, and in his efforts 
aimed at reinscribing philosophical concepts in terms of questions of 
entropy in particular, but also, in part, from what might loosely be 
called ‘political’ complications emerging from his internation proj-
ect (which is a renewal in other terms of Marcel Mauss’s reflections 
on the fate of the national and international, but can additionally and 
with a bit more imagination be conceived as a kind of response to 
Peter Szendy’s call for a new ‘geopolitics of the sensible’608), and in 
part from ongoing email and WeChat discussions I continue to have 
with Anne Alombert and Ouyang Man. As per usual, all responsibil-
ity for any failures of thinking lies with the author, but, beyond this 
standard disclaimer, is there anything worth saying, by way of setting 
the scene for a theatre of the individuation of locality, about this con-
text of friendly discussion?
This four-handed scene (involving myself, Bernard, Anne and Man) 
is obviously conceivable in terms of what Gilbert Simondon calls a 
process of collective individuation, specifically in the sense that four 
perpetually unfinished psychic individuation processes have been 
aiming, via processes of one or another kind of analysis and synthe-
sis, however vaguely or waywardly or hesitatingly at times, towards 
some kind of commonality of understanding and reason (despite the 
fact that they are not all involved in a joint collective project). This 
diffuse aim, due to its very singularity, could only ever be asymptotic, 
the consequence of which is that the collective individuation process, 
too, remains perpetually unfinished – even if all these processes are 
bound one day to be finished off.
But these processes can also be described in terms of locality, 
whereby the locality that I constitute, or in other words the simple 
exorganism that I am, or who I am, interacts with those localities and 
simple exorganisms who are Bernard, Anne and Man. And through 
this interaction, these localities aim to produce the coherence of 
another locality, a slightly large scale of exorganism, and a collective 
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individuation process, one operating across the tertiary retentional 
supports of global digital networks. At the risk of sounding grandiose, 
we might describe this locality, distributed between Paris, Shanghai 
and Melbourne, hence in a geophysical location not much smaller than 
the limits of the biosphere itself, as a kind of cosmological sphere, 
characterized by a certain warmth, produced by a certain productive 
tension, that is, a resonance, and within which Bernard’s position 
might be conceived as in some way paternal, raising his philosophical 
progeny, or again, as a saint who inspires by his no doubt imperfect 
but still rationally miraculous exemplarity.
I deploy these admittedly rather ingratiating metaphors not to flat-
ter but to suggest the psycho-techno-anthropological multidimen-
sionality involved in conceiving locality in terms of cosmologies har-
bouring processes that are less a matter of the harmony of encircling 
spheres than of inwardly and outwardly spiralling tendencies: there 
is, after all, no such thing as a truly stable orbit, but only a relation-
ship between gravitational and centrifugal forces; nor, more funda-
mentally, is there after general relativity any formation of the fabric 
of spacetime that is not either expanding or contracting (as Alexander 
Friedmann showed as early as 1922). Even at the level of the physics 
of space and time, then, there is no such thing as true stability.
Take ‘warmth’, for example: functionally speaking, the concept of 
warmth is not physical but biophysical, naming one of the conditions 
under which the negentropic processes of biological life can flourish 
safely, comfortably and fruitfully, referring to the threshold limits 
of tolerability of atmospheric temperature (or water temperature for 
marine or fluvial life), in the struggle against the freezing cold (a 
coldness that, indeed and in fact, lowers the rate of physical entropy, 
but also kills the potential for biological life to temporarily thwart 
the entropic processes against which it struggles). In the case we are 
describing here, it is not a question of biological or endosomatic life 
that has evolved in the terrestrial locality we call the biosphere, but 
of noetic or exosomatic life, where ‘warmth’ would thus be a meta-
phorical name for the psychosocial conditions in which exosomatic 
life can flourish safely, comfortably and fruitfully. It is a question of 
the atmospheric conditions of transindividuation, that is, the condi-
tions of that medium which fills the apparent void between brains and 
bodies and gives it its character, a transparent element we might also 
describe metaphorically in terms of nineteenth-century physics as a 
kind of aether.
This invisible medium through which waves of noetic warmth 
propagate is, however, inaccessible to any interferometer, the instru-
ment used in the Michelson-Morley experiment. When Ernst Cassirer 
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considers the question of the cosmos in Renaissance philosophy, and 
wants to describe the transformation introduced into the movement 
and principle of knowledge by Nicholas of Cusa, for whom measure-
ment was fundamental (which is to say, measuring instruments), he 
argues that even if this still relies on fixed points, these are no lon-
ger ‘prescribed once and for all’ as an ‘unbridgeable gap [that] sep-
arates the “above” from the “below”, the “higher” heavenly world 
from the “lower” sublunary world’.609 Rather than this predetermined 
Aristotelian cosmos, knowledge in the Cusanian world must navigate 
without fixed central points and pre-given interpenetrating spheres, 
and instead the ‘intellect must learn to move in its own medium, in the 
free aether of thought’.610
This noetic character is further indicated when Cassirer describes 
the cosmos according Giordano Bruno, which, unlike ‘the rigidity of 
the Aristotelian-Scholastic cosmos’, is one in which ‘the concept of 
space merges with that of the aether, and this, in turn with the con-
cept of the world soul’.611 Like the aether through which nineteenth-
century physics speculated that light propagated, no physical experi-
ment will ever confirm that warmth propagates through such a noetic 
aether. Yet despite this physical non-existence, we are indeed entitled 
to wonder in what way it remains a question of measurement, and by 
what instruments it might prove measurable, given that, irrespective 
of this non-existence, it constitutes a fundamental condition of pos-
sibility for the fruitful cultivation of certain kinds of transindividua-
tion processes occurring between psychic individuals aiming towards 
a commonality, that is, a philia.
In other words, this is, undoubtedly, a question of knowing some-
thing after physics. In regards to this ‘after physics’, it is worth recol-
lecting that Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with a declaration tying 
desire and knowledge together at the heart of the nature (physei) of 
human beings: ‘All men by nature desire to know.’612 If this is taken 
to be a statement about metaphysics, which might be taken as ‘psy-
chological’ in the sense that it concerns the psyche, the desiring soul, 
which is to say a soul that is noetically concerned with its relation-
ship to the future, it nevertheless also counts as epistemological to the 
extent that Aristotle follows it by making a distinction between ani-
mals and humans on precisely this score: the knowledge possessed by 
animals relies upon sensation and memory, and therefore on a phanta-
sia that knows little of experience as such, empeiria. And this means, 
says Aristotle at the beginning of Metaphysics, that the human desire 
to know implies that anthropoi, that is, oi thanatoi, mortals, live by 
other means than do the animals, and specifically by the means of 
tekhnē and logos.
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It is not at all difficult to see how this thought of two kinds of 
knowing possessed by animated beings – those whose phantasia is 
woven from perception and memory, and those who can rely not just 
on sensation but on the sensational experience that is empeiria, which 
is also to say on the kind of knowing made possible by measure-
ment and measuring instruments, by logos and tekhnē – is entirely 
congruent with the distinction between the sensible and noetic souls 
described in De Anima. In other words, this consideration that opens 
up the long path of what will be called metaphysics – which according 
to Heidegger attempts to get the whole of being in view, and which in 
modern philosophy becomes the question not of the being who desires 
to know but of the metaphysics of will – this consideration begins 
with the delimitation of different planes of interaction between differ-
ent kinds of individuals and their milieu, which we can rename with 
Stiegler as the negentropic or endosomatic plane and the neganthropic 
or exosomatic plane.
Aristotle, Nietzsche and Freud read Empedocles
It goes without saying that Aristotle did not himself refer to the negen-
tropic plane, let alone the neganthropic, firstly because Aristotle also 
opens the path of metaphysics by opposing the fixed sphere of heav-
enly bodies, which is to say the sphere of timeless ‘being’, to the sub-
lunar world of temporal ‘becoming’ characteristic of life down here. 
From the outset, these beings of phantasia that we are calling negen-
tropic, and the beings of empeiria that we ourselves are and that we 
are calling neganthropic, are both opposed to a cosmic fixed sphere 
characterized precisely by the absence of any entropic tendency and 
therefore any struggle against it, and which is the sphere of those eter-
nal beings that are the immortals.
But rather than stopping at the absurdity of this anachronistic 
observation (that it never occurred to Aristotle to discuss negentropy 
or neganthropy), rather than allowing ourselves to relax content-
edly at the thought that the ancient world simply lacked the physical 
concepts with which to apprehend the world about them, and conse-
quently lacked the ability to make metaphors out of these concepts, 
what happens if we instead follow this line of thinking all the way 
out to the end? Let us abandon well-trodden pathways into the ques-
tion ‘what is metaphysics?’ and instead pose the question: what con-
ceptual absences prevented anything resembling negentropy from 
entering the Aristotelian conceptual universe? One possible way-
station through which such an unconventional path might lead is 
Aristotle’s dismissal of Empedocles, and specifically of two aspects 
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of Empedoclean thought, both of which will be discovered two and 
a half millennia later, independently it seems, by Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Sigmund Freud.
When in ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’ (1937) Freud 
discusses the struggle between Love and Strife, he differentiates 
the ‘cosmic phantasy’ of Empedocles from what he himself seeks, 
which would be, on the contrary, ‘biological validity’, that is, empeiria 
valid across the negentropic biosphere, yet he acknowledges that the 
account of philia and neikos ‘approximates so closely to the psycho-
analytic theory of the drives that we should be tempted to maintain 
that the two are identical’, that is, that these ‘two fundamental prin-
ciples’, love and strife, amount to what Freud himself calls the drives 
of life and destruction, love and strife together producing a ‘process 
of the universe’ conceived as a ‘continuous, never-ceasing alternation 
of periods, in which the one or the other […] gain the upper hand’.613
It is thus a question of the way in which the Empedoclean cosmos 
is – like every mythological view of the world according to Freud, 
as he said several decades earlier – ‘nothing but psychology projected 
into the external world’, an ‘endopsychic projection’, thus opening the 
analytic prospect that it could ‘be changed back once more by sci-
ence into the psychology of the unconscious’, and through which it 
would become possible ‘to transform metaphysics into metapsychol-
ogy’.614 At the same time, as Sarah Kofman points out, Freud accepts 
the idea that there is something about the drives that involves an irre-
ducible relationship to mythology, an art of mythology, but which, 
he argues in ‘Why War?’, can probably be said about every science, 
even Einstein’s physics.615 There is thus a double gesture involved in 
Freud’s relationship to Empedocles: the claim to turn mythological 
metaphysics into scientific metapsychology, and the claim that sci-
ence itself contains an irreducible mythological element whose con-
ceptual openness, elusiveness and indefiniteness are all essential to 
the promulgation of a new science.
Nietzsche, too, draws attention to this struggle between competing 
drives that, as Kofman says, are not opposites but rather rivals – from 
which she concludes that ‘Empedocles’ model is a political one’.616 In 
his lectures on the ‘pre-Platonic’ philosophers, Nietzsche focuses on 
these ‘drives [that] struggle with each other’ and on the way in which 
this duplicity somehow arises from a ‘oneness of all living things’ in 
which what ‘renders them asunder’ somehow can also be that which 
‘presses them toward mixture and unification’, the result of ‘desire 
and aversion’ as the ‘ultimate phenomena of life’.617 For Freud, for 
whom the life drive can sometimes seem to subsume the death drive, 
taking advantage of the latter so that it might be bent towards its own 
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ends, but where at other times it is the death drive that seems to domi-
nate, with all of life ultimately amounting to an entropic journey back 
to an inorganic state, this Empedoclean conflict is irreducible.618
What both Nietzsche and Freud thus make clear is that what they 
see in Empedocles’s doctrine of the struggle between philia and neikos 
is a genuine theory of tendency and counter-tendency, characterizing 
the universe insofar as it is the domain of life, in which the counter-
tendency somehow emerges from out of the tendency and is locked 
with it in a spiralling transductive embrace. In Metaphysics, however, 
Aristotle sees in this Empedoclean account only a deficiency of anal-
ysis, a failure to make a clean cut between one concept and the other, 
so that, he says, Empedocles ‘in many cases […] makes friendship 
segregate things, and strife aggregate them’.619
For Nietzsche and Freud, this rivalry of tendencies, this play of 
tendency and counter-tendency that describes the ‘ultimate phe-
nomena of life’, amounts to a futural and negentropic relationship to 
the milieu, which is to say, precisely, a question of the relationship 
between knowledge and the world in that function of reason that is 
always an art of living (as Whitehead puts it). As Kofman summa-
rizes Empedocles:
The conditions of possibility of knowledge are, above all, 
vital: to understand the being of things is to increase one’s 
own vital forces. The art of directing one’s thought depends 
on an art of living. […] This is why, once again, desire is at 
the root of a successful exchange between knowing subject 
and the world.620
Freud and Nietzsche thus see the distinction between these two ten-
dencies compositionally. For Empedocles, philia produces that admix-
ture in which the elements lose their properties in being united, while 
neikos, ‘paradoxically […] favours the conservation of the elements’. 
Hence it is the latter that forms the ‘basis of knowledge since it alone 
can tear the parts of the elements from the tissue of their compounds 
and allow like to rejoin like’ – in other words, analysis. But with this 
separating out of elements comes also the risk of error and forgetful-
ness, for which philia is necessary as being the sole possibility of a 
synthesis that recollects a prior unity, ‘since only it can bring about a 
conjunction of elements in the correct proportions’.621
In this reading, which we are construing as the necessity for analy-
sis to be both informed and redoubled by synthesis, and which we 
could also construe as the composition of Dionysian and Apollonian 
tendencies, Empedocles composes rather than opposes these entro-
pic and negentropic tendencies, but this is then precisely what opens 
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up the compositional relationship of analysis and synthesis at the 
root of all knowledge.622 For Aristotle, however, the problem with 
Empedocles’s cosmological account lies in his failure to adequately 
describe an analytical opposition. No doubt we could refer this 
Aristotelian reduction of the compositional to the oppositional to 
the replacement of alētheia by orthōtes, which for Heidegger was the 
hallmark of the fall into metaphysics. This would be to suggest that 
Aristotle dismisses Empedocles as lying conceptually on the wrong 
side of exactitude (whereas we would wish to argue, contra Heidegger 
and à la Stiegler, that this exactitude is the very thing that opens up 
the possibility of an account of the composition of tendencies).
Yet how is it that ‘mixture and unification’ can arise from what 
pulls things apart, which is to say, how can a tendency towards pro-
liferation, and towards the conservation of order, arise from out of the 
overwhelming tendency towards disorder characteristic of the physi-
cal universe? Again, Nietzsche and Freud, who lived in the age of 
thermodynamic entropy but prior to the Schrödingerian account of 
negentropy, both note the extraordinary perspicacity of Empedocles 
in this regard. For Empedocles’s solution to this problem is simply to 
conceive this counter-tendency as an effect generated by chance over 
time, or in other words, to interpret this in the light of Darwin and 
Schrödinger, to conceive the negentropic possibility probabilistically.
As Freud notes, in this way Empedocles really anticipates the the-
ory of natural selection in biological evolution: ‘he also included in 
his theoretical body of knowledge such modern ideas as the gradual 
evolution of living creatures, the survival of the fittest and a recogni-
tion of the part played by chance (tukhē) in that evolution’.623 Kōjin 
Karatani describes this relationship between Empedocles’s cosmo-
logical conception of contending tendencies and his foreshadowing of 
negentropic evolution in similar terms:
Love and strife here are not to be understood as psychologi-
cal categories; they are rather physical forces like gravitation 
and repulsion. Empedocles utilized these principles of com-
bination and separation to conceive a kind of evolution of the 
creatures. [This] did not involve a teleology, but rather was 
an evolution by natural selection.624
What Karatani describes thus seems quite distant indeed from any 
‘psychology projected into the external world’, and still less does he 
understand Empedocles as describing a rivalry of drives that would 
really amount to a ‘political model’. Nevertheless, Karatani agrees 
that the cosmological account given by Empedocles contains the fun-
damental elements of the theory of biological evolution.
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In sum, Freud finds in Empedocles the same two ideas he learns 
from Helmholtz (via Brücke): natural selection (that is, Darwin’s 
theory of the basis of endosomatic organogenesis) and entropy (or 
more specifically, for Freud, Helmholtz’s distinction between free 
and bound energy, which will be translated into his account of the life 
and death drives).625 Much of what Freud refers to as metapsychology 
can be interpreted as the outcome of an attempt to conceive the fun-
damental significance of these two ideas for psychic and collective 
life in a world that was yet to acquire the concept of negentropy as 
Schrödinger conceived it.
Nietzsche is even clearer that this is a matter of the possibility 
of order arising from disorder without design, or, in other words, 
Nietzsche sees that for Empedocles, purposiveness is not the cause 
but the cumulative effect of chance over time. A mere decade after the 
publication of The Origin of Species, Nietzsche, himself only twenty-
five years old, describes Empedocles as ‘the tragic philosopher’,626 
and writes of him as providing these fundamental tenets of what he 
calls ‘materialist systems’:
His main difficulty, however, is to allow the ordered world 
nonetheless to arise from these opposing forces without any 
purpose, without any mind, and here he is satisfied by the 
grandiose idea that among countless deformations and limits 
to life, some purposive and life-enabling forms arise. Here 
the purposiveness of those that continue to exist is reduced 
to the continued existence of those who act according to 
purposes. Materialist systems have never again surren-
dered these notions. We have here a special connection to 
Darwinian theory.627
With his account of the rise of separate and detached body parts, 
which are subsequently joined on the basis of likeness, and only later 
through the combination of dissimilar organs, Empedocles can be 
anachronistically interpreted as describing the evolution that runs 
from unicellular to multicellular organisms, which are then increas-
ingly characterized by the functional unity of diverse organs. In 
Physics, however, Aristotle critically evaluates this place of chance 
and natural selection in Empedocles, which Aristotle describes as the 
notion that it is merely a ‘coincident result’ that we find ourselves with 
‘the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful 
for grinding down the food’.628 His conclusion is that it is impossible 
that such a differentiation and proliferation of functional organs could 
be the outcome of chance or coincidence: such phenomena, he states, 
are evidently ‘for the sake of something’, and must therefore be taken 
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as proof that ‘action for an end is present in things which come to be 
and are by nature’.629
With this dual Aristotelian dismissal of Empedocles, and 
specifically of
 ▪ the notion of a compositional and transductive relationship 
of tendency and counter-tendency lying at the origin of the 
phenomenon of life,
 ▪ the notion that this negentropic tendency, giving rise to bio-
logical order (organic organisms), can be explained proba-
bilistically (or improbabilistically) rather than in terms of 
pre-existing final causes,
the path towards a metaphysics of will founded on an oppositional 
logic was set.
Were things otherwise, had Aristotle not rejected Empedocles and 
the notion of counter-tendency, had he not rejected the notion that 
chance and selection could give rise to purposiveness rather than the 
other way around, what else might he have been drawn to conclude 
about the distinction and relationship between endosomatic beings 
limited to sensation, memory and phantasia, and exosomatic beings 
open to tekhnē, logos and empeiria? Putting such counterfactual and 
slightly absurd questions to one side, the ‘end of metaphysics’ might 
as well amount, we are proposing, to the end of the Aristotelian forget-
ting of Empedocles, an end that would be philosophically initiated by 
Nietzsche and Freud but prepared by Clausius, Boltzmann, Helmholtz 
and Darwin, in ways that neither Nietzsche nor Freud could fully deal 
with, even though we might well describe their thinking as never 
fully successful attempts to think in precisely this direction.
From metaphysics to metacosmics
Such resources already equip us with means sufficient to con-
test Heidegger’s account of the end of metaphysics as well as his 
account of Nietzsche’s place in that end. We may well see the his-
tory of metaphysics in terms of the fate of that ‘desire to know’ with 
which Aristotle opens Metaphysics, and which eventually becomes, 
in Hegel, ‘the unity of knowing and willing’, and finally becomes, in 
Nietzsche (according to Heidegger), the ‘absolute subjectivity of the 
body; that is, of drives and affects; that is to say, of will to power’.630 
For Heidegger’s Nietzsche, then, the final metaphysical reversal con-
sists in folding the rationality of the animal rationale into these drives 
and affects, which Heidegger then presumes to be reducible to the 
level of animalitas.
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If we allow ourselves to credit the notion of bringing to an end the 
Aristotelian forgetting of Empedocles, however, then what Heidegger 
himself continues to forget is not only that these drives and affects are 
not at all ‘animal’, neither in Nietzsche nor in Freud, since they are 
instead what opens onto the very possibility of the desire to know as 
logos and tekhnē, but also that all of these, instinct, drive, desire, arise 
from those highly improbable, if not indeed singular (happening once 
ever) processes that inaugurate, in turn, negentropy and neganthropy. 
With this thought, we can take Heidegger’s own conclusion regarding 
the end of metaphysics as itself raw metaphysical material in want of 
complete reinterpretation:
The end of metaphysics that is to be thought here is but the 
beginning of metaphysics’ ‘resurrection’ in altered forms; 
these forms leave to the proper, exhausted history of fun-
damental metaphysical positions the purely economic role 
of providing raw materials with which – once they are cor-
respondingly transformed – the world of ‘knowledge’ is 
built ‘anew’.631
What does ‘raw materials’ mean here? The raw materials at stake here 
are not akin to those simple atomic elements such as copper or iron, 
to be dug up, smelted and shaped into new inorganic but organized 
forms, as was formerly done by an artisan and is now accomplished 
industrially. Rather, these materials are more like those remnants 
of ancient life, whose highly complex (highly organized) organic 
molecular constituents over aeons gradually become the still highly 
complex hydrocarbons of oil and coal, the complexity of which makes 
possible their combustibility, that is, their possibility of releasing 
reserves of potential energy. Or, even more so, like those less ancient 
organic remnants that have been turned from biomass into necromass, 
at the microcosmic scale forming the humus, and at the macrocosmic 
scale the pedosphere, which is to say, the set of highly complex com-
ponents deriving from the diversity of past endosomatic organisms 
and forming an essential precondition for the continued existence of 
the biosphere. In other words, Heidegger’s account of the fate of the 
history of metaphysics should be construed in terms of its constituting 
what Stiegler calls the noetic necromass.632
The interpretation of the end of metaphysics becomes a question, 
then, of desiring to know what is being left behind to form this noetic 
necromass, and what is being resurrected from out of this complex 
humus that is at the same time the transindividual aether that forms 
the cosmic ‘element’, where this ‘knowing’ must itself pass through 
the question of a future in which, indeed, the world of knowledge 
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must be built ‘anew’. This raw material does not consist just in a set 
of hypotheses, arguments and theorems to be pieced together in new 
ways like prefabricated building blocks. For the Heidegger of 1942, 
it is a matter of seeing that the fate of metaphysics lies in ‘modern 
machine technology’, and that the question of what comes after that 
fate (in a lecture course devoted to the complex entanglement of 
‘locality and journeying’) is that of the possibility of a new path:
For our thinking remains everywhere metaphysical, […] 
because metaphysics first begins to achieve its supreme and 
utter triumph in our century as modern machine technology. 
It is a fundamental error to believe that because machines 
themselves are made out of metal and material, the machine 
era is ‘materialistic’. Modern machine technology is ‘spirit’, 
and as such is a decision concerning the actuality of every-
thing actual. […] It is just as childish to wish for a return 
to previous states of the world as it is to think that human 
beings could overcome metaphysics by denying it. All that 
remains is to unconditionally actualize this spirit so that we 
simultaneously come to know the essence of its truth. […] 
Yet in truth, this ‘all that remains’ is not the last escape 
route. Rather, it is the first historical path into the com-
mencements of Western historicality, a path that has not at 
all been ventured into.633
This triumph of metaphysics as the spirit of modern machine tech-
nology described by Heidegger in 1942 is what we are describ-
ing as the fate of metaphysics at the end of the long history of the 
Aristotelian repression of the Empedoclean account of tendency and 
counter-tendency.
In 1964, Heidegger will describe this in terms of the process by 
which philosophy ‘turns into the empirical science of man’, and 
explain how the empirical sciences of man are in turn bound to 
succumb to the dictates of cybernetics, by which ‘scientific truth 
is equated with the efficiency’ of the effects of its application, so 
that ‘“Theory” means now: supposition of the categories which are 
allowed only a cybernetical function…’.634 The cybernetic pre-alloca-
tion of the categories of thought threatens, Heidegger is clearly stat-
ing, to lead to the elimination of thinking itself, and this at a time 
when we have still barely begun to think. How close is Heidegger 
here to Stiegler’s position, for instance when the latter writes:
Digital technology […] is based on the computer, which, 
more than anything, is an artificial organ of automated 
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categorization, that is, it automatically produces digital ter-
tiary retentions on the basis of other digital tertiary reten-
tions. The automation of categorization makes it possible for 
operations of analysis and understanding to be delegated to 
digital systems.
Interpretation cannot be delegated to an analytical system 
of tertiary retentions: on the contrary, it always consists in 
deciding between possibilities opened up by tertiary reten-
tions, but [which] these tertiary retentions are not themselves 
capable of choosing between, however automated they may 
be – for here, to choose means, precisely, to disautomatize.635
But Heidegger continues: ‘…which are allowed only a cybernetical 
function, but denied any ontological meaning’.636 With this, as with 
everything he writes, Heidegger shows that he can only partly undo 
the Aristotelian repression: not because this ‘cybernetical function’ 
has an ontological meaning but because Heidegger never exposes 
his notion of being to the tragic notion of tendency and counter-ten-
dency unearthed in the wake of the second law of thermodynamics by 
Nietzsche and Freud.
This is not to say that Heideggerian concepts are not susceptible to 
being understood compositionally – quite the opposite, given that for 
Heidegger existence precedes essence and being is always and inevi-
tably a question of singular forms of being-in-becoming. Heidegger’s 
is indeed a processual form of thinking, and this is why, for example, 
he rejects objections based on the argument of ‘circular reasoning’:637 
there is no static starting point at which to begin drawing the circle of 
thought, and one has always already entered the circuit that one is try-
ing to penetrate, the process of thinking thus constituting a spiral.638
What Heidegger cannot see, however, is that the Da of Dasein, 
and the fundamental locality of all knowledge and truth, arise from 
the fact that Dasein, the noetic soul, is engaged in a counter-entropic 
struggle not just through biological evolution or metaphysical history 
but through what Alfred Lotka calls ‘exosomatic evolution’,639 operat-
ing according to criteria that are always thermodynamically local and 
informationally idiomatic. To interpret this fate of knowledge, truth 
and philosophy under cybernetics beyond metaphysics, we maintain, 
is to interpret the meaning of this transformation of ‘language into 
an exchange of news’, of the arts into an industry of ‘regulated-regu-
lating instruments of information’, and of the ‘ontologies of the vari-
ous regions of beings (nature, history, law, art)’ into the ‘operational 
and model character of representational-calculative thinking’640 – it 
is to interpret the meaning of all of this in terms of the irreducibly 
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local struggle against both thermodynamic and informational entropy 
(where the latter, as a circuit of knowledge and memory through the 
necessity of exosomatic hypomnesic organs, is what opens that error 
and forgetting identified by Empedocles with neikos).
If this is indeed a question premised on the necessity of know-
ing and desiring the future of knowledge itself, which means build-
ing that future – where this ‘building’, however, is not a matter of 
constructing it from building blocks but rather concerns a complete 
reinvention (a ‘transformation in our ways of thinking and experienc-
ing, one that concerns being in its entirety’641) – then we can contend 
that it must also pass through the formulation of that challenge that 
is discernible in the statement with which Freud concluded his treat-
ment of Empedocles: ‘no one can foresee in what guise the nucleus of 
truth contained in the theory of Empedocles will present itself to later 
understanding’.642 Likewise, François Jacob will end The Logic of Life 
by noting that the scientific understanding of endosomatic and exoso-
matic systems and processes might ‘today’ (in 1970) be seen in terms 
of the cybernetical functions of ‘messages, codes and information’, 
but he immediately adds that tomorrow’s analysis may well ‘reconsti-
tute them in a new space’.643
Such challenges and professions amount to versions of the 
Simondonian epistemological dictum that individuation ultimately 
remains unknowable because the only way of pursuing this knowl-
edge (of individuation) is by individuating. The future guise of the 
Empedoclean ‘cosmic phantasy’, after the end of metaphysics, corre-
sponds to a resurrection that leaves the physics of metaphysics behind 
in an act of anamnesic reinitiation that we are proposing to call the 
beginning of metacosmics, which would be less an anti-physics than 
an a-physics. This would be to recall Bataille’s reference to atheology, 
which he defines, for instance, as ‘the science of the death or destruc-
tion of God’.644
Nevertheless, it is not just a question of death or destruction, or of 
leaving behind the physics of metaphysics, but of no longer dream-
ing that the oppositions on which it has always been founded could 
be disengaged from one another, such as the opposition of the sensu-
ous and the nonsensuous, which for Heidegger constitutes ‘the funda-
mental configuration of what has long since been called metaphysics’. 
Hölderlin’s work, for example, exceeds metaphysics, for Heidegger, 
because the rivers of the Ister hymn cannot be reduced to ‘symbolic 
images’, where something sensuous (the work) exists for the sake 
of something nonsensuous or suprasensuous.645 The enigma of the 
place occupied by the rivers in Hölderlin’s poetry as delineated by 
Heidegger, and how they (and the poets) are locality and journeying, 
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approaches towards the question of metacosmics as we are raising 
it here. Yet Heidegger himself cannot conceive how this question of 
locality and journeying, however far beyond physics it may venture, 
must also never forget physics, even if it can never be reduced to it, 
and more specifically it must always retain, and never fully disen-
gage from, the physics of the second law of thermodynamics and the 
always improbable possibility of localized counter-entropy.
Such a metacosmics would delimit the conditions under which it 
would be possible to inaugurate what I have in a previous chapter 
called a ‘theory of general entropy’, whose generality would imply the 
a-systematicity of Bataille’s general economy more than Einstein’s 
general relativity. Such a theory of general entropy would also be, by 
definition, a general theory of negentropy, that is, of life and evolu-
tion, but also, beyond Schrödinger, of exosomatic life and its (techno-
logical) evolution. The generality of such theory would consist above 
all in its not being able to be kept within the bounds of a physical 
theory: it is a question not just of the thermodynamic entropy charac-
teristic of the universe and revealed by the consideration of the inef-
ficiency of heat engines (through being generalized to all closed sys-
tems), but also of a ‘cosmic’ entropy that is opened up at least from 
the onset of that localization not of space but of places that gets going 
with the conquest of fire, which becomes the hearth and ends with the 
final stages of the so-called Anthropocene.646
If the artefact of technics is always a pharmakon, both poison and 
cure, it is first of all because the circuit between the living and the 
dead (the dead matter of which it is composed) remains subject to 
the probabilistic tendencies of the second law while being itself an 
expression of a neganthropic improbability that is the singular expres-
sion of a dynamic. This dynamic itself amounts to an improbable ten-
dency, a tendency to produce diversity in the deferral of its probable 
erasure, and this occurs not just thermodynamically or biologically 
but noetically: because such an improbable tendency (for the noetic 
soul to rise up rather than fall, to move forward rather than regress, 
against all odds, and only ever intermittently) is fundamentally singu-
lar, it is in all likelihood not reducible to mathematical laws.
Or: it may always be possible to apply mathematical approaches to 
the past of such a tendency, in a way that can, with hindsight, suc-
cessfully (but only ever partially) illuminate the dynamic of which 
such a tendency forms a part, but it is not possible to apply a math-
ematical approach capable of describing the future of that tendency, 
subject as it always is to surprising improbabilities, at least insofar as 
the possibility of an improbable future persists, however improbably 
– here lies the whole question of the Anthropocene considered as the 
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twilight of reason and the fulfilment of nihilism. And it is in this way 
that we must interpret and confront the shock of the Anthropocene, 
as Bonneuil and Fressoz647 call it, so that we feel the slap in the face 
to humankind that it implies, feel it as those primary retentions that 
are always already being interpreted through the selections we make 
on the basis of our secondary retentions, and which are in that way 
very far from being the data with which we could calculate our rela-
tionship to the entropic future of that nihilistic tendency (however 
much we must also continue to calculate the implications of climate 
data and so on):
When one takes a slap, it is the given: sense data. To receive 
a slap in the face, to suffer it, is to receive sense data in the 
form of a shock. To learn that one’s father has died: this is 
to receive the given (which becomes not sense data but a 
data of sensibility, feeling, since the father is effaced, with-
drawn from the sensible, and has become, if not ‘spiritual’ or 
‘suprasensible’, at least revenantial: spectral).648
This shock resonates, and this resonance of what is given (and not just 
data), which involves nothing more than recursive waves of mutually-
entangled primary, secondary and tertiary retentions, must be felt, so 
that, in affecting us, it can through us affect the motives of reason 
that make possible procursive surprises. It is for this epistemologi-
cal reason that, ultimately, such a theory of entropy must be general 
rather than physical – or in other words, it implies what we are calling 
a metacosmics, for which both physics and metaphysics remain as a 
shadow from which it cannot ever disengage.
As Barbara Stiegler points out, the twentieth-century preoccupa-
tion with the ‘advance’ and ‘delay’ of the species in the organism’s 
struggle with its environment, this preoccupation with the ‘lag’ 
of the human species compared with the acceleration of the milieu 
it has itself created, a preoccupation that set the terms of the kinds 
of economic theories and practices associated with neoliberalism 
(Lippmann) and ultra-liberalism (Hayek), also led the opponents of 
these twentieth-century ‘liberalisms’ to abandon the question of the 
relationship between biology and politics, ceding the ground to the 
most reductive versions of these relationships. The result has been 
what itself amounts to a metaphysical opposition: between the ‘natu-
ralism’ or ‘biologism’ of those who all too easily link the bio- to the 
political, and a ‘constructivism’ of those who unthinkingly refuse 
this connection, leading to oppositional forms of thought, but also to 
forms of denial that amount to new forms of reactivity and resentment 
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(including and especially, we contend, in the realms of desire and sex-
uality). Barbara Stiegler’s conclusion is that this demands
that a new philosophical and political conception of the 
meaning of life and evolution be reconstructed, one that 
goes beyond the sterile standoff between constructivism and 
biologism, so that philosophy can play a full role in the arena 
of the political battles to come, so that the history and mean-
ing of the politics of evolution can be clarified, and so that 
it can contribute to reclaiming a collective, democratic and 
enlightened government of life and the living.649
Beyond Barbara Stiegler’s explicit conclusion, which she draws 
from a consideration and confrontation of Lippmann’s neoliberalism 
and Dewey’s pragmatism, we would argue, with Bernard Stiegler, 
that these questions of life and evolution, and of exosomatic life and 
artificial selection, cannot avoid the admittedly difficult conceptual 
terrain of thermodynamic, biological and informational entropy and 
negentropy. As Stiegler père points out (in a manner not dissimilar 
to that of Philip Mirowski), the origins of neoliberalism also lie in 
the informational entropy propagated with the rise of computational 
cognitivism.650
The path beyond biologism and constructivism rightly called for 
by Barbara Stiegler is, we would argue, ultimately required to pass 
through Bernard Stiegler’s effort to think, create and take care of a 
sur-real cosmology, whose prospects are first opened up around 2013, 
when he begins to deploy the concepts of anthropy, neganthropy, 
neganthropology, Entropocene and Neganthropocene. At the same 
time, it may well be that there are questions of biological negentropy, 
questions of the retentional forms characteristic of endosomatic life, 
that have been left open in the work of Bernard Stiegler, as we will 
suggest below. Hence it is that we propose the name of ‘metacosmics’ 
for the theatre in which such a fruitful encounter could be staged and 
brought to light, that is, to life. It becomes a question, then, of meeting 
the obligation of justifying the necessity of this new term, metacos-
mics, not least in the face of the risks and dangers it may also con-
tain of falling back into metaphysics: our suggestion is that, if there is 
such a justification, it lies in the question and the problem of negan-
thropological locality.
Troubles of belonging
This theatre will undoubtedly involve other characters and others fig-
ures, among them Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowski and Maurice 
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Godelier, all of whom should be analysed, reread, critiqued and rein-
terpreted from a metacosmic standpoint that asks about the relation-
ship of life and evolution to a new philosophy and politics of desire, 
sexuality and kinship, where all of these are themselves understood 
within the framework of an exorganological neganthropology of 
locality. This theatre is thus bound to stage a play of several acts, or 
a series of interconnected chamber pieces, which will have to remain 
for another occasion. In what follows, it will be just one of these char-
acters, Peter Sloterdijk, who will be put on stage, and even he only in 
relation to a portion of his complex and multi-dimensional singular-
ity, and in a way that both his supporters and his opponents might feel 
is lit in a strange way that somewhat distorts his best-known features.
If locality is a question, it is first of all because we see the evidence 
of the problem of locality all about us: Sloterdijk describes the twen-
tieth century as ‘an era of political psychoses at whose core emerges 
[…] troubles of belonging’.651 From his spherological viewpoint, he 
sees such troubles as symptoms of no longer knowing who one is 
or who others are, since such forms of knowledge arise only ‘where 
a sufficient number of good primary spheres blossom’, or, to put it 
another way, where there are what Donald Winnicott calls transitional 
spaces whose rich noetic necromasses and resonant noetic aethers 
allow what Stiegler calls processes of transindividuation to flourish 
neganthropically, that is, to enchant worlds. The destruction of this 
kind of knowledge of who one is and who others are, which is to say 
(in Stiegler’s terms) its proletarianization, leads Sloterdijk to conceive 
modern nations as ‘asylums’, spaces of protection for the uprooted.
Today, however, ‘the uprooted’ refers, says Sloterdijk, not just to 
the asylum seeker but to the local and the indigenous: we are all in 
want of asylum inasmuch as we are in want of being a we, for lack 
of the knowledge of how to form any such we, that is, any locality, 
in a twentieth and now twenty-first century in which individuals are, 
as Sloterdijk puts it, ‘driven to undertake reformattings of the world 
[…] without first developing the psychic means to enable them to get 
acclimatized and familiarized with their new conditions of life’.652 In 
such a situation, according to Sloterdijk, ‘national asylums’ possess 
only the limited function of entertaining ‘the necessary illusion of 
anchorage, of territorial immunity, of solidary integration, and wher-
ever this asylum function does not operate, violence erupts’.653
What does it mean to say that we are driven to undertake ‘reformat-
tings’ without being capable of ‘acclimatizing’ to ‘new conditions’? 
What Sloterdijk seems to be describing here are the consequences of 
the acceleration of changes occurring within technical systems, where 
these changes constitute shocks that leave former ways of living with 
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these conditions no longer workable, which is to say that the knowl-
edge of how to live within these former conditions is exposed as no 
longer able to function as knowledge. New forms of knowledge are 
therefore required – or must be invented – but the formation of such 
new knowledge is itself prevented by the perpetual transformation 
occurring precisely because of this acceleration. The turmoil of this 
adaptive rather than adoptive situation is what Sloterdijk calls refor-
mattings without acclimatization, leaving those thereby ‘uprooted’ 
stranded in, at best, asylums built of spheres that fail to blossom.
What is gained, if anything, by referring to ‘acclimatization’ and 
‘familiarization’ in this context, with its seeming reference to the 
‘atmosphere’ of an epoch or a location? To acclimatize is to undergo 
or undertake a process of adjustment in relation to one’s climatic sur-
roundings, to ‘get used to’ one’s conditions so as to be able to function 
well within them. More specifically, it is a question of the ‘elemental’ 
conditions of that existence, the way in which it is necessary to have 
an organized relationship to the time and space of collective life, for 
example, which Stiegler refers to as calendarity and cardinality:
Adoption is that which is presupposed by the constitution of 
a we in general. A we is always constituted by calendarity 
and cardinality. For us to be able to say we, we must share 
the same calendar system and the same cardinal system. If 
we cannot refer to the same calendar, that is, if we do not 
share common time, and if we do not have a common rep-
resentation of the spatial world in which we share systems 
of orientation – for example, if we cannot read street names, 
maps, or road signs – we amount to strangers. We have no 
sense of familiarity with a we other than on condition of 
such a sharing. Today, however, calendarity and cardinality 
are submitted to the control of global cultural industries.654
The organization of time and space this implies is not just a ques-
tion of printed maps or printed calendars, of course: it is a matter of 
all the manifold ways in which the division and organization of time 
and space become collective phenomena, that is, shared memories 
and understandings. What is it that is shared in this way, and how are 
memories shared collectively? The answer is obvious: through tertiary 
retentions that form the common fabric by which a collective individ-
uation process weaves a relationship running from past to future. It is 
through such tertiary retentional calendarities and cardinalities that 
time and space gain the noetic possibility of coalescing into an epoch 
and a locality – amounting to the dream and the promise of a collec-
tive future. And if those cardinalities and calendarities are not just a 
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matter of literal maps and calendars, it is because they start with the 
shared geography itself, including in the ways it is negentropized bio-
logically and neganthropized psychosocially. If elements of geogra-
phy can function as a tertiary retentional foundation for the adoption 
of a way of life for a we, it is because they have become shared aspects 
of common significance through the weave of transgenerational time 
that turns spaces into places, that is, neganthropic localities. It is this 
ability for a geographical territory to function, ‘tertiary retentionally’, 
as a locality that is short-circuited by this submission to the ‘delocal-
ized’ culture industries.
What Sloterdijk and Stiegler both describe, then, is a ‘reformat-
ting’ that overlays a territory without enabling the persistence of any 
localization, with the consequence that the process of adoption that 
makes possible ‘belonging’ is disrupted – troubled by the impossibil-
ity of familiarization. Coming back to the question of ‘acclimatiza-
tion’, then, and to the atmospherics it implies, if this is a question of 
resonating with a locality and an epoch, then the waves of this reso-
nance are composed of the elemental sea of tertiary retention within 
which local-epochal collective life is always embedded and suffused. 
If the language of wave harmonics might seem to invoke a kind of 
mysticism, it is worth remembering that the atmospheric waves that 
waft in the form of a warm gentle breeze are themselves obviously 
composed of countless atoms and molecules, and this warmth is but 
an effect of countless collisions between these discrete elements. In 
other words, what makes possible the resonating warmth or sweet-
ness of a locality or an epoch, what makes possible the knowledge of 
how to live within the conditions of life operating in an anthropized 
territory, are the forms of grammatization that grant the possibility 
for anything and everything within a territory to function as a local-
ity. And this is what also grants the possibility of a dysfunctioning 
of locality – the proletarianization of our relationship to the time and 
space of our existence.
What such a diagnosis suggests is that the problem is not the terri-
tory and its deterritorialization resulting from anthropization, that is, 
technicization: deterritorialization is always in effect and underway, 
because all localization occurs in a relationship between smaller and 
larger scales of locality, microcosms and macrocosms. Troubles of 
belonging arise not simply from this perpetual process of deterritori-
alization, but from the inability to form new localizations when these 
reformattings can no longer be accompanied by forms of acclimatiza-
tion and familiarization, and where these processes must always be 
conceived in terms of the resonances made possible by the gramma-
tization of hypomnesic tertiary retentions. In other words, it is not a 
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question of space ‘itself’ or time ‘itself’, but of the chances or other-
wise for a redoubling of space via the knowledge through which it has 
had and continues to have the possibility of becoming a place, and 
through the redoubling of time via the knowledge through which it 
has had and continues to have the possibility of possibility of becom-
ing an epoch. But these questions of local and epochal acclimatiza-
tion and its troubled future cannot be asked without the critique of 
Husserlian phenomenology that introduces the question of tertiary 
retention, and without the analytical concept of the grammatization of 
tertiary retention, through which alone it becomes possible to conceive 
a theory and politics of proletarianization and deproletarianization.
The quotation from Stiegler about calendarity and cardinality was 
from a short book that he dedicated to those who voted for the French 
National Front. It was a way of indicating that troubles of belonging 
– or forms of suffering – lie behind these symptomatic reactions, and 
that the fundamental issues raised by such troubles and such suffering 
should not be matters abandoned to the ideologues of the far right. 
This is how we should also choose to read and interpret Sloterdijk on 
these same matters, and he himself seems to want to encourage such 
a conclusion:
Even a left-wing cultural politics must take account of it, 
by assisting local impulses, or spherical needs, to find non-
reactionary solutions. If it fails to fulfil this social and eco-
logical mission, explosions will never fail to materialize.655
Almost always, such troubles are conceived in terms of a problematics 
of identity and difference or same and other. But these bipolar ways 
of conceiving such disturbances and disruptions almost always prove 
to be founded on anything but a transductive or compositional under-
standing: they are always inherently metaphysical, if not derivative 
of the pathological opposition between biologism and constructivism 
diagnosed by Barbara Stiegler, and as such in no way metacosmic. 
Consequently, these bipolar forms of conceiving such troubles almost 
always end up designating enemies and scapegoats.
We should instead conceive such troubles of belonging, troubles 
brought by the proletarianization of the knowledge of the I and the 
we, neither simply as symptoms of a deficiency of identity nor of a 
deficiency of difference. Sloterdijk might be thought to indicate this 
necessity when he suggests that every attempt of human beings to live 
together is ‘made of continuities and discontinuities’. This would be 
in contrast, he argues, to ‘the attempt to invert [this formula] and prop 
thought up essentially on discontinuities, as certain types of thought 
that stem from philosophies of difference suggest’.656
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Leaving aside the question of whether this amounts to an effective 
riposte to so-called ‘philosophies of difference’ (the dismissive tone 
alone suggests that it does not rise to the level of a critique), we can 
at least credit Sloterdijk with acknowledging the tendency towards an 
endless unwinnable war, perpetually ‘choosing diversity over norma-
tivity’ but in the same stroke wanting to ‘choose unity over division’, 
and on and on, as if the struggle between tendencies could ever be 
reduced to such ‘choices’. It may be a war waged on the terrain of cul-
ture, but its unwinnability stems from never being able to perceive the 
character or causes of the cultural aether itself, an aether amounting 
to a rich but now depleted noetic atmosphere emanating from the rich 
but now depleted soil of the noetic necromass. It is, in short, a war for 
access to scarce resources, conducted in a desert but without recog-
nizing that this scarcity is primarily the result of a systemic destruc-
tion of the knowledge of how to fashion tools (and in the first place, 
tools of grammatization) capable of excavating what we need in order 
to subsist – and to exist.
It certainly cannot be a matter of concluding that so-called ‘philos-
ophies of difference’ are outmoded, and can therefore be abandoned: 
différance, repetition, inscription – all of these amount to a funda-
mental step of thought from which there is no turning back. It is cru-
cial, however, to also recognize that the deconstruction of the logic of 
identity and opposition must not mean the elimination of distinctions. 
What remains to be found, or re-found, or re-founded, are the terms 
with which to transform the relationships between identity and differ-
ence, or same and other, into relationships that are not just polar but 
transductive, or to find or re-find or re-found the terms with which to 
describe the finitude and openness of localities in terms of the com-
position of tendencies. Such terms will lead to a philosophy neither 
of identity nor of difference, but of tension and resonance, and of the 
perpetual possibility of their being lost.
There is more than one place to look in order to seek such a form of 
thinking. Anne Alombert, for example, has recently shown in a lec-
ture given at Sussex that tension between individual and milieu is the 
very condition of the development of knowledge, and that the loss of 
knowledge induced by algorithmic performativity amounts to the col-
lapse of that tension:
Indeed, the totally automated, self-regulated, and adaptive 
infrastructures which can be applied everywhere and are 
supposed to eliminate any kind of tension between individu-
als and their environments in fact prevent these individuals 
from encountering any specific tensions or from overcoming 
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them through the invention of new local, collective and sin-
gular knowledge. As Canguilhem has shown, it is because 
tensions appear in their relation to their milieu that human 
living beings develop knowledge – knowing how to do, how 
to live and how to theorize – all of which are ways of resolv-
ing the problems encountered in the relationship with their 
milieu (technical shocks or social tensions).657
Here, it would be necessary to enter further into the relationship 
between these (technical) shocks and (social) tensions. As Alombert 
argues, high-speed algorithmic performativity eliminates the ten-
sion between organism and milieu that alone produces the knowledge 
that, as she puts it, enables resolution of the problems between the 
individual and its environment. It would then be a matter of articu-
lating this thought with Gilbert Simondon’s attempt to reconceptu-
alize information in a non-quantitative fashion, which, as Yuk Hui 
has shown, is based on conceiving information as a tension, within 
a cybernetic system, between a signal and a receiver, and where the 
production of significance amounts to the resolution of this tension.658 
It is a question of how such a thought can also be brought together 
with Simondon’s notions of associated milieu and internal resonance 
or Giuseppe Longo and Maël Montévil’s notion of bio-resonance in 
the extended critical transitions of biological phase space, strongly 
correlating the parts and the whole of anti-entropic systems.659 The 
basis of such articulations could only be that the significance to which 
the resolution of informational tension amounts equates to knowledge 
as a function of the relationship between organism and milieu (and 
then a matter of investigating to what extent this articulated account 
is or is not mathematizable, that is, how it relates to the question of the 
limits of calculability).
But what we must then also say is that this relationship between 
organism and milieu is itself a relationship between two scales of 
cosmic sphere. What does it mean to refer to different ‘scales of cos-
mic sphere’? Stiegler has in recent years been engaged in address-
ing this question, and he does so, in part, precisely by articulating 
Canguilhem’s concern with the technical form of life (as the noetic 
tension between the individual and the milieu) with Simondon’s con-
cern with rethinking information and its theory, in addition to retak-
ing Derrida’s notion of différance as distinguishable into two forms of 
the struggle against entropy (negentropic and neganthropic), on this 
basis reinterpreting the work of Whitehead (on the function of reason), 
Lotka (on exosomatization) and Winnicott (on transitional space and 
the transitional object) to outline a ‘hyper-materialist epistemology’ 
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in which knowledge and the desire to know are construed as func-
tions and faculties of a sur-real cosmology.660 In such a cosmology, we 
could say, the tension and resonance holding parts and whole within a 
metastable cohesion arise from the aesthetic or cosmetic sphere, con-
ceived in a general sense as the socialization of desire.661 This must 
always be founded on the relationship between retentional forms, 
from the genetic to the nervous to the grammatized forms of tertiary 
retention, but the articulation of these fundamental retentional forms 
requires profound analysis and interpretation (to which we will return 
elsewhere, but where we can immediately state that the cosmetics of 
such a cosmos are always noetic artifices, in all senses of the word, 
and where this would also necessarily involve questions of sexual 
difference).
To what extent can spherology be conceived as a pharmacology?
Let us now give a few indications about how and why Sloterdijk’s sph-
erological project might also be roped in to the metacosmic project 
being proposed here. For this preliminary foray, scouting this foreign 
but not completely unfriendly territory (or perhaps it is better to say: 
the territory of our best frenemy), some precautions with respect to 
Sloterdijk may prove prudent, as might some modifications – if not 
a thoroughgoing critique. Sloterdijk does not shy away from a rather 
wild form of ‘exaggerated’ thinking that can be both a virtue and a 
vice, making it a delicate matter to pick out those kernels with the 
potential to cross-fertilize with Stiegler’s neganthropology and sur-
real cosmology.
A fundamental starting point for comparing their work would be to 
acknowledge the significant overlap between Stiegler and Sloterdijk 
in terms of their conception of the complicated origin of the kinds of 
beings that we ourselves are, despite Sloterdijk’s apparent distate for 
philosophies of difference. For his part, Stiegler’s notion of an origi-
nary default at the onset of technical life (or hominization, but which 
it is better to call exosomatization) involves a fault that would be any-
thing but a lack because it is the opening of the excessive character of 
noetic souls that would also be exclamatory souls:
This becoming-symbolic as logos, which only is in the 
course of its being ex-pressed, is what I call an ex-clama-
tion: the noetic experience of the sensible is exclamatory. 
It exclaims itself before the sensible insofar as it is sensa-
tional, that is, experience of a singularity that is incommen-
surable, and always in excess. The exclamatory soul, that 
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is, sensational and not only sensitive, enlarges its sense by 
exclaiming it symbolically.662
And from Sloterdijk’s side, he undertakes a critique of Arnold 
Gehlen’s notion that human existence evolves from the outset as a 
neotenic, helpless form of Homo pauper. For Gehlen, human being is a 
‘deficient being’, as Sloterdijk describes:
This phrase is not only meant to refer to the biological ‘nega-
tive endowments’ of homo sapiens, with all its maladjust-
ments, non-specializations, undeveloped traits and so-called 
‘primitivisms’; it also recalls the increased burden that has, 
according to Gehlen, weighed down this excessively unpro-
tected, environmentally disconnected, instinct-deprived, 
organically destitute animal, abandoned by all innate inner 
guidance, from the start.663
As Sloterdijk points out, however, if this is ‘meant to be the starting 
point for a grand narrative of primordial deficiency and its immedi-
ate compensation through cultural abilities’, the problem is that it ‘is 
impossible to derive such a dramatic dowry of deprivations from a 
natural history of humanity’s precursors’.664 In other words, given that 
natural selection functions to eliminate monstrosities and conserve 
mutations that are beneficial to the relationship between organism 
and milieu, it appears impossible to reconcile the purported rise of 
such ‘de-specialized and juvenilized’ beings with the theory of bio-
logical evolution:
If biologically and culturally motivated development led 
to the results that are evident in early humans, then their 
evolutionarily preferred qualities must not be interpreted 
as deprivations; on the contrary, they would predominantly 
possess qualifying or, in Darwin’s terms, fitness-increas-
ing virtues.665
More pointedly, it makes no sense to propose an evolutionary 
sequence in which endosomatic deficiency precedes its exosomatic 
supplementation, in which the ‘primal scene of anthropogenesis’ 
would occur as ‘the appearance of a creature unfit for life’ so that it 
‘immediately had to withdraw into the protective shell of a prosthetic 
cultural armor in order to compensate for its own biological impos-
sibility’.666 Against the fiction of a ‘deficient being’, Sloterdijk thus 
postulates that this ‘developmental trait can only be grasped as a self-
reinforcing incubator effect’ that turns our species into ‘beneficiaries 
of a pampering, cerebralizing and infantilizing tendency’ that unfolds 
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‘without any long-term or species-wide reduction of evolutionary 
chances for the neotenically daring living being’:
The success story of the ‘symbolic species’ could not have 
turned out as we see today in retrospect if its basic charac-
ter had not led to a productive interconnection of somatic 
refinements and psychoneuro-immunological and technical 
reinforcements.667
Rather than the fiction of a deficient being who compensates for its 
poverty through exosomatic compensations, then, anthropogenesis 
is the story of a ‘luxury being’ whose capacity for exosomatization 
grants potentials for defunctionalized openness:
Homo sapiens is a basally pampered, polymorphically luxu-
riating, multiply improvable intermediate being whose for-
mation resulted from the combined action of genetic and 
symbolic-technical forces.668
In other words, both Sloterdijk and Stiegler offer accounts of the ori-
gin of the distinction of the noetic soul as a being whose seeming 
‘lack of qualities’ both conceals and arises conjointly with an excess 
made possible by and making possible another kind of evolution 
beyond the biological: that of exosomatic beings who are as such irre-
ducibly open, improbable, excessive and symbolic.
In Neither Sun Nor Death, Sloterdijk describes the distinction 
between these two kinds of evolution – or two kinds of différance – in 
terms of a difference between two kinds of ‘special machines’: firstly, 
‘autoplastic or autopoetic’ ‘living machines’, and then that second 
evolutionary process through which
man became more than a living machine, but also a sort of 
machine of the spirit, insofar as he has formed the possibil-
ity, in thought, of thinking and of letting the world emerge 
as world.669
It is perhaps unclear, here, to what extent Sloterdijk is using the term 
‘machine’ in a metaphorical sense, as so often happens in the history 
of philosophy, and to what extent he could instead be construed as 
attempting to describe the exosomatic existence of simple exorgan-
isms as an inextricable relationship between endosomatic and exo-
somatic organs. If we take it that Sloterdijk is describing a double 
emergence corresponding to the advent of endosomatization and then 
exosomatization, then this phrase, ‘machine of the spirit’, might be 
understood as indicating the impossibility of reducing the relation-
ship of the endo- and the exo- in exosomatic life to a mere addition of 
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biological and physical components. This ‘spirit’ would thus refer to 
the excessiveness of the noetic and exclamatory soul, and this ‘com-
ing-into-the-world’ (emphasizing ‘beginnings more than ends’) that 
is also the Heideggerian emergence of the world-as-world (and end-
ing with ‘modern machine technology as spirit’) would then also cor-
respond to the negentropogenesis and neganthropogenesis that each 
individual must traverse as a kind of double birth.
Sloterdijk describes this double birth in the following terms:
Because humans must not only be liberated from a mother, 
they also find themselves confronted with the challenge of 
entering into the ‘house of Being’. Coming-into-the-world 
is the philosophical formula for a biological event charged 
with an ontological character.670
Clearly there is something quasi-Heideggerian and something quasi-
Winnicottian going on in this account: the entrance into world-as-
world corresponds to a process of substitution for the first sphere, that 
is, the maternal sphere. If Sloterdijk holds to ontological rather than 
organological terminology, or in other words if he tends to not quite 
see this double sense of coming-into-the-world as the doubling of 
the endosomatic by the exosomatic, nevertheless Sloterdijk does also 
stress Heidegger’s understanding that ‘the question of Being emerges 
through questions of power and of technology’.671 He emphasizes the 
continuity of his thinking with Heidegger’s non-physical conception 
of space, which he says ‘broke the habit that consists in interpreting 
being-in from the angle of everyday physics, and showed that human 
being-in-something […] must be interpreted as a standing-outside, an 
ecstatic positionality, or a being-held-on-the-outside’.672
This being-in in the form of an ecstatic positionality is also 
expressed as a kind of spatial différance (though he does not use this 
term from the ‘philosophy of difference’) that opens up the possibility 
of a locality that is not just a space:
From the outset, what it [the sphere] thus expresses is the 
idea that all inhabiting implies a milieu of transference – or 
again, to employ Deleuze and Guattari’s jargon, a deterri-
torialization within a subsequent reterritorialization. One 
lives to the extent that one projects an elsewhere into a here. 
There is no place without a here-there difference.673
This Heideggerian-seeming différance of here and there, phrased in 
Deleuzian terms and opening up the possibility of a place and the 
whole proto-pharmacology of locality and journeying that occupies 
Heidegger in 1942, is then extended out to a Winnicottian-seeming 
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liberation from and by the mother (thus opening up a ‘milieu of trans-
ference’), but where, as in Stiegler’s extension of the transitional 
object and transitional space beyond the confines of the good-enough 
mother, Sloterdijk turns this into a socio-technological pharmacology:
My theory of space formation in modernity is backed by the 
observation that, in the process of civilization, interiority 
gets replaced by exteriority. Otherwise said, it belongs to the 
essence of socio-technology to play with maternal capaci-
ties in non-maternal media. Modernity consists in finding 
technological substitutes for maternity, in every sense of the 
word. […] Mothers, the bio-patrons, get replaced by artifi-
cial patronage systems.674
It would no doubt be possible to interpret this last statement – con-
cerning the shift from that primary maternal sphere common to all 
placental mammals to that secondary exosomatic sphere characteris-
tic of luxury beings alone – metaphysically or non-pharmacologically, 
to the extent that it seems open to the possibility of being understood 
as constructing an opposition between bio-maternity and artificial 
patronage in non-maternal media.
In correspondence after the lecture that became this chapter was 
originally delivered, Anne Alombert raised the question of the phar-
macological character of Sloterdijk’s project in general, by wonder-
ing if his account of ‘spherization’ is equally an account of ‘de-spher-
ization’. One way of approaching this question could be to ask what 
Sloterdijk means when he describes ‘all inhabiting’ as implying ‘a 
deterritorialization within a subsequent reterritorialization’. It would 
also be possible to refer again to his critique of Gehlen. After quoting 
the latter (‘In the light of this reflection, world-openness is fundamen-
tally a strain’), Sloterdijk writes:
This means – even if the author does not state it openly – 
that the main characteristic of the way homo sapiens experi-
ences the world and acts within it lies in a problematic over-
abundance of sensory impressions as well as possibilities of 
experience and action, and by no means in a prior poverty 
and deprivation. Its underspecialized, multiply adaptable 
or ‘open’ nature results firstly in an overly impressionable 
receptiveness, and secondly in an extremely broad spectrum 
of action options – which deviate from the trivial middle 
value and extend to the improbabilities of art, asceticism, 
orgies and crime.675
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Sloterdijk thus invites us to understand that the luxury beings that 
we are find ourselves exposed to the full range of pharmacological 
improbabilities, as well as to the pharmacological character of the 
trivial and the average (the probable), because, or so it seems, we are 
characterized by the ‘detachability’ of drives that can be reattached to 
those improbably singular aims that are the infinite objects of desire 
of every kind.
On this basis, we might well reinterpret the replacement of the 
maternal ‘bio-patron’ with ‘artificial patronage systems’ in a non-
metaphysical way, as Sloterdijk’s description of the changing relation-
ship to the external milieu that occurs when genetic forces are increas-
ingly replaced by symbolic-technical forces, leading in ‘modernity’ to 
a formation of space that is no longer just technical but techno-logical, 
industrial, not to mention bio-technological and bio-industrial – at 
every level of ‘reproduction’. It is thus tempting and conceivable to 
conclude that Sloterdijk’s general account of reproduction implies a 
form of thinking that exceeds metaphysics while also responding to 
the imperative to overcome the division between the scientific and the 
philosophical in the direction of knowledge built ‘anew’:
It is always necessary to question anew the phenomenon 
of how it is that life organizes its continuity. With which 
advanced fortifications, with which war-machines […]? 
How do living systems manage to reproduce themselves? 
How do they make themselves a future? In this, philosophy 
converges with systemic concerns, and it does so, in the first 
place, under metabiological auspices.676
For Sloterdijk, such auspices mean that the
anthropotechnical theory of space in contradistinction to 
that of physics resides in the fact that I define the container 
as autogenous, that is, as a surreal form of space, wherein 
several selves together constitute something that I call a 
sphere. This, precisely, is the space of psychic resonance.677
That these metabiological auspices imply an anthropotechnical 
account of the pharmacological character of noesis, and that, in the 
Anthropocene, this also has fundamental implications for a pharma-
cology of locality at the scale of the biosphere, seems obvious from 
the following passage:
I start from a strong ontological thesis: intelligence exists. 
This leads to a strong ethical thesis: there is a positive corre-
lation between intelligence and the will to self-preservation. 
Daniel Ross 344
Since Adorno, we have known that this correlation can 
be questioned—that was the most promising idea of older 
Critical Theory. It started from the observation that intel-
ligence can go in the wrong direction and confuse self-
destruction with self-preservation. […] What is on the 
agenda now is an affirmative theory of global co-immunity. 
It is the foundation of, and orientation for, the many and var-
ied practices of shared survival.678
On the question of immunity as metaphor
Sloterdijk’s conception of spherological space, then, involves what 
he calls a ‘constitutive surrealism’, an ‘original spatialization’ that 
is also a ‘perpetual space-delusion’ arising from the fact that human 
existence is a co-existence.679 In other words, here-there différance 
structures the noetic production of knowledge and reason as func-
tions of neganthropic life, which always occupies spheres that are 
themselves always delusional, that is, noetic dreams of one or another 
world-as-world, worlds whose fabric is conditioned by the mediating 
tension and resonance of an aesthetic atmospherics. It is for this rea-
son that Sloterdijk refers to immunity, as can be seen in his attitude to 
the history of metaphysics:
I read classical metaphysics as a library of effective proposi-
tions about the globality of the world, where world is con-
strued as an immune system. Ontology is therefore the first 
immunology.680
classical philosophy’s premises were the premises of a 
theory of the space of shelter, and therefore of a cosmo-
logical and theological spherology, or even better of a 
sphero-immunology.681
Ought we not be suspicious and reticent, however, about the use of 
this ‘metaphor’ of immunity? Does not its ‘biologism’ tend to encour-
age the notion that ‘we’ must defend ourselves against invasion from 
foreign elements, with all of the unpalatable political suggestions this 
may seem to encourage or legitimize? Although both Derrida and 
Sloterdijk indulge in the language of immunity, auto-immunity, co-
immunity and so on, isn’t this just to make the mistake of allowing 
into play a metaphor that suggests a false equivalence between very 
different regimes of individuation? Is it not fundamentally dangerous 
to import such a ‘biologistic’ metaphor into fields for which this can 
only be a foreign element?
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It is worth remembering, however, that this paradigm is not firstly 
biomedical at all. Immunity begins as a political or legal or indeed 
economic concept, referring to an exemption from an obligation or 
a requirement or a law that is generally applicable to everyone who 
does not possess such immunity. We insist on the economic aspect not 
just because immunity starts as an exemption from a tax or tribute, 
but more generally because this implies a suspension of the exchange 
relationship that materializes ob-ligation from a very general anthro-
pological standpoint, as Roberto Esposito points out:
This is where its anti-social, or more precisely, anti-com-
munal character comes to the fore: immunitas is not just a 
dispensation from an office or an exemption from a tribute, 
it is something that interrupts the social circuit of recipro-
cal gift-giving, which is what the earliest and most binding 
meaning of the term communitas referred to. If the members 
of the community are bound by the obligation to give back 
the munus that defines them as such, whoever is immune, by 
releasing him- or herself from the obligation, places himself 
or herself outside the community.682
It is by extension of this politico-economic immunitary paradigm 
that the biomedical paradigm is established, by which immunity 
refers to ‘a protective response in the face of a risk’, or more precisely, 
in the face of a ‘rupture of a previous equilibrium and the consequent 
need for its reconstitution’, and more precisely still, where that threat 
comes from ‘trespassing or violating borders’, located ‘always on 
the border between the inside and the outside, between the self and 
other, the individual and common’.683 This biomedical immunitary 
paradigm is not just a translation of the politico-economic paradigm, 
however – it is a transformation whose roots lie in the discovery of the 
possibility of acquiring immunity, and of doing so artificially, that is, 
technologically:
But what makes it significant for the purposes of our recon-
struction is the turn it takes within its own field between 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, first with the dis-
covery of a measles vaccine by Jenner, and then with the 
experiments by Pasteur and Koch, the birth of medical bac-
teriology proper. The passage that most interests us is the 
one leading from natural to acquired immunity – in other 
words, from an essentially passive condition to one that is 
actively induced.684
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This technological, ‘active’ immunity is produced by the first genu-
inely endosomatic turn of exosomatization (internalizing exosomatic 
elements). It is also a step in the history of technics: not just a ques-
tion of organized inorganic matter but of re-organized organic matter 
(biotechnology). It is through this turn and this step that it amounts to 
a transformation of the earlier paradigm of immunity, because it con-
tains a new idea, absent from the political and economic conception:
The basic idea that came into play at a certain point was that 
an attenuated form of infection could protect against a more 
virulent form of the same type.685
In other words, immune protection does not involve ‘a strat-
egy of frontal opposition’, nor one that operates by ‘keeping [ills] 
at a distance’, but instead a strategy of ‘exclusion by inclusion’. As 
Esposito states:
The body defeats a poison not by expelling it outside the 
organism, but by making it somehow part of the body. Its 
salvation thus depends on a wound that cannot heal, because 
the wound is created by life itself. […] It must incorporate a 
fragment of the nothingness that it seeks to prevent, simply 
by deferring it. […] In so doing, it retains its objective in the 
horizon of meaning of its opposite: it can prolong life, but 
only by continuously giving it a taste of death.686
Can we not see, in this economico-political concept extended to the 
biomedical and biotechnological field, a pharmacology of immunity, 
in which the body must adopt its own wound and where only what is 
poisonous contains that which makes possible the protection of the 
organism? If so, was it not through this internalization of biotech-
nological exosomatization that this general pharmacological charac-
teristic was exposed, just as it was through the development of those 
exosomatic organs that are heat engines that the general entropic ten-
dency was exposed? Moreover, in this necessary incorporation of the 
fragment of the poisonous foreign, is it not, as a differentiating defer-
ral, precisely a of the play of tendency and counter-tendency in the 
struggle against entropy:
The first thing to point out is that the immunitary para-
digm does not present itself in terms of action, but rather in 
terms of reaction – rather than a force, it is a repercussion, 
a counterforce, which hinders another force from coming 
into being.687
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Hence if we can say, for example, that the pharmakos is a reaction 
to the shock produced by the pharmakon, then are we not entitled to 
see this pathological shock reaction as precisely constituting a kind 
of auto-immune response? The question is: under what conditions are 
we justified in making this kind of analysis? And the answer will be, 
beyond just the question of tendency and counter-tendency: provided 
that we do not repress or deny the fact that the basis of this reaction 
lies in arrangements of retentions and protentions.
Immune systems are retentional systems, and more than that, 
interpretive systems
If the pharmacological character of the pharmakon ultimately stems 
from the anthropic and neganthropic extension (by other means) of 
the negentropic struggle against entropy, in the sense that it concerns 
the struggle against the elimination of improbabilities and the reduc-
tion of the improbable to the probable and the average, where these 
struggles involve not just life but the articulation of the living with 
the non-living, and if this question of probabilities and the improb-
able is always a matter of the conservation of the past that opens up 
the possibility of improbable and incalculable futures, then we are 
saying that, ultimately, the pharmacological character of the pharma-
kon is always a question of organized, retentional systems that open 
up protentional possibilities, possibilities of the transformation and 
diversification of order – new noetic dreams. From this, it follows that 
conceiving immunity beyond the danger of biological metaphoricity 
is a matter of reconceiving it in terms of retentionality. It is a matter of 
writing it as the immuno-logical with a hyphen, just as Stiegler refers 
to the techno-logical as the composition of tekhnē and logos that opens 
up the possibility of what Heidegger in 1942 calls the spirit of modern 
machine technology.
The possibility of such an immuno-logical account can be opened 
up by reflecting on the ‘informational’ mechanism of the biological 
immune function. Jean Claude Ameisen’s account of the ‘sculpture of 
the living’,688 which Francesco Vitale enlists in the service of elabo-
rating a Derridian ‘biodeconstruction’,689 makes clear that we have 
good reason to conclude that the immune system is nothing but a 
retentional system separate from the memory of the nervous system, 
an endosomatic system devoted to endosomatic memory (whereas the 
nervous system of human beings is an exosomatized system insepara-
ble from exosomatic memory). The immune system develops its own 
set of secondary retentions, its own accumulation of retained traces 
of past history, precisely by cutting off molecular strands of invading 
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organisms, keeping them as a private epidemiological archive, and 
using these supports protentionally to determine how to react or not 
react in future encounters. It is only through this retention of preced-
ing but necessary exposures to immunological risk that the immune 
system can function. In other words, the immune system is noth-
ing more than a somatic system regulating the here-there difference 
between the endo- and the exo-, prone to auto-immune disorderliness 
due precisely to retentional and protentional errors and mishaps in the 
struggle to maintain improbable negentropy.
Why, after all, did the immune system evolve in vertebrates? What 
the sensorimotor apparatus gives to the endosmatic organism is a set 
of abilities with which to navigate its exterior milieu and its incon-
stancies (as Canguilhem described them), endosomatic mechanisms 
allowing the organism to conquer space and time (which is to say, 
speed). The rate at which the inconstancies of its milieu are incon-
stant, however, the rate at which the exterior milieu changes, is gen-
erally far slower than the life of a single organism inhabiting that 
milieu. And the reason is clear: ecosystems change, more or less, at 
the rate of genetic drift orgeological change.
Yet there are inconstancies that can vary at a rapid enough rate that 
they transform the conditions of life for organisms and species in an 
exponentially threatening way: this is what occurs with the advent of 
a new viral or bacterial pandemic. The Covid-19 pandemic can almost 
literally be described as a situation in which one little viral fellow 
jumped into a human being, finding a species-home so conducive to 
its lifestyle that within a few months its children, grandchildren and 
great-grandchildren had spread throughout the biosphere, producing 
billions of ‘offspring’ at a generational rate that vastly exceeds the 
genetic adaptive capacities of its hosts (and in this case, where the 
speed of geographical movement is obviously a product of the exoso-
matic character of those twenty-first-century hosts). In other words, 
there is a vast difference in speed between the rate of viral transmis-
sion and the pace of human genetic drift: it is precisely because of 
such disparities that the immune rather than genetic retentional sys-
tem can prove to be the difference between survival and extinction in 
the face of such rapidly changing inconstancies.
In the case of this endosomatic but non-nervous system, the opera-
tion of the retentional and protentional process may not be sensible (to 
the nervous system), but it is indeed a retentional system possessed 
by the organism and through which it struggles to maintain its bio-
logical negentropy. This is why a vaccine is nothing other than an 
exosomatic-endosomatic biotechnological tool that takes advantage 
of the retentional basis of immune functioning, not just to boost the 
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immunity of the individual, but to try to respond to the inconstancies 
of the milieu in such a way that it protects an entire population, which 
is to say that a vaccine is a form of the transindividuation of immuno-
logical knowledge.
The separateness of the two endosomatic retentional systems is also 
expressed physiologically as the so-called ‘blood-brain barrier’, and 
this, too, needs to be understood if we are to think the prospects of an 
encounter between exorganology or neganthropology and immunol-
ogy or spherology. In fact, it is not just the brain and nervous system 
that are protected from the immune system: other organs and parts 
of the body receive this ‘immune privilege’, as it is called, where the 
immune system is partially or wholly excluded from normal function-
ing. The uterus, for example, must become a site of immune privi-
lege prior to conception, because of the risk that the fertilized egg will 
be judged by the immune system as foreign to the body and there-
fore eliminated.
The immune system is thus wholly or partially ‘switched off’ or 
excluded from areas of the body that are vital to survival and repro-
duction, where the risk of autoimmunity or unwanted immune effects 
needs to be minimized. But what is the root cause of this risk that 
requires immune privilege? Does the possibility of such anaphylactic 
effects not precisely derive from the fact that the immune system is 
not only a retentional system, but an interpretive system, that is, from 
the fact that it is a sensitive instrument, always susceptible to the risk 
of misinterpretation, misidentification of an element as being poison-
ous or otherwise?
It is, of course, not interpretive in the same way that, for example, 
written language is always a question of interpretation, including as 
written law that must be interpreted in order to open the possibility of 
reasoned judgment. At the same time, however, it is exactly a question 
of an endosomatic system that must encounter a situation, compare 
that situation with its accumulated retentional history, and on that 
basis cross the threshold into action, and where this is always a pro-
cess that can go poorly or well for the organism, that is, entropically 
or negentropically, given that interpretation is difficult and the organ 
of interpretation delicate: recognition can always and easily fail. This 
is precisely why Canguilhem can say that immunity and anaphylaxis 
are two normal responses that only differ in their being either physi-
ological or pathological in their consequences.690
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Towards a neganthropological immunology
What would such a thought imply for a social psychology appropriate 
to any neganthropological approach? First, it implies that any account 
of the pharmaco-logy of immunity and auto-immunity in exosoma-
tization cannot avoid the question of the logos and more specifically 
of the ‘history’ of tertiary retention. Second, it implies that, for this 
reason, it cannot avoid the question of grammatization, which is also 
to say, of proletarianization. But the latter should then be construed as 
the tertiary retentional auto-immune tendency that destroys knowl-
edge and leads to the regression of the sensational soul as it succumbs 
to the sensationalist tendencies that engender the panic behaviour of 
crowds lying behind so many contemporary troubles of belonging.691
Hence it should not be a surprise that it was in the context of a 
discussion of the way in which ‘analogical and digital mnemo-tech-
nical grammatization’ produces the figure of the consumer and the 
proletarianization of this consumer that Stiegler will write that ‘my 
belief remains that this becoming is self-destructive, or, to put it in 
the words of Jacques Derrida, auto-immune’,692 to which he attaches 
a note explaining that capitalism is a process of adoption operating 
via the continuation of the process of grammatization and ‘exposed 
to the entire question of the auto-immunitary reaction’693 explored 
by Derrida. Might it be possible, then, that what is missing from 
Sloterdijk’s immunological spherology is a systematic account of 
grammatization, and that such an absence leads to an inadequate con-
sideration of the auto-immunitary characteristics of contemporary 
spherization and despherization?
As for a ‘systematic account’, no doubt this is indeed missing, but, 
somewhat surprisingly, something like grammatization is indeed dis-
cernible in his text (even if only between the lines, in the sense that no 
major theses are drawn from it), and specifically in the way Sloterdijk 
treats psychoanalysis, which is to say the social psychology of desire. 
Having noted that ‘linear mentality […] is a consequence of the letter-
press [that] follows from the one-sidedness engendered by alphabeti-
zation’,694 having noted that with the invention of the phonetic alpha-
bet, ‘the operative handling and observation of being takes a massive 
leap forward’695 because the ‘Greek alphabet is the first triumph of 
analysis’, having noted that ‘with analytic success an interest for syn-
thesis also comes to the fore, that is to say, the possibility […] to write 
new things’, he concludes that analysis ‘qua process of elementariza-
tion is the preschool of synthesis’.696
What Sloterdijk means by elementarization is more or less what 
Stiegler, reading Sylvain Auroux, means by discretization: turning a 
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temporal flow into discrete spatial elements that can be analysed and 
reproduced. While Sloterdijk doesn’t at all seem to see how this ques-
tion of elementarization is also that of the grammatization of gesture 
that lies behind the industrial revolution (which is Stiegler’s stroke of 
genius, even if it comes from rereadings of Auroux, Leroi-Gourhan, 
Simondon and the Grundrisse), which is to say behind what Sloterdijk 
calls modernity and what has more recently come to be called the 
Anthropocene, he does acknowledge that the nineteenth century was 
‘shot through’ with analysis ‘at the level of empiricism’, based on ‘the 
elementarization of the various domains of being’.697
What is odd is that this whole account is merely a prelude to his 
assessment of psychoanalysis qua analysis:
But behind the pathos of professions of faith in the primacy 
of analysis what is dissimulated is an avowal of theoretical 
perplexity, because what psychoanalysis thereby admits, at 
bottom, is that its discipline has not accomplished any con-
vincing elementarization.698
Now, we may well have a sense of what he means, if he is suggest-
ing that, despite The Interpretation of Dreams and its claim to have 
discovered the royal road to the unconscious, Freud could never really 
‘discretize’ the continuum of dreaming and the fluxes and flows of the 
unconscious mind, in lieu of which psychoanalysis all too easily suc-
cumbs to a kind of esoteric priestliness. But if this is the case, we first 
have to ask: is Sloterdijk making the error of imagining that, in the 
systems and structures of desire, the elementary is necessarily simple, 
or is he ascribing this conceptual error to psychoanalysis itself?
In any case, it is surely impossible, in this respect, to avoid the sig-
nificance of Freud’s nephew, Edward Bernays, or more particularly of 
all those who followed in his wake in the technosciences and neuro-
sciences and other associated pseudo-sciences of marketing – eventu-
ally including neuroeconomics and neuromarketing. Surely Bernays 
and his heirs have been engaged in nothing other than an elementa-
rization of dreams and desires, in order to produce a wholly unholy 
(wholly calculable, and hence unpriestly) ‘psycho’-‘analysis’, the bet-
ter to synthesize artificial dreams, an elementarization now carried 
out algorithmically on ‘big data’. Is this not precisely a question of the 
auto-immuno-logical production of what Sloterdijk calls ‘exoneuro-
ses’,699 generated through those non-maternal patronage systems that 
are socio-technologies (now mostly via ‘social media’ that are in fact 
anti-social)?
It is a question, here, of producing the outlines of a metapsychol-
ogy of exosomatization for any possible neganthropology. In addition 
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to the seeming deficiency of Sloterdijk’s account of the fate of what 
Stiegler calls grammatization, we can also wonder about the ade-
quacy of his account of the maternal relationship as the ‘first sphere’. 
That this leads Sloterdijk to a several-hundred-page account of intra-
uterine existence gives the reader a true sense of the risks entailed by 
his celebration of a ‘philosophy of exaggeration’.
Yet this, too, is potentially ameliorable, for instance by referring 
to the first chapter of Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, where Jean 
Laplanche carefully traces the relationship between instinct and drive 
in Freud, and does so by drawing out its four constituent and elemen-
tal dimensions:
 ▪ ‘impetus’, Drang, the pressure or the ‘motor factor in the 
drive’, where to ‘define a drive by its impetus […] is, from 
an epistemological point of view, almost a tautology’;
 ▪ ‘aim’, Ziel, the ‘act to which the drive is driven’, and 
where ‘the only “final” aim is always satisfaction, defined 
[as] the appeasing of a certain tension caused precisely 
by the Drang’;
 ▪ ‘object’, Objekt, the ‘thing in regard to which or through 
which the drive is able to achieve its aim’, and which may 
or may not be a person or a part of a person, such partial 
objects ‘being, in fact or in fantasy, detached or detachable’, 
but which may also be a function;
 ▪ ‘source’, Quelle, an ‘unknown but theoretically knowable 
somatic process, a kind of biological x, whose psychical 
translation would in fact be the drive’ or ‘represented in 
mental life by a drive’, or delegated to a drive.700
(It would seem eminently possible to connect these four dimen-
sions to the four causes in Aristotle, although Laplanche himself 
does not do so.)
Laplanche’s whole account here merits careful consideration, not 
just as a way of supplementing Sloterdijk’s account of the maternal 
sphere, but because of the clarification he offers of the relationship 
between instinct, drive and desire, and the mechanisms involved in 
their compositional distinction.701 Laplanche also suggests a kind 
of analogy between (1) instinct and wanting milk (an object whose 
function is nutrition), (2) drive and sucking the nipple, and (3) desire 
and sucking the thumb (or, supplementing these elements, sucking 
the artificial dummy). In other words, more may remain to be said 
about the role of the maternal in any such socio-technical psychology, 
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which will be both closer to and more distant from biology than any 
existing psychology (or, for that matter, any existing anthropology).
In short, where all of this leads Laplanche is to the notion that the 
partial object (the breast) may be lost at the moment when the total 
object (‘the mother as person’) emerges, that this finding of an object 
as its re-finding (as Freud says) involves, when it concerns the drive 
of sexuality, not the rediscovery of the lost object but its ‘substitute 
by displacement’ (its différance), by which ‘the aim has become the 
scenario of a fantasy’ and thus that sexuality ‘in its entirety’ amounts 
to ‘the slight deviation, the clinamen from the function’.702 All of this, 
too, is a question of escaping the hermeneutic circle by entering into 
a cosmic or noetic spiral, and, as such, all of this, too, is a recapitula-
tion, differently, of the question of Meno.
As Laplanche well understands, with the question of deviation, 
the notion of perversion is automatically brought into play, and hence 
one is immediately confronted by the paradox involved in defining 
sexuality as a functional deviation. We will quote his conclusions at 
length, even if we cannot here give them the analysis and interpreta-
tion they deserve:
The movement we sketched above, a movement of exposi-
tion which is simultaneously the movement of a system of 
thought and, in the last analysis, the movement of the thing 
itself, is that the exception – i.e., the perversion – ends up by 
taking the rule along with it. The exception, which should 
presuppose the existence of a definite instinct, a pre-existent 
sexual function, with its well-defined norms of accomplish-
ment; that exception ends up by undermining and destroying 
the very notion of a biological norm. […] What is perverted 
is still the instinct, but it is as a vital function that it is per-
verted by sexuality. […] The drive properly speaking, in the 
only sense faithful to Freud’s discovery, is sexuality. Now 
sexuality, in its entirety, in the human infant, lies in a move-
ment which deflects the instinct, metaphorizes its aim, dis-
places and internalizes its object, and concentrates its source 
on what is ultimately a minimal zone, the erotogenic zone. 
[…] This zone of exchange is also a zone of care, namely, 
the particular and attentive care provided by the mother […]: 
these zones focalize parental fantasies, so that we may say, in 
what is barely a metaphor, that they are the points through 
which is introduced into the child that alien internal entity 
which is, properly speaking, the sexual excitation.703
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For Laplanche, then, the neotenic character of exorganic life (not 
its deficiency but its luxury, not its lack but its excess) lies precisely 
in this co-implicated question of the relationship between drive and 
function, a complication that amounts to a default of origin:
on the one hand, the proposed genesis implies in fact that 
what comes first – say, the vital order – contains what might 
be called a fundamental imperfection in the human being: a 
dehiscence. What is ‘perverted’ by sexuality is indeed the 
function, but a function which is somehow feeble or pre-
mature. […] On the other hand, to that very extent, it is the 
later which is perhaps more important, and alone allows 
us to understand and to interpret what we persist in calling 
the prior.704
Laplanche is well on the way, here, to offering fundamental elements 
of a neganthropological metapsychology, which continues his work 
with Jean-Bertrand Pontalis on ‘fantasy and the origins of sexual-
ity’,705 and which a later chapter of Life and Death in Psychoanalysis 
conjoins to questions of the relationship between the life and death 
drives and negentropy and entropy, respectively.
But leaving this movement of Laplanche to one side, one might say, 
more programmatically, that Sloterdijk is arguing that what Freud 
called metapsychology must be supplemented and deepened with a 
metabiology that would also be a metacosmology. To this we should 
also add, conversely, that what Vitale calls biodeconstruction must be 
supplemented with a psychodeconstruction that would also be a cos-
modeconstruction: our argument is that this is the terrain on which a 
general theory of entropy, a neganthropology, an exorganology and a 
metacosmics must be played out.
If we are willing to indulge the possibility of believing in the move-
ment of such a metacosmic and exorganic neganthropology, that is, 
a movement of thought that would inextricably also be a movement 
of ‘the thing itself’, this in no way involves delineating a ‘domain of 
being’ but rather concerns the invention of a highly improbable future. 
We might conceive this future in terms of what the thinker whom 
Nietzsche in 1861 described as ‘my favourite poet’,706 that is, Friedrich 
Hölderlin – Nietzsche observing in the same letter that Hölderlin 
‘hated in Germans the mere specialist, the philistine’,707 a hatred of 
philistinism that we can see clearly expressed in the Trauerspiel con-
cerning the suicide of Empedocles at Mount Etna – has Empedocles 
say in the first version of this play (later filmed by Jean-Marie Straub 
and Danièle Huillet in their unique cinematic style, the extreme 
austerity of which draws attention firstly to the locality of words, 
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secondly to their idiomatic concreteness, and thirdly to their uncanny 
strangeness). In his Der Tod des Empedokles, the eponymous philoso-
pher, almost a mythological and fictional character projected from out 
of the Greek noetic necromass and filtered through Hölderlin’s singu-
lar German imagination, expresses the hope that a path can be opened 
up, a resurrection producing new, highly improbable states of a cos-
mos in which ‘the green of earth will glisten once again’.708
It is a matter of hearing in this hope for a glistening green the pos-
sibility of finding a zone of care and a way of caring not just for our 
biospheric negentropic fate, but also for our psychospheric and noo-
spheric neganthropic fate, and a renewed capacity for receiving a sen-
sational ‘glistening’ that will open new exclamatory paths. Without a 
path towards such a multidimensional cosmic and cosmetic resurrec-
tion, the cellular suicide that Ameisen sees as opening new voids in 
the sculpture of the living via the genetic milieu, and the anaphylac-
tic endosomatic suicide that can occur when the retentional systems 
of the immune system overreact, and the psychic auto-immunity that 
can lead the thinker to abandon his own noetic garden and instead 
contemplate the void of the volcano, and the civilizational suicide that 
Toynbee sees as inherent to what Valéry already saw as the mortal 
character of civilizations, will find a whole new counterpart in the 
technospheric suicide brought about by the pharmacological charac-
ter of locality, now operated by automated tertiary retentional systems 
distributed at the macrocosmic level of the biosphere, destroying not 
just knowledge but also the desire to know, and leading, ultimately 
and irreversibly, to a terrestrial Pandaemonium.

Afterword: On Positive Pharmacology
Bernard Stiegler
Grammatology, retention and the play of traces
Jacques Derrida investigated the possibility of grammatology ‘as a 
positive science’709 – but he did so by positing from the outset that 
such a possibility would be self-annihilating to the extent (and the 
excess) that this grammato-logy would shatter its own logos: it would 
be forced to ‘solicit logocentrism’ while at the same time ‘decon-
structing’ it. We should therefore refer to graphematics or gramma-
tography – and abandon the possibility that these could present them-
selves ‘as sciences’.
The scientific positivity of a ‘positive grammatology’, positive in 
this sense, necessarily passes through the question of the essence of 
writing, and therefore of its being: it should interrogate the origin 
of writing. Writing, however, if we understand it on the basis of the 
question of the trace, that is, as archi-trace or archi-writing, is pre-
cisely what constitutes the ordeal of a default of origin:
Where does writing begin? When does writing begin? 
Where and when does the trace, writing in general, common 
root of speech and writing, narrow itself down to ‘writing’ 
in the colloquial sense? […] A question of origin. But a med-
itation upon the trace should undoubtedly teach us that there 
is no origin, that is to say simple origin; that the questions of 
origin carry with them a metaphysics of presence.710
This question of trace and archi-trace builds on those of retention and 
protention, which emerged in the Derridian corpus in 1962711 with the 
‘Introduction’ to The Origin of Geometry,712 and which, in 1967 (also 
the year in which Of Grammatology was published), formed the cru-
cial analysis in Speech and Phenomena.713
In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida sets out to show that pri-
mary retention and the privilege accorded to it by Husserl in On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time falls within a 
‘metaphysics of presence’. Beyond the difference between the two 
kinds of retentions identified by Husserl and qualified as primary 
and secondary, we must pose the question of the trace that exceeds 
all presence, that is, all opposition between presence and absence 
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– which is also to say, the opposition that Husserl erects in principle 
between primary retention and secondary retention.
Of Grammatology takes up this problematic of retention decon-
structed on the basis of the concept of the trace, and as the decon-
struction of this ‘metaphysics of presence’, that is, the privileging 
of the present, and of which the privilege of primary retention over 
secondary retention would be the index – deconstruction passing on 
this occasion through Heidegger and the question of being, as well 
as through Saussure, Leroi-Gourhan, Lévi-Strauss and Rousseau. 
The absent presence, and the absence forming or giving presence, 
is the trace.
Nevertheless, ‘that there is no origin, that is to say simple origin’:714 
should this not lead us to question the question of the archi-trace, or 
even of the trace itself? If there will never have been a simple ori-
gin, then, rather than referring to the trace or the archi-trace, is it not 
a matter of investigating and problematizing, even older than ‘the 
trace’, that complex of traces which would from the outset constitute 
that which would, through a retrospective illusion, initially present 
itself as ‘the’ trace?
From the trace to traces: being, becoming,  
différance and process
To submit the question of the trace to that of traces, and as the primor-
dial multiplicity of traces – by positing that there is no simple origin, 
and that in the primordial complex of traces that the default of origin 
unceasingly becomes (rather than being it, it being a question not of 
the being of the trace, this copula being erased, but of the becoming of 
traces), the trace must ‘always already’ have become an indefinite plu-
ral – we must return to the question of the relationship between pri-
mary and secondary retention as defined by Husserl, and to Derrida’s 
commentary on this question in Speech and Phenomena:
As soon as we admit [with primary retention] this continuity 
of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, 
in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impres-
sion and primordial retention, we admit the other into the 
self-identify of the Augenblick […]. The difference between 
retention and reproduction, between primary and second-
ary memory, is not the radical difference Husserl wanted 
between perception and nonperception; it is rather a differ-
ence between two modifications of nonperception.715
I have already commented on this commentary as follows:
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These considerations are perfectly legitimate, and I have 
taken them up in my own work, but with several specifica-
tions that I consider indispensable: the difference between 
primary and secondary retention is not a radical difference 
insofar as primary retention is unceasingly composed with 
secondary retention, that is to say, insofar as perception is 
always projected by, upon, and in imagination – contrary to 
what Husserl thinks, and Brentano as well. But it is no less 
the case that the difference remains and constitutes a dis-
tinction that is not an op-position, but precisely what I have 
called a com-position. Now this constitutive character of 
composition – that is, the woof of time – constructed by the 
difference between primary and secondary is a distinctive 
philosophical discovery on Husserl’s part. At the end of his 
career, he supplements it with the discovery of retentional 
finitude and its primordial technicity in geometry. Neither 
of these advances were, in the end, fully acknowledged or 
explored in Derrida’s thought. Différance passes through 
this difference, but the latter in turn presupposes the differ-
entiation (and thus the identification) of what I have called 
tertiary retention – the name for everything at stake in The 
Origin of Geometry.716
That there is no radical difference between primary retention and sec-
ondary retention does not mean that there is no difference between 
them. But nor this does mean that the difference that there is in 
fact(s) [en effet(s)] between them could be turned into the question 
of the trace, such that it would itself be indifferent to this difference 
(because it stands on another plane) and could therefore give or make 
this difference – and as différance – before the appearance of these 
retentional forms themselves.
For in order for there to be what Derrida calls the trace, which he 
also understands not just as the difference (and this is why we speak 
of the ‘philosophy of difference’), but as différance, we need terms 
that are transductively constituting as well as transductively consti-
tuted by this difference that différance gives: we need a process. Such 
a process obviously does not precede its terms, but nor do the terms 
precede the process.
Such a question of process is that of individuation qua process of 
individuation that cannot be thought on the basis of the origin that 
the individual would be, but which individuates this individual such 
that, structurally in want of itself [en défaut de lui-même] (unfinished 
[inachevé]), it is always becoming and co-individuating with other 
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individuals within a process that, incapable of being thought within 
the framework of substantialism or the hylomorphic schema, opens up 
the question of the preindividual as the phase in which the individual 
individuates itself by shifting phase [se déphasant], where phasing 
and dephasing constitute the process itself.
The default of différance – between the One and the Many
Différance is what Simondon tried to think as the process of indi-
viduation – where the difference, that is, the trace, ‘commences’ in 
différance through individuating (dephasing) differences, that is, 
through traces in which the preindividual shifts phase as this dif-
férance: it is what does not commence (on its own); it is that which is 
not the commencement. It is what not only has no simple origin, but, 
ultimately and literally, has no origin at all: it is the default of origin 
that is necessary, and that is necessary in diverse ways. And here lies 
the whole question – in this diversity of which the metaphysical obses-
sion will be to subsume it under the One of the concept, and of which 
the concept of the trace or the archi-trace (as the trace or as the archi-
trace) still seems to be a ghost.
This multiplicity that arises in the default of origin, and as this very 
default (as the default of the One), that is, as the individuation of the 
preindividual fund or background [fonds préindividuel] of which one 
cannot say that it ‘is’ this default, but that it makes this default, where 
defaults ‘swarm’, as Deleuze and Guattari would have said, is the pro-
cess through which an arrangement is effected between primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary retentions, that is, as the emergence of a complex 
of traces articulating the living and the non-living.
Yet by downplaying the difference between primary and secondary 
retention as Husserl conceives it – and despite his interpretation of 
The Origin of Geometry and of the place that technics occupies in it 
as that which gives access to idealities through polishing, surveying 
and writing, that is, as a praxical space remedying the retentional fini-
tude of the protogeometer – Derrida avoids investigating and describ-
ing what we should understand as tertiary retention. It is here that 
the whole problem of this ‘grammatology as positive science’ lies, a 
grammatology that is, however, constituted from beginning to end as 
the question of the relationship between protention(s) and retention(s), 
as Of Grammatology indicates on many occasions, for example in 
Derrida’s commentary on Leroi-Gourhan, where the trace becomes 
the grammē of which différance is the history.
In Gesture and Speech, Leroi-Gourhan describes the unity of man, 
Derrida writes,
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as a stage or an articulation in the history of life – of what 
I have called differance – as the history of the grammè. […] 
[T]he notion of program is invoked. It must of course be 
understood in the cybernetic sense, but cybernetics is itself 
intelligible only in terms of a history of the possibilities of 
the trace as the unity of a double movement of protention 
and retention.717
As can be seen perfectly clearly here, différance is life – as the his-
tory of the grammē. This is also to refer to what with Simondon we 
would call the process of vital individuation – such that it can lead 
to a process of psychic and collective individuation.718 The history of 
the possibilities of the trace within différance as the ‘history of life’: it 
is this that constitutes the ‘unity of a double movement of protention 
and retention’.
Intentional consciousness and tertiary retention
In life, however, an articulation of the living and the non-living 
makes it possible that in this ‘double movement of protention and 
retention’, that is, in this différance that is life, there appears ‘the 
grammē as such’, which ‘intentional consciousness’ makes appear, or 
indeed that makes ‘intentional consciousness’ appear, from which it 
emerges – unless this ‘emergence’, which ‘undoubtedly makes pos-
sible the emergence of the systems of writing in the narrow sense’,719 
is, like the invention of man, a transductive relation such that, just as 
man is the inventor of technics only because he is invented by it, so 
too intentional consciousness is conscious of the grammē as such only 
because the grammē as such makes intentional consciousness possible 
– and does so through what I call a process of grammatization, of 
which Sylvain Auroux proposed a ‘positive science’, so to speak (with 
limits that I have tried to analyse on various occasions), and where 
the discretization that conditions this ‘as such’ is accomplished not 
consciously, but technically.
One wonders how we are to understand this rather surprising state-
ment in which Derrida, who does not reason in these Simondonian 
terms, suggests that writing systems in the narrow sense would be 
made possible by the emergence of intentional consciousness – when 
we would be tempted to think, if we were completely faithful to the 
logic of the supplement as well as to its historicity or its prehistoric-
ity, that the formation of intentional consciousness is the psychic side 
(as a stage of its individuation) of the technical formation of those 
tertiary retentions that are the systems of writing in the narrow sense.
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Be that as it may, more generally, does not the thought of différance 
rush here prematurely towards ‘systems of writing in the narrow 
sense’, if it is true that there is tertiary retention long before this writ-
ing in the narrow sense, and if it is true that this proto-tertiary reten-
tion is already an articulation of the living and the non-living that 
induces a retentional/protentional process (a différance) thoroughly 
overdetermined and undetermined by this default of origin?
This default of origin is a new modality of the individuation of 
the preindividual fund that is hollowed out in life (like the ‘collapsed 
zones’ of genetic coding720) as what Derrida himself will call life/
death. And this is so precisely through tertiary retention and through 
what will become the technical system that individuates itself by 
shifting phase, and, in this way, by individuating what only thus 
becomes psychic and collective individuation – a meta-individuation 
of the preindividual fund from out of which tertiary, that is, acciden-
tal, retentions will arise.
This meta-individuation would amount to a bifurcation in the reten-
tional and protentional conditions of individuation, such that, intrinsi-
cally différant, psychic individuation and collective individuation are 
in transductive relation with technical individuation, that is, across 
the proliferating multiplicity of transductive relations that are woven 
by the play of these tertiary retentions that are technical traces with 
primary and secondary retentions, forming a new protentional regime 
that is desire – by which becoming [devenir] is trans-formed into future 
[avenir], that is, into temporality (the condition of what Husserl calls 
intentionality).
Desire and protention
This proliferation is that of desire qua idealization, the latter consti-
tuting a new protentional regime – and it is only on this ground that 
a mathematical-philosophical ideality can be constituted, on the basis 
of which, by passing through this specific form of tertiary retention 
that is writing in the narrow sense, the thought of the grammē as such 
will become possible. But this new protentional regime is not just that 
of consciousness: it is also that of the unconscious.
(We should ask ourselves here to what extent Derrida is able to take 
hold of the concepts of retention and protention, formulated by Husserl 
in order to think consciousness, and extend them to différance as the 
history of life without, however, thematizing the immense phenom-
enological problem opened up by this extension, and despite the fact 
that Derrida always ultimately places himself under the authority of 
phenomenology so as to defend, for example, the Saussurian position 
Afterword: On Positive Pharmacology 363
that requires distinguishing the appearing sound and the appearing of 
the sound,721 etc.).
Here, the question of tertiary retention must be understood in rela-
tion to the question of the transitional object – that is, by having 
recourse to Winnicott. But if tertiary retention emerges from a dif-
férance that, qua process of vital individuation, is composed of reten-
tions and protentions that are in a way pre-intentional, then we must 
also turn to Bowlby,722 whose work and material is close to that of 
Winnicott, and who raises the question of the relationship between 
the instincts and the drives, that is, between elementary protentional 
forms. We must do so, if we want to take seriously (and it is impera-
tive that we do so) the Derridian propositions regarding pre-inten-
tional différance, and if we want to take seriously, not the passage 
from archi-writing or the archi-trace to writing (and the trace) in the 
narrow sense, but the question of the relationships between the living 
and the organized non-living, organized as technical organs – which 
is the question of general organology.
If tertiary retention is not qualified in such a way, that is, as govern-
ing and overdetermining by indetermining the compositions of primary 
and secondary retentions, it becomes very difficult not to drown in the 
aporias of the trace, for example, by wondering where and when the 
trace begins, which is also called, here, (the) writing.
Traces of the default: Derrida’s future passes through Simondon
While it is obvious – and I have tried to show this on many occasions 
– that primary retention is ceaselessly composing with secondary 
retention, and that in this sense their difference is not radical because 
they form a system of traces (which are always arranged by retentional 
systems723 and through which attentional forms are metastabilized724), 
but where we must also analyse the way in which tertiary retentions 
condition and ‘factorize’ the play of primary and secondary reten-
tions, it is just as obvious that a primary retention is not a secondary 
retention, which is obviously not a tertiary retention, even though no 
one of them occurs without the others.
This play of three types of traces not only begins well before writ-
ing ‘in the ordinary sense’, but also before the traces that Derrida 
observes via Leroi-Gourhan: those rupestral inscriptions or carved 
bones found on the excavation sites of the Upper Palaeolithic.725 The 
play of these three types of retentions begins long before even that, 
with the very first flint tools – this at least is what I have tried to show 
in Technics and Time, 1.
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This having been said, what of the question of scientificity in these 
matters, and of ‘grammatology as a positive science’? To understand 
this problem other than in a purely speculative and logical way, that 
is, steeped in this logos of which it would be a matter of overcoming 
the metaphysics of presence, is to approach it as a practical question 
of the default of origin as that which is necessary (in modern French 
we would say ‘il faut ce défaut’, and in old French ‘ce défaut faut’, 
from the verb ‘falloir’). This default is necessary, but even though it 
is necessary, this necessity is itself always flawed: always faulty, fal-
tering, that is, forgotten, repressed – not as a lack or as something 
missing, but such that it is always to come [à venir], and in this way 
protentional.726 Such is the structure of desire, that is, of ‘intentional’ 
différance, changeable by the grammē as such, which is also to say by 
what Heidegger would have called the question,727 and as the structure 
of what Derrida called exappropriation.
 ‘The’ trace that Of Grammatology tracks down, in tracking down 
the ‘metaphysics of presence’, and as archi-trace (which would later 
lead Derrida to refer to the ‘quasi-transcendental’), dates from before 
tertiary retention: it would thus concern life as such, long before tech-
nicized life that articulates itself with the non-living while organizing 
it (as, precisely, an artificial organ), as the genetic program and so on. 
As grammē, it amounts to memory in all its forms, and first of all as 
biological memory. But it is also the ‘magnetic storage facility’ [mag-
nétothèque] to which Leroi-Gourhan refers728 – and who discusses the 
advent of the global mnemotechnological system – and the cybernet-
ics that was then being imposed, in an age that was also that of struc-
turalism, molecular biology and so on.
Furthermore, the question of the originary default of origin, of 
which the technicization of life is the direct inscription of this life 
becoming life/death, and which comes to oppose the possibility of 
grammatology as positive science, is not just the question of ‘the’ 
trace: it is that of a play between traces such that in this play, they give 
this play [jeu], and more precisely games [jeux], and stakes [enjeux] 
that are each time unprecedented and unheard of and that open up as 
the protentions of all these plays and games – as games of love and 
chance that fall within what is not just a ‘logic of the supplement’, but 
a ‘quasi-causal logic’.
That these questions can be posed to and as a grammatology, 
which is a deconstruction, stems from a genealogy and a retrospec-
tive of traces that must abandon the question of a one (the trace) that 
would not be always already many, and that must in this way shift 
from the question of the individual to that of individuation: the future 
of Derrida passes through the work of Simondon (which does not 
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contain it). Such is the future of what will have been opened up under 
the name and as the enterprise of deconstruction. At the default of ori-
gin of deconstruction, there will have always been a multiple.
Organology of transductive relations linking traces
The play of traces that continues to unfold until it reaches the point 
of being capable of considering the ‘grammē as such’ results from an 
arrangement between three organological levels:
 ▪ the level of the psychosomatic organs of the psy-
chic individual;
 ▪ the level of the technical and artificial organs of the techni-
cal individual (forming a technical system);
 ▪ the level of the social organs that are institutions and 
organizations of all kinds, constituting the social systems 
through which collective individuation is concretized.
As a method of investigating the transductive relations between the 
processes of psychic individuation, the processes of technical individ-
uation and the processes of collective individuation, general organol-
ogy undertakes the genealogy of the relations between primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary retentions. Amounting in this way to a ‘history 
of the supplement’, it develops the concept of ‘grammatization’,729 a 
process that concerns gesture and the body as much as it does logos, 
and which, as the history of writing understood in this sense, is the 
condition of an intelligible understanding of industrial development. 
In addition, it studies the unfolding of transductive relations and 
their effects as a process of transindividuation forming circuits of 
all kinds, and at all three organological levels, which is also to say 
between these three levels.
Over the course of this process of transindividuation that is dif-
férance, psychic secondary retentions are always becoming collective 
secondary retentions (forming the transindividual, that is, meaning 
[signification]), while at the same time:
 ▪ collective secondary protentions are also being formed;
 ▪ tertiary retentions as pharmaka make it possible to control 
(which does not mean to master) the production of these 
psychic and collective secondary retentions through reten-
tional systems and criteriologies (formed by long circuits 
of transindividuation730), which are constituted by social 
organizations;
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 ▪ these retentional systems and criteriologies, which belong 
to the third level of general organology (the level of the 
social body concretizing collective individuation through 
the social systems), tend today to be absorbed by the techno-
logical level of the planetarized technical system, becoming 
thoroughly mnemotechnical and thus constituting a process 
of generalized proletarianization;
 ▪ the psychic individual henceforth finds itself disindividu-
ated, deprived of the possibility of participating in collec-
tive individuation (being proletarianized).
Pharmacology as positive knowledge
The grammatological question that Derrida formulates in 1967, five 
years after the question of writing appeared in the phenomenology 
of geometrical knowledge belatedly formulated by Husserl, leads in 
1972 to a pharmacological question: writing – on which at the end of 
his work Husserl confers a constitutive status, thus forming what Jean 
Hyppolite will famously call a ‘transcendental field without a sub-
ject’731 (which obviously does not mean that there is no I in this field, 
as ‘mediocre thinkers’732 will have believed, but that if there is any-
thing transcendental, it exceeds the subject, and does so as its default) 
– thus becomes a pharmakon, which may be a remedy for ‘retentional 
finitude’ but is also what, through the retentional extension in which 
it consists as tertiary retention, makes possible short-circuits of the 
anamnesic retentional activity in which thinking consists.
If in 1967 grammatology could pose the question of its possible and 
impossible scientificity, in 1972 this ambiguous game turns out to be 
that of a pharmacy, if not a pharmacology – of which grammatology 
is an initial formulation and a field that exceeds that which was ger-
minated there and does so precisely as the question of the pharmakon.
What we must confront today, beyond grammatology as a positive 
science, is not just the question but the problem of pharmacology as 
a positive knowledge whose positivity is not that of a science but of 
a practice – let us say of a praxis, and more precisely of techniques 
of the self and others that together form the question of care, and of 
those systems of care that, via retentional systems, form social sys-
tems. Yet these social systems are the very thing that the pharma-
kon, having become industrially techno-logical, tends to dissolve into 
prostheses themselves arranged through services promoted by global 
marketing and aimed at eliminating diachronicities, that is, singulari-
ties capable of forming objects of desire irreducible to the generalized 
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computation from which all of this stems, and where all of this occurs 
under the hegemonic control of a financialized economic system that 
therefore no longer invests, preferring careless and self-destructive 
speculation.
In other words, positive pharmacology is not a positive science. On 
the other hand, it necessarily calls for a general organology that is 
itself not a positive science, but a paradigm investigating the posi-
tive sciences by starting from the question of the organon that is com-
mon to them not as logos but as tekhnē – and which is inevitably and 
invariably transmuted into a pharmakon by the revelation of its toxici-
ties, which are never sufficiently foreseen.
Positive pharmacology and political economy
In ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, the question of grammatology becomes the 
question of pharmacology. But Derrida himself never understood this 
as such, nor therefore did he do so from the standpoint of a positive 
pharmacology, that is, the question of the investments made possible 
by the pharmakon (and still less from the standpoint of a ‘positive sci-
ence’). If one could and should refer to positive pharmacology, how-
ever, it is therefore precisely not as a science, but as a positive (and 
knowledgeable [savante]) technicity of this technics that is always and 
firstly a pharmakon, inasmuch as, from the outset and irreducibly, it 
divides itself into a pair of opposites.
A positive technicity is a form of knowledge that is not a science, 
but which, taking care of what presents itself as a chance and a vir-
tue (a power, a force, an excellence) only in being accompanied by its 
opposite (an expedient, a dependency, a poison), does not try to reduce 
its duplicity, but on the contrary knows that this condition of impos-
sibility is the condition of a contingent positivity, one that is accidental, 
risky, tukhē becoming kairos, that is, a possibility arising from out of 
impossibility, and as the necessity of a fault (or what Blanchot called 
the improbable).
It is a question of knowing how to turn this necessity into a virtue – 
which would involve knowing-how-to-make-a-virtue-of-a-necessity-
of-those-needy-ones who are the neotenics (that is, pharmacological 
beings) becoming noetics.
This amounts to the program of a political economy that could only 
be a praxis. Such a praxis, however, needs a theory. This praxis is 
named positive pharmacology, the theory of which is named gen-
eral organology.
In recent years, I have often tried to think this with Deleuze and 
his concept of quasi-causality – which remains in and returns from 
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Hades, making (the) différance with Lyotard and Derrida, ghosts of 
anamneses to come. If there are any.
Translated by Daniel Ross.
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The great acceleration that has become known as the Anthropocene has 
brought with it destructive consequences that threaten to give rise to a 
dangerous and potentially explosive convergent reaching of limits, not just 
climatically or biospherically, but psychosocially. This convergence demands 
a new kind of thinking and a reconsideration of fundamental philosophical, 
political and economic theory in light especially of the age of computational 
capitalism, in order to prevent this convergence from becoming absolutely 
catastrophic. The French philosopher Bernard Stiegler argued that the basis for 
such a reconsideration must be, in a very general way, the thought of entropy. 
Psychopolitical Anaphylaxis examines, draws on, and dialogues with Stiegler’s 
work, and aims to take steps towards this new kind of thinking. Borrowing 
also from Georges Canguilhem and Peter Sloterdijk, it argues as well for an 
immunological perspective that see psychopolitical convulsions as a kind 
of anaphylactic shock that threatens to prove fatal. The paradox that must 
ultimately be confronted in the Anthropocene conceived as an Entropocene is 
the contradiction between the urgent need for a global emergency procedure 
and the equally necessary task of finding the time to carefully rethink our way 
beyond this anaphylactic. The task of thinking today must be to inhabit this 
paradox and make it the basis of a new dynamic.
